BAYNES v. BRADY PLUS CORPORATION et al

2:25-cv-16859Njd17 de fev. de 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MATTHEW BAYNES,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRADY PLUS CORPORATION et al,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 25-16859 (SDW) (JRA)
WHEREAS OPINION
February 17, 2026
WIGENTON, District Judge.
THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon Defendants Brady Plus Corporation
and Mooney General Paper Co., LLC’s, improperly pled as “Mooney General Paper Co.,”
(“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 5) Count II of Plaintiff Matthew Baynes’ (“Plaintiff”)
Complaint (D.E. 1 (“Compl.”)), and this Court having reviewed the Defendants’ submissions,
noting that it is unopposed; and
WHEREAS Defendants removed this action to this Court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction, arguing that Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint is preempted by Section 7 and Section
8 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). (D.E. 1; D.E. 5.)
WHEREAS the Supreme Court held that when the States regulate activity that is “arguably
protected” under Section 7 of the NLRA or “arguably prohibited” under Section 8 of the NLRA,
“the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) in order to avert “the danger of state interference with national
[labor] policy.” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). Section
7 of the NLRA protects employee rights to collectively bargain and “engage in other concerted
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activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 8 of the NLRA
prohibits employers from “interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7].” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
WHEREAS “Garmon preemption protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over
unfair labor practice proceedings; accordingly, if a cause of action implicated protected concerted
activity under Section 7 of the NLRA or conduct that would be prohibited as an unfair labor
practice under Section 8 of the NLRA, the cause of action is preempted.” Voilas v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 170 F.3d 367, 378 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Davis v. Benihana, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 3d 524,
540 (D.N.J. 2025). 	Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for refusing to
facilitate Defendant’s anti-union activities, which he reasonably believed to violate the NLRA. As
such, Plaintiff’s claims clearly implicate protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA
and alleges that Defendants were engaged in unfair labor practices under Section 8 of the NLRA.
Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint
because it is preempted by the NLRA and must be heard before the NLRB; therefore
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ Susan D. Wigenton 	x
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
Orig: 	Clerk
cc: 	Parties
José R. Almonte, U.S.M.J.
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