ELMILLIGY v. UNION COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE et al

2:25-cv-19130Njd8 de jan. de 2026

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Case 2:25-cv-19130-EP-CF Document 4
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Filed 01/08/26 Page 1 of 11 PagelD:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MAHMOUD ELMILLIGY,
Plaintiff,

Vv.

UNION COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE,
et al.,

Defendants.

MAHMOUD ELMILLIGY,
Plaintiff,

Vv.

UNION COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE,
et al.,

Defendants.

PADIN, District Judge.

No. 25cv12720 (EP) (CF)

No. 25ev19130 (EP) (CF)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Presently before the Court are two motions from pro se Plaintiff Mahmoud Elmilligy

seeking emergency relief. As explained in more depth below, the Court DENIES both motions.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2025, pro se Plaintiff Mahmoud Elmilligy filed a hybrid complaint and motion for

a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in Case No. 25-12720 (“Elmilligy I’). Elmilligy I, D.E. 1

(“Elmilligy I First TRO Motion’). Plaintiff also sought to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).

D.E. 1-2 (“Elmilligy I IFP Application”). That same day, the Court granted his Elmilligy I IFP

Application, denied Plaintiff's Elmilligy I First TRO Motion, and deferred screening Plaintiff's

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Elmilligy I, D.E. 3 (‘Order Denying Elmilligy I First
TRO Motion”).

Since then, Plaintiff has filed numerous motions for immediate and injunctive relief across
multiple cases concerning the same factual underpinnings: that a variety of actors, including
governmental entities, have deprived Plaintiff of several of his constitutional rights while relying
on false information, which has significantly impacted Plaintiffs life. Plaintiffhas asserted across
well-over a dozen emergency motions that he faces imminent harm such that injunctive relief is
required, yet this Court has consistently determined that those claims are unfounded. On January
7, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff's emergency filing in Elmilligy I. While Plaintiff has failed to
establish that he faces imminent harm such that injunctive relief is required, the Court nevertheless
allowed Plaintiff's pleadings in Elmilligy I to pass the IFP screening stage. Elimilligy I, D.E. 105.

Now, Plaintiff has commenced a new action against the Union County and Morris County
Prosecutor’s Offices—both defendants in Elmilligy I. Case No. 25-19130, (“Elmilligy II’), D.E.
1 (“Complaint”). Plaintiff has accompanied his Complaint with another emergency motion for a
TRO and preliminary injunction in which he “seeks immediate injunctive relief to halt Defendants’
ongoing reliance on demonstrably false criminal information that is actively depriving Plaintiff of
liberty, travel, and legal status without due process.” Elmilligy I, D.E. 2 (“Elmilligy I] TRO”).
Plaintiff also seeks to proceed IFP. Elmilligy I, D.E. 1-4 (“Elmilligy II IFP Application”). In
addition, on January 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed another emergency motion in Elmilligy I requesting
that various forms of injunctive relief be entered against Noha Sedik, one Defendant in the action.

D.E. 127 (“Elmilligy I TRO”).

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Consolidation

This Court has the power to sua sponte consolidate cases under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(a). See, e.g., Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Landis, 96 F. Supp. 2d 408, 410 (D.N.J.
2000), aff'd, 248 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 2000). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) provides: ‘If
actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may ... consolidate
the actions.’” Kamdem-Ouaffo v. Task Mgmt. Inc., No. 17-7506, 2018 WL 3360762, at *26
(D.N.J. July 9, 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)) (“The Court will swa sponte consolidate these
matters for all purposes.”), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 792 F. App’x 218 (3d Cir. 2019).

As Plaintiff himself recognizes, see Elmilligy II, D.E. 1-1 at 3, both Elmilligy I and II
involve the same Defendants and “arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts,” Landis, 96 F.
Supp. 2d at 418, namely that: Defendants in each action—most of them connected to municipal
law enforcement—have deprived Plaintiff of his civil rights by relying upon false criminal
information to wrongfully and maliciously prosecute him. Complaint at 3. After reviewing the
allegations in Elimilligy I and II, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are interconnected in a
manner that warrants being considered together. Accordingly, “in the interests of efficiency and
judicial economy,” the Court will CONSOLIDATE Elmilligy I and Elmilligy I. Vaughn: Douce
v. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, No. 23-21737, 2024 WL 4771356, at *3 (D.N.J.
Nov. 13, 2024). Elmilligy I will consequently be ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATED.

Id!

' Because Elmilligy II is consolidated into Elmilligy I, Plaintiff's Elmilligy II IFP Application is
DENIED as MOOT.

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B. TRO Motions

In the Elmilligy I TRO, Plaintiff requests that the Court enters an order which, at minimum,
prohibits Ms. Sedik from: (1) making false, misleading, or retaliatory reports to law enforcement,
courts, or state agencies concerning Plaintiff; (2) interfering, directly or indirectly, with Plaintiffs
access to medical care, employment, housing, or parental rights; (3) contacting Plaintiff except
through counsel or court-authorized channels; and (4) encouraging or soliciting third parties to
engage in the above conduct. Elmilligy I TRO Mot. at 5.

In the Elmilligy I] TRO, Plaintiff seeks multiple forms of injunctive relief as well,
including, inter alia, for the Court to order Defendants the Morris County and Union County
Prosecutor’s Offices to: (1) cease representing that Plaintiff had a criminal record in June 2023
when he did not; (2) cease representing that Plaintiff was present in the United States during the
March 2024 alleged conduct; (3) correct or annotate all criminal databases to reflect the factual
dispute and Plaintiff's documented absence; (4) suspend enforcement of any warrants, detainers,
or enforcement actions premised on those false representations; and (5) refrain from transmitting
the false information to third parties pending final adjudication. Complaint at 4-5.

As best as the Court can discern from his filings, Plaintiff seeks emergency injunctive relief
because he allegedly faces imminent risk of: (1) continuing criminal exposure; (2) deprivation of
international travel and passport rights; and (3) cascading collateral consequences from false
criminal designations. Elmilligy II TRO Motion at 4.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) governs the issuance of TROs without notice to the
adverse party. A court may issue a TRO under such circumstances only if: “(A) specific facts in
an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the

movant .. . certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not

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be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). The Court construes Plaintiff's filings liberally because
Plaintiff is a pro se litigant. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nevertheless, the
Court DENIES Plaintiff's TRO Motions on both procedural and substantive grounds.

1. Failure to certify effort to give notice

As the Court noted in its Order Denying Elmilligy I First TRO Motion—and also explained
to Plaintiff in a different case also consolidated into Elimilligy I in which he filed a TRO—
Plaintiff has failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) because he has not
certified in writing any effort made to give notice of this filing and the reasons why it should not
be required. See Dkt in Elmilligy H. This alone is a basis to deny his requested relief in both
motions pending before this Court. See Alexander v. Russo, No. 23-1514, 2023 WL 3434038, at
*2 (D.N.J. May 12, 2023).

2. Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits

Plaintiff's TROs also fail on substantive grounds. To prevail on a TRO, the moving party
must make the threshold showing that they: (1) have a likelihood of success on the merits of their
claims and (2) will be irreparably harmed if the injunction is not granted. Reilly v. City of
Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017). As the Supreme Court has made clear, “a
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted
unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The decision to grant or deny . . . injunctive relief is an act of equitable
discretion by the district court.” eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).

Injunctive relief is “never awarded as of right.” Groupe SEB USA, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating

Case No. 25-13244, D.E. 5, (July 24, 2025).

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LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def’ Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 24 (2008)).

Even when construing Plaintiff's filings liberally, the Court finds they are too vague and
conclusory to grant him relief. For example, in Elmilligy I, Plaintiff alleges that “information
maintained and relied upon by [the Morris County Prosecutor’s Office] represented that Plaintiff
had a criminal record,” but Plaintiff did not have a criminal record at that time. Complaint at 2-3.
While Plaintiff acknowledges this is an “objective, verifiable fact,” he provides no supplemental
information beyond his conclusory allegations for the Court to ascertain the veracity of this claim.
Id. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that the criminal allegations maintained by the Union County
Prosecutor’s Office state that he was present in the United States operating a motor vehicle in
March 2024, even though Plaintiff was outside the country at that time. /d. at 3. Plaintiff further
asserts that the Union County Prosecutor’s Office continues to “rely” upon allegations premised
on Plaintiff's presence in the United States at that time. Jd. Again, Plaintiff provides no detail to
substantiate these claims. For instance, he does not provide any proof he was outside the country
in March 2024, he does not specify what criminal allegations were made against him, and he does
not explain how these Union County Prosecutor’s Office continues to rely on these claims in any
way. The Court cannot rely on vague and unsupported allegations to grant injunctive relief.

His TRO in Elmilligy I fails for a similar reason: Plaintiff does not establish success on
the merits. Plaintiff only once mentions the cause of action he brings his claim under and includes
no facts or argument as to why he would prevail on that claim. See generally Elmilligy I TRO.
For example, despite, on numerous occasions alleging that false and misleading reports have been
made to law enforcement about him, Plaintiff does not provide the Court with any reports, how

those reports have been weaponized against him, and how his access to medical care has been

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impacted. This is just one of many ways in which Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with
the information it needs to ascertain his claims and consider granting him injunctive relief.

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to establish success on the merits of his claims in both TROs
because he “has cited little evidence to support his claims, and the Court has little more than bare,
conclusory allegations upon which to base its judgment.” Hammonds v. Allegheny Cnty. Bureau
of Corr., No. 18-1389, 2019 WL 3843085, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2019); see also Zulkarnain v.
Downing, No. 17-2071, 2017 WL 11724182, at *2 (D.N.J. June 13, 2017) (finding that a plaintiff
failed to establish success on the merits of his TRO claim because his alleged causes of actions
were conclusory and unsupported by any specific pleadings); see also Young v. Medden, 241 F.
App’x 45, 47 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of TRO where the plaintiff provided no evidence,
outside of his allegations, to support his claim of wrongdoing).

Because Plaintiff has failed to meet this high bar to establish that he would succeed on the
merits of his claims, the Court will DENY his TRO Motions in Elmilligy I and II.?

C. Pre-Filing Injunction

Pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), a district court may enter a pre-filing
injunction “to preclude abusive, groundless and vexatious litigation.” Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d
1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993). However, “the District Court should not restrict a litigant from filing
claims absent exigent circumstances, such as a litigant’s continuous abuse of the judicial process
by filing meritless and repetitive actions.” Jd. at 1037. “The interests of repose, finality of
judgments, protection of defendants from unwarranted harassment, and concern for maintaining
order in the court’s dockets have been deemed sufficient by a number of courts to warrant such a

prohibition against relitigation of claims.” Jn re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982).

> Because Plaintiff fails to show success on the merits of his claims, the Court does not analyze
whether Plaintiff has shown irreparable harm. See Reilly, 858 F.3d at 176.

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Notably, “a litigant’s pro se status cannot act as a shield against filing injunctions.” Shaikh
v. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., Div. of Ins., No. 19-14092, 2025 WL 1248934, at *8 (D.N.J. Apr. 30,
2025) (citing Grossberger v. Ruane, 535 F. App’x 84, 86-87 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming district
court’s decision to impose filing injunction on pro se litigant who continued to file meritless
motions, briefs, and letters after case was closed)); Danihel v. Off. of the President, No. 14-6880,
2015 WL 1954269, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2015), aff'd, 640 F. App’x 185 (3d Cir. 2016)
(enjoining a pro se plaintiff from “commencing any new civil matters against the named
Defendants that relates to the subject matter of this action’’); Jaye v. Shipp, No. 17-5257, 2018 WL
2278100, at *1 (D.N.J. May 18, 2018) (entering a pre-filing injunction against a pro se litigant to
prevent “abuse of the system and futile expense, as Defendants are forced to repeatedly defend
against ultimately frivolous lawsuits”).

To ensure that a litigant’s right to due process is not wrongfully infringed, a pre-filing
injunction must meet three requirements: “(1) the litigant must be continually abusing the judicial
process; (2) the litigant must be given notice of the potential injunction and an opportunity to
oppose the court’s order; and (3) the injunction must be narrowly tailored to fit the specific
circumstances of the case.” Perlmutter v. Varone, No. 21-5018, 2022 WL 1443426, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. May 6, 2022) (quoting Grossberger, 535 F. App’x at 86).

Since July 2025, the Court has, in this action alone, already ordered Plaintiff to show cause
why a pre-filing injunction should not issue and has subsequently twice warned Plaintiff “that a
continued practice of filing piecemeal emergency motions requesting injunctive relief (which the
Court has repeatedly struggled to understand) may result in the imposition of a pre-filing injunction
in the future.” Elmilligy I, D.E. 76; see also Elmilligy I, D.E. 111 (“The Court again warns

Plaintiff that a pattern of ‘groundless and vexatious litigation’ may result in an order prohibiting

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further filings without the Court’s permission.” (citing Chipps v. U.S.D.C. for the M.D. Pa., 882
F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989)). The Court also explicitly told Plaintiff that “even though he is acting
pro se, [he] must nevertheless[] comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” D.E. 111
(quoting Ellis v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 14-4, 2014 WL 7359108, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 24, 2014)).

Plaintiff's repeated motions for emergency relief over the past several months across
multiple cases have demand considerable judicial resources. In the past few weeks alone, Plaintiff
has, in just these two cases, filed three emergency motions concerning the same set of facts that
are to be litigated in Elmilligy I. And in these motions, Plaintiff has failed to address the
substantive issues which the Court has outlined for him on numerous occasions—namely,
providing specific detail in a coherent narrative such that the Court can review his claims and
consider their merit. Beyond the dozens of duplicative and meritless motions he has filed, Plaintiff
has demonstrated a disregard for this Court’s rules and has engaged in a pattern of vexatious
litigation. For example, Plaintiff recently objected to an automatic extension of a motion date.
Elmilligy I, D.E. 120. Such conduct serves no beneficial purpose and suggests to the Court that
Plaintiff is knowingly abusing the judicial process and the Court’s granting him IFP status, which
has effectively let him pursue new actions without any financial consequence.

As noted above, the Court warned Plaintiff that his continued abuse of the judicial process
could result in a pre-filing injunction. And while Plaintiff heeded that warning for a short time in
late 2025, his recent conduct demonstrates an intent to repeatedly litigate the same series of actions
which Plaintiff is currently litigating in Elmilligy I, while not meaningfully adapting his filings as

directed by the Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff has left the Court with no choice but to enter a pre-

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filing injunction against him because it appears to be the only way to prevent him repeatedly from
continuing to flood this District with duplicative motions and cases.*

Specifically, the Court will enjoin Plaintiff from filing any emergency motions seeking
injunctive relief and/or commencing new actions that arise from the same set of operative facts as
Elmilligy I without first seeking the leave of this Court. Elmilligy I is the proper forum for Plaintiff
to litigate those claims. The Court views this injunction as narrowly tailored because it is tied to
the claims and facts that are being litigated in Elmilligy I. For example, the Third Circuit affirmed
a pre-filing injunction that applied “‘only to a small subset of cases (the present case and new civil
actions brought against these same defendants that relate, or could relate, to the subject matter of
this case)” and allowed the plaintiff to seek the District Court’s permission to file actions that fall
within that subset of cases. Danihel, 640 F. App’x at 190-91; see also Perlmutter, 2022 WL
1443426, at *4 (limiting a pre-filing injunction to the same defendants that the plaintiffs “have
repeatedly dragged into court’).

Il. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Having considered Plaintiffs latest TRO Motions in Elmilligy I and II, as well as Plaintiffs
Elmilligy II IFP Application, and all related items on the docket, and having sua sponte considered
whether to issue a pre-filing injunction against Plaintiff,

IT IS, on this 8 day of January 2026, for the reasons set forth above,

ORDERED that the case pending at Case No. 25-19130 is CONSOLIDATED with the

case pending at Case No. 25-12720; and it is further

4 A review of CM/ECF reveals that Plaintiff has commenced approximately 40 cases in this District
since July 2025, many of which involve the same parties.

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ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATE Case
No. 25-19130; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Elmilligy II IFP Application, D.E. 1-4 in Case No. 25-19130
is DENIED as MOOT; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's TRO Motion, D.E 2 in Case No. 25-19130, is DENIED; and
it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's TRO Motion, D.E 127 in Case No. 25-12720, is DENIED; and
it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff is PROHIBITED from commencing any new actions or filing
any motions styled as emergency motions and which seek injunctive relief that arise from the same
set of facts that are related to Case No. 25-12720 without seeking leave of this Court; and it is
finally

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall send Plaintiff a copy of this Order by regular U.S.

mail.

Sod, Te

Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.

11

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