OAK KNOLL SCHOOL OF HOLY CHILD v. REPUBLIC FRANKLIN INSURANCE GROUP

2:25-cv-13186Njd19 de fev. de 2026

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UNITED 	STATES 	DISTRICT 	COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
OAK KNOLL 	SCHOOL 	OF 	THE 	HOLY
CHILD,
Plaintiff,
v.
UTICA NATIONAL 	INSURANCE 	GROUP,
Defendant.
*
No. 	25-cv-13186 	(MEF) (SDA)
OPINION and ORDER
* 	*
For 	the 	purposes 	of 	this 	Opinion 	and 	Order, 	the 	Court 	largely
assumes 	familiarity 	with 	the 	procedural 	history 	and 	allegations
of 	this 	case.
* 	* 	*
The 	case 	in 	a 	nutshell:
A school 1 	found 	broken 	glass 	embedded 	in 	a 	grass 	field 	it 	owned.
See 	Complaint 	for 	Declaratory 	Judgment 	("Complaint") 	(ECF 	1-2)
~~ 	1, 	12, 	13. 	So 	the 	school 	filed 	a 	claim with 	its 	insurance
company. 2 	See 	id. 	~ 12.
The 	school 	cited 	the 	following 	provision 	of 	the 	governing
insurance 	policy: 	"We 	[the 	insurance 	company] 	will 	pay 	your
1 	Oak 	Knoll 	School 	of 	The 	Holy 	Child.
2 	The 	complaint 	calls 	the 	relevant 	insurance 	company 	the 	"Utica
National 	Insurance 	Group." 	In 	response, 	the 	insurance 	company
says 	that 	it 	was 	"incorrectly 	identified," 	Notice 	of Motion 	to
Dismiss 	Pursuant 	to 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	Pro. 	12 (b) (6) 	(ECF 	4), 	and 	that
"Republic 	Franklin 	Insurance 	Group" 	should have 	been 	named 	as
the 	defendant 	instead. 	Id. 	This 	can be 	resolved 	later, 	as 	the
litigation 	progresses.
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expense 	to 	extract 	'pollutants' 	from 	[school] 	land." 	Id. 	i 	9;
accord 	Exhibits 	A-F 	(ECF 	4-3) 	at 	77. 	And 	per 	the 	policy,
"[p]ollutants" 	are 	defined 	as 	"any 	solid. 	. 	irritant 	or
contaminant, 	including 	. 	waste." 	Complaint 	i 	10; 	accord
Exhibits 	A-Fat 	88.
Coverage 	was 	denied, 	see 	id. 	ii 	14, 	18, 	20, 	and 	the 	school 	sued
the 	insurance 	company. 	See 	id. 	at 	1. 3
From here, 	the 	school 	is 	called 	"the 	Plaintiff" 	and 	the
insurance 	company 	is 	called 	"the 	Defendant."
The 	Defendant 	moves 	to 	dismiss 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil
Procedure 	12(b) (6). 	See 	Notice 	of Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	Pursuant 	to
Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	Pro. 	12 (b) (6) 	(ECF 	4).
The motion 	is 	denied.
* 	* 	*
The 	question 	here 	is 	whether 	glass 	removal 	is 	covered by 	the
above-quoted 	policy 	provision.
Yes, 	says 	the 	Plaintiff 	--- 	and 	therefore 	the 	Defendant's 	motion
to 	dismiss 	should be 	denied. 	Broken 	glass, 	the 	argument 	goes,
is 	"a 	solid material 	. 	[that] 	irritates 	and 	contaminates 	the
surface 	of 	the 	insured 	property" 	and 	"constitutes 	waste 	that
must 	be 	removed 	and 	discarded." 	Plaintiff's 	Opposition 	to
Defendant's 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	("Plaintiff's 	Opposition") 	(ECF 	5)
at 	4.
Glass 	does 	not 	count, 	argues 	the 	Defendant, 	and 	therefore 	its
motion 	should be 	granted. 	"There 	is 	no 	connection, 	real 	or
alleged, 	between 	the 	glass 	and 	an 	environmental 	hazard,
incident, 	or 	catastrophe," 	and 	under 	a 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court
decision, 4 	the 	Defendant 	contends, 	that 	sort 	of 	connection 	is
required 	for 	a 	claim under 	the 	pollution 	clause 	the 	Plaintiff
invokes. 	Memorandum 	of 	Law 	in 	Support 	of 	Defendant, 	Republic 	of
Franklin 	Insurance 	Group 	Incorrectly 	Identified 	as 	Utica
National 	Insurance 	Group's 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	Pursuant 	to 	Fed. 	R.
Civ. 	Pro. 	12(b) (6) 	("Defendant's 	Brief") 	(ECF 	4-2) 	at 	11-14.
* 	* 	*
3 	The 	lawsuit 	started 	off 	in 	a 	New 	Jersey 	state 	court, 	but 	was
removed 	here. 	See 	Notice 	of 	Removal 	(ECF 	1).
4 	More 	on 	the 	case 	later.
2
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The 	parties' 	briefs 	assume 	that 	New 	Jersey 	law 	governs 	their
dispute. 	See 	Defendant's 	Brief 	at 	9; 	Plaintiff's 	Opposition 	at
3-6. 	So 	it 	does. 	See 	Wiggins 	v. 	Netflix, 	Inc., 	2026 WL 	114377,
at 	*1 	n.4 	(D.N.J. 	Jan. 	14, 	2026) . 5
"[T]he 	decisions 	of 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court 	are 	the
authoritative 	source" 	of 	New 	Jersey 	law. 	Navigators 	Specialty
Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Citizens 	Ins. 	Co. 	of Am., 	739 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	259, 	265
(D.N.J. 	2024) 	(cleaned 	up); 	accord, 	e.g., 	Smith 	v. 	CitiMortgage,
Inc., 	702 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	247, 	256 	(D.N.J. 	2023); 	Pim Brands, 	Inc.
v. 	New 	Cibo 	Vita 	LLC, 	2025 	WL 	2938602, 	at 	*1 	(D.N.J. 	Oct. 	16,
2025).
But 	there 	is 	no 	"controlling," 	Popa 	v. 	Harriet 	Carter 	Gifts,
Inc., 	52 	F.4th 	121, 	125 	(3d 	Cir. 	2022), 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court
decision 	as 	to 	the 	question 	on 	the 	table 	--- 	namely, 	whether
broken 	glass 	counts 	as 	a 	"pollutant" 	for 	an 	insurance 	policy
worded 	roughly 	like 	this 	one.
Therefore, 	the 	Court 	"must 	'predict' 	how 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of
New 	Jersey 	will 	eventually 	resolve 	this 	issue." 	Navigators, 	739
F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	265 	(cleaned up).
In 	doing 	so, 	the 	Court 	can 	look 	to 	"a 	range 	of 	sources."
Schulman 	v. 	Zoetis, 	684 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	275, 	278 	(D.N.J. 	2023).
* 	* 	*
The 	Court 	first 	considers 	lower-court 	decisions 	that 	construe
New 	Jersey 	law 	--- 	state 	court 	decisions, 	see 	Pim Brands, 	2025
WL 	2938602, 	at 	*5, 	and 	federal 	court 	ones. 	See 	Navigators, 	739
F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	267; 	Badalamenti 	v. 	Resideo 	Techs., 	Inc., 	2025 	WL
3013023, 	at 	*7 	(D.N.J. 	Oct. 	28, 	2025).
But 	the 	parties 	point 	to 	no 	cases 	in 	which 	a 	court 	has 	issued 	a
ruling 	on 	whether, 	under 	New 	Jersey 	law, 	broken 	glass 	is 	covered
under 	pollution provisions 	like 	the 	one 	here.
5 	There 	may be 	outer 	limits 	to 	the 	idea 	that 	the 	parties'
assumed 	choice 	of 	law 	can 	fix 	choice 	of 	law 	in 	place. 	See
Chapman 	v. 	Salesforce, 	Inc., 	2026 WL 	74192, 	at 	*l 	n.4 	(D.N.J.
Jan. 	9, 	2026). 	But 	even 	if 	there 	are 	such 	limits, 	they 	are 	not
exceeded 	here. 	New 	Jersey 	law 	is 	invoked 	and 	there 	is 	a 	real
connection 	to 	New 	Jersey 	--- 	the 	Plaintiff-school 	is 	located
here. 	See 	Complaint~ 	1.
3
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The 	Court's 	search 	has 	not 	turned 	up 	any 	on-point 	New 	Jersey 	law
cases, 	either.
* 	* 	*
Second, 	the 	Court 	looks 	to 	how 	other 	bodies 	of 	law 	treat 	the
legal 	issue 	in 	play.
A look 	to 	the 	law 	from 	other 	parts 	of 	the 	Nation 	is 	useful 	as 	a
general 	matter 	for 	predicting 	how 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court
would 	resolve 	an 	open 	question 	of 	New 	Jersey 	law. 	See 	Tryp
Hotels 	Worldwide, 	Inc. 	v. 	Sebastian 	Hotel, 	LLC, 	726 	F. 	Supp. 	3d
373, 	388 	(D.N.J. 	2024); 	Howard 	v. 	Wells 	Fargo 	Bank, 	N.A., 	733 	F.
Supp. 	3d 	352, 	357 	(D.N.J. 	2024), 	aff'd, 	2024 	WL 	4890984 	(3d 	Cir.
Nov. 	26, 	2024).
And 	it 	is 	especially useful 	in 	predicting 	how 	the 	New 	Jersey
Supreme 	Court 	would 	resolve 	an 	open 	question 	of New 	Jersey
insurance-coverage 	law. 	See 	generally 	Navigators, 	739 	F. 	Supp.
3d 	at 	268-69; 	Badalamenti 	v. 	Resideo 	Techs., 	Inc., 	755 	F. 	Supp.
3d 	534, 	542 	n.11 	(D.N.J. 	2024).
After 	all, 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court 	routinely 	looks 	to 	the
law 	of 	other 	states 	to 	work 	through 	insurance-coverage
questions, 	particularly when 	they 	relate 	to 	standard-form
insurance 	contracts, 	like 	the 	one 	here. 	See, 	e.g., 	Cypress
Point 	Condo. 	Ass'n, 	Inc. 	v. 	Adria 	Towers, 	L.L.C., 	226 	N.J. 	403,
421-24 	(2016) 	(looking 	to 	a 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	Florida 	decision);
Morton 	Int'l, 	Inc. 	v. 	Gen. 	Accident 	Ins. 	Co. 	of Am., 	134 	N.J. 	1,
23-27 	( 1993) 	(to 	"numerous 	federal 	and 	state 	court []"
decisions); 	Chubb 	Custom 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Prudential 	Ins. 	Co. 	of Am.,
195 	N.J. 	231, 	242-44 	(2008) 	(to 	"consensus 	among 	our 	sister
jurisdictions").
And 	"[t]o 	accurately 	predict 	how 	a 	state 	supreme 	court 	will 	rule
on 	an 	open 	legal 	question, 	a 	federal 	court 	should 	generally
analyze 	the 	question 	using 	the 	same 	interpretative 	approach" 	---
here, 	looking 	to 	other 	states' 	laws 	--- 	"that 	the 	state 	supreme
court 	applies 	in 	the 	relevant 	area 	of 	the 	law." 	Navigators, 	739
F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	268. 6
6 	Why 	does 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court 	look 	to 	the 	law 	of 	other
states 	to 	guide 	the 	development 	of 	New 	Jersey 	insurance-coverage
law? 	Consider 	one 	possible 	answer 	here. 	An 	upside 	to 	having
standardized 	contracts 	available, 	ones 	that 	can 	simply be 	pulled
down 	off 	the 	rack 	and 	used, 	is 	lower 	transaction 	costs. 	If 	a
4
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fresh 	contract 	does 	not 	need writing 	from 	scratch 	every 	time
someone 	wants 	to, 	say, 	rent 	a 	car 	--- 	that 	means 	that 	less 	money
and 	time 	need 	to 	be 	spent 	on 	negotiating 	and 	drafting. 	(This
is, 	in 	part, 	why 	"form books" 	have 	long 	been 	relied 	on, 	see 	John
F. 	Coyle, 	A Short 	History 	of 	the 	Choice-of-Law 	Clause, 	91 	U.
Colo. 	L. 	Rev. 	1147, 	1170-74 	(2020), 	and why 	people 	look 	to
materials 	produced by 	entities 	like 	Nolo.) 	Insurance 	contracts
are 	no 	exception 	to 	any 	of 	this. 	Standardizing 	insurance
contracts 	also 	lowers 	transaction 	costs. 	See, 	e.g., 	Stephen 	J.
Ware, 	Comment, 	A Critique 	of 	the 	Reasonable 	Expectations
Doctrine, 	56 	U. 	Chi. 	L. 	Rev. 	1461, 	1477-78 	(1989); 	Jeffrey W.
Stempel, 	Reassessing 	the 	"Sophisticated" 	Policyholder 	Defense 	in
Insurance 	Coverage 	Litigation, 	42 	Drake 	L. 	Rev. 	807, 	830 	(1993)
But 	what 	standardized 	insurance-contract 	language 	gives 	on 	the
front-end, 	judicial 	interpretation 	can 	take 	away 	on 	the 	back-
end. 	As 	noted, 	contracting parties 	can 	reach 	for 	the 	standard
form 	if 	they 	want 	to, 	and 	save 	on 	transaction 	costs. 	But 	if
judges 	then 	interpret 	the 	standard 	form's 	terms 	(like, 	say,
"commercial" 	or 	"residence") 	in 	a 	great 	many 	disparate 	ways 	---
that 	can 	fritter 	away 	the 	upfront 	cost 	savings. 	A too-large
multiplicity 	of 	interpretations 	can 	breed 	uncertainty;
uncertainty 	can 	facilitate 	dispute; 	and 	dispute 	costs. 	Money
that 	did 	not 	need 	paying 	to 	transactional 	lawyers 	to 	draft 	an
agreement 	at 	time 	one 	(because 	a 	standard 	form 	was 	used) 	might
be 	spent 	anyway 	--- 	at 	time 	two, 	on 	litigators, 	to 	argue 	in
court 	about 	what 	"commercial" 	and 	"residence" 	mean.
Standardized 	judicial 	interpretation 	of 	key 	contractual 	terms
can 	help 	to 	ensure 	that 	transaction 	costs 	that 	were 	saved 	stay
saved 	--- 	and 	do 	not 	just 	reemerge 	in 	another 	form 	later, 	as
litigation 	costs. 	All 	of 	this 	is 	part 	of 	why 	judges 	are
required 	to 	follow 	precedent 	in 	the 	contract-law 	context, 	to
generate 	interpretations 	of 	key 	contractual 	terms 	that 	converge
(standardize) 	over 	time. 	And 	all 	of 	this 	may 	well 	be 	why, 	in
insurance-coverage 	cases, 	the 	law 	of 	one 	state 	is 	generally
guided, 	in 	part, 	by 	the 	law 	of 	other 	states. 	After 	all, 	the
"insurance 	business 	is 	mainly 	conducted 	across 	state 	lines."
Robert 	L. 	Stern, 	The 	Commerce 	Clause 	and 	the 	National 	Economy,
1933-1946 	Part 	Two, 	59 	Harv. 	L. 	Rev. 	883, 	909 	(1946). 	So 	if
courts 	are 	aiming 	to 	reduce 	overall 	uncertainty 	as 	to 	what
"commercial" 	or 	"residence" mean, 	it 	may make 	sense 	to 	try 	to
iron 	out 	some 	of 	the 	differences 	between 	one 	body 	of 	law 	and
others. 	And 	that 	can be 	accomplished, 	in 	part, 	by 	allowing 	the
development 	of 	this 	body 	of 	law 	to 	be 	influenced by 	the 	content
of 	those 	bodies 	of 	law. 	That 	seems 	to 	be 	New 	Jersey's 	approach,
as 	set 	out 	in 	the 	text. 	And 	it 	is 	the 	approach 	of 	other 	states,
too. 	See, 	e.g., 	Nat'l 	Union 	Fire 	Ins. 	Co. 	of 	Pittsburgh 	v. 	CBI
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But 	this 	is 	a 	dead 	end.
The 	parties 	have 	not 	identified 	any 	decisions 	from 	other
jurisdictions 	that 	address 	whether 	broken 	glass 	is 	included 	in
the 	term 	"pollutants." 	And 	the 	Court 	had 	not 	found 	any, 	either.
* 	* 	*
Third, 	the 	Court 	can 	look 	to 	how 	the 	law 	addresses 	analogous
issues. 	See 	Spence 	v. 	ESAB 	Grp., 	Inc., 	623 	F.3d 	212, 	216 	(3d
Cir. 	2010); 	Norfolk 	S. 	Ry. 	Co. 	v. 	Basell 	USA 	Inc., 	512 	F.3d 	86,
92 	(3d 	Cir. 	2008); 	Koppers 	Co. 	v. 	Aetna 	Cas. 	& Sur. 	Co., 	98 	F.3d
1440, 	1445 	(3d 	Cir. 	1996); 	Howard, 	733 	F. 	Supp. 	3d at 	358
("Where 	a 	legal 	problem. 	. 	is 	handled 	in 	a 	certain 	way 	in 	one
area 	of 	law 	. 	--- 	that 	can 	suggest 	it 	will 	be 	handled 	in 	a
similar 	way 	in 	another, 	closely-adjacent 	area 	of 	law[.]").
As 	noted, 	there 	do 	not 	seem to 	be 	any 	decided 	cases 	as 	to
whether 	glass 	removal 	is 	covered 	under 	an 	insurance 	policy 	like
the 	one 	at 	issue 	here.
But 	what 	about 	analogous 	substances? 7
Courts 	have 	assessed whether 	an 	insurance 	policy worded 	roughly
like 	the 	one 	here 	relates 	to 	the 	removal 	of 	substances 	that 	are
arguably 	akin 	to 	the 	broken 	glass 	at 	the 	school.
What 	kinds 	of 	substances 	are 	potentially 	analogous 	to 	the 	broken
glass?
Solid 	substances 	that, 	when 	present 	in 	sufficient 	bulk 	or
volume, 	alter 	the 	pre-existing 	(and 	expected) 	character 	of 	a
plot 	of 	land 8 	and markedly 	limit 	its 	ordinary 	(and 	expected) 	use.
In most 	of 	the 	cases 	involving 	those 	sorts 	of 	solid 	substances,
courts 	have 	held 	that 	the 	substance 	counts 	as 	a 	"pollutant."
See 	Ortega 	Rock Quarry 	v. 	Golden 	Eagle 	Ins. 	Corp., 	141 	Cal. 	App.
4th 	969, 	979-80, 	990 	(2006) 	(dirt 	and 	rocks); 	Pa. 	Nat. 	Mut. 	Cas.
Indus., 	Inc., 	907 	S.W.2d 	517, 	522 	(Tex. 	1995) 	("Courts 	usually
strive 	for 	uniformity 	in 	construing 	insurance 	provisions,
especially where, 	as 	here, 	the 	contract 	provisions 	at 	issue 	are
identical 	across 	the 	jurisdictions.").
7 	No 	cases 	involving 	arguably 	analogous 	substances 	are 	cited by
the 	parties. 	The 	cases 	that 	follow 	in 	the 	text 	have 	not 	been
brought 	to 	the 	Court's 	attention 	by 	them.
s 	Or 	water.
6
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Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Triangle 	Paving, 	Inc., 	973 	F. 	Supp. 	560, 	562, 	567
(E.D.N.C. 	1996) 	(sedimentation); 	Monarch 	Greenback, 	LLC 	v.
Monticello 	Ins. 	Co., 	118 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	1068, 	1070 	n.1, 	1079-80 	(D.
Idaho 	1999) 	(by-products 	of 	gold mining 	comprised 	of 	sand, 	silt,
clay, 	and 	traces 	of 	various 	metals); 	James 	River 	Ins. 	Co. 	v.
Ground 	Down 	Eng'g, 	Inc., 	540 	F.3d 	1270, 	1277 	(11th 	Cir. 	2008)
(construction 	debris); 	Am. 	Contracting 	& Mgmt. 	Corp. 	v. 	Liberty
Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	1995 	WL 	854725, 	at 	*1-2 	(Mich. 	Ct. 	App. 	June 	13,
1995) 	(tree 	stumps, 	fencing, 	wood, 	metal 	construction materials,
and 	other 	debris); 	E. 	Concrete 	Materials, 	Inc. 	v. 	ACE Am. 	Ins.
Co., 	948 	F.3d 	289, 	294, 	301-02 	(5th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(very 	small 	stone
fragments); 	Essex 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	H & H Land 	Dev. 	Corp., 	525 	F.
Supp. 	2d 	1344, 	1352-53 	(M.D. 	Ga. 	2007) 	(sediment 	deposits); 	Atl.
Cas. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Ramirez, 	651 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	686, 	691 	(N.D. 	Tex.
2009) 	(foundry 	refuse, 	brush, 	trees, 	wood 	grindings, 	and
construction 	and 	demolition 	debris); 	Great 	Am. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	R.J.
Schinner 	Co. 	Inc., 	704 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	881, 	886-87 	(E.D. 	Wis. 	2023)
(paper 	and 	plastic 	products); 	Aetna 	Cas. 	& Sur. 	Co. 	v. 	Dow 	Chem
Co., 	933 	F. 	Supp. 	675, 	682-84 	(E.D. 	Mich. 	1996) 	(styrofoam,
polystyrene, 	rubble, 	and 	debris); 	New 	Salida 	Ditch 	Co. 	v. 	United
Fire 	& Cas. 	Ins. 	Co., 	2009 	WL 	5126498, 	at 	*1 	n.1, 	*9 	(D. 	Colo.
Dec. 	18, 	2009) 	(soil, 	sand, 	dirt, 	rocks, 	and 	sediment), 	aff' d,
400 	F. 	App'x 	338 	(10th 	Cir. 	2010); 	Emps. 	Mut. 	Cas. 	Co. 	v. 	Tiger
Creek 	Dev., 	Inc., 	2022 	WL 	2318503, 	at 	*1 	(M.D. 	Ga. 	June 	28,
2022) 	(sediment 	runoff); 	Judd 	Ranch, 	Inc. 	v. 	Glaser 	Trucking
Serv., 	2007 	WL 	1520905, 	at 	*2, 	*7 	(D. 	Kan. 	May 	22, 	2007)
(aluminum 	scrap metal).
But 	not 	in 	all 	of 	the 	cases.
In 	some 	cases, 	courts 	have 	landed 	on 	the 	opposite 	conclusion 	---
that 	such 	solid 	substances 	do 	not 	amount 	to 	a 	"pollutant." 	See
W. 	Bend Mut. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Iowa 	Iron Works, 	Inc., 	503 	N.W.2d 	596,
598, 	600 	(Iowa 	1993) 	(spent 	foundry 	sand); 	Manus 	v. 	Ranger 	Ins.
Co., 	142 	F. 	App'x 	280, 	282 	(9th 	Cir. 	2005) 	(dirt, 	brush, 	weeds,
grapevines, 	leaves, 	tree 	stumps, 	tree 	branches, 	ice 	plants, 	sod,
concrete, 	and 	tires); 	Ruffin 	Rd. 	Venture 	Lot 	IV v. 	Travelers
Prop. 	Cas. 	Co. 	of Am., 	2011 	WL 	2463291, 	at 	*4, 	*7 	(S.D. 	Cal.
June 	20, 	2011) 	(mud 	and 	rocks); 	Tsakopoulous 	v. 	Am. 	Mfrs. 	Mut.
Ins. 	Co., 	2003 	WL 	22595248, 	at 	*1, 	*8 	(E.D. 	Cal. 	Aug. 	9, 	2000)
(soil); 	Everest 	Nat'l 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Megasand 	Enters., 	Inc., 	2022
WL 	6246854, 	at 	*l, 	*4, 	*6-7 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	Aug. 	5, 	2022) 	(silt,
sand, 	sediment, 	and 	construction materials), 	report 	and
recommendation 	adopted, 	2022 	WL 	6225838 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	Oct. 	7,
2022); 	Atain 	Specialty 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Triple 	PG 	Sand 	Dev., 	LLC,
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2023 	WL 	2307647, 	at 	*4, 	*6 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	Feb. 	28, 	2023) 	(silt,
sand, 	sediment, 	and 	dirt), 	report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted,
2023 	WL 	4878902 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	Mar. 	22, 	2023); 	Evanston 	Ins. 	Co. 	v.
Tex. 	Concrete 	& Sand 	Gravel, 	Inc., 	2022 	WL 	18144985, 	at 	*4-5
(S.D. 	Tex. 	Aug. 	2, 	2022) 	(silt, 	sand, 	sediment, 	dirt, 	and 	rock),
report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	2022 	WL 	18144986 	(S.D. 	Tex.
Aug. 	30, 	2022).
In 	short, 	the 	balance 	of 	authority 	tilts 	in 	favor 	of 	the
conclusion 	that 	solid 	substances 	of 	the 	sort 	described 	above 9
count 	as 	pollutants.
This 	supports 	the 	conclusion 	that 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court
would 	hold 	that 	broken 	glass 	--- 	which 	is 	analogous 	to 	the
referenced 	solid 	substances 	--- 	is 	covered 	under 	the 	pollutant-
cleanup 	clause 	here. 10
But 	too 	much 	should 	not 	be 	made 	of 	this.
As 	between 	(i) 	broken 	glass 	and 	(ii) 	the 	solid 	substances 	in 	the
above-cited 	cases 	--- 	the 	analogy may 	not 	be 	perfectly
airtight. 11
And moreover, 	the 	cases 	do 	not 	reflect 	an 	overwhelming 	consensus
one 	way 	or 	another. 	The 	split 	between 	solid-substances-are-
pollutants 	cases 	and 	solid-substances-are-not-pollutants 	cases
veers 	close 	to 	even. 	So 	the 	cases 	do 	not 	collectively 	throw 	off
a 	singular, 	clear 	signal 	as 	to 	how 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court
might 	proceed. 	See 	Badalamenti, 	2025 	WL 	3013023, 	at 	*6 	(holding
that 	relevant 	caselaw 	did 	not 	provide 	a 	"strong" 	basis 	for
predicting how 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court 	would 	rule 	because
the 	cases 	were 	"close 	to 	being 	evenly 	split") 	(cleaned up);
Navigators, 	739 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	266 	(same).
* 	* 	*
9 	That 	is, 	solid 	substances 	that, 	when 	present 	in 	sufficient
bulk 	or 	volume, 	alter 	the 	pre-existing 	(.and 	expected) 	character
of 	a 	plot 	of 	land 	and markedly 	limit 	its 	ordinary 	(and 	expected)
use.
10 	The 	cited 	cases 	involve 	pollution 	exclusion 	clauses, 	with 	one
exception. 	See 	Ruffin 	Rd. 	Venture 	Lot 	IV, 	2011 	WL 	2463291, 	at
*4-7. 	Nonetheless, 	they 	are 	useful 	data 	points.
11 	And 	the 	parties 	have 	not 	weighed 	in 	on 	it. 	See 	footnote 	7.
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Fourth 	and 	finally, 	to 	predict 	how 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court
would 	resolve 	the 	open 	question 	here, 	as 	to 	broken 	glass, 	the
Court 	considers 	"general 	legal 	principles 	as 	articulated by 	the
New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court." 	Tryp 	Hotels, 	726 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	389;
see 	also 	Schulman, 	684 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	279-81.
One 	such 	"general 	legal 	principle[]," 	Tryp, 	726 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at
389, 	is 	this: 	clauses 	in 	insurance 	contracts 	that 	"extend
coverage 	are 	to 	be 	viewed 	broadly 	and 	liberally." 	Villa 	v.
Short, 	195 	N.J. 	15, 	24 	(2008) 	(cleaned 	up); 	see 	also 	Mazzilli 	v.
Accident 	& Cas. 	Ins. 	Co. 	of 	Winterthur, 	Switz., 	35 	N.J. 	1, 	8
(1961).
And 	the 	relevant 	term here, 	"pollutants," 	appears 	in 	a 	clause,
Complaint 	<JI 	9, 	that 	"extend[s] 	coverage." 	Villa, 	195 	N.J. 	at
24. 	This 	favors 	a 	broader 	reading 	--- 	one 	that 	would 	include 	an
obligation 	on 	the 	part 	of 	the 	insurance 	company 	to 	pay 	for 	the
glass 	removal.
Another 	relevant 	general 	principle: 	"an 	insurance 	policy 	should
be 	interpreted 	according 	to 	its 	plain 	and 	ordinary meaning."
Voorhees 	v. 	Preferred Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	128 	N.J. 	165, 	175 	(1992).
Here, 	the 	question 	is 	whether 	the 	insurance 	policy's 	coverage 	of
"pollutants" 	reaches 	the 	broken 	glass.
The 	policy 	defines 	"pollutants" 	to 	include, 	among 	other 	things,
"any 	solid 	. 	contaminant." 	Complaint 	<JI 10; 	Exhibits 	A-Fat
88.
But 	"contaminant" 	is 	not 	further 	defined 	in 	the 	policy. 	How
then 	to 	get 	at 	its 	"plain 	and 	ordinary meaning"? 	Voorhees, 	128
N.J. 	at 	175.
"To 	discern 	'the 	plain, 	ordinary meaning' 	of 	insurance 	contract
terms, 	New 	Jersey 	courts 	routinely 	look 	to 	dictionary
definitions." 	G.E.M.S. 	Partners 	LLC 	v. 	AmGUARD 	Ins. 	Co., 	742 	F.
Supp. 	3d 	410, 	414 	n.3 	(D.N.J. 	2024) 	(collecting 	cases).
And 	going 	that 	route 	favors 	the 	conclusion 	that 	glass 	removal 	is
covered.
An 	everyday 	dictionary, 	Merriam-Webster, 	defines 	"contaminant"
as 	"something 	that 	contaminates." 	Contaminant, 	Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, 	https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/contaminant 	(last 	visited 	Feb. 	17, 	2026).
And 	then 	it 	defines 	"contaminates" 	as 	"to make 	unfit 	for 	use 	by
the 	introduction 	of 	unwholesome 	or 	undesirable 	elements."
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Contaminates, 	Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, 	https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/contaminat
es 	(last 	visited 	Feb. 	17, 	2026).
The 	broken 	glass 	was 	an 	"undesirable 	element[]," 	id., 	in 	the
grass 	sports 	field 	where 	it 	was 	discovered. 	See 	Complaint~~ 	1,
12-13. 	And 	its 	"introduction," 	Contaminates, 	Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, 	allegedly made 	the 	field 	"unfit 	for 	use," 	id. 	See
Complaint~ 	13.
* 	* 	*
Where 	things 	stand.
The 	Defendant-insurance 	company 	seeks 	to 	dismiss 	the 	Plaintiff-
school's 	case 	--- 	because, 	per 	the 	Defendant, 	it 	cannot 	be
liable 	under 	the 	governing 	insurance 	policy 	for 	removing 	the
broken 	glass 	at 	issue 	here.
In making 	its 	argument, 	the 	Defendant 	bears 	the 	burden. 	See,
e.g., 	Hedges 	v. 	United 	States, 	404 	F.3d 	744, 	750 	(3d 	Cir. 	2005)
But 	it 	cannot 	carry 	that 	burden without 	reckoning 	with 	the
arguably 	analogous 	caselaw 	here, 	see 	footnote 	7 	--- 	which, 	as
noted, 	favors 	the 	Plaintiff 	(though 	only to 	a 	limited 	extent).
Cf. 	Volynsky 	v. 	Prudential 	Ins. 	Co. 	of Am., 	2025 	WL 	3062787, 	at
*2 	(D.N.J. 	Nov. 	3, 	2025).
Moreover, 	the 	Defendant 	cannot 	carry 	its 	burden 	without 	taking
on more 	fully 	the 	general 	principles 	of 	New 	Jersey 	law 	set 	out
above. 	They 	call 	for 	a 	"broad[] 	and 	liberal," 	Villa, 	195 	N.J.
at 	24, 	read 	of 	provisions 	that 	extend 	coverage, 	and 	looking 	to
the 	"plain 	and 	ordinary meaning" 	of 	key words, 	Voorhees, 	128
N.J. 	at 	175, 	as 	reflected 	in 	dictionaries. 	Applying 	these
principles 	here moves 	the 	needle 	in 	the 	Plaintiff's 	direction.
Whether 	all 	of 	the 	above 	would 	be 	enough 	for 	the 	Plaintiff 	to
ultimately 	get 	over 	the 	finish 	line, 	to 	win 	here 	as 	a 	matter 	of
law 	at 	the 	end 	of 	the 	case 	--- 	that 	is 	not 	the 	question 	now
before 	the 	Court. 	Rather, 	the 	question 	is 	whether 	the 	Defendant
has 	carried 	its 	motion-to-dismiss 	burden. 	It 	has 	not.
* 	* 	*
Before 	concluding, 	take 	up 	a 	counterargument 	--- 	the 	Defendant's
contention 	that 	it 	should 	prevail 	based 	on 	the 	New 	Jersey
Supreme 	Court's 	decision 	in 	Nav-Its, 	Inc. 	v. 	Selective 	Insurance
Co. 	of America, 	183 	N.J. 	110 	(2005).
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Nav-Its 	concerned 	an 	insurance 	policy 	exclusion 12 ; 	under 	the
exclusion, 	the 	insurer 	did 	not 	have 	to 	cover 	"injuries 	caused by
the 	'discharge, 	dispersal, 	release 	or 	escape 	of 	pollutants.'"
Id. 	at 	112. 	The 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court 	held 	that 	the
exclusion 	should be 	"limited 	to 	traditional 	environmental
pollution." 	Id. 	at 	126.
The 	Nav-Its 	policy 	and 	the 	policy 	at 	issue 	in 	this 	case 	use
identical 	definitions 	of 	"pollutants." 	Compare 	Nav-Its, 	183
N.J. 	at 	115 	(defining 	"pollutants" 	to 	include 	"any. 	. 	solid
irritant 	or 	contaminant, 	including 	. 	waste"), 	with 	Complaint
'lI 	10 	( same ) .
From this, 	the 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	the 	"pollutant" 	provision
in 	the 	Nav-Its 	policy 	and 	the 	"pollutant" 	provision 	here 	must 	be
read 	the 	same 	way. 	See 	Defendant's 	Brief 	at 	12-13.
More 	specifically, 	the 	Defendant 	contends, 	the 	pollutant
exclusion 	in 	Nav-Its 	was 	only 	triggered 	in 	the 	context 	of
"'traditional 	environmental 	pollution.'" 	See 	id. 	at 	13 	(quoting
Nav-Its, 	183 	N.J. 	at 	124). 	So 	too, 	the 	Defendant 	argues, 	the
pollutant-removal 	coverage 	clause 13 	in 	this 	case 	should 	only 	come
into 	play when 	an 	insured makes 	a 	"traditional 	environmental
pollution," 	Nav-Its, 	183 	N.J. 	at 	126, 	claim.
And because 	"[t]here 	is 	no 	connection, 	real 	or 	alleged, 	between
the 	glass 	[at 	the 	school] 	and 	an 	environmental 	hazard, 	incident,
or 	catastrophe," 	Defendant's 	Brief 	at 	14, 	the 	Defendant 	argues,
the 	Plaintiff's 	claim was 	properly 	denied.
But 	the 	argument 	is 	not 	persuasive 	because 	it 	rests 	on 	a
misreading 	of 	Nav-Its. 	The 	next 	section 	explains 	why.
* 	* 	*
As 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court 	explained 	in 	Nav-Its, 	providers
of 	commercial 	insurance 	tried 	for 	decades 	to 	limit 	their
12 	An 	exclusion 	limits 	what 	the 	insurer 	would 	otherwise 	be
required 	to 	cover 	under 	the 	policy.
13 	A coverage 	clause 	determines 	what 	the 	insurer must 	cover
under 	the 	policy 	in 	the 	first 	place 	--- 	before 	an 	exclusion
clause 	(if 	any) 	whittles 	things 	back.
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exposure 	to 	environmental-pollution 	claims.
N.J. 	at 	120-23. 14
See 	Nav-Its, 	183
To 	do 	so, 	insurance 	companies 	tried 	a 	number 	of 	different 	tacks
--- 	including 	developing 	a 	new 	standard-form 	exclusion. 	See
Nav-Its, 	183 	N.J. 	at 	121.
The 	exclusion's 	language 	seemed 	to 	sweep 	very 	broadly. 	See 	Nav-
Its, 	183 	N.J. 	at 	121-22. 	But 	at 	key 	hearings, 	"[t]he 	insurance
industry 	presented testimony 	to 	the 	[New 	Jersey 	State 	Insurance
Department] 	regulators 	as 	to 	the 	intended 	purposes 	of 	the 	[new
standard-form] 	pollution 	exclusion." 	Id.
The 	regulators 	were 	concerned 	that 	the 	then-proposed
exclusion 	sought 	to 	sweep 	too 	many potential 	non-
environmental 	liabilities 	within 	its 	reach. 	The 	insurance
industry 	sought 	to 	allay 	those 	fears 	and, 	thus, 	secure 	the
needed 	approval 	of 	this 	exclusion.
Id. 	at 	122 	(quoting 	Lorelie 	S. 	Masters, 	Absolutely 	Not 	Total:
State 	Courts 	Recognize 	the 	Historical 	Limits 	of 	the 	"Absolute"
and 	"Total" 	Pollution 	Exclusions, 	15 	Env't 	Claims 	J. 	451, 	453
(2003)).
In 	Nav-Its, 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court 	essentially 	held 	the
insurer 	to 	the 	representations 	that 	had been made 	on 	its 	behalf,
years 	before, 	to 	get 	the 	pollution 	exclusion 	approved 	in 	the
first 	place. 	See 	id. 	at 	123-24.
The 	pollution 	exclusion 	had 	been 	pitched 	to 	regulators 	as 	a
solution 	to 	a 	specific 	and 	widely-understood 	problem. 	See
Jeffrey W. 	Stempel, 	Reason 	and 	Pollution: 	Correctly 	Construing
the 	"Absolute" 	Exclusion 	In 	Context 	and 	in Accord 	with 	Its
Purpose 	and 	Party 	Expectations, 	34 	Tort 	& Ins. 	L.J. 	1, 	29, 	31-32
( 1998) 	(the 	"pollution 	exclusion was 	designed 	to 	serve 	the 	twin
purposes 	of 	eliminating 	coverage 	for 	gradual 	environmental
degradation 	and 	government-mandated 	cleanup 	such 	as 	Superfund
14 	Those 	sorts 	of 	claims 	can 	be 	outsized 	and 	unpredictable.
They posed 	a 	threat 	to 	the 	financial 	health 	of 	the 	insurance
industry. 	See 	Jeffrey W. 	Stempel, 	Reason 	and 	Pollution:
Correctly 	Construing 	the 	"Absolute" 	Exclusion 	In 	Context 	and 	in
Accord 	with 	Its 	Purpose 	and 	Party Expectations, 	34 	Tort 	& Ins.
L.J. 	1, 	5 	(1998) 	(cited 	in 	Nav-Its, 	183 	N.J. 	at 	122-23); 	see
also 	Note, 	Joshua 	Rosenkrantz, 	The 	Pollution 	Exclusion 	Through
the 	Looking 	Glass, 	74 	Geo. 	L.J. 	1237, 	1251 	(1986).
12
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response 	cost 	reimbursement") 	(quoted 	in 	Nav-Its, 	183 	N.J. 	at
122-23).
And 	per 	the 	Nav-Its 	court, 	the 	pollution 	exclusion 	would 	control
in 	that 	context 	--- 	but 	not 	beyond. 	Regardless 	of 	the 	reach 	of
its 	language 	as 	an 	abstract 	matter, 	the 	exclusion 	shielded
insurers 	only 	from 	having 	to 	make 	payments 	related 	to 	a
particular 	type 	of 	claim 	--- 	the 	type 	that 	had 	been 	described 	to
regulators 	as 	the 	point 	of 	the 	exclusion.
Based 	on 	[our] 	review 	[of 	the 	origins 	of 	the 	relevant
exclusions], 	we 	are 	confident 	that 	the 	history 	of 	the
pollution-exclusion 	clause 	in 	its 	various 	forms
demonstrates 	that 	its 	purpose 	was 	to 	have 	a 	broad 	exclusion
for 	traditional 	environmentally 	related 	damages.
Notably, 	we 	have 	not 	been 	presented with 	any 	compelling
evidence 	that 	the 	pollution 	exclusion 	clause 	in 	the 	present
case, 	when 	approved 	by 	the 	Department 	of 	Insurance, 	was
intended 	to 	be 	read 	as 	broadly 	as 	[the 	insurance 	company]
urges. 	To 	be 	sure, 	read 	literally, 	the 	exclusion 	would
require 	its 	application 	to 	all 	instances 	of 	injury 	or
damage 	to 	persons 	or 	property 	caused by 	nany 	pollutants
arising 	out 	of 	the 	discharge, 	dispersal, 	seepage,
migration, 	release 	or 	escape 	of 	. 	. 	any 	solid, 	liquid,
gaseous, 	or 	thermal 	irritant 	or 	contaminant, 	including
smoke, 	vapor, 	soot, 	fumes, 	acids, 	alkalis, 	chemicals 	and
waste." 	We 	reject 	[the 	insurance 	company's]
interpretation 	as 	overly broad, 	unfair, 	and 	contrary 	to 	the
objectively 	reasonable 	expectations 	of 	the 	New 	Jersey 	and
other 	state 	regulatory 	authorities 	that 	were 	presented with
an 	opportunity 	to 	disapprove 	the 	clause.
[T]he 	insurance 	industry may 	not 	seek 	approval 	of 	a 	clause
restricting 	coverage 	for 	the 	asserted 	reason 	of 	avoiding
catastrophic 	environmental 	pollution 	claims 	and 	then 	use
that 	same 	clause 	to 	exclude 	coverage 	for 	claims 	that 	a
reasonable 	policyholder 	would believe 	were 	covered by 	the
insurance 	policy.
Nav-Its, 	183 	N.J. 	at 	123-24 	(citations 	omitted).
In 	short, 	Nav-Its 	was 	based 	on 	a 	kind 	of 	industry-wide
regulatory 	estoppel. 	Having 	procured 	regulatory 	approval 	based
on 	representations 	that 	a 	standard 	clause 	excluded 	coverage 	over
one, 	narrow 	type 	of 	claim 	--- 	insurance 	companies 	could 	not, 	a
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generation 	later, 	ignore 	those 	same 	representations 	and 	focus
just 	on 	the 	stand-alone 	wording 	of 	the 	clause, 	in 	a 	way 	that
would 	exclude 	coverage 	of 	a 	much 	broader 	range 	of 	claims 	than
just 	"traditional 	environmental 	pollution. " 15
But 	there 	is 	nothing 	like 	any 	of 	this 	here.
15 	Other 	states 	have 	taken 	roughly 	this 	same 	sort 	of 	regulatory
estoppel 	approach. 	See 	MacKinnon 	v. 	Truck 	Ins. 	Exch., 	31 	Cal.
4th 	635, 	653 	(2003) 	(rejecting 	broad 	construction 	of 	pollution
exclusion 	in 	part 	because 	the 	insurer 	did 	not 	produce 	"evidence
that 	[a] 	substantial 	limitation 	on 	'coverage' 	was 	communicated
to 	. 	. 	insurance 	regulators"); 	Joy 	Techs., 	Inc. 	v. 	Liberty
Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	187 	W. 	Va. 	742, 	749 	(1992) 	(adopting 	narrow
construction 	of 	pollution 	exclusion 	because 	the 	insurer's
representative 	"unambiguously and 	officially 	represented 	to 	the
West 	Virginia 	Insurance 	Commission 	that 	the 	exclusion 	in
question 	did 	not 	alter 	coverage"); 	Claussen 	v. 	Aetna 	Cas. 	& Sur.
Co., 	259 	Ga. 	333, 	337 	(1989) 	(adopting 	narrow 	construction 	of
pollution 	exclusion 	in 	part 	because 	it 	was 	"not 	contrary 	to 	the
interpretation" 	the 	insurer 	offered 	to 	state 	regulators 	"when 	it
was 	adopted"); 	Just 	v. 	Land 	Reclamation, 	Ltd., 	155 	Wis. 	2d 	737,
746-52 	(1990) 	(construing 	the 	phrase 	"sudden 	and 	accidental" 	in
pollution 	exclusion 	to 	align 	with 	"[c]ontemporaneous
representations 	by 	the 	insurance 	industry" 	that 	were 	"relied
upon 	by 	insurance 	regulators" 	when 	they 	approved 	the 	provision
at 	issue); 	Sunbeam Corp. 	v. 	Liberty Mut. 	Ins. 	Co., 	566 	Pa. 	494,
500 	(2001) 	("Thus, 	having 	represented 	to 	[insurance 	regulators]
. 	that 	the 	new 	language 	in 	[a 	pollution 	exclusion] 	. 	did
not 	involve 	a 	significant 	decrease 	in 	coverage 	from 	the 	prior
language, 	the 	insurance 	industry 	will 	not 	be 	heard 	to 	assert 	the
opposite 	when 	claims 	are 	made 	by 	the 	insured policyholders.");
see 	also 	Ala. 	Plating 	Co. 	v. 	U.S. 	Fidelity 	& Guar. 	Co., 	690 	So.
2d 	331, 	336 	(Ala. 	1996); 	Textron, 	Inc. 	v. 	Aetna 	Cas. 	& Sur. 	Co.,
754 	A.2d 	742, 	752-54 	(R.I. 	2000). 	But 	the 	regulatory 	estoppel
approach 	is 	not 	the 	standard 	one. 	See 	Susan 	Stryker, 	Regulatory
Estoppel, 	N.J. 	Law., 	Aug. 	2012, 	at 	53, 	55 	("[O]nly 	a 	minority 	of
states 	have 	followed 	New 	Jersey's 	approach."); 	2 	Environmental
Insurance 	Litigation: 	Law 	and 	Practice§ 	18:26 	(2025 	ed.)
(similar); 	1 	Law 	and 	Practice 	of 	Insurance 	Coverage 	Litigation
§ 	1:16 	(2025 	ed.) 	(similar); 	9 	Couch 	on 	Insurance§ 	127:10 	& n.4
(3d 	ed. 	2025) 	(similar).
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Insurance 	contracts 	generally mean 	what 	they 	say. 	See 	id. 	at
118. 	That 	is 	the 	bread-and-butter 	background 	rule.
But 	in 	Nav-Its 	an 	exception was 	carved 	into 	this 	rule, 	because
regulators 	had 	essentially been 	told by 	the 	insurance 	industry
that 	the 	pollution 	exclusion would 	not 	be 	read 	to 	mean 	all 	that
it 	says 	(because 	doing 	so 	would 	swallow 	up 	a 	great 	deal, 	would
exclude 	a 	broad 	range 	of 	otherwise-covered 	claims).
But 	here, 	in 	this 	case, 	there 	is 	no 	similar 	reason 	to 	move 	away
from 	the 	ordinary background 	rule, 	the 	rule 	that 	insurance
contracts 	mean 	what 	they 	say.
No 	one 	is 	said 	to 	have 	made 	a 	contrary 	(and 	therefore 	estopping)
promise 	to 	state 	regulators.
Insureds, 	for 	example, 	have 	not 	somehow 	sworn 	to 	state 	insurance
regulators 	that 	they 	would 	seek 	coverage 	under 	the 	pollution
coverage 	clause 	here 	only 	for 	"traditional 	environmental
pollution" 	--- 	and 	not 	for 	what 	the 	language 	of 	the 	clause 	seems
to 	encompass 	on 	it 	face, 	which 	includes 	broken 	glass. 16
Nav-Its, 	in 	short, 	is 	not 	controlling 	here.
That 	is 	confirmed by 	a 	more 	recent 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court
case, 	AC 	Ocean 	Walk, 	LLC 	v. 	American 	Guarantee 	& Liability
Insurance 	Co., 	256 	N.J. 	294 	(2024).
There, 	a 	casino 	filed 	claims 	because 	it 	had 	to 	close 	during 	the
Covid pandemic. 	See 	id. 	at 	304-05. 	The 	insurers 	mainly 	denied
coverage 	--- 	and 	later 	cited, 	among 	other 	things, 	contamination
exclusions 	in 	the 	governing 	policies. 17 	See 	id. 	at 	305-06.
Relying mainly 	on 	Nav-Its, 	the 	trial 	court 	read 	the
contamination 	exclusion 	as 	"substantially 	directed 	at
traditional 	environmental 	and 	industrial 	damages" 	and 	held 	it
"inapplicable" 	to 	the 	casino's 	claims. 	Id. 	at 	306 	(cleaned up)
16 	What 	matters 	is 	what 	insureds 	might 	have 	told 	regulators. 	An
insured 	cannot 	be 	estopped 	from 	taking 	a 	position 	based 	on 	what
someone 	else 	might 	have 	told 	regulators.
17 	The 	policies 	defined 	"contamination" 	as 	"any
property 	due 	to 	the 	actual 	presence 	of 	any.
Ocean 	Walk, 	256 	N.J. 	at 	303-04 	(cleaned 	up).
15
condition 	of 	the
pollutant." 	AC
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But 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	New 	Jersey 	disagreed. 	See 	id. 	at 	319-
22. 	It 	concluded 	"Nav-Its 	d[id] 	not 	govern 	th[e] 	appeal" 	for
two 	reasons. 	Id. 	at 	321.
One 	of 	the 	reasons: 	the 	casino
regulators 	were 	[ever] 	misled.
contamination 	exclusion." 	Id.
So 	too 	here.
did 	not 	contend 	"that 	insurance
. 	about 	the 	import 	of 	the
Nav-Its 	"does 	not 	govern," 	id., 	because 	there 	is 	no 	suggestion
in 	this 	case 	that 	regulators 	were 	told 	that 	the 	relevant
pollution 	coverage 	clause 	would 	not 	be 	invoked by 	insureds 	in
cases 	like 	this 	one. 	Insureds 	cannot 	be 	estopped 	from 	seeking
coverage 	based 	on what 	they 	said 	to 	regulators 	when 	they 	did 	not
say 	anything 	at 	all.
* 	* 	*
The 	Defendant 	has 	not 	established 	that 	the 	Plaintiff's 	complaint
fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim. 	Therefore, 	the 	Defendant's 	motion 	to
dismiss 	at 	ECF 	4 	is 	denied. 18
IT 	IS 	on 	this 	19th day 	of 	February, 	202v, 	ORDERED.
/'
/
Michael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
18 	The 	Defendant 	also 	argues 	that 	the 	school's 	field 	is 	not
covered based 	on 	provisions 	excluding 	"[l]and" 	and 	"'[t]he 	cost
of 	excavations, 	grading, 	backfilling, 	or 	filling'" 	from 	the
definition 	of 	"Covered 	Property." 	See 	Defendant's 	Brief 	at 	10-
11; 	Exhibits 	A-Fat 	74. 	But 	the 	policy 	includes 	a 	distinct
"affirmative 	promise 	to 	pay 	for 	the 	extraction 	of 	pollutants
from 	land." 	Plaintiff's 	Opposition 	at 	3; 	Exhibits 	A-Fat 	77.
That 	cannot 	be 	read 	out 	of 	the 	insurance 	contract. 	See 	Prather
v. 	Am. 	Motorists 	Ins. 	Co., 	2 	N.J. 	496, 	502 	(1949); 	see 	also
First 	Baptist 	Church 	of Mauriceville 	v. 	GuideOne 	Mut. 	Ins. 	Co.,
2009 	WL 	415482, 	at 	*5 	(E.D. 	Tex. 	Feb. 	17, 	2009) 	(declining 	to
read 	"policy's 	general 	exclusion 	of 	'land' 	from 	'covered
property'" 	so 	broadly 	as 	to 	render 	distinct 	coverage 	for
pollutant 	cleanup 	and 	removal 	"meaningless"); 	Ashraf 	v. 	State
Auto 	Prop. 	& Cas. 	Ins. 	Co., 	239 	W. 	Va. 	119, 	127-28 	(2017)
( similar) .
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