ORTIZ DE LA HOZ v. RR ENTERTAINMENT MUSIC CORP. et al

2:25-cv-04231Njd3 de mar. de 2026

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Case 2:25-cv-04231-WJM-MAH Document 37 Filed 03/03/26 Page 1 of 3 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 2:25-cv-04231-WJM-MAH Document 37 Filed 03/03/26 Page 2 of 3 PageID:
<pageID>
Case 2:25-cv-04231-WJM-MAH Document 37 Filed 03/03/26 Page 3 of 3 PageID:
<pageID>

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

Case 2:25-cv-04231-WJM-MAH Document 37 _ Filed 03/03/26 Page 1 of 3 PagelD:
<pagelD>

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ORTIZ DE LA HOZ, No. 25-cv-0423 1-WJM-MAH
Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
¥.

RR ENTERTAINMENT MUSIC
CORP. et al,

Defendants.

WILLIAM J. MARTINE U.S.D.J.:

Following dismissal of this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Defendants
Ranphys Dario Ortiz de Leon and Raphael Dario Ortiz de Leon (collectively,
‘Defendants”) moved, pro se, for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11. ECF No. 32 (“Motion”), The Motion is fully briefed, and the Court decides the matter
without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion
is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 5, 2026, the Court dismissed this case on the grounds that it was void ab
initio because the Plaintiff passed away the day before the Complaint was filed. 2026 WL
25947, at *2-3 (D.NJ. Jan. 5, 2026) (ECF No. 30) (“MTD Opinion”), The Court’s
dismissal was with prejudice, and the Court directed the Clerk to close this case. fd.

On January 21, 2026, Defendants moved for Rule 11 sanctions based on Plaintiff's
counsel continuing to litigate this action even though Plaintiff's death before the Complaint
was filed constituted a fatal defect. Mot. 4. Defendants sent Plaintiffs counsel a Rule 11
letter on November 5, 2025, before they filed their Motion to Dismiss on November 24,
2025, including proof of service by email and priority mail. fd 19-24. On February 4,
2026, Defendant Ranphys Dario Ortiz de Leon submitted a declaration notifying the Court
of a trademark complaint submitted to YouTube, which requested removal of a video of
Plaintiff. ECF No. 34 (“Ranphys Declaration”), at 2. The Ranphys Declaration asserts
that the filing of the trademark complaint “directly relevant to the Court’s evaluation of
bad faith, improper purpose, and abuse of legal process under Rule 11” given the Court’s
“clear judicial determination that the claims were void ab initio.” Jed. at 1.

Case 2:25-cv-04231-WJM-MAH Document 37 _ Filed 03/03/26 Page 2 of 3 PagelD:
<pagelD>

Il LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 11’s “central purpose” is “to deter baseless filings in district court.” Cooter &
Gell y, Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S, 384, 393 (1990). The standard is “whether the attorney’s
conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Ario v. Underwriting
Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Acct., 618 F.3d 277, 297 Gd Cir.
2010), as amended (Dec. 7, 2010) (citation modified). Although the Court has discretion,
the Court cannot “base[] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405. Additionally, the Third
Circuit has adopted a “supervisory rule” providing that “all motions requesting Rule 11
sanctions be filed in the district court before the entry of a final judgment.” Mary Ann
Pensiero, inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1988); see also L. Civ. R. 11.3 (requiring
that “[a]ll applications for sanctions” under Rule 11 “shall be filed with the Clerk prior to
the entry of final judgment notwithstanding the provisions of any other Rule of this Court”).

Ill. DISCUSSION

Rule 11 sanctions are unwarranted here, both because the Motion is untimely and on
the merits of the conduct in the Ranphys Declaration and the underlying Motion.

As to timeliness, the Third Circuit’s supervisory rule precluding Rule 11 motions after
the entry of final judgment renders the Motion untimely. See Mary Ann Pensiero, 847 F.2d
at 100. The MTD Opinion and corresponding Order consist of a final judgment, which
was not timely appealed. See Garrett v. Murphy, 17 F 4th 419, 424 Gd Cir. 2021)
(referring to a dismissal with prejudice as a final judgment), The Motion post-dated the
MTD Opinion, and the Reply does not refute the unbroken line of cases barring the Court
from considering Rule 11 sanctions after the entry of final judgment, ECF No. 36
(“Reply”), at 2-5; see Simmerman y, Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 63-64 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing
sua sponte sanctions three months after final judgment was entered); Mellon Bank Corp,
v, First Union Real Est. Equity & Mortg. Invs., 951 F.2d 1399, 1413 (d Cir, 1991)
(affirming denial of sanctions where the moving party filed a Rule 11 motion two weeks
after the entry of final judgment), Defendants cannot also amend their Motion on Reply to
request—for the first time—sanctions under the Court’s inherent authority, Reply 5; see
Aiellos v. Zisa, No. CIV. A. 09-3076, 2009 WL 3486301, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009)
(Martini, J.) (“It is hornbook law that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are
waived,”). Although Defendants are pro se, they must still abide by the same set of rules
as represented parties, See Martinez v. Fudeman, 742 F. App’x 705, 707 (3d Cir. 2018)
(“[D]espite his pro se status, [Plaintiff] was responsible for knowing the procedural
rules.”).

As to conduct not covered by the Pensiero supervisory rule—i.e., allegations in the
Ranphys Declaration that counsel improperly submitted a trademark complaint to
YouTube after the MTD Opinion was docketed—-Rule 11 sanctions are unavailable
because the conduct does not involve the signing of a pleading or court paper. See Landon
v. Hunt, 938 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that the Third Circuit has “consistently

Case 2:25-cv-04231-WJM-MAH Document 37 _ Filed 03/03/26 Page 3 of 3 PagelD:
<pagelD>

held that “Rule [1 sanctions are proper on/y in situations involving a signed pleading”
(emphasis in original)),

Finally, concerning Defendants’ substantive arguments, Plaintiff's counsel did not act
contrary to law in continuing to litigate this case given the lack of binding authority as to
whether substitution was legally possible for a pre-deceased plaintiff. See Mary Ann
Pensiero, Inc. vy. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 1988) (“If there is doubt how the district
court will rule on the challenged pleading or motion, the filing of the paper is unlikely to
have violated Rule 11,”). The Motion relies heavily on the MTD Opinion, which followed
the allegedly sanctionable conduct. See Scott v. Vantage Corp., 64 F.4th 462, 473 (3d Cir.
2023) (“[C]ourts should avoid ‘the wisdom of hindsight? when conducting Rule 11
inquiries.”). And to be clear, Plaintiff's counsel may file a new complaint on behalf of
Plaintiff's estate, which is not bound by MTD Opinion because it was never properly
substituted as a party. See MTD Opinion at *3 & n.3 (“Dismissal here does not preclude
a new action.”); see also Levin v, Lillien, 511 F. App’x 149, 150 Gd Cir. 2013)
(“[A]ithough the District Court’s order provides for a dismissal with prejudice, there is no
question in this case that, as a matter of law, the District Court’s decision has no preclusive
effect, other than on the merits of its jurisdictional ruling.”).

IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Motion is DENIED.

Vv. ORDER
IT IS on this a day of March 2026, hereby,

ORDERED that the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions is DENIED.

INI, U.S.DJ.

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.