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1:26-cv-00150Njd2 de fev. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WOODLEY GEINCHARLES,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC ROKOSKY, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26–cv–00150–ESK
OPINION
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on petitioner Woodley
Geincharles’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
(Petition) (ECF No. 1.) Respondents Elizabeth Detention Center (Center)
Warden Eric Rokosky, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director
Todd M. Lyons, Department of Homeland Security (Department) Secretary
Kristi Noem, and United States Attorney General Pamela Bondi oppose the
Petition. (ECF No. 8.) For the following reasons, I will deny the Petition
without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Haiti. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 16.) He entered the United
States on August 15, 2021, at which time he was detained at the border and
inspected by an immigration officer. (ECF No. 8–1 p. 2.) Petitioner alleged a
fear of persecution or torture if he returned to Haiti, and an asylum officer
concluded on October 18, 2021 that petitioner had sufficiently demonstrated
that fear. (Id.) Petitioner was released on parole as part of the alternatives
to detention program. (ECF No. 9–1.)
Petitioner was arrested on a state misdemeanor charge in March 2025.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 17.) ICE took petitioner into custody and detained him at the
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Center. (Id.) On June 26, 2025, petitioner applied for temporary protected
status (TPS) as a citizen of Haiti. (Id. ¶ 18.) An immigration judge ordered
petitioner’s removal on September 29, 2025. (Id. ¶ 17.) Petitioner filed an
appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals, and that appeal is ongoing.
(Id.)
On January 9, 2026, petitioner filed the Petition alleging that ICE was
illegally detaining him because he is a TPS applicant. (ECF No. 1.) I ordered
respondents to answer by January 16, 2026. (ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed
their answer on January 21, 2026 after receiving petitioner’s consent for an
extension. (ECF No. 8.) Petitioner filed a reply on January 23, 2026. (ECF
No. 9.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas relief may be extended to a prisoner
only when he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction
over such a petition if the petitioner is “in custody” and the custody is allegedly
“in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989).
Petitioner was detained within the District of New Jersey when he filed
the Petition, and he asserts that his continued detention violates due process.
Therefore, I have habeas jurisdiction over his claims. Trump v. J. G. G., 604
U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (per curiam) (noting jurisdiction for “core habeas petitions”
lies in the district of confinement).
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner asserts that respondents are statutorily prohibited from
detaining him because he is a TPS applicant. “The TPS program ‘provides
humanitarian relief to foreign nationals in the United States who come from
specified countries.’” Echeverria v. Janecka, No. 1:25–cv–01832, 2026 WL
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44896, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026) (quoting Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 593 U.S.
409, 412 (2021)). The Department “‘may designate a country for the program
when it is beset by especially bad or dangerous conditions, such as arise from
natural disasters or armed conflicts. The country’s citizens, if already present
in the United States, may then obtain TPS.” Sanchez, 593 U.S. at 412.
Haiti’s TPS designation is presently valid until 11:59 p.m. on February 3, 2026.
See Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 90
Fed. Reg. 54733–01, 54739 (Nov. 28, 2025).
“That status, once granted, provides a noncitizen with certain benefits ‘for
as long as the TPS designation lasts.’ Those benefits include a statutory
prohibition on the noncitizen’s removal and detention.” Echeverria, 2026 WL
44896, at *1 (quoting Sanchez, 593 U.S. at 412); see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1254a(a)(1),
(d)(4). However, removal proceedings may continue and a noncitizen “may
even be ordered removed while under TPS, though the order remains
inexecutable so long as the [noncitizen] remains a TPS beneficiary.” Duarte v.
Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 1044, 1054 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Dhakal v. Sessions, 895
F.3d 532, 537 n. 8 (7th Cir. 2018); Matter of Sosa Ventura, 25 I. & N. Dec. 391,
393 (BIA 2010)).
Petitioner has not been granted TPS designation, but he argues that he
has made a prima facie case of TPS eligibility and that eligibility prevents
respondents from detaining him. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4, 5, 11.) Respondents do not
concede that petitioner is eligible for TPS and assert that even if he were
eligible, “protection against detention extends only to aliens who have actually
been ‘provided temporary protected status,’ not to those who have simply
established a prima facie case of eligibility.” (ECF No. 8 p. 4 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254a(d)(4)). Respondents argue that petitioner’s detention is permissible
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). (Id. p. 2.)
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“When the meaning of a statute [is] at issue, the judicial role [is] to
‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.’”
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024) (quoting
Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 503 (1840)). Here, the relevant statute is 8
U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4), which states that a noncitizen “provided temporary
protected status under this section shall not be detained by the Attorney
General on the basis of the alien’s immigration status in the United States.”
(emphasis added). Petitioner argues § 1254a(a)(4) extends that protection
against detention to noncitizens who have made a prima facie case of TPS
eligibility. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 6, 7.) That section states:
(4) Temporary treatment for eligible aliens
(A) In the case of an alien who can establish a prima facie case of
eligibility for benefits under paragraph (1), but for the fact that the
period of registration under subsection (c)(1)(A)(iv) has not begun,
until the alien has had a reasonable opportunity to register during
the first 30 days of such period, the Attorney General shall provide
for the benefits of paragraph (1).
(B) In the case of an alien who establishes a prima facie case of
eligibility for benefits under paragraph (1), until a final
determination with respect to the alien’s eligibility for such benefits
under paragraph (1) has been made, the alien shall be provided
such benefits.
Accordingly, petitioner argues that respondents are prohibited from detaining
him.
I disagree. Section 1254a(a)(4) limits the benefits extended to TPS
eligible noncitizens to the benefits appearing in paragraph (1), which are
protection from removal from the United States and an “‘employment
authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254a(a)(1). That is all. This reading is supported by 8 C.F.R. § 244.10,
which states in relevant part that
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Temporary treatment benefits shall be evidenced by the issuance of an
employment authorization document. The alien shall be given, in
English and in the language of the designated foreign state or a
language that the alien understands, a notice of the registration
requirements for Temporary Protected Status and a notice of the
following benefits:
(i) Temporary stay of deportation; and
(ii) Temporary employment authorization.
8 C.F.R. § 244.10(e)(1); see also Mansor v. United States Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs., 345 F.R.D. 193, 199 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The temporary treatment
benefits are protection from deportation and employment authorization.”) No
further benefits are listed.
“A ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ is that where a section of
a statute does not include a specific term or phrase used elsewhere in the
statute, ‘the drafters did not wish such a requirement to apply.’” In re Visteon
Corp., 612 F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Mobley, 956
F.2d 450, 452–53 (3d Cir. 1992)). Therefore, it is plain that Congress did not
intend to give TPS applicants the full protections and benefits that are accorded
to TPS recipients. By its plain language, § 1254a(d)(4) only applies to
noncitizens who are TPS recipients; TPS applicants are protected from removal
while their applications were being considered, but not detention. Assuming
without deciding that petitioner has established prima facie eligibility for TPS
status, § 1254a does not categorically prohibit his detention.
In addition to disputing petitioner’s TPS eligibility, respondents assert
that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) authorizes petitioner’s detention. (ECF No. 8 p. 1.)
“Petitioner was (i) apprehended near the border, (ii) placed into expedited
removal proceedings, and (iii) passed a credible-fear screener interview for an
asylum claim. Petitioner thus falls under the mandatory detention
requirements of § 1225(b)(1).” (Id. (internal citation omitted)). Respondents
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submit a Notice to Appear (Notice) dated October 21, 2021 in support of their
argument. (ECF No. 8–1 p. 2.) The Notice identified petitioner as a
noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.”
(Id.) It alleged that he “entered the United States at an unknown location on
or about 8/15/2021” and was “not then admitted or paroled after an inspection
by an immigration officer.” (Id.) Petitioner has submitted ICE Form I-830E
form dated November 9, 2021 indicating that he was released from ICE custody
on “parole with ATD.”1 (ECF No. 9–1).
Petitioner was apprehended shortly after crossing the border and was
provided humanitarian parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). “[P]arole of
such [noncitizen] shall not be regarded as an admission of the [noncitizen] and
when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, have been served the [noncitizen] shall forthwith return or
be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
Noncitizens “who are paroled are thus subject to the ‘entry fiction’ in which they
are legally considered as if they remained at the border throughout and after
their parole until removal or credible fear proceedings conclude.” Faqirzada
v. Rokosky, No. 25–cv–16639, 2026 WL 63614, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2026). In
other words, “[p]etitioner is treated legally as if he remained at the border for
the duration of that parole. Petitioner thus remained subject to both the
removal procedures, and accompanying mandatory detention, which applies to
aliens detained under § 1225(b)(1).” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Petitioner is not entitled to release or bond hearing under this statute.
1 I understand ATD to refer to the alternatives to detention program. See
Garcia-Alvarado v. Warden, No. 25–cv–16109, 2025 WL 3268606, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov.
24, 2025).
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However, noncitizens who are subject to prolonged detention may be
entitled to a bond hearing should their detention become so prolonged as to
become arbitrary. See, e.g., Tuser E. v. Rodriguez, 370 F. Supp. 3d 435, 442–
43 (D.N.J. 2019) (finding that detention had become arbitrary at twenty
months). Petitioner has been detained for almost a year, which is more than
the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention, but the duration
of confinement by itself does not rise to the level of a due process violation. See
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 311–12 (2018)(rejecting argument that
there is a six-month limitation on detention without a bond hearing). “[I]t is
insufficient that [p]etitioner’s detention has merely become suspect by reaching
this six month to a year threshold, in order for [p]etitioner to be entitled to
release he must show that his ongoing detention is so unreasonable or arbitrary
that it has actually violated his rights under the Due Process Clause.” Dryden
v. Green, 321 F. Supp. 3d, 496, 502 (D.N.J. 2018). This “determination on
reasonableness must be highly fact specific … .” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Petitioner has not submitted sufficient facts for me to conclude that
his continued detention violates the Due Process Clause, so his challenge must
fail.
Petitioner’s detention is permitted pursuant to § 1225(b)(1) and has not
risen to the level of a due process violation on the facts before the Court.2 The
Petition will be denied without prejudice.
2 I express no opinion as to whether petitioner may be able to prove a due process
violation under a different set of facts.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Petition is denied without prejudice.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: February 2, 2026
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