2:22-cv-04791•UNITED MERCHANT SERVICES, INC et al v. ROYAL WESTERN COMPUTER, INC et al
UNITED MERCHANT SERVICES, INC et al v. ROYAL WESTERN COMPUTER, INC et al
2:22-cv-04791Njd25 de nov. de 2025
Texto completo
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY UNITED MERCHANT SERVICES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROYAL WESTERN COMPUTER, INC., et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 22-cv-04791 (KSH) (JRA) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiffs, United Merchant Services, Inc. (“UMSI”) and Bluu Inc. (“Bluu,” collectively with UMSI, “Plaintiffs”), move (1) to strike the Answer and Counterclaim of Defendant Royal Western Computer Inc. (“Royal Western”) and Defendant Jong S. Lim (“Mr. Lim,” collectively with Royal Western, “Defendants”), and (2) for the Clerk to enter default against Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Dkt. No. 111 (the “Motion”). Notably, this unopposed Motion is not directed at the other Defendant, Tomorrow POS, Inc (“Tomorrow”), which remains an active Defendant in this case.1 The Honorable Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J., referred this Motion to me for a Report and Recommendation. I decide the Motion on the papers and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.Civ.R. 78.1(b). For the 1 Unless expressly noted otherwise, the term “Defendants” in this Opinion does not include Tomorrow POS, Inc. Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 1 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
2 reasons discussed below, I respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED as to Defendants Jong S. Lim and Royal Western. I. BACKGROUND UMSI is a payment processing company that, through its affiliate, Bluu, provides electronic payment services to merchants. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12– 14, Dkt. No. 79. Essentially, UMSI, through Bluu, provides the software and hardware that enable merchants and retailers to accept payment from customers via electronic means (i.e., credit cards and debit cards). Id. ¶ 15. Key to Plaintiffs’ services is “Royal Touch POS,” UMSI’s point-of-sale software that enables its merchant customers to process customer payments. Id. ¶ 21. To reach various merchants, UMSI contracts with third-party resellers, who agree to exclusively market UMSI’s processing services and equipment, inclusive of its point-of-sale terminals and software, to merchants who may benefit from UMSI’s services and equipment. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs initiated this action on July 28, 2022, against one of these resellers, Royal Western, because Royal Western, through its President and CEO, Mr. Lim, marketed a competing software, “Rainbow POS,” while contractually obligated to exclusively market Plaintiffs’ equipment to customers. See generally id. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants developed their own point-of-sale software, “Tomorrow POS,” which Plaintiffs characterize as an illegal, unauthorized clone of Plaintiffs’ intellectual property. Id. ¶¶ 60–61. Accordingly, Plaintiffs bring various claims for Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 2 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
3 breach of contract, copyright infringement, fraud, and statutory violations against Defendants and Tomorrow. 2 See generally id. Throughout this litigation, the parties made various efforts to settle this matter, but by February 28, 2024, it became apparent the parties would be unable to do so. See Dkt. Nos. 34, 44, 52; February 28, 2024, Minute Entry. Thereafter, on April 15, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, and Defendants filed their Answer generally denying Plaintiffs’ allegations, asserting affirmative defenses, and asserting two counterclaims (“Answer”). Dkt. Nos. 79–80. The parties then proceeded with completing discovery. See Dkt. Nos. 84–85. However, on March 6, 2025, Defendants’ counsel, the Kim Law Firm, moved to withdraw as counsel because Mr. Lim represented that Royal Western had ceased its operations and that he no longer intended to fund the lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 100-2 ¶¶ 6–8. The Kim Law Firm represented that it “informed Mr. Lim of the consequences of the [Kim Law] Firm’s withdrawal,” and despite this warning, “Mr. Lim indicated that he desire[d] to terminate the [Kim Law] Firm’s representation of him and [Royal Western].” Id ¶¶ 7–8. The Kim Law Firm also certified that it had served a copy of its motion to withdraw upom Mr. Lim at his last known address and email. See Dkt. No. 100-4. On May 19, 2025, the Court granted the Kim Law Firm’s motion to withdraw as counsel for Defendants. See Dkt. No. 106 ¶ 1.3 Per the Court’s Order, Mr. Lim 2 According to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, Tomorrow is a shell company set up by Mr. Lim to market Tomorrow POS and avoid Royal Western’s exclusivity obligations. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 64. 3 The Kim Law Firm remains counsel for Tomorrow. Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 3 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
4 was to retain new representation for Royal Western,4 and inform the Court whether he would be representing himself pro se or obtaining new counsel. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Mr. Lim failed to do so. Moreover, the Kim Law Firm was ordered to serve Mr. Lim with Plaintiffs’ updated deposition notices via his email, to notify Mr. Lim of his deposition telephonically, and to provide Plaintiffs with Mr. Lim’s last known address and contact information. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. The Kim Law Firm represented via status letter to the Court that, in compliance with the Order, they, contacted [Mr. Lim] via electronic mail to inform of this firm’s withdrawal as his legal representative, advising him of the potential consequences of said withdrawal and further informed him that he is required [to appear] for the deposition that Plaintiffs noticed for July 1, 2025. Furthermore, the [the Kim Law Firm] made attempts to contact [Mr. Lim] at his last known telephone number on May 19, 2025 and June 11, 2025, to no avail. Dkt. No. 108 at 1. Despite these attempts, the Kim Law Firm has had “no further communication with [Mr. Lim],” id., and Defendants subsequently failed to appear for their respective depositions scheduled on June 27, 2025, and July 1, 2025. Dkt. No. 111-1 at 3. For all intents and purposes, Defendants have abandoned this litigation, having failed to participate in completing the remaining discovery or otherwise appear on this matter, despite the parties’ efforts to communicate with Mr. Lim. See Dkt. No. 108. Following a status conference on July 1, 2025, I granted Plaintiffs leave 4 Royal Western, as a corporate entity, may only appear in federal court through a licensed attorney. See Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993) (“It has been the law for the better part of two centuries . . . that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.”) (citations modified); accord Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373, 374 (3d Cir. 1966); see also Buschmeier v. G&G Invs., Inc., 222 F. App’x 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2007). Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 4 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
5 to file the appropriate motion to resolve this matter as to Defendants. Dkt. No. 110. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion seeking to strike Defendants’ Answer for failure to comply and obey pretrial orders pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(f) and 37(b). Plaintiffs have certified that the instant Motion was “served via this Court’s electronic filing system, via email, and overnight mail upon [Defendants].” Dkt. No. 111-11 at 1. II. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to sanction a party that fails to comply with a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Regarding sanctions, the Court may generally “issue any just orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A) (ii)-(vii)[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1). Specifically, Rule 37(b)(2)(A) states in relevant part: If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, . . . the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the following: . . . (iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part; . . . (vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party[.] Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). The Court uses its sound discretion in deciding what sanctions to impose. See Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 2007). In Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit identified six factors for courts to evaluate when deciding whether to impose a sanction such as Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 5 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
6 striking a pleading: (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary; (3) whether there has been a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868. No Poulis factor is dispositive, and dismissal or default can be granted even when some of the factors are not met. See Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). However, “dismissals with prejudice or defaults are drastic sanctions, termed ‘extreme’ by the Supreme Court, . . . and are to be reserved for [such] cases.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867–68 (citing Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)). III. DISCUSSION As a threshold matter, I note that this Motion follows Defendants’ abandonment of the case. After I granted the Kim Law Firm leave to withdraw, Defendants were ordered to obtain new counsel, or in Mr. Lim’s case, notify the Court if he would be proceeding pro se. See Dkt. No. 106 ¶¶ 5–6. Neither Defendant did so. As Royal Westen is a corporate entity that may only appear in federal court through a licensed attorney, failure to do so justifies the imposition of sanctions. See N.J. Bldg. Laborers’ Statewide Pension Fund v. Innovative Design & Dev., Inc., No. 22- 2470 (JKS) (JSA), 2024 WL 6078306, at *2, *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 6078307 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2024). Moreover, the record makes clear that both Defendants have eschewed their discovery obligations. Despite the parties’ best efforts to reach Defendants, Royal Western failed to produce Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 6 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
7 a corporate representative for a deposition noticed for June 27, 2025, and Mr. Lim, who is allowed to proceed pro se, also failed to appear at his deposition noticed for July 1, 2025. See Dkt. No. 108 at 1; Dkt. No. 111-1 at 3–4. Defendants had sufficient notice of both depositions and this Motion. The Kim Law Firm represented that they made attempts to contact Mr. Lim regarding Defendants’ depositions via their usual means of communication, email and telephone, as ordered by the Court. See Dkt. No. 100-2 ¶¶ 6–8; Dkt. No. 106; Dkt. No. 108. However, their attempts went ignored. See Dkt. No. 108 at 1. In light of that, tendering new deposition notices would be futile. Plaintiffs also attempted to give Mr. Lim notice of the instant Motion, having served the Motion on Mr. Lim via email and overnight mail at the last known address provided to them by the Kim Law Firm. See Dkt. No. 106 ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 111-11. To this, Defendants failed to respond. Defendants have disregarded all attempts made to contact them via known and established means of communication—evidencing their intent to abandon this litigation. By abandoning the case, Defendants “fail[ed] to obey [the] order[s] to provide or permit discovery,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), warranting sanctions under Rule 37. Turning to the Poulis factors, I find that at least four of the six factors are satisfied. The first factor—the extent of the party’s personal responsibility—requires that I examine “whether the party [himself] has caused a delay as opposed to whether counsel for the party is responsible.” Vittas v. Brooks Bros. Inc., Grp., No. 3:14-cv- 3617-BRM-LHG, 2017 WL 6316633, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2017). “[I]t is logical to Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 7 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
8 hold a pro se plaintiff personally responsible for delays in his case because a pro se plaintiff is solely responsible for the progress of his case, whereas a plaintiff represented by counsel relies, at least in part, on his or her attorney.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2008). As the managing officer of Royal Western and a pro se litigant in his individual capacity, Mr. Lim is solely responsible for ensuring that Royal Western is represented by an attorney and that both he and Royal Western meet their discovery obligations. Defendants’ failures to appear at their respective depositions, follow Court orders, or otherwise litigate this case establish a willing abandonment of their defense obligations. These actions, taken after fair warning was already provided to Mr. Lim, Dkt. No. 100-2 ¶¶ 6–8, are only attributable to Mr. Lim. With respect to the second factor, prejudice towards the Plaintiffs, I find that Defendants’ abandonment presents a clear prejudice to Plaintiffs. Prejudice in this context does not mean “irremediable harm,” but rather, “the burden imposed by impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy[.]” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; see also N.J. Bldg. Laborers’ Statewide Pension Fund, 2024 WL 6078306, at *3 (“[The defendant’s] failure to participate in this case and comply with the Undersigned’s Orders has prejudiced Plaintiffs by halting the progress of this action.”). Plaintiffs’ inability to conduct Defendants’ depositions renders Plaintiffs unable to obtain discovery crucial to litigate their case on the merits and further delays resolution of this already three-year-old action. This factor clearly weighs in favor of striking the Defendants’ Answer. Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 8 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
9 The third factor, which examines whether there has been a history of dilatoriness, leans against striking Defendants’ Answer. “Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non- response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260 (quoting Adams v. Trs. of New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994)). However, “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a history of dilatoriness.” Id. at 261 (citation modified). Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants have a recent history of dilatoriness and their failure to act seem[s] to be in conformity with Mr. Lim’s modus operandi to no longer participate in this litigation.” Dkt. No. 111-1 at 8. But as Plaintiffs recognize, Defendants’ misconduct is recent and only resulted in a few instances of misconduct since the Kim Law Firm filed its motion to withdraw. While Defendants clearly conveyed they no longer intend to participate in this litigation, I cannot find that their recent abandonment of this case establishes a history of dilatoriness. Under the fourth factor, I must consider “whether the conduct was ‘the type of willful or contumacious behavior which was characterized as flagrant bad faith.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 875). “Generally, ‘[w]illfullness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.’” Id. (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 875). However, merely negligent or inadvertent conduct will not suffice to satisfy this factor. Id. Here, Defendants’ conduct is at least willful. Mr. Lim made clear he does not intend to continue funding the litigation, Dkt. No. 100-2 ¶ 6, nor has he made any Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 9 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
10 effort to comply with this Court’s orders or appear for depositions. Despite prior counsel’s warnings to Mr. Lim, and the parties’ best efforts to communicate with him, Mr. Lim has intentionally abandoned this case, and therefore, this factor weighs in favor of striking Defendants’ Answer. The fifth factor requires that I examine the effectiveness of alternative sanctions. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869. Recognizing that “striking a pleading must be a sanction of last resort,” New Jersey Bldg. Laborers’ Statewide Pension Fund, 2024 WL 6078306, at *3, no lesser sanction is appropriate here. As discussed, Royal Western, as a corporate entity, cannot proceed in this litigation without representation of counsel, and appears to no longer be operating. Mr. Lim has also abandoned this litigation and has not responded to this Court’s directives as it pertains to obtaining new counsel, or the parties’ efforts to complete discovery. Accordingly, there is no alternative sanction that can remedy Defendants’ abandonment. Finally, the sixth factor requires that I examine the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70. “A claim, or defense, will be deemed meritorious when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff or would constitute a complete defense.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 923 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Nevertheless, “the Court cannot meaningfully evaluate the potential merits” of Defendants’ defenses and counterclaims because fact discovery is incomplete, and Defendants abandoned the litigation. Chilupuri v. Eagle IT Inc., No. 22-6718-SDW-AME, 2024 Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 10 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
11 WL 4363059, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4366850 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2024). Therefore, this factor is, at best, neutral. Balancing the Poulis factors, I find that striking Defendants’ Answer is an appropriate sanction for the circumstances described above. See Ware, 322 F.3d at 221 (finding that each factor need not be satisfied for sanctions to be imposed); see also Pro Custom Solar, LLC v. Castillo, 19-12469 (SDW) (LDW), 2021 WL 7842376, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2021) (finding the defendants’ apparent abandonment of the action warranted striking their answer and entering default), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 11593795 (D.N.J. May 24, 2021). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that Plaintiffs’ Motion be GRANTED and that the District Court strike the Answer of Defendants Jong S. Lim and Royal Western and provide Plaintiffs with leave to seek entry of default and default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. By November 26, 2025, Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Defendants Jong S. Lim and Royal Western at their email address and via certified mail at their last known address. The parties have fourteen days to file and serve objections to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); L.Civ.R. 72.1(c)(2). HON. J OSÉ R. ALMONTE U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE J UDGE Dated: November 26, 2025 Case 2:22-cv-04791-KSH-JRA Document 118 Filed 11/25/25 Page 11 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
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