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2:23-cv-01035Njd18 de fev. de 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
R.C.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 23-1035 (SRC)
OPINION
CHESLER, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the appeal by Plaintiff R.C. (“Plaintiff”) of the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) determining that he was
not disabled under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This Court exercises jurisdiction
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and, having considered the submissions of the parties without
oral argument, pursuant to L. CIV. R. 9.1(b), finds that the Commissioner’s decision will be
affirmed.
In brief, this appeal arises from Plaintiff’s application for supplemental security income,
alleging disability beginning October 31, 2011. A series of hearings was held before ALJ Jack
Russak (the “ALJ”) between November 9, 2021 and August 23, 2022, and the ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision on November 21, 2022. Plaintiff sought review of the decision from the
Appeals Council. After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, the ALJ’s
decision became the Commissioner’s final decision, and Plaintiff filed this appeal.
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In the decision of November 21, 2022, the ALJ found that, at step three, Plaintiff did not
meet or equal any of the Listings. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity to perform sedentary work, with certain exertional and nonexertional
limitations. At step four, the ALJ also found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past
relevant work. At step five, the ALJ determined, based on the testimony of a vocational expert,
that there are jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant
can perform, consistent with his medical impairments, age, education, past work experience, and
residual functional capacity. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been disabled within the
meaning of the Act.
The record shows that Plaintiff’s claims have twice before been denied at the agency
level, and both times the Commissioner’s decisions were vacated on appeal to the District Court,
with the case remanded to the Commissioner. The present decision under review is thus the third
in a series of final decisions appealed to the District Court. In an introductory paragraph which
lays out the arguments on appeal, Plaintiff begins as follows: “plaintiff will respectfully argue
that a prior District Court Remand Opinion and Order was effectively ignored in the post-remand
decision under current review which repeats the same errors, issues the same findings and arrives
at the same conclusions previously rejected by this Court.” (Pl.’s Br. at 7.) This line of
argument raises questions about whether there is controlling legal authority for the proposition
that a Court performing judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) should review not only
the final decision of the Commissioner (which § 405(g) expressly authorizes), but should expand
the scope of its inquiry to cover the entire history of the claimant’s applications to the Social
Security administration, together with all previous appeals under § 405(g). Plaintiff implicitly
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suggests that this Court should act to review and enforce previous District Court opinions and
orders from previous now-terminated appeals with final judgments. This Court has three
questions about this line of argument: 1) what is the legal authority that requires this Court to
perform that task?; 2) what legal authority explains the standard this Court should apply when
acting to review and enforce previous final judgments?; and 3) given Plaintiff’s assertion that the
Commissioner has repeated the same errors, why is it not sufficient for this Court to limit its
inquiry to the legal errors that appear in the latest final decision of the Commissioner? If this
Court finds that the final decision under review contains the errors asserted by Plaintiff, and
performs its obligations under § 405(g) accordingly, what is the practical benefit of an analysis
based on prior final judgments? In short, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s line of argument based
on enforcement of previous final judgments is highly problematic.
At the outset, the Court observes that the authorizing statute limits its ability to consider
this line of argument. The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), states:
Judicial review. Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the
amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action
commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision
or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow. . . .
The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the
record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing. The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .
Plaintiff has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner under § 405(g), and the statute
authorizes this Court to review that final decision only. Nothing in the authorizing statute allows
this Court to review previous vacated decisions of the Commissioner or the decisions of previous
District Courts in previous appeal cases. Pursuant to § 405(g), this Court limits its consideration
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of Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal to arguments that concern the specific final decision of the
Commissioner that Plaintiff has appealed, and this Court does not consider issues outside the
boundary clearly drawn by § 405(g), such as past vacated final decisions of the Commissioner
nor the decisions of District Courts which vacated those decisions.
Nor does Plaintiff persuade that controlling legal authority supports this line of argument.
When challenging the RFC determination at step four, Plaintiff argues:
An agency’s failure to adhere to a Court’s Remand Order in a subsequent
administrative proceeding is legal error and must serve as a basis for remand. See
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 886 (1989) (“Deviation from the court’s
remand order in the subsequent administrative proceedings is itself legal error,
subject to reversal on further judicial review.”)
(Pl.’s Br. at 49.) Plaintiff has misinterpreted Hudson, quoting the case out of context and
omitting the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Shalala v Schaefer which sharply limits the
holding from Hudson. Here is Plaintiff’s quote from Hudson in context:
Deviation from the court’s remand order in the subsequent administrative
proceedings is itself legal error, subject to reversal on further judicial review. In
many remand situations, the court will retain jurisdiction over the action pending
the Secretary’s decision and its filing with the court. The court retains the power
in such situations to assure that its prior mandate is effectuated.
Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 886 (1989) (citations omitted). When viewed in context, it is
clear that the quoted holding applies in cases in which the District Court both remands the case
to the Commissioner and retains jurisdiction over the case “to assure that its prior mandate is
effectuated.” Plaintiff does not contend that such is the situation here and, indeed, the present
appeal was opened as a new case in this Court.1
1 The final order in the previous appeal to the District Court, filed September 1, 2020, reverses
the Commissioner’s decision, remands the case, enters final judgment, and closes the case, with
no mention of retention of jurisdiction. Cuevas v Commissioner, No. 17-13464 (D.N.J. filed
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Moreover, in Shalala v Schaefer, the Supreme Court clarified and limited its holding in
Hudson as follows:
However, the facts in Hudson also show that the District Court had not terminated
the case, but had retained jurisdiction during the remand. And that was a central
element in our decision, as the penultimate sentence of the opinion shows:
“We conclude that where a court orders a remand to the Secretary in a benefits
litigation and retains continuing jurisdiction over the case pending a decision from
the Secretary which will determine the claimant's entitlement to benefits, the
proceedings on remand are an integral part of the 'civil action' for judicial review,
and thus attorney's fees for representation on remand are available subject to the
other limitations in the EAJA.” 490 U.S. at 892 (emphasis added).
We have since made clear, in Finkelstein, that that retention of jurisdiction, that
failure to terminate the case, was error: Under § 405(g), “each final decision of
the Secretary [is] reviewable by a separate piece of litigation,” and a sentence-
four remand order “terminate[s] the civil action” seeking judicial review of the
Secretarys final decision. 496 U.S. at 624-625 (emphases added). What we
adjudicated in Hudson, in other words, was a hybrid: a sentence-four remand that
the District Court had improperly (but without objection) treated like a sentence-
six remand. We specifically noted in Melkonyan that Hudson was limited to a
“narrow class of qualifying administrative proceedings” where “the district court
retains jurisdiction of the civil action” pending the completion of the
administrative proceedings. 501 U.S. at 97. We therefore do not consider the
holding of Hudson binding as to sentence-four remands that are ordered (as
they should be) without retention of jurisdiction, or that are ordered with
retention of jurisdiction that is challenged.
Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 299-300 (1993) (emphasis added.). The Supreme Court thus
made clear that sentence four remands should be ordered without retention of jurisdiction, and
that the facts of Hudson limited its application to a very narrow group of cases. In the instant
case, the previous remand orders did not retain jurisdiction, and the cited holding of Hudson does
not apply.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s case on appeal suffers from two principal defects: 1) its failure to
Sept. 1, 2020.)
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deal with the issue of the burden of proof at the first four steps of the sequential evaluation
process; and 2) its failure to deal with the harmless error doctrine. As to the burden of proof,
Plaintiff bears the burden in the first four steps of the analysis of demonstrating how his
impairments, whether individually or in combination, amount to a qualifying disability. Bowen
v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
As to the harmless error doctrine, the Supreme Court explained its operation in a similar
procedural context in Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009), which concerned review of
a governmental agency determination. The Court stated: “the burden of showing that an error is
harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Id. In such a case,
“the claimant has the ‘burden’ of showing that an error was harmful.” Id. at 410.
Plaintiff thus bears the burden, on appeal, of showing not merely that the Commissioner
erred, but also that the error was harmful. At the first four steps, this requires that Plaintiff also
show that, but for the error, she might have proven her disability. In other words, when
appealing a decision at the first four steps, if Plaintiff cannot articulate the basis for a decision in
her favor, based on the existing record, she is quite unlikely to show that an error was harmful.
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision at steps three and four on appeal: 1) the ALJ erred
at step three by failing to perform an equivalence analysis which combines the effect of
combinations of severe impairments, as well as erring in the analysis of mental limitations, as
well as erring in the analysis of obesity; and 2) at step four, the exertional limitations in the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination are not explained, and the nonexertional
limitations have been rejected by prior District Court decisions.2
2 As already stated, this Court reviews only the final decision of the Commissioner; it does not
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in a number of ways at step three, but at no point does
Plaintiff demonstrate that he was harmed by any of these alleged errors, as required by Shinseki.
At no point does Plaintiff muster the evidence of record to persuade that, but for these errors,
Plaintiff might have proven that he met the criteria for a specific listed impairment, or for
medical equivalence to a specific listed impairment. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that any of the alleged errors at step three harmed him.
Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to perform a medical equivalence analysis based on
combinations of Plaintiff’s severe impairments. Plaintiff has overlooked, however, the
requirements for the medical equivalence analysis set forth in SSR 17-2p, “Evidence Needed by
Adjudicators at the Hearings and Appeals Council Levels of the Administrative Review Process
to Make Findings about Medical Equivalence,” which states:
At the hearings level or at the AC level when the AC issues its own decision, the
adjudicator is responsible for the finding of medical equivalence. The adjudicator
must base his or her decision about whether the individual's impairment(s)
medically equals a listing on the preponderance of the evidence in the record. To
demonstrate the required support of a finding that an individual is disabled based
on medical equivalence at step 3, the record must contain one of the following:
1. A prior administrative medical finding from an MC or PC from the initial
or reconsideration adjudication levels supporting the medical equivalence
finding, or
2. ME evidence, which may include testimony or written responses to
interrogatories, obtained at the hearings level supporting the medical
equivalence finding, or
3. A report from the AC's medical support staff supporting the medical
equivalence finding.
consider previous vacated decisions nor the rationale stated by District Courts for the decisions
to vacate them.
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Crucially, Plaintiff’s brief fails to point to any specific evidence of record that meets the
requirements stated in SSR 17-2p. Plaintiff thus has failed to demonstrate that he was harmed by
any alleged errors in the step three medical equivalence analysis because, but for the ALJ’s
alleged errors at step three, he might have met the requirements stated in SSR 17-2p to support a
determination of medical equivalence to a Listing.3 Without this, this Court cannot conclude that
any alleged errors at step three prejudiced Plaintiff, pursuant to Shinseki.
As to step four, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not offer a rationale for the exertional
limitations in the RFC determination. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the
residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, with certain additional exertional
limitations. The ALJ offered over six pages of discussion and analysis of the evidence of record
that supported the exertional limitations in the RFC determination. (See Tr. 482-489.) The text
of the ALJ’s decision does not support Plaintiff’s allegation that the ALJ offered no rationale for
the exertional limitations in the RFC determination. This Court has reviewed the residual
functional capacity determination and finds that it states a rationale which is supported by
substantial evidence.
Plaintiff has failed to persuade this Court that the ALJ erred in the decision, or that he
was harmed by any errors. Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ erred, has not shown that the
evidence supported a decision in his favor, and has made no demonstration of
prejudice as required by Shinseki. This Court finds that the Commissioner’s decision is
3 Nor did Plaintiff muster the evidence to show that he met the criteria for any specific listed
mental disorder, nor for any specific Listing related to obesity.
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supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed.
s/ Stanley R. Chesler
STANLEY R. CHESLER, U.S.D.J.
Dated: February 18, 2026
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