REEVES v. PRESSLER, FELT & WARSHAW, LLP et al

2:25-cv-17071Njd3 de mar. de 2026

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IV. ORDER
For the forego$sons and for good cause shown;
IT IS on this • day of February, 2026, hereby,
ORDERED that Plaintiffs request for a stay, ECF No. 7, is DENIED; and it is :farther
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4, is GRANTED; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is
further
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Sanctions is DENIED; and it is :farther
ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint consistent with this Opinion
and in strict accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Local Civil Rule 15.1
no later than March 12, 2026.
4
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOANETTE REEVES,
No. 25-cv-17071-WJM-JISA
Plaintiff,

OPINION & ORDER
Y.

PRESSLER, FELT & WARSHAW,
LLP, et al,

Defendants.
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:

Plaintiff brings this case against Defendant Pressler, Felt & Warshaw, LLP (“PFW”)
and ten John Doe defendants for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq (““FDCPA”), as well as common law fraud and fraudulent
inducement. ECF No. 1 (“Complaint”), €§ 7-8, 38-56. PFW filed this Motion to Dismiss,
which includes a request for Rule 11 sanctions. ECF No. 4 (“Motion”). Plaintiff did not
submit a response brief before the return date, instead requesting a stay. ECF No, 7. The
Court decides the Motion without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons
set forth below, the stay request is DENIED, the Motion is GRANTED, the Complaint is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the sanctions request is DENIED.

1. BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff owed a debt, which was ultimately assigned to
PFW to collect following a series of intermediate transactions. Compl. 9717, 19-21.
Plaintiff claims that one of these intermediate transactions was void for violating the New
Jersey Consumer Finance Licensing Act, making the debt itself void. Jd J] 18, 25.
Nonetheless, PFW commenced a lawsuit in New Jersey state court (the “Collection
Lawsuit”) to collect the debt. Jd. [] 24-25. Plaintiff claims that the Collection Lawsuit is
void ab initio, so any attempts to collect on the debt are prohibited by state law. Jd. JJ 25-
26, 31. Plaintiff asserts that “the Collection Lawsuit deprived Plaintiff of truthful, non-
misleading, information in connection with Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt.” fd.
7 32. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that the “unlawful collection of the void Debts” caused
her “emotional damages like stress, anxiety, embarrassment, and financial loss including
having to pay for court fees.” Jd. 4 37.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on October 30, 2025. On January 9, 2026, PFW moved to
dismiss and for Rule 11 sanctions. Although Plaintiff received an extension pursuant to
Local Rule 7.1, Plaintiff failed to file an opposition brief. Instead, Plaintiff filed a
“Suggestion of Bankruptcy,” referring to a bankruptcy petition filed on September 30,

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2025—before this litigation commenced. ECF No. 6; see also No, 25-bk-20207-CMG
(ECF No. 1). In parallel with this action, Plaintiff filed another nearly identical complaint
against PFW involving a different debt. No. 25-cy-15278-CCC-AME (ECF No. 1)
(“Genesis Action”). In both cases, Plaintiff filed a “Suggestion of Bankruptcy” and a
request for a stay after PFW filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 6; Genesis Action, ECF
Nos. 6, 7. Judge Espinosa denied Plaintiff's stay request in the Genesis Action, ECF No.
10. For the same reasons, Plaintiff's request for a stay of this action is DENIED.

Il. DISCUSSION

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court may dismiss a complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Where, as here, a defendant challenges the allegations
of a complaint on their face, Mot. 4, the Court “appl[ies] the same standard as on a review
of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Jn re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data
Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 633 Gd Cir. 2017). The Court “must only consider the
allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 Gd
Cir, 2014). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Dervitz
v. ARS Nat'l Servs. Inc., No. 22-3090, 2024 WL 1173739, at *4 Gd Cir. Mar. 19, 2024)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).

Defendant’s sole basis for dismissal is that the Complaint fails to plead a concrete
injury-in-fact, as required to establish Article TI standing. Mot. 4; see Huber v. Simon’s
Agency, Inc., 84 F 4th 132, 144 Gd Cir. 2023) (recognizing that standing requires “(1) an
injury-in-fact; (2) that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct; and (3) that
is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision’) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 590 (1992)). An injury-in-fact must “be concrete—that is, real, and not
abstract.” TransUnion LLC y, Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 424 (2021) (citation modified).

Recently, the Third Circuit explained that an informational injury can constitute an
exception to the concreteness requirement, where the “entitlement to the information
allegedly withheld is the sine gua non of the informational injury doctrine.” Huber vy.
Simon’s Agency, Inc., 84 F.4th 132, 145 (3d Cir, 2023). To survive a motion to dismiss
based on an informational injury, “a plaintiff need only allege that she [1] was denied
information to which she was legally entitled, and [2] that the denial caused [3] some
adverse consequences related to the purpose of the statute.” Kelly v. RealPage Inc., 47
F.4th 202, 212 (3d Cir. 2022); George v. Rushmore Serv. Cir, LLC, 114 F.4th 226, 235 3d
Cir, 2024), Under this framework, “unclear disclosures do not equate to outright
omissions.” Huber, 84 F.4th at 146.

As to the legally entitled information element, the Complaint fails to specify what
legally required information was allegedly withheld from Plaintiff, generally referring to
the Collection Action as ifthe existence of a litigation necessarily implies an informational
deprivation. See Compl. 432. Plaintiff never states that she “sought disclosure of
information to which [she was] legally entitled, and that [Defendants] failed to disclose

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that information.” Kelly v. RealPage Inc., 47 F Ath 202, 214 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation
modified),

As to the adverse consequences element, Plaintiff states, in conclusory fashion, that she
suffered “stress, anxiety, embarrassment, and financial loss including having to pay for
court fees” because the Collection Lawsuit was filed against her. Compl. 937. Even
assuming that this threadbare statement meets the FDCPA’s causation element, “[n|othing
in the complaint indicates that [the plaintiff] could not pay her debt as a result of the letter,
that the omission caused downstream financial consequences, or that [the plaintiff] suffered
distress.” George v. Rushmore Sery. Cir., LEC, 114 F.4th 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2024), Indeed,
the Third Circuit in a similar case has concluded that “the filing of this lawsuit cannot
constitute an adverse effect.” /d, at 236 n.12.

Even viewing Plaintiffs alleged emotional injuries in isolation, Plaintiff still fails to
allege an injury-in-fact. See Compl. 437. All claims of an injury lack any supporting
factual allegations. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d
at 633 (recognizing that courts may disregard legal conclusions and that conclusory
statements do not suffice to support threadbare allegations of standing); Tice v. Cu. Area
Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 520 (d Cir. 2001) (looking past “bare allegations of
mental/emotional distress, mental anguish, stress and inconvenience” to conclude that the
plaintiff failed to allege facts supporting an injury (citation modified)). As pleaded,
Plaintiff's allegation that she suffered “stress, anxiety, embarrassment, and financial loss”
relates only to Defendants’ debt-collection efforts, not from the disclosure of private
information or from allegedly false statements that can be analogized to a traditional
common law injury. See Barclift y. Keystone Credit Servs., LLC, 93 F.4th 136, 145 Gd
Cir.), cert. denied, 145 $8. Ct. 169 (2024) (recognizing that after TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U.S, 413 (2021), failure to show a close relationship with a traditional
common law harm cannot establish an injury-in-fact). Moreover, while Plaintiff may have
needed “to pay for court fees,” she “cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue
by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Eny’t, 523
U.S, 83, 107 (1998). Accordingly, even when viewed outside the context of the FDCPA
or an informational injury, Plaintiff fails to plead an injury-in-fact.

Hk CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff has failed to allege a concrete injury-in-fact, the Complaint is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See Barclift, 93 F.4th at 148 (modifying a
dismissal with prejudice based on lack of a concrete injury to dismissal without prejudice
“(bjecause the absence of standing leaves the court without subject matter jurisdiction to
reach a decision on the merits”). The Court also DENIES Defendants’ request for
monetary sanctions at this time. See, eg., Richelson v. Yost, 738 F. Supp. 2d 589, 602
(E.D. Pa. 2010) (granting a motion to dismiss without prejudice and denying a motion for
sanctions). However, the Court reminds counsel of the obligations of Rule 11 and the New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct, including the need to avoid frivolous and duplicative
litigation.

IV. ORDER
For the forego$sons and for good cause shown;
IT IS on this • day of February, 2026, hereby,
ORDERED that Plaintiffs request for a stay, ECF No. 7, is DENIED; and it is :farther
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4, is GRANTED; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is
further
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Sanctions is DENIED; and it is :farther
ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint consistent with this Opinion
and in strict accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Local Civil Rule 15.1
no later than March 12, 2026.
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