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2:26-cv-00677Njd9 de fev. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RENNY R. ESPINOZA SIRA,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil Action No. 26-677 (JXN)
PAM BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NEALS, District Judge
Before the Court is Petitioner Renny R. Espinoza Sira’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his potential future
detention by immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing (ECF No. 1) and a
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 2.) Respondents filed a letter response. (ECF No.
7.)
According to the Petition, Petitioner is a native of Venezuela and has lived in the United
States for the past three-and-one-half years. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Petitioner submits that he was
initially paroled into the country. (ECF No. 2 at 3.) Petitioner timely applied for Asylum,
Withholding of Removal, and Convention Against Torture Withholding on April 17, 2023. (ECF
No. 1 at 5.) Those applications remain pending. (Id. at 2.)
Petitioner has attended yearly Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) check-in
appointments in August 2023, August 2024, and August 2025. (Id.) Petitioner submits that,
without a change in circumstances, ICE changed his check-in appointments from once a year to
once every two months, and then to monthly check-ins. (Id.)
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Petitioner seeks a preliminary injunction, enjoining Petitioner’s potential future arrest and
detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers. (See ECF No. 2.) The
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction pertains only to Petitioner’s potential future arrest and
detention. (See id.) A party “seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [1] he is likely to
succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
injunctive relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in
the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations
omitted). “[T]he moving party must establish the first two factors, and only if these gateway factors
are established does the district court consider the remaining two factors.” Greater Phila. Chamber
of Com. v. City of Phila., 949 F.3d 116, 133 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction relies on the argument that Petitioner has
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that Respondents lack the statutory
authority to mandatorily detain Petitioner or to expedite his removal. (Id. at 3-4.) However,
Petitioner fails to provide any legal support for his position that this Court can enjoin his
speculative future detention. Additionally, this Court cannot review the likelihood of success of
Petitioner’s claim regarding whether Respondents lack statutory authority to mandatorily detain
him, as that claim is not ripe for review.
Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the United States to “cases” and
“controversies.” U.S. Constitution, art. III, § 2. “This case-or-controversy limitation, in turn, is
crucial in ‘ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects the proper—and properly limited—role of
the courts in a democratic society.’” Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534, 539 (3d
Cir. 2017) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)). “And courts
enforce it ‘through the several justiciability doctrines that cluster about Article III,’ including
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‘standing, ripeness, mootness, the political-question doctrine, and the prohibition on advisory
opinions.’” Id. (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009)).
At its core, ripeness works “to determine whether a party has brought an action prematurely
. . . and counsels abstention until such a time as a dispute is sufficiently concrete to satisfy the
constitutional and prudential requirements of the doctrine.” Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P., 866 F.3d
at 539 (quoting Peachlum v. City of York, 333 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 2003)). Various concerns
underpin it, including whether the parties are in a “sufficiently adversarial posture,” whether the
facts of the case are “sufficiently developed,” and whether a party is “genuinely aggrieved.” Id.
(quoting Peachlum, 333 F.3d at 433-34.)
Applying the ripeness doctrine to Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Court
finds Petitioner’s claim that Respondents lack the statutory authority to potentially arrest and
mandatorily detain him in the future is premature. Petitioner’s argument regarding what authority
Respondents may use to detain Petitioner and whether he may be held under mandatory detention
is purely speculative. The facts of this claim are not “sufficiently developed” because Petitioner
has not been detained, and Petitioner only speculates regarding what authority Respondents may
attempt to detain him under.
As this Court cannot review the likelihood of success of Petitioner’s claim regarding
whether Respondents lack statutory authority to mandatorily detain him, as that claim is not ripe
for review, he cannot meet the standard for the issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining
Respondents from arresting and detaining Petitioner.
In his Petition, Petitioner indicated that he believed he faced “imminent detention” at his
January 25, 2026. ICE check-in. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Respondents informed the Court that
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Petitioner’s ICE check-in was rescheduled to February 1, 2026. (ECF No. 7 at 1, fn. 1.) According
to the ICE detainee locator, Petitioner is not currently detained.1
It appears that Petitioner was not detained at the February 1, 2026, ICE check-in, and the
Court has determined that Petitioner’s claims regarding what statutory authority Respondents may
detain Petitioner under are premature. As such, the Court will provide Petitioner with thirty days
to inform the Court if he wishes to proceed with his due process claims regarding his ICE reporting
requirements. If Petitioner chooses to proceed with the due process claims regarding his ICE
reporting requirements, Petitioner shall provide the Court with supplemental briefing on those
claims. Specifically, Petitioner shall provide supplemental briefing regarding (1) Petitioner’s full
supervision requirements; (2) how these requirements amount to “custody” for jurisdictional
purposes; and (3) what authority this Court has over the Department of Homeland Security’s
(“DHS”) decisions regarding Petitioner’s supervision requirements. Accordingly
IT IS, on this 9th day of February 2026,
ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 2) is DENIED
without prejudice; it is further
ORDERED that within thirty (30) days of the date of this Memorandum and Order,
Petitioner shall inform the Court in writing whether he wishes to proceed with the Petition as
discussed above or withdraw the Petition; it is further
ORDERED that if Petitioner proceeds with the Petition, he shall provide the Court with
supplemental briefing regarding (1) Petitioner’s full supervision requirements; (2) how those
requirements amount to “custody” for jurisdictional purposes; and (3) what authority this Court
1 U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Detainee Locator, available at https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results
(last visited February 5, 2026).
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has over the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) decisions regarding Petitioner’s
supervision requirements; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum and Order
upon the parties electronically.
________________________
JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge
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