SETHI v. ISMAIL et al

2:25-cv-13448Njd13 de jan. de 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
KUNAL SETHI,
Petitioner,
v.
MOHAMMED JAFFAR ISMAIL and
LUBNA ISMAIL,
Respondents.
Case No. 2:25-cv-13448 (BRM) (AME)
OPINION
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
Before this Court is Petitioner Kunal Sethi’s (“Petitioner”) Motion to Confirm the
arbitration award issued by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in Sethi v. Ismail, AAA
Case No. 01-24-0000-6077, on April 22, 2025 (the “Award”) (ECF No. 2); and Respondents
Mohammed Jaffar Ismail and Lubna Ismail’s (“Respondents”) Cross-Motion to Vacate the Award
(ECF No. 4) pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. Petitioner filed
an Opposition on August 4, 2025 (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 8); and Respondents filed a Reply on August
11, 2025 (ECF No. 9). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1332(a).1 Having
reviewed and considered the submissions filed in connection with the motions and having declined
to hold oral argument in accordance with Local Civil Rule 78.1(b), for the reasons set forth below
1 “The FAA does not independently create federal question jurisdiction . . . .” France v. Bernstein,
43 F.4th 367, 377 n.7 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)). Therefore, to confirm, vacate, modify an arbitration award
under the act requires diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which is to be determined
based on the petition submitted to the court and not the underlying controversy between the parties.
Id. (citing Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 4 (2022)).
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and for good cause shown, Petitioner’s Motion to Confirm is DENIED, Respondents’ Motion to
Vacate is GRANTED, and the matter is REMANDED to the AAA for additional arbitration
proceedings and further evaluation consistent with this Opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In 2018, Respondents owned and operated a single restaurant business titled Tribos Peri
Peri (“TPP”) in Saddle Brook, New Jersey. (ECF No. 1-5 ¶ 33.) On August 1, 2019, Respondents
entered into a General Partnership Agreement (the “Operating Agreement”) with Petitioner and
non-party Nitesh Dabholkar (“Dabholkar”) to form an LLC—TPP Express, LLC (the “Franchise
Company”)—to market and establish TPP franchises, which would be organized and governed
under the laws of New Jersey. (ECF No. 1-1 §§ III, XI(1).) Pursuant to Section III of the Operating
Agreement, Petitioner and Dabholkar each were provided with a 20% ownership interest in the
franchise. (Id. § III, VI(5).) This interest would last indefinitely if twenty franchise stores were
established “within thirty six months from the date of the formation of the Franchise Company.”
(ECF No. 1-5 § V(A); see also id. § VI(2) (providing Respondents “exclusively will own the rights
to the brands, trademarks, logos and other intellectual property for [TPP] until twenty franchise
stores are established and operating”).) However, if the members failed to establish the twenty
franchise stores within the allotted time, the Operating Agreement would terminate, and ownership
would revert back to Respondents solely. (ECF No. 1-5 § V(B).) Pursuant to Section V, in the
event the Operating Agreement was terminated and ownership reverted, Petitioner and Dabholkar
each would be entitled to a 20% interest in “the royalites of any franchise stores they have
established during the thirty six month period.” (Id. (emphasis added).)
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On November 6, 2020, Petitioner, Respondents, and Dabholkar entered into an addendum
to the Operating Agreement (the “Addendum”). (See generally ECF No. 1-2.) The addendum
contained three relevant provisions, it: (1) removed Dabholkar as a member of the Franchise
Company; (2) amended Section III to provide Petitioner with a 40% interest in the franchise; and
(3) amended Section V to extend the time to establish the twenty franchise stores from thirty-sixth
months to fifty-four months from the date of the formation—January 31, 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 3–5.) The
addendum, however, also amended Section V to remove the terms “they have” from the provision.
(Compare ECF No. 1-1 § V(B), with ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 5.) Therefore, pursuant to the amended Section
V, in the event the Operating Agreement was terminated and ownership reverted, Petitioner would
be entitled to a 40% interest in “the royalties of any franchise stores established during the fifty-
four month period.” (ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 5 (emphasis added).)
Prior to February 1, 2024, six franchise stores were successfully established. (ECF No. 1-
5 ¶ 161; see also id. ¶ 162 (declining to consider as established four additional franchise stores).)
In 2023, an additional restaurant was initially established in Artesia, California (the “Artesia
TPP”). (See id. ¶ 41.) At the time the Artesia TPP was opened, the Franchise Company was not
authorized to establish franchises in California. (Id.) On March 4, 2023, a franchise agreement was
entered pertaining to the Artesia TPP. (See id.) However, the Artesia TPP was closed nineteen
days later on March 23, 2023. (See id. ¶ 42.)
On February 1, 2024, the Operating Agreement terminated and ownership reverted back to
Respondents. (Id. ¶ 44.)
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B. Arbitration History
On February 9, 2024, Petitioner filed a demand for arbitration pursuant to Section XI(2) of
the Operating Agreement. (See generally ECF No. 1-3.) Section XI(2) provides, in relevant part,
the [p]arties agree that any dispute, claim, or controversy arising out
of or relating to [the Operating Agreement] will be resolved through
mandatory binding arbitration administered by the [AAA] in
accordance with its Commercial Arbitration Rules, and the
judgment of its arbitrator(s) may be entered by any court of
competent jurisdiction. The [p]arties further agree that the [FAA]
governs the interpretation and enforcement of this provision.
(ECF No. 1-1 § XI(2).) The demand for arbitration included six causes of action: (1) breach of
contract (ECF No. 1-3 ¶¶ 49–57); (2) breach of fiduciary duties (id. ¶¶ 58–62); (3) breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealings (id. ¶¶ 63–69); (4) unjust enrichment (id. ¶¶ 70–74); (5)
accounting (id. ¶¶ 75–78); and (6) oppression and freezeout of a minority shareholder (id. ¶¶ 79–
84). The demand for arbitration sought damages totaling $1,200,000.00 as well as attorneys’ fees
and costs. (Id. ¶ 1.)
On March 8, 2024, Respondents filed an answer and counterclaims. (See generally ECF
No. 1-4.) Relevant to this matter, the counterclaims included a claim for reputational damage and
lost revenue based on Petitioner’s closing of the Artesia TPP without Respondents’ notification or
consent totaling $75,966.36.2 (See id., Counterclaim ¶ 36, Request for Relief ¶ (c).) The
counterclaims also sought attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id., Request for Relief ¶ (d).)
On March 27, 2024, an arbitrator was appointed (the “Arbitrator”). (ECF No. 1-5 ¶ 14.)
Between February 10 and March 14, 2025, the Arbitrator conducted the hearing, during which the
parties had the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs on specific legal questions. (Id. at 1;
2 Respondents’ counterclaims included requests for reputational damage totaling $75,000 and
unauthorized purchases totaling $966.36. (ECF No. 1-4, Counterclaim ¶ 36–37.)
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accord id. ¶¶ 15–31.) On April 1, 2025, the parties confirmed there were no further proofs to offer,
and the Arbitrator closed the hearing as he was satisfied the record was complete. (Id. ¶ 32.)
On April 22, 2025, the Arbitrator issued the Award, which affirmed Petitioner’s breach of
contract claim (see generally id. ¶¶ 57–107) and rejected his remaining claims, i.e., breach of
fiduciary duties; breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealings; unjust enrichment; accounting;
and oppression and freezeout of a minority shareholder (see id. ¶¶ 108–44). Notably, the Arbitrator
did not find Respondents breached the Operating Agreement prior to the termination of the
agreement on January 31, 2024. (See generally id. ¶¶ 57–107). Rather, the Arbitrator found
Respondents breached the Operating Agreement by failing to pay Petitioner his 40% interest in
royalties on January 31, 2024. (See generally id.; see also id. ¶ 145 (“[Petitioner]’s main claim
accrued on February 1, 2024 when royalites first became due under the [Operating Agreement] as
the arbitrator interprets it . . . .”); ECF No. 1-6 ¶ 9 (determining “Respondents’ failure to make any
royalty payments post-termination to be the breach”); but see ECF No. 1-1 § VIII(1) (requiring
profits to be distributed to the members within ten business days of the last day of January).) “In
summary, the [A]rbitrator interpret[ed] both the [Operating Agreement] and the [A]ddendum to
entitle [Petitioner] to royalties received from franchise stores opened and operational as of January
31 , 2024” (ECF No. 1-5 ¶ 106), which the Arbitrator held to be a “total” breach of the Operating
Agreement entitling Petitioner to a lump sum payment of the estimated future royalties (see id.
¶ 107 (“The [A]rbitrator concludes that the Respondents’ failure to make any royalty payment to
[Petitioner] is a breach of the [Operating Agreement] and [A]ddendum and entitles [Petitioner],
now, to a fair estimate of his share of future royalties.”)).
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Furthermore, the Arbitrator rejected Respondents’ defenses and counterclaims, including
the claim for reputational damage. (See generally id. ¶¶ 145–55.) Specifically, the Arbitrator
found:
Respondents have not proven any damage as a result of closure of
the Artesia [TPP]. Their suggestion of potential reputational damage
is purely speculative. They did not present proof that any
prospective franchisee refused to sign a franchise agreement
because of concern about closure of the Artesia [TPP]. The claim
that Respondents are entitled to damages by reason of that closure
is specious.
(Id. ¶ 152.) However, the Arbitrator also found that, because “the [F]ranchise [C]ompany was not
authorized under California law to make franchise sales until May 2023, months after the Artesia
franchise agreement was signed[,] . . . . the Artesia franchise agreement is unenforceable.” (Id. ¶
153.)
Reviewing the record, the Arbitrator determined only six franchise stores were established
by January 31, 2024. (Id. ¶ 161; see also id. ¶ 162 (declining to consider as established four
additional franchise stores).) Based on a damage calculation spreadsheet prepared by Petitioner’s
expert, the Arbitrator calculated the total for past and future royalites to be $640,280.33. (Id.
¶ 165.) Furthermore, the Arbitrator awarded attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $116,434.50 under
AAA Rule R-49(d)(ii) (id. ¶¶ 175–76), which provides an arbitrator’s award may include
“attorneys’ fees if all parties have requested such an award” (id. ¶ 169).
On April 25, 2025, Respondents filed a request for reconsideration under AAA Rule 52(a),
which permits an arbitrator to interpret an award or to correct typographical errors. (ECF No. 1-6
at 1–2.) Specifically, Respondents requested the Arbitrator to: (a) remove Respondents from the
Award and substitute the Franchise Company in their place; (b) reduce the damages based on a
calculation error; (c) vacate the award of attorneys’ fees and costs; and (d) eliminate the conclusion
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the Franchise Company was not authorized under California law to enter into the Artesia franchise
agreement. (Id. at 2.) In response, Petitioner filed an opposition to the request on May 16, 2025.
(Id.) On May 20, 2025, both Respondents and Petitioner filed supplemental submissions. (Id.) On
May 22, 2025, the Arbitrator rejected the request for reconsideration as the requests were “not
matters that can be the subject of [AAA Rule 52(a)].” (Id. ¶ 27.)
C. Procedural History
On July 17, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition and Motion to Confirm the Award pursuant to
9 U.S.C. § 9. (ECF Nos. 1-2.) On July 19, 2025, Respondents filed a Cross-Motion to Vacate the
Award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10. (ECF No. 4.) In support of their Cross-Motion, Respondents
argue the Award demonstrates evident partiality in concluding the Artesia franchise agreement
was unenforceable (see generally id. ¶¶ 60–69) and the Arbitrator exceeded his powers by
awarding premature and speculative damages in response to Petitioner’s breach of contract claim
(id. ¶¶ 47–59); imposing personal liability against Respondents (id. ¶¶ 20–46); and awarding
attorneys’ fees and costs (id. ¶¶ 70–81). On August 4, 2025, Petitioner filed an Opposition to
Respondents’ Cross-Motion to Vacate. (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 8.) In response, Respondents filed a Reply
on August 11, 2025. (ECF No. 9.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The FAA supplies parties to an arbitration agreement with the authority to apply to the
court for an order confirming, 9 U.S.C. § 9, vacating, id. § 10, or modifying an arbitration award,
id. § 11. “[M]indful of the strong federal policy in favor of commercial arbitration,” Sutter v.
Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2012) as amended (Apr. 4, 2012), however,
“the court[] play[s] only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator.” Wilkes
Barre Hosp. Co. v. Wyo. Valley Nurses Ass’n PASNAP, 453 F. App’x 258, 260 (3d Cir. 2011)
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(quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)). The
court reviews an award under an “‘extremely deferential standard,’ the application of which ‘is
generally to affirm easily the arbitration award.’” Hamilton Park Health Care Ctr. Ltd. v. 1199
SEIU United Healthcare Workers E., 817 F.3d 857, 861 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Dluhos v.
Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003)); Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of
Am., 396 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2005), as amended (Mar. 17, 2005) (“There is a strong
presumption under the [FAA] in favor of enforcing arbitration awards.” (internal citation
omitted)).
“[E]ffusively deferential language notwithstanding, the courts are neither entitled nor
encouraged simply to ‘rubber stamp’ the interpretations and decisions of arbitrators,” Hamilton
Park Health Care Ctr., 817 F.3d at 861 (quoting Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 113 (3d
Cir. 1996)), and may vacate or modify an award “under exceedingly narrow circumstances,”
Dluhos, 321 F.3d at 370. Pursuant to Section 10(a) of the FAA, the court may vacate an arbitration
award if: “(1) [the award] was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) the arbitrator[]
demonstrated partiality or corruption; (3) [the arbitrator] w[as] guilty of misconduct; or (4) [the
arbitrator] exceeded [his or her] powers.” Anoruo v. Tenet HealthSystem Hahnemann, 697 F.
App’x 110, 111 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)).
Similarly, pursuant to Section 11 of the FAA, the court may only modify an award if: (a)
there was “an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred
to in the award”; (b) “the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them”; or (c)
“the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.” “If one of
these latter three events has occurred, the [c]ourt may modify and correct the award so as to
effectuate its intent and promote justice between the parties.” AV Design Servs., LLC v. Durant,
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Civ. A. No. 19-8688, 2024 WL 378612, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2024). The moving party “bears the
burden of proving that the arbitration award at issue should be vacated [or modified].” Jersey Shore
Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Local 5058, Health Prof’ls & Allied Emps., Civ. A. No. 16-4840, 2017 WL
1025180, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2017) (citation omitted); see also Handley v. Chase Bank USA
NA, 387 F. App’x 166, 168 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The party seeking to overturn an award bears a heavy
burden, as these are “exceedingly narrow circumstances . . . .’” (quoting Dluhos, 321 F.3d at 370)).
III. DECISION
Petitioner moves for an order confirming the Award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 9 (see generally
ECF No. 2); and Respondents cross-move for an order vacating the same award pursuant to 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) and (4)3 (see generally ECF No. 4). As noted above, the Arbitrator rejected all
causes of action against Respondents but the common-law breach of contract claim. (See generally
ECF No. 1-5 ¶¶ 57–144.) Furthermore, the Arbitrator found Respondents sole breach of the
Operating Agreement was their failure to pay Petitioner his 40% interest in royalties for the six
3 Although Respondents also claim the Award should be vacated for misconduct pursuant to
Section 10(a)(3) (see ECF No. 4-1 ¶ 19), Respondents fail to brief this issue (see generally ECF
No. 4). Therefore, the Court need not address it. See Miller v. Burt, 765 F. App’x 834, 838 (3d Cir.
2019) (“[A] passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”
(quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375,
398 (3d Cir. 1994)).
Alternatively, Respondents claim the Award should be vacated under the New Jersey Uniform
Arbitration Act (“NJUAA”), N.J. Stat. Ann § 2A:23B-1, et seq. (See ECF No. 4-1 ¶ 19.) “It is well
established that absent clear intent to apply a non-FAA standard [for vacating an award], the FAA
standard is to be applied.” CD & L Realty LLC v. Owens Ill, Inc., 535 F. App’x 201, 204 (3d Cir.
2013) (citing Ario v. Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Llyods, 618 F. 3d 277, 295 (3d Cir.
2010)). Here, Section XI(2) provides the parties “agree that the [FAA] governs the interpretation
and enforcement of this provision.” (ECF No. 1-1 § XI(2).) The Operating Agreement is absent
any suggestion the parties intended to apply the NJUAA, or any other non-FAA standard, in the
interpretation or enforcement of the Operating Agreement. (See generally ECF No. 1-1.)
Regardless, “there is no relevant distinction between the FAA and NJUAA vacatur standards that
would change the outcome.” United Merch. Wholesale Inc. v. Direct Containers Inc., Civ. A. No.
18-617, 2018 WL 3601232, at *1–2 (D.N.J. July 26, 2018).
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franchise stores established as of January 31, 2024, which the Arbitrator concluded to be a “total”
breach entitling Petitioner to a lump sum payment of the estimated future royalties. (See id. ¶¶ 107–
08.) Therefore, the sole cause of action at issue is based on the terms of the Operating Agreement,
which contains a choice-of-law provision providing the agreement “will be governed by the laws
of the State of New Jersey exclusively.” (ECF No. 1-1 § XI, ¶ 1.)
“The validity of a contractual choice-of-law clause is a threshold question that must be
decided not under the law specified in the clause, but under the relevant forum’s choice-of-law
rules governing the effectiveness of such clauses.” Fin. One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special
Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 332 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S.
415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive
law and federal procedural law.”); Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F. 3d 225, 227 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“In evaluating whether a contractual choice-of-law clause is enforceable, federal courts sitting in
diversity apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.”).
Here, the jurisdiction over requests to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award is
based on diversity jurisdiction. See France v. Bernstein, 43 F.4th 367, 377 n.7 (3d Cir. 2022).
Therefore, the Court applies New Jersey choice of law rules in deciding whether the Operating
Agreement’s choice of law clause is enforceable. Pursuant to New Jersey law, “effect [is generally
given] to contracting parties’ private choice of law clauses unless they conflict with New Jersey
public policy.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 331 n.21 (3d Cir.
2001) (citing Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 133 (N.J.
1992)). As the parties do not dispute the breach of contract claim is based on New Jersey common
law precedents (see ECF No. 4-1 ¶ 55; see also generally ECF No. 6), the Court declines to
consider whether the choice-of-law provision conflicts with New Jersey public policy. See
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Schaffner v. Monsanto Corp., 113 F.4th 364, 377 n.6 (3d Cir. 2024). Therefore, the Court will
enforce the choice-of-law clause and apply New Jersey common law contract principles to the
interpretation and enforcement of the Operating Agreement.
A. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)
Pursuant to Section 10(a)(2), the court may vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator
demonstrated evident partiality or corruption. Facta Health Inc. v. Pharmadent LLC, Civ. A. No.
23-2224, 2024 WL 4345299, at *7 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2024) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)). “[E]vident
partiality is strong language and requires proof of circumstances powerfully suggestive of bias.”
Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 252 (3d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added)
(quoting Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1523 n.30 (3d Cir. 1994)). “For an
arbitrator’s bias to be ‘evident,’ it ‘must be sufficiently obvious that a reasonable person would
easily recognize it.’” Facta Health Inc., 2024 WL 4345299, at *7 (quoting Freeman, 709 F.3d at
253).
Here, Respondents argue the Award demonstrates evident partiality as the Arbitrator
concluded the Artesia franchise agreement was unenforceable because the agreement was entered
before the Franchise Company was authorized to do so under California law. (See generally ECF
No. 4 ¶¶ 60–69; ECF No. 1-5 ¶¶ 153–54.) However, this issue was “never raised by the parties”
(ECF No. 4 ¶ 67) and, as such, the Arbitrator’s decision to address it “implicates fundamental due
process concerns[] as Respondents had no notice that their execution of the Artesia [franchise]
agreement would become a basis for liability.” (Id. ¶ 68.) In response, Petitioner claims the issue
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is not material as the Arbitrator determined “Respondents had not proven any damage as a result
of the closure of the Artesia [TPP].”4 (ECF No. 1-5 ¶ 152; see ECF No. 6 at 17.)
Reviewing the record, neither Petitioner nor Respondents alleged a cause of action based
on the terms of the Artesia franchise agreement. (See generally ECF No. 1-3; see also ECF No.
1-4 ¶ 36; accord ECF No. 1-5 ¶ 56.) However, Respondents submitted a copy of the Artesia
franchise agreement to the Arbitrator for review (see ECF No. 1-5 ¶¶ 150–54), which the Arbitrator
reviewed in response to Respondents’ counterclaim for reputational damage and lost revenue
relating to the Artesia TPP (id. ¶¶ 145–55 (reviewing Respondents’ “Defenses and
Counterclaim(s)”)).
The Arbitrator determined Petitioner was not liable for reputational damage and lost
revenue under the terms of the General Partnership Agreement and that Respondents’ allegation
of potential reputational damage were purely speculative as Respondents “did not present proof
that any prospective franchisee refused to sign a franchise agreement because of concern about
closure of the Artesia [TPP].” (Id. ¶¶ 149, 152.) The Arbitrator also found the Artesia franchise
agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law because the parties entered into the agreement
before the Franchise Company was able to make such agreements under California Law. (Id.
¶¶ 153–54.) Therefore, the Arbitrator dismissed Respondents’ counterclaim for reputational
damage and lost revenue with prejudice. (Id. ¶ 155.) Notably, the Arbitrator did not impose liability
against Respondents based on the determination the Artesia franchise agreement was
unenforceable. (Id. ¶ 161 (imposing liability against Respondents based solely on the established
franchises in Providence, Metuchen, Manalapan, Ellicott City, Westborough, and Sommerville).)
4 Petitioner, however, fails to address whether the Arbitrator’s consideration and determination of
an issue never raised by the parties may sufficiently demonstrate the Arbitrator’s evident partiality
under Section 10(a)(2). (See generally ECF No. 6.)
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Having opened the door by alleging a cause of action against Petitioner for damages based
on the closing of the Artesia TPP, Respondents cannot claim the Arbitrator demonstrated evident
partiality by reviewing the entire submitted record in deciding same. See Metromedia Energy, Inc.
v. Enserch Energy Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 574, 579 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]mprovident, even silly,
factfinding does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2004)). At most, the Arbitrator’s determination is
a legal error potentially exceeding his powers under Section 10(a)(4). See Facta Health Inc., 2024
WL 4345299, at *7. As Respondents have not argued this issue, the Court need not decide whether
the Arbitrator in determining the Artesia franchise agreement was unenforceable exceeded his
powers under Section 10(a)(4). (See ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 60–69 (limiting the argument to Section
10(a)(2)).)
For the above stated reasons, Respondents’ Cross-Motion to Vacate the Award under
Section 10(a)(2) is DENIED.
B. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)
Pursuant to Section 10(a)(4), the Court may vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator
exceeded its powers. “By contractually restricting the issues they will arbitrate, the individuals
with whom they will arbitrate, and the arbitration procedures that will govern, parties to an
arbitration agreement may place limits upon the arbitrator’s powers that are enforceable by the
courts.” Sutter, 675 F.3d at 219–20. An arbitrator exceeds these limits, subjecting an award to
judicial vacatur, by “decid[ing] an issue not submitted [for] [arbitration], grant[ing] relief in a form
that cannot be rationally derived from the parties’ agreement and submissions, or issu[ing] an
award that is so completely irrational that it lacks support altogether.” Id. In other words, when an
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arbitrator “strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively dispenses
his own brand of industrial justice, [the arbitrator] exceeds his [or her] powers and [the] award will
be unenforceable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2010).
An arbitrator exceeds its powers when either “the arbitrator demonstrates manifest
disregard of the [law],” Major League Umpires Ass’n, 357 F.3d at 280, or the award violates
established public policy as “ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents,” Easter
Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 531 U.S. 57, 62–63 (2000); accord
AV Design Servs., 2024 WL 378612, at *3. Whereas the “manifest disregard” doctrine requires the
moving party to demonstrate the arbitrator “knew” and “appreciated” a governing legal principle
but “nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it,” Paul Green Sch. Of
Rock Music Franchising, LLC. v. Smith, 389 F. App’x 172, 175–77 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted), the “public policy” doctrine merely requires the party to demonstrate
the award violates a “well-defined” and “dominant” public policy as “ascertain[ed] by reference
to the laws and legal precedents,” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 993 F.2d 357,
360 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983));
accord Comcast of New Jersey, LLC v. IBEW Loc. Union No. 827, Civ. A. No. 21-17050, 2022
WL 16895502, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2022), aff’d, Civ. A. No. 22-3239, 2024 WL 340692 (3d
Cir. Jan. 30, 2024); see also United Transp. Union Loc. 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d
376, 382 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The exception is available only when ‘the arbitration decision and award
create an explicit conflict with an explicit public policy . . . .’” (quoting Serv. Emps. Int’l Union
Local 36 v. City Cleaning Co., 982 F.2d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 1992))). “[T]he question of public policy
is ultimately one for resolution by the courts.” W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766; Stolt-Nielsen,
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559 U.S. at 671 (“[A]n arbitrator’s task is to interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public
policy.”).
Here, Respondents argue the Arbitrator exceeded his powers by awarding premature and
speculative damages in response to Petitioner’s breach of contract claim (ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 47–59),
imposing personal liability against Respondents (id. ¶¶ 20–46), and awarding attorneys’ fees and
costs (id. ¶¶ 70–81). Each of these arguments involves application of a comprehensive body of
substantive state law, and the Court addresses each in turn.
1. Breach of an Installment Contract
Pursuant to New Jersey law, a breach of contract claim requires a plaintiff to establish the
following four elements: (1) “the parties entered into a contract containing certain terms”; (2)
“[the] plaintiff did what the contract required [the plaintiff] to do”; (3) “[the] defendant did not do
what the contract required [the defendant] to do, defined as a breach of the contract”; and (4) “[the]
defendant’s breach, or failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiff.”
Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 206 A.3d 386, 392 (N.J. 2019) (alterations in original)
(quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 139 A.3d 57, 64 (N.J. 2016)). “Each element must be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence.” Globe Motor Co., 139 A.3d at 64.
Although any breach of a contract may give rise to a claim for remedies, the courts
distinguish between the remedies available for a “partial” breach—“[remedies] based on only part
of the injured party’s remaining rights to performance”—and a “total” breach—“[remedies] based
on all of the injured party’s remaining rights to performance.”5 Restatement (Second) of Contracts
5 A breach of contract provides only three remedies: restitution—“return[ing] the innocent party
to the condition he or she occupied before the contract was executed;” performance—“mak[ing]
the non-breaching party whole by requiring the breaching party to fulfill his or her obligation under
the agreement”; and compensatory damages—“put[ting] the innocent party into the position he or
she would have achieved had the contract been completed.” Marina Dist. Dev. Co., LLC v. Ivey,
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§ 236 (1981); see, e.g., In re Est. of Balk, 138 A.3d 572, 576 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2016). For
example, a “partial” breach of an installment contract by non-payment only entitles a plaintiff to
seek recovery of the unpaid benefit; whereas a “total” breach entitles a plaintiff to “seek recovery
of one lump sum representing the present value of the monetary benefits [the plaintiff] could have
received over [the course of the contract].” Cipala v. Lincoln Tech. Inst. (Cipala II), 843 A.2d
1069, 1072–73 (N.J. 2004) (quoting Stopford v. Boonton Molding Co., 265 A.2d 657, 667 (N.J.
1970)); see also Cipala v. Lincoln Tech. Inst. (Cipala I), 806 A.2d 820, 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 843 A.2d 1069 (stating a “partial” breach “gives rise to a
claim for specific performance”); see also Hage v. Unumprovident Corp., Civ. A. No. 04-5933,
2008 WL 5423954, at *11 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2008) (“Because of the ‘absolute’ or ‘total’ breach of
the ‘entire’ contract, the plaintiff was able to . . . obtain his future benefits.”). Therefore, when a
plaintiff seeks remedies based on a total breach, the Court is required to conduct a two-step analysis
by first determining whether the defendant breached the contract; and, if a breach occurred, then
assessing whether said breach was in fact a “total” breach. See, e.g., Cipala II, 843 A.3d 1069; In
re Est. of Balk, 138 A.3d 572.
It is well-established that New Jersey, like other jurisdictions, follows the general rule “[a]
breach of an installment contract by non-payment does not constitute a breach of the entire
contract.”6 Dean v. Provisor, No. A-1199-20, 2022 WL 2711255, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
223 F. Supp. 3d 216, 221 (D.N.J. 2016) (emphasis added) (citing Totaro, Duffy, Cannova and
Company, L.L.C. v. Lane, Middleton & Company, L.L.C., 921 A.2d 1100, 1107 (N.J. 2007)).
Although each of these remedies serves a different purpose, all three remedies serve the ultimate
goal under contract law—“to put the injured party in as good a position as if performance had been
rendered.” Id.
6 It is well-established a breach of an installment contract by non-payment may constitute a “total”
breach permitting recovery of one lump sum of monetary benefits if the parties’ agreement
contains an acceleration clause. See, e.g., Dean v. Provisor, No. A-1199-20, 2022 WL 2711255,
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at *4–7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 13, 2022). Alternatively, the New Jersey Appellate Division
has previously held non-payment may also constitute a “total” breach if accompanied by
anticipatory repudiation. See In re Est. of Balk, 138 A.3d at 576 (citing, in part, Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 250). In an unpublished decision, however, the Appellate Division has
more recently held non-payment does not constitute a “total” breach regardless of whether
accompanied by anticipatory repudiation. Dean, 2022 WL 2711255, at *7 (citing Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 243(3)); see also Kerrigan v. Otsuka Am. Pharm., Inc., 560 F. App’x 162,
at *3 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014) (“While we are not bound by unpublished state court decisions, we may
look to them as persuasive authority when ascertaining state law.”). At this time, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has not explicitly held whether a breach of an installment contract by non-payment
may constitute a “total” breach permitting recovery of one lump sum of monetary benefits if
accompanied by anticipatory repudiation. As the Arbitrator did not find Respondents alleged
breach was accompanied by a repudiation (see generally ECF No. 1-5), however, this Court need
not determine how the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold, if presented with the proper action.
Here, the Operating Agreement does not contain an acceleration clause. (See generally ECF No.
1-1.) As noted above, the Arbitrator did not find Respondents breach of contract was accompanied
by an anticipatory repudiation. (See generally ECF No. 1-5.) In an email dated July 13, 2023,
Respondents wrote: “we will owe you would be 40% of the royalty minus the expenses, for the
remaining term of the 6 or 7 [f]ranchised stores.” (ECF No. 1-5 ¶ 85.) And, on January 12, 2024,
Respondents wrote:
You will be eligible for 40% of the royalties collected ‘‘for any
franchise stores they have established’’ per the contract.
We differ in our interpretation of the language here.
• Per my interpretation Providence RI, Metuchen, NJ
and Manalapan, NJ are eligible as these were signed
up by Devin. The subsequent 4 were entirely fruits of
my effort.
• Per your interpretation, all seven should be
included.
Per the contract such disagreements may be decided by an Arbitrator
only and their decision is binding on all.
(ECF No. 1-5 ¶ 86.) Neither of these emails suggest an anticipation to repudiate future payments.
Rather, these emails merely suggest a disagreement as to the applicable number of franchise
restaurants, which appears to this Court to have been a reasonable disagreement as neither
Petitioner nor Respondents were ultimately correct in their interpretation. (Compare ECF No. 1-5
¶ 86 (Petitioner arguing the applicable number to be seven), and id. (Respondents arguing the
applicable number to be four), with id. ¶ 161 (Arbitrator finding the applicable number to be six).)
Therefore, the Court finds neither exception applies to the installment contract rule and, as such, a
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July 13, 2022) (quoting In re Est. of Balk, 138 A.3d at 576); see also R.C. Beeson, Inc. v. Coca
Cola Co., 337 F. App’x 241, 244 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] missed payment[] is insufficient to constitute
a ‘total breach’ of the agreement . . . .”). Rather, “claims based on installment contracts or other
divisible, installment-type payment requirements accrue with each subsequent installment” and “a
plaintiff may sue for each breach only as it occurs.” In re Est. of Balk, 138 A.3d at 576 (emphasis
added) (quoting Cnty. of Morris v. Fauver, 707 A.3d 958, 971 (N.J. 1998)); see also Berkley Risk
Sols., LLC v. Indus. Re-Int’l, Inc., No. A-2366-15, 2017 WL 4159170, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Sept. 20, 2017) (“[A] cause of action accrues on the date upon which the right to institute and
maintain a suit first arises.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Courts have used the ‘installment
contract’ approach in a variety of situations,” Metromedia Co. v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 655
A.2d 1379, 1381 (N.J. 1995), including, but not limited to, claims for future profits and interests
in royalites, see, e.g., R.C. Beeson, 337 F. App’x at 243.
Here, the Operating Agreement is an installment contract which requires Respondents to
pay Petitioner 40% of the royalties earned at the six franchise stores established prior to February
1, 2024. (See ECF No. 1-5 ¶¶ 106–07; accord ECF No. 1-1 § V(B)); see also Dean, 2022 WL
2711255, at *7 (applying the installment contract rule “where one party has fully performed his
[or her] undertaking, and all that remains for the opposite party to do is to pay a certain sum of
money at a certain time or times” (quoting Phelps v. Herro, 137 A.2d 159, 164 (Md. 1957)); see
also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 243(3) (applying the installment contract rule “[w]here
at the time of the breach the only remaining duties of performance are those of the party in breach
and are for the payment of money in installments not related to one another”). On February 1,
breach of the Operating Agreement cannot constitute a “total” breach permitting recovery of one
lump sum of monetary benefits.
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2024, Respondents failed to pay Petitioner said royalties and, as a result, a breach of contract claim
accrued. (ECF No. 1-5 ¶ 145; but see ECF No. 1-1 § VIII(1) (requiring profits to be distributed to
the members within ten business days of the last day of January).) Pursuant to the installment
contract rule, however, only a “partial” breach of contract claim accrued at the time, which merely
entitled Petitioner to seek a remedy of specific performance. See Cipala I, 806 A.2d at 823; Cipala
II, 843 A.2d at 1072–73; see also In re Est. of Balk, 138 A.3d at 576; accord Dean, 2022 WL
2711255, at *6; R.C. Beeson, 337 F. App’x at 244. Accordingly, as a “total” breach of contract
claim had not accrued under the installment contract rule, the Arbitrator exceeded his powers by
awarding damages in conflict with well-established New Jersey law.
Having determined the Arbitrator exceeded his powers by prematurely reviewing a claim
for “total” breach of the Operating Agreement, the Court need not review whether the damages
awarded were in fact speculative, in conflict with public policy.
For the above stated reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion to Confirm the Award
and GRANTS Respondents’ Cross-Motion to Vacate the Award. and the matter is REMANDED
to the AAA for additional arbitration proceedings.
2. New Jersey Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
It is well-established an LLC is a “form of unincorporated business organization that
provides corporate-style limited liability to its owners, while affording the owners the partnership-
like capacity to structure the entity by agreement rather than as prescribed by statute.” Patel v.
New Jersey Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of Revenue & Enter. Servs., 318 A.3d 685, 688–89 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2024) (quoting Assemb. Regul. Oversight & Gaming Comm. Statement to A. 1543
(Jan. 30, 2012)); see also Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 1988)
(“We begin with the fundamental propositions that a corporation is a separate entity from its
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shareholders and that a primary reason for incorporation is the insulation of shareholders from the
liabilities of the corporate enterprise.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting State, Dep’t of Environ.
Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.3d 150, 164 (N.J. 1983))). “As a result, LLCs have become the
business entity form of choice for new businesses, and far more . . . LLCs have been formed in
recent years than corporations and limited partnerships combined.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-1
Editor’s Notes (Jan. 30, 2012).
An LLC organized and governed under the laws of New Jersey is subject to the Revised
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (“NJ RULLCA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-1, et seq. See
also IE Test, LLC v. Carroll, 140 A.3d 1268, 1275 n.3 (N.J. 2016) (“All LLCs in New Jersey are
now subject to the [NJ] RULLCA”). Pursuant to the NJ RULLCA, a NJ LLC may be operated
under the terms of an operating agreement, which governs: (1) the relations among the members;
(2) the rights and duties of a manager; (3) the activities of the LLC and the conduct of same; and
(4) the means and conditions to amend the agreement. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-11(a); see also N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-11(i) (requiring the NJ RULLCA “to be liberally construed to give the
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of operating
agreements”); but see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-11(c) (providing eleven statutory limits to the scope
of an operating agreement). The NJ RULLCA defines the term “operating agreement” broadly to
include any agreement, “whether or not referred to as an operating agreement and whether oral, in
a record, implied, or in any combination thereof, of all the members of a[n] [LLC].” N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 42:2C-2; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-2(c) (permitting a preformation operation agreement).
In the absence of an operating agreement, or to the extent such an agreement does not otherwise
provide for a matter, the default provisions of the NJ RULLCA shall apply. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§
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42:2C-11(b), -37; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-18 (requiring merely a certificate of formation
to form an LLC).
The Franchise Company is a NJ LLC. (See ECF No. 4-2 at 32–41; accord ECF No. 1-1 §§
III, XI(1).) Prior to and following the formation of the Franchise Company, all members of the NJ
LLC agreed to the terms of the Operating Agreement. (See generally ECF Nos. 1-1, 1-2); see, e.g.,
Premier Physician Network, LLC v. Maro, 256 A.3d 1069, 1076 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2021)
(recognizing an agreement as an operating agreement if all existing members agree to the terms of
same); Garlapathi v. Kamishetty, No. A-4417-19, 2021 WL 4851294, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Oct. 19, 2021) (recognizing a “partnership agreement” as an operating agreement); Flor v.
Greenberg Farrow Architectual Inc., No. A-2208-20, 2023 WL 7036278, at *15 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Oct. 26, 2023) (recognizing an agreement to create an LLC as an operating agreement);
Williamsberg v. Aparri, LLC, No. A-3996-21, 2023 WL 8889303, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Dec. 26, 2023) (recognizing a draft agreement as an operating agreement where members agreed
to terms of same orally). Therefore, the Franchise Company is to be operated under the terms of
the Operating Agreement and, to the extent the agreement does not provide otherwise, the default
provisions of the NJ RULLCA. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 42:2C-2, -11; see also N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 42:2C-1 Editor’s Notes (Jan. 30, 2012) (identifying the NJ RULLCA as a “second generation”
LLC statute, which provides “a series of ‘default rules’ that govern the relations among the
members in situations they have not addressed in their operating agreement”).
In relevant part, the Operating Agreement read in conjunction with the NJ RULLCA
provide the following. First, upon formation, both Petitioner and Respondents were
members/managers (“members”) of the Franchise Company. (ECF No. 1-1 §§ III, VI ¶ 6, XI ¶ 1;
accord ECF No. 4-2 at 32–41 (identifying Petitioner and Respondents as
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“[m]embers/[m]anagers”)); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-2 (defining the terms “member” and
“manager”). The Operating Agreement provided each member with a transferable interest to
receive net profits according to his or her respective ownership interest, which were to be
distributed to the members on a yearly basis from a joint distribution account. (ECF No. 1-1 §§
VIII ¶ 1, IX ¶¶ 2–3); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-2 (defining the term “distribution” to mean
“a transfer of money or other property from [the] [LLC] to another person on account of a
transferable interest”); id. (defining the term “transferable interest” to mean “the right, as originally
associated with a person’s capacity as a member, to receive distributions from a limited liability
company in accordance with the operating agreement, whether or not the person remains a
member”). Petitioner, however, would be dissociated as a member if twenty franchise stores were
not established within fifty-two months of the formation. (ECF No. 1-1 § V ¶ B); see also N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-46(b) (permitting dissociation if “[a]n event stated in the operating agreement
as causing the [member]’s dissociation occurs”).
Next, upon dissociation, Petitioner ceases to be a member of the Franchise Company. (See
ECF No. 1-1 § V ¶ B); accord N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-2. However, Petitioner retains a right “to
receive 40% of the royalties for any franchise stores established during the fifty four month
period.” (ECF No. 1-2); accord N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-2. As the Operating Agreement does not
define the term royalties or provide when said royalties are to be distributed, the NJ RULLCA
governs such matters. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 42:2C-11(b). Importantly, Petitioner’s right to receive
royalties is a “transferable interest,” which must be “distributed.” See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-2;
(see also ECF No. 1-1 § IX ¶ 2 (stating money paid to the parities are to be distributed from the
joint distribution account).) Pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-35, in relevant part, a NJ LLC
“may not make a distribution if after the distribution” the LLC “would not be able to pay its debts
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as they become due in the ordinary course of the [LLC]’s activities.”7 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-
35(a)(1). Therefore, a plain reading of the Operating Agreement in conjunction with the default
provisions of the NJ RULLCA provides Petitioner is entitled to a distribution of his transferable
interest—40% of the royalties for the six franchise stores established during the fifty four month
period—if, and only if, the distribution of same would not render the Franchise Company unable
to pay its debts in the ordinary course of its activities, which are to be distributed directly from the
Franchise Company’s distribution account.8
Finally, the Operating Agreement contains no provisions either eliminating or limiting a
member’s insulation from personal liability and, as such, adopts the NJ RULLCA provisions on
this issue. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-11(g) (permitting “[t]he operating agreement [to] alter or
eliminate the indemnification for a member”). The NJ RULLCA insulates a member from personal
liability absent extraordinary circumstances, “such as fraud or injustice, [which] warrant piercing
the corporate veil.” AV Design Servs., 2021 WL 1186842, at *9 (citing Torres v. Mbogo, No. A-
4671-18, 2020 WL 6112958, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 16, 2020); accord N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 42:2C-30(a); but see N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 42:2C-11(c)(4), -38(c) (requiring the limited
7 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-35 also provides the term “distribution” “does not include amounts
constituting reasonable compensation for present or past services or reasonable payments made in
the ordinary course of business under a bona fide retirement plan or other benefits program.” N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-35(g). Here, Petitioner’s 40% interest in royalties does not constitute as either
reasonable compensation or payment under a benefits program.
8 The Arbitrator determined Petitioner is entitled to gross royalties rather than net royalties. (ECF
No. 1-5 ¶ 166.) Pursuant to the broad deference allocated to an arbitrator in the interpretation of
an agreement, the Court accepts the Arbitrator’s determination that the term royalties refers to
gross royalties and not net royalties. However, pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-35, the royalties
may only be distributed if the distribution of same would not interfere with the Franchise
Company’s ability to pay its debts in the ordinary course of its activities.
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liability company to indemnify a representative unless the representative breached the duties of
loyalty or care). Specifically, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2C-30(a) provides:
The debts, obligations, or other liabilities of a limited liability
company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise:
(1) are solely the debts, obligations, or other
liabilities of the company; and
(2) do not become the debts, obligations, or other
liabilities of a member or manager solely by reason
of the member acting as a member or manager acting
as a manager.
However, a member may waive his or her insulation from personal liability under the NJ RULLCA
if done so voluntarily and intentionally. See Knorr v. Smeal, 836 A.2d 794, 798 (N.J. 2003)
(arguing waiver of the Affidavit of Merit statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-1, et seq.). “An effective
waiver requires a [member] to have full knowledge of his [or her] legal rights and intent to
surrender those rights.” Id. Although intent need not be stated expressly, the circumstances must
objectively demonstrate the member knew of his or her right and then abandoned it “clearly,
unequivocally, and decisively.” Id.; Sroczynski v. Milek, 961 A.2d 704, 721 (N.J. 2008) (Rivera-
Soto, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A waiver cannot be divined but, instead, must
be the product of objective proofs . . . .”); Fauver, 707 A.2d at 970 (“[W]aiver cannot be predicated
on consent given under a mistake of fact.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The party asserting
the doctrines of either waiver or corporate veil piercing bears the burden of establishing same. See
Richard A. Pulaski Const. Co. v. Air Frame Hangars, Inc., 950 A.2d 868, 878 (N.J. 2008);
Baldinger v. Baldinger, No. A-1733-09, 2011 WL 2637005, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July
7, 2011).
Here, the breach of contract claim could not be maintained against Respondents as a matter
of law absent either waiver or extraordinary circumstances warranting the piercing of the corporate
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veil.9 In response, the Arbitrator argues Respondents waived their right to insulation from personal
liability under the NJ RULLCA by failing to assert either: (a) “[the Franchise Company] was a
necessary party [to the arbitration]” (see ECF No. 1-6 ¶¶ 6–7); or (b) “there [wa]s no basis to pierce
the corporate veil” (id. ¶ 7).10 However, Petitioner—not Respondents—had the obligation to assert
the doctrines of waiver and corporate veil piercing. (See generally ECF No. 1-3.) Furthermore, the
Arbitrator was required to conduct a preliminary hearing, Am. Arb. Ass’n, Commercial
Arbitration Rules & Mediation Procedures (“CAR”), R-22 (Sept. 1, 2022), available at
https://perma.cc/J5QK-6NJM, during which the Arbitrator was to address “whether all necessary
or appropriate parties [we]re included in the arbitration.” Id. at 36 ¶ P-2(a)(ii). Accordingly, as
neither Petitioner nor the Arbitrator addressed the issue of personal liability prior to the Award,
the Arbitrator exceeded his powers by awarding damages against Respondents personally in
conflict with the NJ RULLCA and the well-established fundamental purpose for incorporation,
i.e., insulation from personal liability.
For the above stated reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Confirm the Award is DENIED,
Respondents’ Cross-Motion to Vacate the Award is GRANTED, and the matter is REMANDED
to the AAA for additional arbitration proceedings.
9 The Arbitrator claims Respondents did not argue prior to the issuance of the Award “there is no
basis to pierce the corporate veil.” (ECF No. 1-6 ¶ 7.) It is well-established under New Jersey law,
however, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is an equitable remedy, not an affirmative
defense. Richard A. Pulaski Const. Co., 950 A.2d at 877-78. Furthermore, “[t]he party seeking to
pierce the corporate veil bears the burden of proof.” Id. (quoting Tung v. Briant Park Homes, Inc.,
670 A.2d 1092, 1096 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). Therefore, Petitioner and not Respondents
was required to assert the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and to establish a basis for same.
10 The Arbitrator also argues although the Operation Agreement provides for distribution of the
interest in royalties, it does not state the Franchise Company “is the obligor for those payments.”
(ECF No. 1-6 ¶ 7; but see ECF No. 1-1 § IX ¶¶ 2–3 (providing the royalties were to be deposited
into the Franchise Company’s joint distribution accounts and all distributions were to be
distributed from same).)
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C. Attorneys’ Fees & Arbitration Costs
Any award of attorneys’ fees and costs “must start from the proposition that New Jersey
has a strong public policy against the shifting of costs and that th[e] [New Jersey Supreme] Court
has embraced that policy by adopting the ‘American Rule,’ which prohibits recovery of counsel
fees by the prevailing party against the losing party.” Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 982
A.2d 420, 439–40 (N.J. 2009) (quoting In re Est. of Vayda, 875 A.2d 925, 928 (N.J. 2005)). “Under
the American Rule, which is the law of [New Jersey], a prevailing party may not be granted
attorney’s fees unless authorized by the parties’ contract, court rule, or statute.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rock Work, Inc. v. Pulaski Const. Co., Inc., 933 A.2d 988, 991
(App. Div. 2007)). “The [American] [R]ule promotes three goals: (1) unrestricted access to the
courts for all persons; (2) ensuring equity by not penalizing persons for exercising their right to
litigate a dispute, even if they should lose; and (3) administrative convenience.” Boyle v. Huff, 314
A.3d 793, 799 n.5 (N.J. 2024) (quoting In re Niles Tr., 823 A.2d 1, 8 (N.J. 2003)). The New Jersey
Supreme Court has only recognized four exceptions to this rule permitting fee-shifting pursuant
to: (1) statutes; (2) court rules; (3) principals of fiduciary malfeasance; and (4) the parties’ contract.
Litton Indus., 982 A.2d at 439–40.
Relevant to this matter, New Jersey recognizes “a party may agree by contract to pay
attorneys’ fees.” Id. (quoting N. Bergen Rex Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 730 A.2d 843,
848 (N.J. 1999)). However, “even where attorney-fee shifting is controlled by contractual
provisions, courts will strictly construe that provision in light of the general policy disfavoring the
award of attorneys’ fees.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the courts have upheld
fee-shifting only if expressly provided for within the parties’ contract—i.e., “the American Rule
will prevail in arbitration unless the parties otherwise agree.” Rock Work, 933 A.2d at 996; accord
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Mitschele v. Wilf/Mitschele Joint Venture, No. A-777-18, 2020 WL 2121574, at *10–11 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. May 5, 2020) (holding the arbitrator did not have the authority to award
attorneys’ fees solely pursuant to the AAA Rules); but see Zecca v. Monterey Condo. Ass’n, Inc.,
No. A-4531-18, 2020 WL 2177053, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 6, 2020) (holding the
arbitrator had the authority to award attorneys’ fees pursuant to the AAA Rules pursuant to the
terms of Court order).
Here, fee-shifting is not expressly provided for within the General Partnership Agreement.
(See generally ECF No. 1-1.) Rather, the Arbitrator awarded attorneys’ fees and costs as the parties
agreed to arbitrate in accordance with the rules of the AAA (id. § XI ¶ 2); and AAA Rule 49(d)(2)
states attorneys’ fees and costs may be awarded “if all parties have requested such an award” (ECF
No. 1-5 ¶ 138). New Jersey courts, however, have specifically held an agreement to arbitrate in
accordance with the rules of an arbitrator to be insufficient to provide an arbitrator with the
authority to award attorneys’ fees and costs. Rock Work, 933 A.2d at 995–96. Rather, an arbitrator
may only fee-shift if the parties’ contract expressly authorizes same. Id. at 996. Accordingly, as
the Arbitrator awarded attorneys’ fees and costs absent an express provision in the Operating
Agreement authorizing same, the Arbitrator exceeded his powers in conflict with well-established
New Jersey law. See, e.g., see, e.g., Regan v. Conway, No. A-1962-22, 2025 WL 1021308, at *1,
14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 7, 2025); Delaware River Port Auth. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police
Penn-Jersey Lodge No. 30, No. A-4473-16, 2018 WL 4761907, at *5–6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Oct. 3, 2018).
For the above stated reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Confirm the Award is DENIED and
Respondents’ Cross-Motion to Vacate the Award is GRANTED. and the matter is REMANDED
to the AAA for additional arbitration proceedings.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner’s Motion to Confirm is DENIED, Respondents’
Motion to Vacate is GRANTED, and the matter is REMANDED to the AAA for additional
arbitration proceedings and further evaluation consistent with this Opinion. An appropriate order
follows.
Date: January 13, 2026 /s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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