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2:25-cv-17189Njd4 de fev. de 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MOHAMMED IBRAHIM,
Civil Action No. 25-17189
OPINION
February 4, 2026
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC ROKOSKY, et al.
Respondents.
SEMPER, District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
of Petitioner Mohammed Ibrahim (“Petitioner”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the
constitutionality of his continued immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing.
(ECF No. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention—
now exceeding twelve months—has become unreasonably prolonged in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Sudan who entered the United States on October 28,
2024, after stowing away on a cargo vessel. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 21; ECF No. 7-1 at 3.) Upon arrival,
immigration officials detained Petitioner and placed him in expedited removal proceedings. (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 22.) When Petitioner expressed fear of returning to Sudan based on past persecution related
to his religious beliefs, he was afforded a credible-fear interview. 	(Id.) 	A supervisory asylum
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officer determined that Petitioner had demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture. (ECF
No. 1, Exs. A–B.)
As a result of that determination, Petitioner was referred to removal proceedings under 8
U.S.C. § 1229a.1 (ECF No. 1 ¶ 3.) On November 4, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security
issued a Notice to Appear charging Petitioner as removable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)
(presence without admission or parole) and 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (lack of valid entry documents).
(ECF No. 1, Ex. A; ECF No. 7 at 6-7.)
Petitioner pursued asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture while detained. (ECF No. 7 at 11-12.) His merits hearing was initially scheduled
for May 9, 2025. (ECF No. 1, Ex. G.) At that hearing, DHS raised new arguments concerning
Petitioner’s nationality and alleged firm resettlement, and for the first time suggested Chad as an
alternative country of removal. 	(ECF No. 1 ¶ 23.) 	The Immigration Judge continued the
proceedings and ordered briefing. (Id.) DHS did not submit a brief, and the merits hearing was
ultimately rescheduled for August 8, 2025. 	(ECF No. 1, Exs. H–J.)
On September 24, 2025, the Immigration Judge denied all applications for relief and
ordered Petitioner removed to Sudan. (ECF No. 1, Ex. C.) Petitioner timely appealed that decision
to the BIA, where it remains pending. (ECF No. 1, Ex. D.)
Petitioner has remained continuously detained since October 28, 2024—a period now
exceeding twelve months. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.) He has not received a bond hearing and is regulatorily
ineligible for bond. (Id.) See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B). Petitioner has submitted a request
for parole pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) and ICE Directive 11002.1, supported by evidence of
1 Notwithstanding that referral, Petitioner’s continued detention remains governed by 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b), which authorizes the detention of arriving noncitizens pending the completion of removal
proceedings and does not provide for an individualized bond hearing. See Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
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identity, community sponsorship, and medical need. 	(ECF No. 1 ¶ 25.) 	That request remains
pending without adjudication. (Id.)
On January 6, 2026, Petitioner filed a Notice of Supplementary Authority (ECF No. 9),
advising the Court of the decision in Maksaddzhon A. v. Pittman, No. 25-13734, 2025 WL
3648710 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2025), where the Hon. Madeline Cox Arleo found that Petitioner’s
detention of fifteen months under § 1225(b) exceeded constitutional limits under the German
Santos framework.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Habeas Jurisdiction
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, federal district courts retain jurisdiction to review the legality of
executive detention, including immigration custody. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001);
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). A district court may grant habeas relief if the petitioner
“is in custody in violation of the laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Jurisdiction lies in the district of initial custody and is unaffected by subsequent transfers. Anariba
v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 445–446 (3d Cir. 2021); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426, 441 (2004).
In German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, the Third Circuit recognized that
“an alien lawfully present but detained under § 1226(c) can still challenge his detention under the
Due Process Clause.” 965 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that due process imposes an outer
limit on the duration of mandatory detention). Thus, where a noncitizen is mandatorily detained
pending removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the Due Process Clause demands a bond
hearing 	once 	detention 	has 	become 	“unreasonably 	long.” 	Id. 	at 	210-211. 	To 	assess
reasonableness, courts consider: (1) the length of detention; (2) whether detention is likely to
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continue; (3) the reasons for delay; and (4) the conditions of confinement. Id. at 211; see also
Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 475–476 (3d Cir. 2015).
When detention becomes unreasonable, due process requires an individualized bond
hearing at which the Government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence,
that continued detention is necessary to mitigate flight risk or danger, and that alternatives to
detention are insufficient. Id. at 213–214 (describing minimum procedural safeguards required by
due process).
Although German Santos arose under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), courts within this Circuit have
applied its constitutional framework to prolonged detention under § 1225(b), reasoning that both
provisions authorize detention without individualized risk assessments. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F.
Supp. 3d 822, 826 (W.D. Pa. 2025) (applying German Santos to arriving alien detained under §
1225(b)); Maksaddzhon A. v. Pittman, No. 25-13734, 2025 WL 3648710 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2025)
(same).
The Court recognizes that the Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez rejected the
imposition of time limits or bond-hearing requirements as a matter of statutory interpretation under
§ 1225(b). 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018). The relief ordered here does not rest on a construction of
the immigration statutes, but instead flows from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which independently constrains the duration of civil detention. See German Santos, 965 F.3d at
209–210 (confirming that Jennings does not foreclose as-applied constitutional challenges to
prolonged detention.)
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Length of Detention
Petitioner has been detained for approximately twelve months without a bond hearing.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 2.) 	Detention of this duration substantially exceeds the allowable periods the
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Supreme Court has described as typical when upholding mandatory detention statutes against
facial challenge. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 529–530 (2003) (noting that detention under
§ 1226(c) typically lasts “roughly a month and a half,” or “about five months” where appeals are
taken).
Courts within this Circuit have repeatedly recognized that detention approaching or
exceeding 	six 	months 	without 	an 	opportunity 	for 	individualized 	review 	raises 	serious
constitutional concerns. 	See Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 475–476 (explaining that detention
becomes suspect as it moves beyond six months); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (observing that
Congress doubted the constitutionality of detention longer than six months).
Moreover, Petitioner’s detention is likely to continue for a significant additional period.
His appeal before the BIA remains pending, with no transcript or briefing schedule issued. (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 24.) Given the BIA’s substantial backlog, there is no reasonable expectation of imminent
resolution. 	This factor weighs heavily in favor of finding the detention unreasonable. 	German
Santos, 965 F.3d at 212 (finding likelihood of continued detention “unreasonable”).
B. Responsibility for Delay
The record does not reflect that Petitioner engaged in dilatory tactics. (See ECF Nos. 1; 8.)
To the contrary, he pursued relief in good faith and requested only limited continuances necessary
to respond to new issues raised by the Government. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 50.) Courts must be careful not
to penalize noncitizens for pursuing available legal remedies. See Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 678 F.3d
265, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (warning against treating good-faith litigation as a factor against
detainees).
Here, certain delays are attributable to the Government, which raised new arguments on
the day of the merits hearing and then failed to brief those issues despite a court-ordered schedule.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 51.) Even where neither party acts in bad faith, however, detention may still become
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unreasonable by virtue of its length alone. 	German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211 (explaining that
reasonableness does not turn solely on fault).
C. Conditions of Confinement
Petitioner is confined in a secure detention facility under conditions comparable to penal
incarceration. See Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 475-476 (noting that civil detention becomes more
constitutionally troubling as it resembles criminal punishment). 	Petitioner has also submitted
evidence of serious medical issues, including respiratory conditions for which surgery was
recommended but not provided during detention. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 52, Ex. F.) As detention lengthens,
the severity of confinement conditions assumes greater constitutional significance. 	German
Santos, 965 F.3d at 210.
D. Totality of the Circumstances
Considering the length of detention, the likelihood of continued confinement, the absence
of dilatory conduct by Petitioner, and the conditions of detention, the Court concludes that
Petitioner’s continued detention without an individualized bond hearing has become unreasonably
prolonged in violation of the Due Process Clause. This conclusion rests on the constitutionality
of the detention itself and does not require the Court to assess the validity of the underlying
removal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court’s exercise of habeas jurisdiction is not foreclosed
by the Third Circuit’s recent decision in Khalil v. President, United States, No. 25-2162, 2026 WL
111933, at *9 (3d Cir. Jan 15, 2026), which addressed detention claims that were “inextricably
linked” to the removal process. See Kourouma v. Jamison, No. 26-182 2026 WL 120208, at *3
(E.D. Pa. 2026) (distinguishing the petitioner’s challenge to government’s authority to detain him
without a bond hearing from the challenge to detention in Khalil that was “‘inextricably linked’ to
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his removal proceedings”).2 The Court acknowledges the valid order of removal here. (See Ex.
C.) 	The instant habeas petition does not challenge the validity of that removal order, and this
decision does not disturb that order. But the Due Process Clause does not permit the Government
to detain a noncitizen for over a year, with no foreseeable end, without affording him a meaningful
opportunity to contest the necessity of that detention. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (prohibiting
arbitrary civil detention); see also Maksaddzhon A., 2025 WL 3648710, at *3 (providing petitioner
with a bond hearing because his detention of “more than 15 months” was unduly prolonged and
thus unreasonable under German Santos).
Therefore, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in
which the Government bears the burden of establishing that Petitioner’s continued detention is
necessary because he poses a flight risk or danger to the community, and that no less restrictive
alternatives would suffice. German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213–214.
E. Parole and Accardi Claims
Petitioner also asserts that ICE’s failure to adjudicate his parole request in accordance with
its own binding directives violates the Administrative Procedure Act and the Accardi doctrine.
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 38–45.) Because the Court grants relief on constitutional grounds, it need not reach
those claims. 	See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(counseling constitutional avoidance).
2 “Unlike the challenge to detention in Khalil, Petitioner’s challenge here is not “inextricably
linked” to his removal proceedings. Petitioner does not argue that his confinement is unlawful
because the Government’s removal action is itself invalid. Cf. [Khalil, No. 25-2162] at 28
(“Though Khalil also challenges his detention, his arguments against it are identical to his
arguments against removal.”). Nor does Petitioner challenge the Government's broader authority
to detain him pending a final decision on removal. Instead, he challenges the Government’s
authority to detain him without a bond hearing.” Kourouma, 2026 WL 120208, at *3 (emphasis
in original).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.
Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing consistent with due
process within 7 (seven) days of the accompanying Order. At that hearing, the Government shall
bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner’s continued
detention is necessary because he poses a flight risk or danger to the community, and that no less
restrictive alternatives would suffice. German Santos, 965 F.3d at 213–214.
An appropriate Order follows.
/s/ Jamel K. Semper 	j
Hon. Jamel K. Semper
United States District Judge
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