LUSTIG v. DANIEL MARKUS, INC. et al

2:20-cv-00379Njd20 de jan. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRYAN LUSTIG, on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

No. 20-cv-379

¥.

DANIEL MARKUS, INC, (D/B/A PERFECT
PAWN), DANIEL RISIS, MARGARITA
RISIS AND OLEG NEIZVESTNY, OPINION

(Consolidated No. 22-cv-161)

Defendants,

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J:

Before the Court are Defendant Daniel M. Risis’s (“Mr, Risis”} “Emergency Notice of
Constitutional Obstruction, Due Process Violation, and Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment,”
ECF No, 231, Mr. Risis’s “Motion to Vacate Void Judgment,” ECF No. 238 (together, the
“Motions to Vacate”), and Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Approval of Settlements (the
“Fees Motion’), ECF No. 232 (collectively, the “Motions”). The Court decides the Motions
without oral argument, Fed, R. Civ. P. 78(b), For the reasons stated herein, the Motions to Vacate
are DENIED and the Fees Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND!
A. Discovery Disputes

Commenced in January 2020, this Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective action
languished in discovery for years. Plaintiff served initial discovery demands in June 2020, yet
apparently had not received any documents by September of that year. Galloway Decl. J] 16-18,
ECF No. 233-1. After nearly two years’ worth of delays and multiple motions to compel, see ECF
Nos, 9, 50, 55, 64, 66, 79, 84, 86, 100, then-Magistrate Judge Edward 8. Kiel appointed a Special
Master to resolve all pending and future discovery disputes in this action, ECF No, 104,

The discovery disputes continued. Mr. Risis twice adjourned his deposition on short notice,
including the morning of December 20, 2022—the date the Special Master ordered Mr. Risis to be
deposed. Galloway Decl. 29; ECF No, 134; see also ECF No. 135 (ordering Mr. Risis to pay
cancellation fees). While Mr, Risis was eventually deposed in February 2023, the record indicates

! The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts of the case, recited in its earlier Opinion (ECF
No, 226), and sets forth only what is necessary to decide the Motions. The Court takes judicial notice of docket entries
from other court proceedings relevant to this action. See Leiva v. Sec’y of DHS, 230 F. Supp. 3d 406, 409 n.2 (D.NJ.
2017).

AUTHENTICATED 1
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

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that he was belligerent and combative during his testimony. See ECF No. 218-6.” All told, the
myriad discovery disputes resulted in Plaintiffs filing eleven letters explaining the disagreements
and participating in at least twenty-five different telephone conferences regarding discovery.
Galloway Decl. { 77.

B. The Temporary Restraining Order against Mr. Risis

In April 2022, Plaintiff moved for an order enjoining Mr. Risis from (1) posting anything
on social media about the parties in this case; and (2) contacting any opt-in plaintiffs in this action
(the “TRO Motion”), ECF No. 110. The TRO Motion followed Mr. Risis’s posting a series of
YouTube videos “threatening and [making] defamatory comments about Plaintiff, his wife, his
counsel, and certain opt-in plaintiffs participating in [this] action” and contacting opt-in plaintiffs
“in an attempt to harass, intimidate, and chill opt-in participation.” fd. at 8; ECF No. 111. The
Court granted the TRO Motion in part, enjoining Mr. Risis from contacting any of the opt-in
plaintiffs. ECF No, 111, Despite this, Mr, Risis continued his attempts to contact the opt-in
plaintiffs. ECF Nos. 116, 123, 129. In response, Judge Kiel issued an order restricting Mr. Risis’s
communications with opposing parties. ECF No. 131.

C. Mr. Risis Begins to Proceed Pro Se

Five different attorneys represented Mr. Risis during the pendency of discovery in this
matter. See ECP Nos. 43, 74, 77, 87, 107. After each of their withdrawals, Mr. Risis has proceeded
pro se since at least May 2022, ECF No. 115. Accordingly, Mr. Risis filed a Consent and
Registration Form to Receive Documents Electronically (the “Consent Form”). ECF No. 130.
The Consent Form, signed by Mr. Risis, lists daniel@mikrobank.com as the email address to which
Mr. Risis would receive electronic notifications of all filings in this matter.

D, Mr, Risis’s First Bankruptey Filing

In March 2023, Mr, Risis filed a pro se bankruptcy petition in this District’s Bankruptcy
Court (the “First Bankruptcy Proceeding”), resulting in this action being administratively stayed.
Galloway Decl. 46; in re Daniel M. Risis, No. 23-11800 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2023); ECF No. 142.
This filing caused Plaintiff's counsel to enter an appearance in the First Bankruptcy Proceeding,
and later, move for relief from the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay. Galloway Decl. | 46; J7 re
Daniel M. Risis, No, 23-11800, ECF No. 224 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2023). The First Bankruptey
Proceeding was ultimately dismissed, and the Bankruptcy Court issued an order prohibiting Mr.

2 Mr, Risis’s deposition transcript contains numerous examples of the Special Master admonishing Mr. Risis for his
conduct, see Tr, 28:25-29:25; 36:23-37:21; 39:4-8 (Mr. Risis, ff you don’t stop interrupting me, we're going to have
areal problem all day long. That’s not the way it’s normally done. So please do what [Plaintiffs counsel] asked you
to do”), 61:4-61:11; 99:24-25 (“We're never going to finish if we don’t just answer the question”); 108:13-14; 120:7-
13; 134:25-136:4; 148:5-10; 160:2-7; 185:4-5, Mr, Risis hurling childish insults towards Plaintiff's counsel, see Tr,
62:18-63:5 (Mr. Risis making an uncouth remark about Plaintiffs counsel’s weight}; 99:5-L 1 (Mr. Risis making a
rude comment about Plaintiff's counsel’s putative lack of literacy skills), and otherwise obstructing the orderly taking
of his deposition. See Tr, 19:14-20:12: 116:16-17; 166:13-14; 194:22-195:9.

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Risis from refiling for bankruptcy for a period of one year and 180 days. Ja re Daniel M. Risis,
No, 23-11800, ECF No. 364 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2023),

E. The Summary Judgement Motions and Mr. Risis’s Second Bankruptcy Filing

Plaintiff first moved for summary judgment on November 3, 2023 (the “First Summary
Judgment Motion”). ECF No. 157. After receiving an extension, Mr. Risis filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Opposition to Summary Judgment in December 2023. ECF No. 165. Judge
Kiel ordered Mr, Risis’s motion to be construed as an opposition to the First Summary Judgment
Motion. ECF No. 166. After multiple filings by Mr. Risis and his assistant, Jaime Resnick, this
Court entered an order reiterating the same. ECF No, 172. Mr. Risis filed three more letters before
the Court denied the First Motion for Summary Judgment on procedural grounds, ECF No, 181.

Plaintiff then moved to certify the FLSA collective in September 2024. ECF No. 205.
After the Court granted final certification, ECF No, 213, Plaintiff moved again for summary
judgment on November 7 (the “Second Motion for Summary Judgment”), ECF No, 218, Between
this Court’s denial of the First Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's filing the Second
Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Risis submitted eighteen filings: some addressed to the
various Magistrate Judges who have handled this case, others addressed to this Comt, and others,
still, addressed to “all judges” in this District. ECF Nos. 182, 183, 185, 187, 190, 191, 193, 196,
197, 199, 202, 203, 207, 209, 210, 212, 215, 217.2 Mr. Risis did not, however, file an opposition
to the Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Nor did he file a responsive statement of material
facts. See L. Civ. R. 56.1.

The Bankruptcy Court’s bar on Mr. Risis’s ability to refile expired on December 26,
2024—-while the Second Motion for Summary Judgment was pending. Four days later, Mr. Risis
filed for another bankruptcy (the “Second Bankruptcy Proceeding”). Jn re Daniel Risis, No. 24-
22714 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2024); see ECF Nos, 220-21, This Court, in its opinion administratively
staying this matter for the duration of the Second Bankruptcy Proceeding, stated:

Prior to Plaintiff's notice of bankruptcy, he was already subject to a motion for
summary judgment. ECF No. 218. That motion was filed on November 7, 2024,
and Defendant Risis failed to file a brief in opposition to the motion. The Court
therefore advises the parties that ... it will not reset Defendant Risis’s deadline to
respond to the motion for summary judgment.

ECF No. 222. Mr. Risis then filed another letter addressed to “all judges” alerting them of the
administrative stay. ECF No, 223.

3 This includes two of Mr. Risis’s three motions to dismiss, ECF Nos, 183, 187. Judge Kiel denied Mr, Risis’s first
motion to dismiss because Mr. Risis had already filed an answer. ECF No. 153. Magistrate Judge Jessica 8. Allen
denied Risis’s second motion to dismiss, stating that Judge Kiel’s reasoning applies “with equal force to Mr. Risis’s
instant Motion.” ECF No. 186. Undeterred, Mr. Risis moved to dismiss a third time. ECF No. 187, Again, Judge
Allen denied the motion, ECF No 189,

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The Second Bankruptcy Proceeding was dismissed on August 15, 2025. ECF No. 224,
The Bankruptcy Court’s order included a second, two-year prohibition on Mr, Risis’s filing for
bankruptcy. J re Daniel Risis, No. 24-22714, ECF No. 217 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2025), After the
Second Bankruptcy Proceeding’s dismissai, this Court lifted the automatic stay, ECF No. 225, and
granted summary judgment on afl counts. ECF No, 226, The Court ordered Mr. Risis to pay
$1,916,246.94 in damages (the “Judgment”) and directed Plaintiff to submit an application for
attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 227. The instant Motions followed.

IL LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motions to Vacate

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 grants courts broad discretion to vacate a final judgment.
Grounds for relief from a judgment include fraud or voidness. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Mr. Risis
moves for relief under Rules 60(b)(4) and 60(d)(3). Under Rule 60(b)(4), vacatur is required when
a judgment is void. On Track Transp., Inc. v. Lakeside Warehouse & Trucking, Inc., 245 F.R.D.
213, 215 (E.D. Pa. 2007). A judgment is void only if it is predicated on a jurisdictional error or a
due process violation. Smith v. Kershentsef, No, 24-cv-1278, 2024 WL 3874227, at *1 Gd Cir.
Aug. 20, 2024); Ia re Semcrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 323 Gd Cir, 2013) (denying Rule 60(b)(4)
motion where the movant was afforded notice and an opportunity to object).

Relief under Rule 60(d)(3), on the other hand, can only be granted if the movant provides
clear and convincing evidence of: “(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which
is directed at the court itself.” Hatchigian v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Loc. 98 Health & Welfare
Fund, 610 ¥. App’x 142, 143 (Gd Cir. 2015) (citation modified); Smith, 2024 WL 3874227, at *2.
This is a “demanding standard,” and it remains even when the movant is pro se. Fink y. Bishop,
No, 21-cv-2651, 2022 WL 4533855, at *2 (“[A] determination of fraud on the court may be
justified only by the most egregious misconduct directed to the court itself”).

B. Attorneys’ Fees

The FLSA and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law authorize prevailing. parties to seek
attorneys’ fees and costs. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); N.J.S.A. § 34:11-56a25, The movant has the burden
to prove reasonableness of its fees by “submitting evidence supporting the how's worked and the
rates claimed.” United States ex rel. Palmer vy. C&D Techs., Inc., 897 F.3d 128, 139 Gd Cir. 2018)
(citation modified). The burden then shifts to the opposing party to provide evidence to challenge
the reasonableness of the requested fee. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 3d Cir. 1990).
Fees calculated via the lodestar method are presumed to be reasonable. fd.

C, Settlement Approval

Courts employ a three-part analysis to decide whether to approve a settlement of FLSA
claims. Courts consider: (1) if the settlement “concerns a bona fide dispute”; (2) the settlement’s
fairness and reasonableness relative to the employee; and (3) whether the settlement frustrates the
implementation of the FLSA in the workplace. Payton-Fernandez v. Burlington Stores, Inc., 671

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F, Supp. 3d 512, 520 (D.N.J. 2023); Gabrielyan v. S.O. Rose Apartments LLC, No 15-cv-1771,
2015 WL 5853924, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2015). A proposed settlement concerns a bona fide
dispute when it reflects a “reasonable compromise” on issues covered by the FLSA. Davis v. Essex
Cnty., No. 14-cv-1122, 2015 WL 7761062, at *2 (D.N_J. Dec. 1, 2015).

Ill DISCUSSION
A. Motions to Vacate

Mr. Risis advances multiple arguments in his successive Motions to Vacate.’ ‘The Court
only considers Mr. Risis’s positions that the Judgment must be vacated because (1) the lack of
notice to Mr. Risis voided the Judgment under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
Def.’s First Mot. 5; (2) the Judgment constitutes fraud on the court, id.; and (3) the Court erred in
concluding that Mr, Risis is an employer under the FLSA, Def.’s Second Mot. 2.°

1. Due Process

Mr. Risis argues that he never received notice of the Second Summary Judgment Motion,
a hearing regarding the same was never held, and that he was never “given [an] opportunity to
oppose or even to understand what was being sought.” Def.’s First Mot. 1. Mr. Risis is correct
that this Court decided the Second Summary Judgment Motion without oral argument. The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, expressly authorize courts to “determin[e] motions on
briefs, without oral hearings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); see also L. Civ. R. 78.1(b) (providing a
default rule of deciding motions without oral argument).

Next, Mr. Risis’s contention that he never received notice of the Second Summary
Judgment Motion is belied by the record in this case. As discussed supra, Mr. Risis submitted a
signed Consent Form to this Court on October 13, 2022. ECF No. 130. The Consent Form lists
daniel@mikrobank.com as his email address: the exact address the Motions to Vacate provide as
Mr. Risis’s preferred account for receiving future case notifications, Def.’s First Mot. 12, and the
one listed on the docket as registered for case updates.

The Court similarly rejects Mr. Risis’s argument that he did not have an opportunity to
oppose the Second Summary Judgment Motion. The Second Summary Judgment Motion was
filed on November 7, 2024; the deadline for opposition was November 18. Mr. Risis made no
such submission. Instead, he commenced the Second Bankruptcy Proceeding, of which he notified
this Court in January 2025. ECF No. 220. In response, the Court advised Mr. Risis that he failed
to file an opposition to the Second Summary Judgment Motion and it would not reset his deadline

4 Mr. Risis filed a second motion to vacate during the pendency of his initial motion. ECF No, 238. For ease of
reference, this Opinion refers to the brief accompanying Mr. Risis’s November 12 Motion to Vacate as “Def.’s First
Mot.,” and the brief accompanying Mr. Risis’s December 9 Motion to Vacate as “Def.’s Second Mot.,” respectively.

5 The Court finds Mr. Risis’s other arguments, including that the Judgment violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection, and that Plaintiff's submissions relied on forged signatures, to be without merit. Def.’s
First. Mot. 4-5, See New Jersey v. Aristeo, 610 F. App’x 95, 96 (3d Cir. 2015),

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to respond, ECF No, 222, Despite knowing since January 2025 that he would not receive another
chance to oppose the Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Risis ceased correspondence
with the Court until after the Judgment was issued. ECF Nos. 228, 231. Put simply, Mr, Risis had
ample opportunity to oppose the Second Motion for Summary Judgment, his claim that he has
been displaced from his home since Fuly 2025 notwithstanding. ECF No. 231-3 4 2. The fact that
Mz. Risis chose not to file an opposition does not warrant vacatur of the Judgment. Cf Williams
ve NYC. Dep’t of Corr, 219 F.R.D, 78, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying vacatur where a pro se
plaintiff failed to a follow court order). Nor does it give rise to a due process violation. See Jn re
Semcrude, L.P., 728 F.3d at 323.

The Court also notes that it had construed Mr. Risis’s December 5, 2023 submission as an
opposition to the First Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Submission”). ECF Nos. 166, 172.
Because Mr. Risis did not refile the Submission in opposition to the Second Motion for Summary
Judgment, it was not properly before the Court and, therefore, the Court did not consider the
Submission in granting summary judgment.

Even if it had done so, the Court’s decision would not have changed. The Submission
offers only conclusory, unsupported statements that contradict the record before the Court and
inapposite record cites purporting to support those statements. The evidence is clear that (1) Mr.
Risis misclassified employees as exempt under the FLSA and unlawfully deprived them of
overtime, Op. 4 (describing the employees’ job responsibilities); (2) Mr. Risis failed to pay an
hourly minimum wage, id. (discussing Perfect Pawn’s payroll documents and Mr. Risis’s
admissions regarding such failures); and (3) Mr. Risis, as managing director of Perfect Pawn, was
an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA. Jd at 5 (recounting Mr. Risis’s admissions
regarding his control and authority over Perfect Pawn). In other words, the Submission does not
raise a genuine issue of material fact necessary to survive summary judgment, United States v.
Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 185 Gd Cir, 2011) (citation modified).

Finally, Mr. Risis represents that he “did not understand what was being sought” in the
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, The Court disagrees. Through his many filings, Mr. Risis
has shown he is able to meaningfully participate in this case, even without counsel. See ECF Nos.
137, 138, 147, 151, 154, 160, 162, 165, 170, 171, 174, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 187, 190, 193, 196,
199, 202, 203, 207, 209, 210, 212, 215, 217, 220, 223, 228, 231, 238. The fact that Mr. Risis has
commenced three separate pro se actions since September 2025 further supports this conclusion.
See Risis v. Risis, 25-cv-81174 (S.D, Fla. 2025); Risis v. Menendez, 25-cv-16644 (D.N.J. 2025);
Risis v. State of New Jersey, 25-cv-16629 (D.N,J. 2025), Thus, because the Court finds that Mr.
Risis received adequate notice of the Second Summary Judgment Motion, Mr. Risis was given
multiple opportunities to oppose said motion, and he has demonstrated that he understands the
nature of these proceedings, it cannot conclude that the Judgment violated Mr. Risis’s right to due
process.

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2. Fraud on the Court

Mr. Risis next argues that the Judgment should be vacated because it constitutes fraud on
the Court. Def.’s First Mot. 5, 7-8. Because of the dearth of any evidence—let alone “clear,
unequivocal, and convincing” evidence-—to substantiate this claim, the Court rejects Mr. Risis’s
argument. Fink, 2022 WL 4533855, at *2. Asaresult, Mr, Risis cannot meet the standard required
for vacatur. Jd.

3. Mr, Risis’s Status as Employer of Perfect Pawn

For his last argument, Mr. Risis claims the Judgment is void because he is not an employer
under the FLSA. Def.’s Second Mot. i. Although this is plainly contradicted by the record, see
Op. 1-2 (explaining how Mr. Risis, as Managing Director, “made all decisions related to
compensation,” had the authority to hire and fire employees, oversaw Perfect Pawn’s daily
operations, and admitted that Margarita Risis “gave [him] authority to run the Company the way
[he] chose fit”), Mr. Risis nonetheless cites a Department of Justice settlement with Perfect Pawn
that listed Margarita Risis as the company’s sole shareholder. Jd at 1-4. This does not end the
inquiry, however. Attanasio v, Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 417, 423 (M.D. Pa. 2012)
(opining that ownership of a company is not “automatically dispositive” of employer status). As
previously explained, the Enterprise test dictates whether an individual is an employer under the
FLSA. See Op. 4-5 (citing Jn re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 683 F.3d
462, 469 (3d Cir. 2012)), Seeing no need to revisit its earlier analysis of this issue, and heeding
the Third Circuit’s guidance that “the FLSA defines employer expansively and with striking
breadth,” the Court declines to vacate its ruling that Mr, Risis is an employer under the statute. Jn
re Enter., 683 F.3d at 468 (citation modified),

Taking all this into account, the Court concludes that Mr. Risis has not demonstrated any
reasons justifying relief under Rule 60. The Motions to Vacate are DENIED.°

B. The Fees Motion

Plaintiff moves to recover the attorneys’ fees and costs expended in prosecuting this action.
Mr. Risis did not file an opposition, despite the Court’s informing him of his opportunity to do so.
ECF No, 230. Regardless, the Court reviews the fees for reasonableness, As described above,
Plaintiff's counsel spent a significant number of hours navigating the challenges of this case, such
as responding to Mr. Risis’s numerous filings, seeking emergency relief due to Mr. Risis’s
misconduct, and filing motions in each of Mr. Risis’s Bankruptcy Proceedings. See supra Section
I; see also Pl.’s Br. 12-14.

§ Because Mr, Risis moves for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), this Court does not consider whether he is entitled to relief
under Rule 60(b)(6), the Rule’s catch-all provision, SEC v. Fin. Warfare Club, Inc., 425 F. App’x 85, 87 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Lifieberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 855 (1988) (“[T]he availability of relief
under [other Rule 60(b)] subsections renders subsection (b)(6) unavailabie to him here”); Vroom, Inc, v. Sidekick Tech,
LLC, No. 21-cv-6737, 2026 WL 34853, at #2 n.3 (D.N.J, Jan. 6, 2026}.

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Considering counsel’s experience and what other courts have found in FLSA cases, the
Court deems an average hourly rate of $500 to be reasonable. See Liv. Sushi To Go Cherry Hill,
LLC, No. 22-cy-4734, 2023 WL 4958105, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2023) (collecting cases). While
Plaintiff asserts that counsel devoted 1,104.95 hours to this matter, Plaintiff also advised the Court
that, given the settlements with Defendants Daniel Markus, Inc., Margarita Risis, and Oleg
Niezvestny (the “Settling Defendants”), he seeks attorneys’ fees and costs from Mr. Risis only.
ECF No, 234, As a result, this Court will not award attorneys’ fees for tasks unrelated to the
prosecution of this action against Mr. Risis (e.g., negotiations with the Settling Defendants), See
Swan by Carello v. Daniels, 917 F. Supp. 292, 301 (D. Del. 1995) (describing a district court’s
“wide discretion” on allocating fees in cases involving multiple defendants); Laboratorios Rivas,
SRL vy, Ugly & Beanity, Inc., No, 11-cv-5980, 2013 WL 5977440, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2013)
(declining to award fees for work unrelated to non-settling defendant). Nor will this Court award
attorneys’ fees for time spent drafting the Fees Motion. See Prandini v. Nat’l Tea Co., 585 F.2d
47, 52 (3d Cir, 1978). Accordingly, the Court reduces the number of hours spent on this case to
1050, and awards $525,000 in attorneys’ fees, The Court also awards $55,003.66 in costs, an
amount “adequately documented” and “reasonable based on the circumstances of this case,”
McGowan v. ChG Health Network, LLC, No. 22-cv-2770, 2024 WL 1340329, at *14 (D.N.J. Mar.
28, 2024), for a total of $580,003.66.

Lastly, Plaintiff seeks approval of settlements with Daniel Markus, Inc., Margarita Risis,
and Oleg Niezvestny (the “Settlements”). PI.’s Br. 17, The Court concludes that each element of
its Inquiry is met, First, the Settlements resolve a bona fide dispute between Plaintiff and the
Settling Defendants regarding minimum wage and overtime violations. See AfeGowan, 2024 WL
1340329, at *12 (“Disagreements over hours worked or compensation due clearly establishes [sic]
a bona fide dispute”) (citation modified). Second, the Settlements are fair and reasonable, as they
will enable the employees to recover a “significant portion” of the wages unlawfully withheld from
them, Pl.’s Br. 19; see Gabrielyan, 2015 WL 5853924, at *2. Third, nothing before the Court
indicates the Settlements will frustrate the implementation of the FLSA. For these reasons,
Plaintiff's request for approval of the Settlements is GRANTED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Vacate is DENIED. The Fees Motion is
GRANTED. The Court awards $380,003.66 in attorneys’ fees and costs, to be borne by Mr. Risis.
An appropriate order follows.

Date: J annaryAO 2026

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

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