JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS IRELAND LIMITED v. LUPIN INC. et al

2:21-cv-14271Njd26 de jan. de 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS IRELAND
LIMITED,
Plaintiff,
v.
LUPIN INC., LUPIN
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and TEVA
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 21-14271 (SRC) (JSA)
(CONSOLIDATED)
OPINION
JESSICA S. ALLEN, U.S.M.J.
This is a consolidated Hatch-Waxman patent case. Plaintiff, Jazz Pharmaceuticals
Ireland Limited, asserts that Defendants Lupin Inc., Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Teva
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.’s proposed ANDA products infringe forty-eight (48) claims across twelve
(12) patents covering Plaintiff’s branded drug Xywav®, which is an FDA-approved treatment for
cataplexy and/or excessive daytime sleepiness associated with narcolepsy.
Plaintiff’s initial Complaint was filed on July 28, 2021, followed by five related
Complaints, which have been consolidated for all purposes into this action. (See ECF Nos. 47,
81, 116, 195). Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to strike allegedly new prior-art
references and invalidity theories contained within two of Defendants’ opening expert reports—
the Amended Expert Report of Michael Crowley, Ph.D. (the “Crowley Report”) and the Opening
Expert Report of S. Craig Dyar, Ph.D. (the “Dyar Report”) (sometimes, collectively, “the
Reports”). (See ECF Nos. 240, 247). Defendants oppose the motion. (ECF No. 244). No oral
argument was heard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons set forth below, and for good cause
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shown, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
A. 	Relevant Procedural History
Several Scheduling Orders have been entered in this consolidated action. (See ECF Nos.
34, 74, 81, 116, 143, 195, 201, 217, 239). Relevant here, Lupin served Amended Invalidity
Contentions on July 22, 2022, and again on January 4, 2024, and Teva served Invalidity
Contentions on September 22, 2023. (See Declaration of Liza M. Walsh, Esq. (“Walsh Decl.”)
Exs. 1-2, 14, 16; ECF No. 244-1). Following the close of fact discovery, the parties timely
served their opening expert reports on April 21, 2025. (See ECF No. 217).2
By letter dated April 24, 2025, Plaintiff advised the Court that it claimed to have
“identified new theories, prior art, and prior art combinations in Defendants’ opening expert
reports that were not disclosed in their invalidity contentions.” (ECF No. 229). On May 1, 2025,
the Undersigned held a Case Management Conference, wherein the parties were directed to
informally address the issue and then submit a status letter on or before May 9, 2025. (See
Transcript of Case Management Conference, dated May 1, 2025 (“Tr.”), 10:20-14:4; ECF No.
235).
In their May 9th submission, the parties advised that they had narrowed their disputes
over expert reports and sought additional time to further meet-and-confer. (ECF No. 234).
Ultimately, the parties were not able to resolve their disputes. As such, the Court instructed the
parties to file any motions to strike opening expert reports by June 20, 2025, and held the balance
1 The Court assumes the parties are familiar with the extensive history of this case. Only the background relevant to
the present motion is set forth herein.
2 The parties agreed to consolidation of these case for all purposes, including permitting Defendants to rely on each
other’s contentions. (See ECF No. 46-1 at 2; see also ECF No. 244 at 1 n.1). Accordingly, Dr. Crowley and Dr.
Dyar each submitted single invalidity reports on behalf of both Defendants. (Id.)
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of expert discovery in abeyance pending the outcome of the motions. (See ECF No. 239).3
On June 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present motion to strike, contending that the Reports
each contain new invalidity theories and new prior-art references not previously disclosed in
Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions. (ECF No. 240).
B. 	Relevant Patents At Issue
The Crowley Report addresses four (4) patents in the case, which the parties refer to as
the “Mixed Salts Patents”—U.S. Patent Nos. 8,591,922 (“the ’922 patent”), 9,132,107 (“the ’107
patent”), 8,901,173 (“the ’173 patent”), and 11,554,102 (“the ’102 patent”). (See ECF No. 241
at 2; see also Walsh Decl., Ex. 3 (the Crowley Report)). The Mixed Salts Patents claim “novel
pharmaceutical compositions that Plaintiff invented while developing its Xywav® product.”
(Id.) The active ingredient in Xywav® is “oxybate,” and the Mixed Salts Patents cover the
Xywav® oxybate composition, which is a mixture comprised of 48% calcium oxybate, 21%
magnesium oxybate, 23% potassium oxybate, and 8% sodium oxybate. (See id.)
The Dyar Report is directed to U.S. Patent No. 11,426,373 (“the ’373 patent”). (See ECF
No. 241 at 2-3; see also Walsh Decl., Ex. 4 (the Dyar Report)). Plaintiff contends the ’373
patent claims “novel discoveries that [Plaintiff] made during clinical testing of Xywav®.” (ECF
No. 241 at 2). According to Plaintiff, “during the development of Xywav®, [Plaintiff’s]
scientists expected that Xywav® would be bioequivalent to a different oxybate product already
on the market[,] a 100% sodium oxybate product called Xyrem®,” but “unexpectedly found
something very different.” (Id. at 3). In short, Xyrem® was best taken on an empty stomach,
because if Xyrem® was taken with food, there was increased absorption time (Tmax ) and
3 The parties’ dispute relating to Plaintiff’s infringement expert report is the subject of Defendants’ motion to strike,
(ECF No. 242), which is being addressed in a separate opinion and order.
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decreased effectiveness (C max ). (Id.) Unlike Xyrem®, Plaintiff’s scientists allegedly found that
Xywav® does not exhibit significantly delayed or decreased absorption rates in the presence of
food. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the claims of the ’373 patent relate to methods of treating
patients based on that discovery. (Id.)
C. 	Current Dispute
The Crowley Report contains three clear theories of invalidity directed to the Mixed Salts
Patents:
• 	Ground 1: Obviousness over the Cook Publication, which identifies sodium,
potassium, magnesium, and calcium oxybate as pharmaceutically acceptable, alone
or in combination. See Crowley Report, Ex. 3 at ¶ 4 (summary), ¶¶ 152-239
(Ground 1);
• 	Ground 2: Obviousness over the Cook Publication in combination with Conte
(’030 patent) and/or Gessa (’632 patent), which confirm the suitability and
preference for the same four oxybate salts (sodium, potassium, magnesium, and
calcium), and Karppanen, which provides teachings and motivation to reduce
sodium by adding potassium, magnesium, and calcium specifically. Id. at ¶ 5
(summary), ¶¶ 240-255 (Ground 2); and
• 	Ground 3: Obviousness over the Xyrem® Label—which includes explicit FDA
warnings about high sodium content—in combination with Cook, Conte, Gessa,
and Karppanen. Id. at ¶ 6 (summary), ¶¶ 256-360 (Ground 3).
(See ECF No. 244 at 4; see also ECF No. 241 at 7).
The Dyar Report opines that the asserted claims of the ’373 patent are invalid for at least
four reasons:
(1) obvious in view of the ʼ922 patent; (2) obvious in view of the ʼ922 patent in
combination with Borgen; (3) obvious in view of the ʼ922 patent in combination
with the Xyrem® label; and (4) anticipated by the ʼ922 patent.
(See ECF No. 244 at 7-8; see also ECF No. 241 at 9).
The parties agree the Reports contain the above opinions and that they are generally
consistent with the disclosures in Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions. (See ECF No. 244 at 4, 7-
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8; ECF No. 241 at 7-9). However, Plaintiff contends that the Reports contain additional theories
and references that exceed what was disclosed in Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions. (See ECF
No. 241 at 1). Thus, according to Plaintiff, Defendants were required to seek leave to amend
their contentions pursuant to Local Patent Rule 3.7 and establish “good cause.” (See id. at 1, 17).
Plaintiff further contends that because Defendants have not moved to amend and cannot establish
good cause, the Court should strike the following undisclosed references, twenty-six (26)
paragraphs in the Crowley Report, and thirty-nine (39) paragraphs in the Dyar Report, appearing
as:
(1) the Crowley Report’s alleged substantive reliance on
references, “FDA Regulations”4 and “Noro”5;6
(2) a new obviousness theory in the Crowley Report reliant on a
reference identified as “Palma”7;8
(3) a new solubility theory in the Crowley Report, including
reliance on references “USP”9 and “Page”10;11
(4) an allegedly new sodium reduction theory in the Dyar Report;12
and
(5) the Dyar Report’s inclusion of an allegedly new inherency
theory.13
(See ECF No. 244 at 12-17, at times, collectively, “the allegedly new theories and references”).
Defendants counter that what Plaintiff describes as the allegedly new theories and
4 Reference attached to Walsh Decl., at Ex. 7.
5 Reference attached to Walsh Decl., at Ex. 8, and in certified translated form at Ex. 9.
6 Crowley Report, ¶¶ 111, 113-15, 141, 143, 146, and 274.
7 Reference attached to Walsh Decl., at Ex. 12.
8 Crowley Report, ¶¶ 144, 253, 275, and 292-93.
9 Reference attached to the Walsh Decl., at Ex. 10.
10 Reference attached to the Walsh Decl., at Ex. 11.
11 Crowley Report, ¶¶ 134-139, 147-151, 177, and 276.
12 Dyar Report, ¶¶ 215-221, 299, 330-32, 353, 355, 360-61, 405, 435-36, 455, 457, 462, and 464.
13 Dyar Report, ¶¶ 224-31, 335, 348, 363, 439, 451, 466, 492, 503-04.
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references were either properly disclosed in Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions or otherwise did
not have to be disclosed, in accordance with the Local Patent Rules. (ECF No. 244 at 1).
Specifically, Defendants contend that Reports contain no new theories. Further, Defendants
contend that any references not previously identified in their Contentions were included in the
Reports merely for background purposes, as complimentary proof, or as evidence of a motivation
to combine, as permitted by the Local Patent Rules. (See id. at 1-2). Therefore, according to
Defendants, no motion to amend was required. (Id.) Defendants further contend that, even
assuming the Reports contain new theories or references not otherwise permitted, the controlling
standard for exclusion is not the amendment standard of Local Patent Rule 3.7 as suggested by
Plaintiff, but rather, the Third Circuit’s multi-factor test for analyzing a request to exclude expert
testimony set forth in Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass’n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d
Cir. 1977) (at times, “Pennypack”). (See id. at 11).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“The Local Patent Rules exist to further the goal of full, timely discovery and provide all
parties with adequate notice and information with which to litigate their case.” Amgen Inc. v.
Kashiv Biosciences LLC, 2019 WL 5445974, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2019).14 The Patent Rules
“are designed to require the parties to crystallize their theories of the case early in the litigation
and to adhere to those theories once they have been disclosed.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Pursuant to Local Patent Rule 3.3, a party opposing an assertion of patent infringement
must serve on all parties its “Invalidity Contentions,” which shall contain, among other things,
the following information: (a) the identity of each item of prior art that allegedly anticipates each
14 The Local Patent Rules “were adopted verbatim from the Northern District of California and are identical to those
adopted in Eastern District of Texas. Accordingly, courts in this District look to these ‘sister-courts’ for guidance
with respect to issues not commonly addressed in this District.” Curia IP Holdings, LLC v. Salix Pharm., Ltd., 2025
WL 1627251, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 18, 2025).
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asserted claim or renders it obvious, (b) an explanation of why the prior art renders the asserted
claim obvious, including an identification of any combinations of prior art showing obviousness,
(c) a chart identifying where specifically in each alleged item of prior art each limitation of each
asserted claim is found, and (d) a detailed explanation of the bases for the asserted grounds of
invalidity based on enablement or written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id.
“Invalidity contentions . . . take the place of a series of interrogatories that [plaintiff]
would likely have propounded had the patent local rules not provided for streamlined discovery.”
Evolusion Concepts, Inc. v. Cross Eng’g, LLC, 2019 WL 13149923, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8,
2019). However, despite Rule 3.3’s requirement that prior art references be included in
invalidity contentions, an expert may permissibly refer to previously undisclosed references
when such references are not being used to support a claim limitation—several examples include
references used as: “(1) background material relevant to the technology at issue; (2) state of the
art; and (3) establishing what one of skill in the art would have known at the time of the
invention.” Ziilabs, Inc., Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., 2015 WL 7303352, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 25, 2015); see Celgene v. Hetero Labs, Ltd., 2021 WL 3701700, at *2 (D.N.J. June 15,
2021). Likewise, experts may also rely on previously undisclosed references to provide support
for “motivations to combine,” as these are not required disclosures under Local Patent Rule 3.3.
See Azurity Pharms., Inc. v. Amneal Pharma., LLC, 2023 WL 2817367, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 9,
2023) (Rule 3.3 does not require a defendant to disclose “motivations to combine” in
contentions); Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2 (undisclosed reference may be used for
“supplemental motivations to combine or complimentary proof”).
At the same time, a party cannot simply justify “the non-disclosure of prior art references
. . . by affixing the label of background materials.” Evolusion Concepts, Inc., 2019 WL
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13149923, at *1. Thus, if a party develops new theories of invalidity or relies on new references
after serving its contentions, Local Patent Rule 3.7 requires the party to seek leave to amend its
contentions, which may be granted “only by order of the Court upon a timely application and
showing of good cause.” Id.; see O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Pwr. Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d
1355, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Courts have repeatedly avowed that Rule 3.7 is the proper vehicle to seek to add new
theories or references in patent cases, and that parties should not embed new theories or
references within expert reports. See, e.g., Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2 (“Given the
purpose behind the patent local rules’ disclosure requirements, ‘a party may not use an expert
report to introduce new infringement theories, new infringing instrumentalities, new invalidity
theories, or new prior art references not disclosed in the parties’ infringement contentions or
invalidity contentions.’”) (quoting Verinata Health, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 2014 WL 4100638,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014))); Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2014 WL
997532, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2014), aff’d, 2014 WL 1494592 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2014). However,
this District’s Patent Rules are notably silent on the remedy for noncompliance. See Taro
Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Novitum Pharma, LLC, 2020 WL 1673045, at *10 n.4 (D.N.J. Apr. 6,
2020) (“While it is apparent that Defendant has violated [the Local Patent Rules], the Local
Patent Rules are silent on the remedy to be applied.”). As detailed below, this absence of a
remedy in the Rules has apparently created diverging views among courts in this District
regarding the proper standard to apply when evaluating a noncomplying party’s inclusion of new
references and/or theories in expert reports.
Again, Plaintiff submits that the appropriate standard for Defendants’ noncompliance is
governed by Local Patent Rule 3.7, which requires Defendants to move to amend and establish
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good cause. According to Plaintiff, the proper remedy is to strike those portions of the Reports
containing the allegedly new references and theories. (See ECF No. 241 at 12; ECF No. 247 at
4). Some courts in this District have adopted this approach by considering the party’s failure to
seek leave to amend under Rule 3.7 and establish good cause. These courts have found that such
noncompliance with the Local Patent Rules alone warrants striking new theories and references
revealed for the first time in an expert’s report. See, e.g., Janssen Pharms., Inc. v. Mylan Labs
Ltd., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90278, at *35 (D.N.J. May 23, 2023), aff’d, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS
7190 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2025); Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2; Eagle View Techs., Inc. v.
Xactware Sols., Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195828, at *37-41 (D.N.J. Nov. 29, 2017), aff’d,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88948 (D.N.J. May 29, 2018); Merck, 2014 WL 997532, at *7.15
In comparison, Defendants submit the proper standard is governed by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) and a balancing of the Pennypack factors identified by the Third
Circuit16 to determine whether exclusion of the new theories and references is proper. (See ECF
No. 244 at 10-11). In support of their position, Defendants rely on cases which employ this
approach. (See id. at 11 (citing Azurity Pharms., Inc., 2023 WL 2817367, at *3, and Otsuka
Pharm. Co. v. Torrent Pharms., Inc., 133 F. Supp. 3d 721, 729 (D.N.J. 2015))); see also, e.g.,
Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. Alkem Lab. Ltd., 2025 WL 2355957, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2025).17
15 As explained by the court in Merck, if a party develops a new theory of infringement or invalidity, Rule 3.7 places
the burden on that party to show good cause to amend their contentions to include the new theory. Id. at *7. If,
however, a party seeking to advance a new theory were allowed to skip the amendment process and simply insert a
new theory into an expert report, it would shift the burdens involved – that is, it would effectively relieve the
moving party of having to show good cause under the Local Patent Rules and have the practical effect of requiring a
showing of prejudice to warrant exclusion of the untimely theories or references involved. Id. The Merck court
found it “could not allow” the burden to be shifted in this way. Id.
16 Although this is a patent case, the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to evidentiary rulings not unique to
patent law. See, e.g., Insite Vision Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 783 F.3d 853, 864–65 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (applying Third
Circuit law).
17 Although not raised by the parties, the Undersigned notes that other courts in this District have considered such
applications to strike without specific reference to Patent Rule 3.7 or the Pennypack factors. See, e.g., Bausch
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The Pennypack factors are: (1) “the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the
excluded witnesses would have testified” or the excluded evidence would have been offered; (2)
“the ability of that party to cure the prejudice”; (3) the extent to which allowing such witnesses
or evidence would “disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in the
court”; (4) any “bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the court's order”; and (5) the
importance of the excluded evidence. Id. at 904-05.18
Reconciling these competing standards is not the threshold issue. Rather, this Court first
must consider “whether the expert has permissibly specified the application of a disclosed theory
or impermissibly substituted a new theory altogether.” Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2. Only
if this Court finds the Reports contain a newly disclosed theory or reference is it necessary to
determine the proper legal standard for exclusion. Of course, what is “new” in a patent expert’s
report can be a nuanced evaluation, and several courts have noted the following general,
overarching approach to the issue now before the Court:
The threshold question in deciding whether to strike an expert
report or, in this case, select portions of an expert report, is
whether the expert has permissibly specified the application of a
disclosed theory or impermissibly substituted a new theory
altogether. When the line between permissible application of a
disclosed theory and impermissible substitution of a new theory
blurs, the district court revert[s] to a simple question: will striking
the report result in not just a trial, but an overall litigation, that is
Health Ireland Ltd. v. Padagis Israel Pharm. Ltd., 2022 WL 4366413, at *8-9 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2022); King Pharm.
Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2010 WL 2670804, at *1 (D.N.J. June 29, 2010).
18 As an aside, the Court observes that the Federal Circuit has applied the Local Patent Rule 3.7-motion-to-amend
approach in one District of New Jersey case, and the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) and Pennypack
factors approach in a District of Delaware case. Compare Janssen Pharms., Inc., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7190, at
*9-10 (appeal from District of New Jersey, affirming exclusion based on violation of Local Rules without
considering Pennypack factors), with Astellas US LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 2022 WL 17998229, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Dec.
30, 2022) (appeal from District of Delaware, affirming exclusion based on balance of Pennypack factors). The
Federal Circuit’s application of these different approaches quite possibly is due to the District of New Jersey’s
adoption of Local Patent Rules, whereas the District of Delaware has not.
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more fair, or less?
Sonos, Inc. v. Google, LLC, 2023 WL 2918751, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2023) (internal
quotes and cites omitted); see also Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2 (Hochberg, J.
(Ret.), stating, “[t]he Special Discovery Master will apply the overarching question, ‘will
striking the report [portion or reference] result in not just a trial, but an overall litigation,
that is more fair, or less?’”) (quoting Verinata, 2014 WL 4100638, at *3).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises five objections to the substance of the Reports. Each is addressed
separately below.
A. 	Dr. Crowley’s Reliance on the FDA Regulations and Noro19
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions disclose that a person
of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would have been motivated to reduce the amount of sodium
present in Xyrem®. (See ECF No. 247 at 8-9). Nor does Plaintiff appear to dispute that, at
times, Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions refer generally to “Noro” and the “FDA Regulations”
when discussing a desire to reduce sodium content. (See ECF No. 244 at 11-12 (citing
Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions, Walsh Decl., Ex. 14 at 2, 5; Walsh Decl. Ex. 1 at 35, 46))).
Rather, Plaintiff contends that Defendants introduce a new theory of obviousness in the Crowley
Report by, for the first time, specifically relying on “Noro” and the “FDA Regulations” for the
express purpose of supporting their invalidity theory. (ECF No. 241 at 15; ECF No. 247 at 8-9).
Defendants contend that the challenged paragraphs in the Crowley Report, including
Noro and the FDA Regulations, are being used for precisely the same purpose as their
Contentions, and thus, there is no new theory presented. (ECF No. 244 at 11-12). In addition,
19 Crowley Report, ¶¶ 111, 113-15, 141, 143, 146, and 274.
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Defendants note that Plaintiff was aware of the FDA Regulations and Noro, having cited and
discussed these references at length in Plaintiff’s responsive Validity Contentions. (See ECF No.
244 at 14).
The question boils down to whether Defendants are presenting a new theory of
obviousness by combining previously disclosed references for a different purpose, thus creating
a new theory. The Court concludes they have not. A review of the Crowley Report reveals that
the references to Noro and the FDA Regulations are described as background and located in the
“State-of-the-Art” section of Dr. Crowley’s Report (see ¶¶ 111, 113-15, 141, 143, and 146).
While it is true that the State-of-the-Art section is incorporated by reference into Ground 3, (see
¶ 274), footnote 42 of the Crowley Report makes clear that Dr. Crowley is only relying on “Noro
[and] FDA Regulations solely for scientific background, motivation, and reasonable expectation
of success.” (Crowley Report, ¶ 151 n.42).
This Court finds no new theory of invalidity has been presented, and that the references
are permissibly used. Specifically, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff was on notice of both Noro
and the FDA Regulations, and that Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions included the position that
a POSA would have been motivated to reduce sodium content. (See ECF No. 244 at 12-15
(citing portions of Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions)). Thus, Defendants’ reliance on Noro
and the FDA Regulations amounts to Dr. Crowley’s use of permissible background, a motivation
to combine, and, at most, further specification of “a disclosed theory,” and not “an impermissibly
substituted [] new theory altogether.” Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2. The Court therefore
declines to strike this portion of the Crowley Report.
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B. 	Dr. Crowley’s Alleged New Theory Reliant on Palma20
Plaintiff contends Dr. Crowley introduces a new theory of obviousness. Specifically,
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Crowley opines that “a POSA would arrive at a mixed oxybate salt
composition (rather than a composition of only magnesium oxybate or potassium oxybate)
because a reference identified as Palma, which concerns colonoscopy prep drugs, teaches that
high doses of magnesium and potassium could ‘cause gastrointestinal disturbances.’” (ECF No.
241 at 16).
Defendants acknowledge that the “Palma” reference is not cited in their Invalidity
Contentions or included in their accompanying chart. (See ECF No. 244 at 6-7). However,
Defendants counter that their invalidity theory regarding a mixed oxybate salt composition was
fully disclosed as part of its Invalidity Contentions, and that the reference to “Palma” is reduced
to a footnote, wherein Palma serves as “scientific knowledge” and background in “further
support of Defendants’ previously disclosed invalidity allegations.” (ECF No. 244 at 17).
Defendants have the better of the argument. Defendants’ Invalidity Conventions disclose
their theory of invalidity, which appears as part of Grounds 1 and 2 in the Crowley Report.
Palma is only tangentially mentioned. Specifically, in noting that “high doses of magnesium and
potassium could . . . cause gastrointestinal disturbances,” (Crowley Report, ¶ 144), Dr. Crowley
cites Palma as support for his observation that “many colonoscopy drugs use combinations of
sodium, potassium, and magnesium.” (Id. ¶ 144 n.41). The context of the Crowley Report’s
reference to Palma confirms it is a mere anecdotal aside and a background reference, not an
attempt to support a new theory with a previously undisclosed reference. Indeed, Palma is not
referenced again in the Crowley Report, other than in footnote 42, which, in fact, affirmatively
20 Crowley Report, ¶¶ 144, 253, 275, and 292-93.
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states that Palma is being used for background purposes only. (See Crowley Report, ¶ 151 n.42).
Thus, the Court agrees with Defendants that the reference to Palma is merely permissible
background being offered to support a previously disclosed theory, and thus, declines to strike
any aspect of the Crowley Report on this basis. See Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *1.
C. 	Dr. Crowley’s Alleged New Solubility Theory21
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions contain a theory of
solubility. Nevertheless, it contends that Dr. Crowley’s Report expands or alters the theory by
relying, at least in part, on two new references, the “United States Pharmacopeia (“USP”)” and
“Page.” (See ECF No. 241 at 17; see also ECF No. 247 at 11). In response, Defendants dispute
that there is any new theory. Defendants contend that their solubility theory was disclosed in
Invalidity Contentions based on, among other references, the Cook Publication, and that Plaintiff
responded to this theory in its responsive Validity Contentions (see ECF No. 244 at 18-20).
Defendants further contend that USP and Page are merely background references that do not
support any theory of invalidity. (Id.) This Court agrees.
As Defendants explain, their solubility theory is no surprise and was discussed
extensively in their Invalidity Contentions and Plaintiff’s responsive Validity Contentions. (See
ECF No. 244 at 18-20). The references to USP and Page do not change the equation. Rather,
USP and Page are referenced, respectively, in footnotes and stand for seemingly uncontroversial
factual propositions and background and do not serve as references supporting a new or
undisclosed theory of invalidity directed to a particular claim limitation. (See Crowley Report, ¶
134 n. 38; Crowley ¶ 136 n.39). Moreover, as with Palma, Noro, and the FDA Regulations
discussed above, Dr. Crowley affirmatively represents that USP and Page are being used for
21 Crowley Report, ¶¶ 134-139, 147-151, 177, and 276.
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background purposes only. (See Crowley ¶ 151 n.42). Thus, this Court agrees that these
references are purely background information and are permissibly included in the Crowley
Report. See, e.g., Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *1 (citing Genetech, Inc. v. Trustees of Univ.
of Penn., 2012 WL 424985, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2012)). Accordingly, the Court finds no
basis to strike.
D. 	Dr. Dyar’s Alleged New Sodium Reduction Theory and References22
Plaintiff contends that the Dyar Report shifts the sands of Defendants’ invalidity theories
by arguing, for the first time, that a POSA would have found the pharmacokinetic limitations of
the ’373 patent obvious because a POSA would “know that sodium impacts the
pharmacokinetics of certain drugs and thus would expect the claimed reduction in sodium in an
oxybate composition to lead to a commensurate reduction in any food effect.” (ECF No. 241 at
12-13).
According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions submit that the claimed
pharmacokinetic effects would have been obvious “under only the inherency doctrine.” (Id.
(emphasis in original); see also id. at 3-4). Yet, Plaintiff contends that Defendants have twice
tried to change their theory. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants realized the flaw in their original
inherency argument upon the retention of new counsel and tried to rectify it by filing a motion to
amend their answer to include an inequitable conduct defense. (Id.) However, District Judge
Chesler denied their motion to amend and thus, Plaintiff contends, Defendants have pivoted to
another option: attempting to modify their theory in the Dyar Report to focus on sodium and
obviousness, supporting the theory with two completely new references, “Azizi” and “Darbar.”
(See id.)
22 Dyar Report, ¶¶ 215-221, 299, 330-32, 353, 355, 360-61, 405, 435-36, 455, 457, 462, and 464.
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In response, Defendants acknowledge that Azizi and Darbar are not cited in their
Invalidity Contentions. Nevertheless, Defendants contend that their “position has always been
that a POSA would be motivated to use the lower-salt formulations of the ’922 patent given what
was known about sodium at the time of the invention.” (ECF No. 244 at 27). In support,
Defendants contend that Azizi and Darbar are merely cited as supplemental motivations to
combine or as complimentary proof in support of a previously disclosed theory. (Id. at 28).
Defendants’ explanations do not hold up. In short, the Court finds that the Dyar Report
contains a new sodium reduction theory supported by the references to Azizi and Darbar, and
this theory was not disclosed in Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions. Connecting the dots from
the patent’s claims to Defendant’s Invalidity Contentions to the Dyar Report illustrates the point.
The relevant claim limitation from the ’373 patent states, in part, “a reduced food effect
as measured by C max as compared to an equal dose of Xyrem®.” (ECF No. 241 at 4).
In addressing that limitation, Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions clearly state that this
claim limitation is an “inherent” characteristic of the administration of the ’922 patent. (See
Declaration of Nicholas A. LoCastro, Esq., Ex. 6 (Lupin’s Amended Invalidity Contentions) at
29 (claim limitation is “an inherent characteristic of the administration of the ‘922 patent
composition”) and Ex. 8 at Appendix 43, p. 4 (Teva’s Invalidity Chart) (“The recited C max values
are inherent properties following administration”); ECF No. 241-1)).
However, the Dyar Report says something materially different. The Dyar Report states,
in relevant part:
215. 	[T]he teachings of the ’922 patent that the reduced sodium GHB mixed
salt composition had a reduced food effect compared to a composition made only
from sodium GHB would not be surprising to the POSA. Rather, this expectation
would have been consistent with a POSA’s knowledge that the pharmacokinetics
of drugs can be significantly influenced by the presence of sodium. As discussed
above, the POSA knew that the administered meal and Xyrem® itself both
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introduced high amounts of sodium to a patent. In the context of other drugs, two
prior art studies highlighted the impact of sodium content on their
pharmacokinetics.
216. 	For example, Azizi et al., “Effect of Contrasted Sodium Diets on the
Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacodynamic Effects of Renin–Angiotensin System
Blockers,” HYPERTENSION (2013) (LUPIN_XYWAV_EXPERTS_0000025-
000031) investigated how dietary sodium affects the pharmacokinetics and
pharmacodynamic responses of various renin-angiotensin system (RAS) blockers
in healthy male subjects. Azizi at p. 1239. Azizi showed that a high-sodium diet
(SR) led to a substantial decrease in the bioavailability of both candesartan
cilexetil and atenolol. Azizi at 1243 (“We found that a high-sodium diet was
associated with a ≈30% decrease in exposure to a single oral dose of 8 mg
candesartan cilexetil or of 50 mg atenolol in healthy male subjects, as shown by
the AUCs and C max values obtained, which were lower than those for SD
conditions.”). For candesartan cilexetil, the area under the curve (AUC0–∞) for
plasma concentration was 0.74 (90% CI, 0.66–0.82) during SR compared to SD,
indicating a reduction in bioavailability. Azizi at Abstract. Similarly, atenolol
exhibited a 31% reduction in bioavailability with an AUC0–∞ ratio of 0.69 (90%
CI, 0.54–0.88) during SR. Azizi at Abstract. These findings suggest that sodium
intake can significantly alter the absorption and systemic availability of these
drugs. Azizi at 1244.
217. 	Likewise, Darbar et al., “Modulation by Dietary Salt of Verapamil
Disposition in Humans” CIRCULATION (1998)
(LUPIN_XYWAV_EXPERTS_000032-000038) demonstrates that dietary
sodium significantly influences the pharmacokinetics of verapamil, a drug that
undergoes extensive first-pass metabolism. Darbar at Abstract. The POSA would
be aware that Xyrem® also undergoes significant first-pass metabolism. Xyrem®
label at 4 (“Sodium oxybate undergoes significant presystemic (hepatic first-pass)
metabolism”). 218. Darbar showed that plasma concentrations of verapamil were
significantly lower during the high-salt diet phase. Darbar at Abstract, p. 2704.
. . .
220. 	[T]he POSA knew that sodium content impacts the pharmacokinetics of
certain drugs. Azizi et al. showed that a high-sodium diet decreases the
bioavailability of candesartan cilexetil and atenolol, while Darbar found that
high dietary salt intake reduces the plasma concentrations and efficacy of
verapamil.
221. 	Therefore, a smaller difference in Cmax between fed and fasted states for
a single dose of reduced sodium GHB salt(s) compared to an equal dose of
immediate release liquid solution would have been obvious and reasonably
expected by the POSA.
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(Dyar Report, ¶¶ 215-17, 220-21) (italics added)).
In short, this aspect of the Dyar Report does not present the inherency theory disclosed in
Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions. Rather, the Dyar Report presents an obviousness theory
directed to the reduced food effect claim limitation in the ’373 patent, contending that a POSA
would have found it obvious that a formulation with less sodium would have exhibited the
claimed food effect. (Id.) Moreover, Azizi and Darbar are plainly being utilized as substantive
references to support the new theory; they are not merely complimentary sources or background.
(See, e.g., Dyar Report, ¶¶ 216-17, 220-21). Thus, this Court finds that the Dyar Report contains
a new theory of invalidity based on obviousness. (See id.) The question thus turns to whether
this new theory should be excluded.
Plaintiff contends the challenged paragraphs in Dyar Report should be automatically and
reflexively excluded because Defendants have not moved to amend their Invalidity Contentions
to include the theory (or references) as required by Local Patent Rule 3.7, let alone established
good cause for any such amendment. (See ECF No. 241 at 13; ECF No. 247 at 4-5). As
previously addressed, there is support among some courts for this approach. See, e.g., Janssen
Pharms., Inc., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7190, at *9-10; Celgene, 2021 WL 3701700, at *2; Merck,
2014 WL 997532, at *7. And if this Court were to adopt this approach, it cannot be disputed that
Defendants have not moved to amend or even attempted to establish good cause pursuant to Rule
3.7. Accordingly, such noncompliance with Rule 3.7 would independently warrant striking the
new theory. However, even if this Court were to adopt the more liberal Pennypack factors
approach, this Court would still find exclusion is warranted.
Here, neither side analyzes the Pennypack factors in particularly great detail. Still, in
general terms, Plaintiff claims that allowing new theories and references in the case would be
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unfairly prejudicial because fact discovery is closed, and Defendants have had years to prepare
an invalidity defense. (ECF No. 241 at 17-20). Specifically, Plaintiff continues that allowing
Defendants to expand the case at this late stage “would severely prejudice [Plaintiff] and its
experts by requiring them to respond to Defendants’ new positions without the benefit of fact
discovery as to those positions and in far less time than would otherwise be appropriate.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also contends that Defendants are impermissibly attempting to work around Judge
Chesler’s denial of their motion to amend to include an inequitable conduct defense. (Id.)
In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims of prejudice are “baseless,” and that
is no basis to strike any aspect of the Reports under the Pennypack framework. (ECF No. 244 at
29). Further, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s arguments regarding discovery are
“hypothetical,” in that Plaintiff fails to explain in any detail what fact discovery it would pursue.
(Id. at 29-30).
As previously noted, the decision on whether to exclude evidence under the Pennypack
factors turns on: (1) “the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded
witnesses would have testified” or the excluded evidence would have been offered; (2) “the
ability of that party to cure the prejudice”; (3) the extent to which allowing such witnesses or
evidence would “disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in the court”;
(4) any “bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the court's order”; and (5) the
importance of the excluded evidence. Id. at 904-05. “The importance of the evidence is often
the most important factor.” Z.F. Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.2d 254, 298 (3d Cir. 2012).
The Court is convinced that on balance the Pennypack factors support exclusion in this case. See
Meyers, 559 F.2d 904-05.
First, there is surprise, as this Court has already determined that the theory and references
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are new and were not disclosed in Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions.
Second, the Court considers whether there is prejudice to Plaintiff and the ability to cure
it. See id. at 904-05. Here, Plaintiff convincingly shows that it would suffer prejudice if
required to address a new theory, post-fact discovery and in the middle of expert discovery. To
that end, the Court finds there is insufficient time to reopen fact discovery to allow further
exploration of this new theory and then restart expert discovery. This is particularly so given
Defendants’ complete failure to explain why this new theory (and references) could not have
been added earlier in the case through a proper motion to amend invalidity contentions.
Third, allowing the new theory would disrupt the orderly progress of the case. Indeed, as
Plaintiff points out, District Judge Chesler previously declined to allow Defendants to pursue an
inequitable conduct counterclaim premised, in part, on a theory that an inventor had withheld
prior art references from the USPTO during prosecution of the ʼ373 patent that would have
allegedly shown that a POSA would have reasonably expected the claimed pharmacokinetics of
the ʼ373 patent due to the inclusion of a magnesium salt. (See ECF No. 200 at 19-20). While the
denial of Defendants’ motion to amend was based primarily on futility, Judge Chesler did find
that Defendants did not act with sufficient diligence in seeking to alter their theory of invalidity
in the case. (See ECF No. 200 at 23). Thus, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that allowing
Defendants to recast their invalidity position to rely on sodium (as opposed to magnesium)
would lead to an unfair result.
Fourth, the Court finds, on this record, bad faith has not been shown.
Finally, Defendants completely fail to address the fifth—and often the most prominent
Pennypack factor—that is, the importance of the evidence to be excluded. See Z.F. Meritor, 696
F.2d at 298. Indeed, Defendants’ opposition brief is devoid of any discussion of the importance
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of this theory or the consequences of its exclusion. Moreover, the sodium reduction theory at
issue is plainly not Defendants’ only theory of invalidity, as the Dyar Report has four additional
theories of invalidity directed to the ’373 patent. (See ECF No. 244 at 7-8). Considering
Defendants’ failure to explain the importance of the evidence and given that they still have
several theories of invalidity they can pursue, the Court finds that the evidence has not been
shown to be important. See, e.g., Astellas, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 35933, at *17-18 (“[Plaintiff]
has not shown that the excluded evidence here is critical or of sufficient importance to outweigh
the other factors. The excluded evidence was merely an alternative theory of infringement, not
the sole theory of infringement.”). Thus, the most important Pennypack factor weighs in favor of
exclusion.
On balance, the first, second, third, and fifth Pennypack factors weigh in favor of
exclusion. Accordingly, the Court finds on the record presented, exclusion of the new references
and theory is warranted. As such, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request to strike these disputed
paragraphs in the Dyar Report.23
E. 	Dr. Dyar’s Alleged New Inherency Theory24
This dispute focuses on the claim limitation in the ’373 patent reciting “a reduced food
effect as measured by C max as compared to an equal dose of [Xxyrem].” 	(ECF No. 241 at 4).
The parties agree that Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions addressed this claim limitation25 and
that the following paragraph in the Dyar Report is permissible based on that disclosure:
223. 	As explained throughout this report, the ’922 patent discloses using a
reduced sodium mixed salt GHB pharmaceutical composition within the meaning
23 Dyar Report, ¶¶ 215-221, 299, 330-32, 353, 355, 360-61, 405, 435-36, 455, 457, 462, and 464.
24 Dyar Report, ¶¶ 224-31, 335, 348, 363, 439, 451, 466, 492, 503-04.
25 Defendants’ Invalidity Contentions addressed this claim limitation by stating, in part, “the pharmacokinetics are a
natural property of that composition and/or are an inherent benefit or advantage of the composition taught in the
’922 patent.” (Walsh Decl., Ex. 16 at 29).
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of the claims. Supra at ¶¶81- 83, 135-139, 165-167; infra at ¶¶232-237. And as
explained above, the ’922 patent discloses a head-to-head comparison of the
reduced sodium mixed salt GHB composition with Xyrem®. See, e.g., Table 8;
supra at ¶¶194-203. The reduction in C max when the two formulations are
compared under the conditions and meaning of Claim 1 is necessarily present.
(Dyar Report, ¶ 223; see ECF No. 241 at 4; ECF No. 244 at 21; ECF No. 247 at 7).
However, Plaintiff contends that in responsive Validity Contentions, it argued that the
clinical data shows that not every patient administered the compositions of the ’922 patent will
necessarily exhibit the claimed pharmacokinetic parameters, and thus, the pharmacokinetic claim
limitation of the ’373 patent is not inherent in the compositions of the ’922 patent. (ECF No. 241
at 4).
The parties dispute whether the Dyar Report attempts to counter Plaintiff’s Validity
Position by shifting its inherency theory, focusing on the following paragraph:
226. 	To the extent Plaintiff (or its expert) attempts to point to data from a
patient cohort where there may be data at the edges of the normal distribution
(hereinafter referred to as “outliers”) where the claimed food effect reduction is
not observed for a particular sample set or patient, this would not save the claim.
For the purposes of these claims, the pharmacokinetic parameters (including C max
and AUC) would still be necessarily present even if Plaintiff was able to point to
some outliers because “‘C max ’ refers to the average of the maximum plasma
concentration (in oxybate mg/L or ug/mL) achieved in individual patients.”
35:19-22 (the ’373 patent defining C max ).
(Dyar Report, ¶ 226) (bold emphasis in original; italics added).
Plaintiff argues that the Dyar Report’s attempt to define C max as referring to “the average
of the maximum plasma concentration . . . achieved in individual patients,” is an attempt to
respond to Plaintiff’s Validity Contentions and rescue Defendants’ inherency argument in the
event there are “outlier” patients that do not necessarily exhibit the claimed pharmacokinetic
limitations. (See ECF No. 241 at 10). Plaintiff contends these disputed sections of the Dyar
Report should be stricken because Defendants are attempting to attach a particular meaning to
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C max that was not raised during the Markman process and, is in fact, contrary to the parties’
representation in their Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement that the claim
limitation containing C max carried its plain and ordinary meaning. (Id., citing Joint Claim
Construction and Prehearing Statement at ECF No. 138)). According to Plaintiff, if it had been
made aware of Defendants’ intent to define C max to include “averages,” they would have pursued
the question further in Markman and/or discovery. (See ECF No. 241 at 18, ECF No. 247 at
8).26
Defendants counter that paragraph 226 in the Dyar Report is merely expanding on the
theory expressed in their Invalidity Contentions and in paragraph 223 and is not a new theory at
all. Instead, Defendants contend that Dr. Dyar’s Report is merely elaborating on why the
reduction in C max is present, based on how the ’373 patent itself defines “C max .” (ECF No. 244 at
23 (citing the ’373 patent at 35:19-22 (“C max refers to the average of the maximum plasma
concentration (in oxybate mg/L or ug/mL) achieved in individual patients.”))). As it relates to
the parties’ claim construction discussions, Defendants contend that they never agreed to any
definition of C max and that the parties’ Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement merely
references C max within the context of a lengthier limitation, where that lengthier limitation carries
its plain and ordinary meaning. (See ECF No. 244 at 24). Defendants further argue that the
patent’s definition of C max controls, and that Defendants could not have stipulated otherwise
during the Markman process as a matter of law, as the inventor’s “lexicography governs.” (See
id. at 22, 25). Thus, Defendants contend the Dyar Report does not contain any new theory, and
Plaintiff cannot dispute the meaning of C max , as it is the “express definition in its own patent.”
(Id.)
26 There have been no formal claim construction proceedings in this case, as the parties have not requested the Court
construe any terms in the patents-in-suit. (See ECF Nos. 76, 114, 138).
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On reply, Plaintiff contends that there is “no lexicography for the term C max .” (ECF No.
247 at 5). Rather, Plaintiff argues that the “Definitions” section of the ’373 patent does not list
C max ; the definition Defendants rely on is limited to the tables and figures found in a specific
example in the patent; and that the ’373 patent defines C max differently, at different times. (ECF
No. 247 at 6).
The Court rejects Plaintiff’s position for several reasons.
First, Defendants have indisputably advanced an inherency theory, arguing that the
reduction in C max is necessarily present in the composition of the ’922 patent. (See Dyar Report,
¶ 223). The Court finds that paragraph 226 is reasonably construed to be an extension or further
articulation of that disclosed theory, not a new theory altogether. See, e,g., Celgene, 2021 WL
3701700, at *13. In short, Defendants contend their inherency argument should succeed
regardless of whether there are outlier patients, whereas Plaintiff disagrees. This is a legal
dispute, not a disclosure dispute. As such, the Court does not find a new theory has been
asserted in the Dyar Report.
Second, to the extent this theory is more than a mere extension or further articulation
(which the Court concludes it is not), Plaintiff would be well-positioned to address this issue in
its responsive expert report and in expert depositions. Indeed, while Plaintiff posits several
hypothetical questions it would pursue on this subject in discovery, (see ECF No. 241 at 18),
these questions appear to be more appropriate for expert discovery.
Third, to the extent the parties believe that this issue truly requires Markman proceedings,
either side is free to submit a request to the District Judge to conduct limited claim construction
proceedings on the meaning of the term “C max ” in the ’373 patent. In short, the Court finds no
basis to strike this portion of the Dyar Report.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to strike, (ECF No. 240), is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the Court grants Plaintiff’s
request to strike the following paragraphs in the Dyar Report: 215-221, 299, 330-32, 353, 355,
360-61, 405, 435-36, 455, 457, 462, and 464. The remainder of Plaintiff’s motion is denied. An
appropriate order will be entered.
SO ORDERED.
s/Jessica S. Allen____________
Hon. Jessica S. Allen
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: Hon. Stanley R. Chesler, U.S.D.J.
Dated: January 15, 2026
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