WIGGINS v. NETFLIX, INC. et al

2:24-cv-05643Njd14 de jan. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHRISTINA WIGGINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NETFLIX, INC.,
Defendant.
No. 2:24-cv-5643
(MEF)(MAH)
OPINION and ORDER
Table of Contents
I. 	Background
II. 	Validity
III. Federal Law
IV. 	Conclusion
* 	* 	*
I. 	Background
A woman1 (“the Plaintiff”) sued her former employer2 (“the
Defendant”3) under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination for
pregnancy-based discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.
See Complaint (ECF 1) ¶¶ 1, 40-71 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 10:5-1 et seq.).
1 	Christina Wiggins.
2 	Netflix, Inc.
3 	The complaint also lists as defendants a set of John Doe
individuals and corporations. 	See Complaint at 1. 	But none
have been named or served, so the focus here is only on Netflix.
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In response, the Defendant has moved to compel arbitration,
citing an arbitration clause in the Plaintiff’s employment
contract. 	See Notice of Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF 37)
at 1; Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to
Compel Arbitration (“Defendant’s Brief”) (ECF 37-1) at 1-3.
* 	* 	*
The Plaintiff argues that the case should not be sent to
arbitration for two reasons.
First, because no valid arbitration agreement was formed. 	See
Plaintiff Christina Wiggins’s Opposition to Defendant Netflix’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Plaintiff’s Brief”) (ECF 39) at
7-17.
And second, because even if there was a valid agreement, it
cannot be enforced under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual
Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2022. 	See id. at 20-26
(citing 9 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.).
Take these arguments up below.
II. 	Validity
To determine whether an arbitration agreement is valid, courts
look to “ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation
of contracts.” 	First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 944 (1995).
Under New Jersey law,4 “[a]n agreement to arbitrate, like any
other contract, must be the product of mutual assent.” 	Atalese
v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 442 (2014)
(cleaned up).5
4 	Via their legal briefs, the parties agree that it is New
Jersey law that applies. 	See Defendant’s Brief at 6-12
(applying New Jersey law); Plaintiff’s Brief at 7-20 (same).
Accordingly, the Court applies New Jersey law. 	See Chapman v.
Salesforce, Inc., 2026 WL 74192, at *1 n.4 (D.N.J. Jan. 9,
2026); see also Complaint ¶ 11 (indicating that the Plaintiff
worked for the Defendant “exclusively from her home in Hudson
County, New Jersey”).
5 	There are other components of a valid contract under New
Jersey law. 	See Stabile v. Macy’s, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 3d 429,
433 (D.N.J. 2024). 	But the parties only take up the mutual
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This requires parties “to have full knowledge of [their] legal
rights,” id. (quoting Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 (2003)),
based on contractual language that “explain[s] that the
[relevant party] is giving up her right to bring her claims in
court or have a jury resolve the dispute.” 	Id. at 447.
Put differently, there needs to be “language that explains that
a party who agrees to arbitration waives the right to sue in
court and makes clear that arbitration and civil litigation are
distinct proceedings.” 	Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J.
119, 137 (2020).6
* 	* 	*
Against the above legal backdrop, move now to this case.
When the Plaintiff was offered her job, she signed (i) an offer
letter, and (ii) a document referenced in that offer letter,
titled an “Agreement Regarding Your Netflix Employment
(Including Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate).” 	See Declaration of
Counsel in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration, Exhibit A
(from here, (ii) is “the Employment Agreement”) (ECF 37-2); see
also Defendant’s Brief at 3.7
Per the Employment Agreement:
assent requirement, so that is the Court’s sole concern here.
See Chapman, 2026 WL 74192, at *2 & n.5.
6 	No one argues that New Jersey’s mutual assent law, when
applied in the arbitration context, is preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act. 	And there does not appear to be an obligation
for the Court to raise that issue sua sponte. 	See Stabile, 751
F. Supp. 3d at 441 n.22; see also Chapman, 2026 WL 74192, at *2
n.6.
7 	In assessing a motion to compel arbitration, even where a
complaint makes “no reference to the [relevant] arbitration
agreement; [does] not attach the agreement as an exhibit; and
[does] not base the claims on the existence of the agreement,”
Young v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 119 F.4th 314, 318 (3d Cir.
2024) (cleaned up), the agreement can be considered by the
court, so long as no one tees up a relevant factual issue ---
like whether it was indeed signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought. 	See generally id. at 318-21. 	Here, no
factual issues have been raised, so the Court can look to the
two documents alluded to in the text.
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Let’s not fight in court. Even in the best of
relationships, disputes can arise. 	Rather than
fighting it out in court, both you and [the
employer] agree to arbitrate . . . any . . . and all
employment related disputes, including claims under
state or federal law. . . .
You also agree to let the entire dispute be handled
by JAMS, pursuant to the JAMS Employment Rules &
Procedures. . . .
By choosing arbitration, both of us agree that
arbitration will be the sole remedy for any disputes
between us (with the exception of claims before
administrative bodies), and neither of us will
pursue any action in court, except that either of us
may file an application for injunctive relief (or
other provisional remedy) where a temporary order
from a court may be necessary to preserve the status
quo or protect the interests in dispute.
Employment Agreement ¶ 8.
* 	* 	*
The Employment Agreement quoted above is plainspoken and
straightforward.
It expressly indicated that by signing on, the Plaintiff was
“agree[ing] to arbitrate” rather than “fighting [any disputes]
out in court.” 	Employment Agreement ¶ 8. 	And this was
reinforced by the Employment Agreement’s statements that
“arbitration will be the sole remedy for any disputes,” that
“the entire[ty of any] dispute[s will] be handled by JAMS,” and
that neither party “will pursue any action in court.” 	Id.
(emphases added).
All of this seems to meet New Jersey law’s mutual assent
standard, and to check the box of a valid arbitration agreement.
The Plaintiff, though, presses three counterarguments. 	Tick
through these.
* 	* 	*
The Plaintiff’s first counterargument: the Employment Agreement
“does not include [sufficiently] clear and unambiguous language
stating that [the Plaintiff] is waiving her right to trial by
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judge or jury.” 	Plaintiff’s Brief at 1. 	Why not? 	Because “the
words ‘trial,’ ‘judge,’ and ‘jury’ are completely absent from
the agreement.” 	Id. at 1; see id. at 11-16.
But here, the Employment Agreement used the word “court”
repeatedly, and in a way that makes clear that a proceeding in
“court” was what the Plaintiff would be giving up. 	See
Employment Agreement ¶ 8.
When “court” is used in that way in an arbitration agreement,
New Jersey law does not require “judge,” “jury," or “trial” to
be specifically invoked. 	See Collazo v. Prime Flight of DE,
Inc., 2020 WL 3958498, at *7 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020) (“It is
clear enough that the waiver of every kind of court trial
encompasses a waiver of a particular kind of court trial, i.e.,
a jury trial.”) (emphasis omitted); Stutheit v. Elmwood Park
Auto Mall, 2018 WL 6757030, at *3-4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Dec. 26, 2018) (“[E]xplicit waiver of the right to ‘maintain a
court action’ would clearly include the right to a jury
trial.”); Roundtree v. PrimeFlight Aviation Servs., Inc., 2017
WL 4697070, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2017) (“‘Even a person of
common knowledge, but without higher formal education, might
very well understand that if one waives access to a court, one
has waived access to a jury.’”) (quoting Emergency Physicians of
St. Clare’s, LLC v. Proassurance Corp., 2010 WL 3311861, at *6
(D.N.J. Aug. 19, 2010)); accord Brownlee v. Town Sports Int’l
Holdings, Inc., 2019 WL 149645, at *2-3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Jan. 8, 2019); Jaworski v. Ernst & Young U.S. LLP, 441 N.J.
Super. 464, 481 (App. Div. 2015); see generally Atalese, 219
N.J. at 444 (“No particular form of words is necessary to
accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights” in an
arbitration agreement).
* 	* 	*
The Plaintiff’s second counterargument: though the Employment
Agreement noted that it covered “all employment related
disputes, including claims under state or federal law,”
Employment Agreement ¶ 8, it said nothing in particular about
“workplace discrimination claims.” 	Plaintiff’s Brief at 2; see
id. at 16-17.
But New Jersey law goes the other way.
In Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76 (2002), an employee
agreed (essentially as here) to arbitrate “all disputes relating
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to [her] employment.” 	Id. at 81. 	And the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that this was “clear,” “unambiguous,” and
“sufficiently broad to encompass reasonably [the] plaintiff’s
statutory [claims],” id. at 96 --- which included pregnancy-
based discrimination claims under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination, similar to the ones at issue here. 	See id. at
82-83
* 	* 	*
Third, the Plaintiff contends that the Employment Agreement is
not valid because it “does not detail any differences between
arbitration and a court of law.” 	Plaintiff’s Brief at 2.
But this, too, runs aground on the caselaw.
In Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, for example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that an arbitration agreement could be enforced even
though it “provide[d] only a general concept of the arbitration
proceeding that would replace a judicial determination of [the
plaintiff’s] claims.” 	244 N.J. at 138.
Indeed, the agreement in Flanzman shed light on the “concept of
. . . arbitration,” id., in only one substantial way. 	Namely,
by juxtaposing arbitration with a civil trial, and indicating
that under the agreement, arbitration would take place “in lieu
of a jury or other civil trial.” 	Id. at 126 (emphasis added).8
This worked, per the Supreme Court, because “it ma[de] clear
that the contemplated arbitration would be very different from a
court proceeding.” 	Id.
The Employment Agreement in this case makes its own comparison,
and provides essentially the same level of specificity as the
Flanzman agreement. 	See Employment Agreement ¶ 8 (“Rather than
fighting it out in court, both you and Netflix agree to
arbitrate . . . .”).
8 	“Substantial” in the preceding sentence in the text because
the agreement also juxtaposes arbitration and litigation in two
other (narrow and technical) ways. 	See Flanzman 244 N.J. at 126
(indicating (1) that any arbitration award would be enforceable
by “court[s] having jurisdiction,” and (2) that the parties were
responsible for those arbitration expenses that they would
“otherwise be required to bear in a court action”).
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Accordingly, if the level of detail was enough in Flanzman, as
the New Jersey Supreme Court held, then it must be enough here,
too. 	See also Frederick v. Law Off. of Fox Kohler & Assocs.
PLLC, 852 F. App’x 673, 675-77 (3d Cir. 2021) (upholding an
arbitration agreement with similar language).9
* 	* 	*
In short: the Plaintiff’s three counterarguments are not
persuasive, and the parties’ arbitration agreement was valid
under New Jersey law.
III. Federal Law
Look now to the Plaintiff’s next argument: that this case cannot
be arbitrated because the 2022 Federal Ending Forced Arbitration
of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act “prohibits
arbitration of matters such as this one, that involve
allegations related to harassment on the basis of sex.”
Plaintiff’s Brief at 2; see id at 20-26.
Per the Act, “at the election of the person alleging conduct
constituting a sexual harassment dispute . . . no predispute
arbitration agreement . . . shall be valid or enforceable with
respect to a case which is filed under . . . State law and
relates to . . . the sexual harassment dispute.” 	9 U.S.C.
§ 402(a).
The Plaintiff argues that the Act applies in cases like this
one, where pregnancy-based claims are asserted --- because
harassment on the basis of pregnancy is a form of sex-based
harassment, see id. at 21, and in New Jersey, sexual harassment
is defined broadly as that which “‘occurs because of the
9 	The Employment Agreement here also adds a small bit of extra
detail. 	It “identifies a specific arbitration organization as
the administrator of its program, and designat[ing] that
organization’s employment arbitration rules as the governing
rules for the proceeding.” 	Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30,
52 (2020); see Employment Agreement ¶ 8 (“You also agree to let
the entire dispute be handled by JAMS, pursuant to the JAMS
Employment Rules & Procedures.”). 	Under New Jersey law, this
weighs in favor of a mutual assent conclusion, because it also
helps “make[] clear,” Flanzman, 244 N.J. at 138, that
arbitration is different from suing in court. 	See, e.g.,
Chapman, 2026 WL 74192, at *5 (so holding).
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victim's 	sex.'" 	Id. 	at 	22-23 	(quoting 	Lehmann 	v. 	Toys 	'R' 	Us,
132 	N.J. 	587, 	602 	(1993)) 	(emphasis 	omitted).
In 	response, 	the
not 	constitute 	a
New 	Jersey 	law.
Motion 	to 	Compel
Defendant 	argues 	that 	the 	Plaintiff's 	claims 	do
~well-pleaded 	claim[] 	of 	sex 	harassment" 	under
See 	Defendant's 	Reply 	in 	Further 	Support 	of 	Its
Arbitration 	(ECF 	40) 	at 	7-8, 	10.
All 	of 	this 	raises 	questions 	of 	first 	impression. 	The 	meaning
of 	the 	2022 	Act 	has 	not 	been 	substantively 	addressed 	by 	any 	of
the 	Nation's 	federal 	appellate 	courts 	or 	by 	this 	Court.
Addressing 	the 	relevant 	issues 	will 	likely 	require 	sustained
analysis. 	But 	as 	things 	stand, 	the 	parties' 	papers 	are 	sparse
on 	this 	point. 	Before 	coming 	to 	a 	decision 	on 	the 	relevant
federal 	law 	issue, 	the 	Court 	will 	solicit 	further 	briefing.
IV. 	Conclusion
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	out 	above, 	the 	Defendant's 	motion 	to 	compel
arbitration 	is 	administratively 	terminated. 	An 	order 	will 	issue
today 	as 	to 	a 	briefing 	schedule 	on 	the 	2022 	statute. 	After 	the
briefing 	is 	received, 	the 	Court 	will 	restore 	the 	motion 	to 	its
active 	docket.
IT 	IS 	on 	this 	14th 	day 	of 	January, 2 ~-~[t"~/rSO
p .j,·
ORDERED.
~:
Michael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
8
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