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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

BRIAN B.,
HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
v.
No. 1:25-cv-17141 GS&MW)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant. AND ORDER
APPEARANCES:
Alan H., Polonsky, Esq. Shawn C, Carver, Special Assistant U.S.
Polonsky & Polonsky Attorney
512 8S. White Horse Pike Social Security Administration
Audobon, NJ 08106 Office of Program Litigation, Office 3
6401 Security Boulevard

Counsel for Petitioner Baltimore, MD 21235
Brian B.

Counsel for SSA Commissioner
Frank Bisignano

WILLIAMS, District Judge:

Presently before the Court ts the Petition of Brian B.! (“Petitioner”) seeking review of the
final decision of the Commissioner of the U.S. Social Security Administration (‘Commissioner’)
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court heard oral argument in connection with this appeal on
October 9, 2026. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the arguments of counsel,

the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision for the reasons that follow.

' Pursuant to this Court’s Standing Order 2021-10, this Memorandum Opinion and Order will refer
to Petitioner solely by first name and last initial.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO

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I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on August 18, 2023, alleging
disability beginning December 2, 2022. (A.R. 229-35.) The Social Security Administration denied
the claim initially on March 20, 2024, and again upon reconsideration on July 30, 2024. (ALR.
103-112, 114-121.) Petitioner then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALT”), (A.R. 122-123.) The ALJ held a video hearing on February 25, 2025, at which Petitioner
testified and was represented by counsel. (A.R. 46, 52-63.) An impartial vocational expert (“VE”)
also testified at the hearing. (A.R. 64-72.)

On March 13, 2025, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, concluding that Petitioner
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from December 2, 2022 through
the date of the decision. (A.R. 25-39.) Petitioner appealed that decision fo the Appeals Council,
which denied review on September 18, 2025, (A.R. 1-3.) Petitioner timely appealed to this
Court. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.)

IE. DISCUSSION

The Court assumes familiarity with the record and the applicable standard of review and
recounts herein only that information relevant to the Court’s determination on this appeal.

On appeal, Petitioner alleges four errors by the ALJ. First, Petitioner contends that the ALJ
rejected the opinions of two treating neuropsychologists, Dr. Lawler and Dr. Ledakis, as
unpersuasive without an adequate explanation because the ALJ (a) failed to account for the
supportability of these opinions and (b) failed to consider whether these opinions were consistent
with the other medical evidence of record. Second, Petitioner asserts that the ALJ erred in finding
that Petitioner’s intellectual disability did not satisfy Listing 12.02. Third, Petitioner argues that he

ALJ found unpersuasive the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Lazarus, for erroneous

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reasons, when his opinion was purportedly supported by his findings and consistent with the
evidence from other medical sources. Finally, Petitioner contends that the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) defined by the ALJ did not contain all of Petitioner’s credibly established
limitations — namely, an inability to remember and carry out simple instructions — and, moreover,
that the jobs cited by the VE could not be performed with those limitations. With respect to this
final point, Petitioner argues that the RFC included an ability to follow only “simple instructions,”
but the jobs identified by the ALJ at Step Five require a worker to follow more than simple
instructions, The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALI’s evaluation
of the medical records and the formulation of the RFC, The Court addresses each argument in turn.

A, The ALJ properly discounted the medical opinions in the record

The gravamen of Petitioner’s argument is that the evidence of record, including several
medical source opinions and the opinions of non-medical sources, consistently reflect functional
limitations resulting from Petitioner’s persistent difficulty remembering information, yet the ALJ
erroneously substituted her judgment for the opinions of experts and determined that Petitioner
was able to work. As set forth below, the Court agrees with Petitioner that the medical source
statements are consistent with each other, However, the functional limitations identified by the
providers in these medical source statements are not consistent with and supported by the
providers’ treatment notes, test results, and other evidence of record. Furthermore, the functional
limitations do not account for the strategies Petitioner utilizes to compensate for his memory
impairment, which he learned through cognitive therapy sessions specifically designed to rectify
problems resulting from his memory issues,

The ALJ’s consideration of medical opinion evidence is governed by regulations which

focus on the persuasiveness of each medical opinion. 20 C.E.R. § 416.920c(a). The regulations list

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the factors to be utilized in considering medical opinions: supportability, consistency, treatment
relationship including the length and purpose of the treatment and frequency of examinations,
specialization, and other factors including familiarity with other evidence in the record or an
understanding of the disability program. 20 C.RR. § 416.920c(c), The regulations require the ALJ
“to explain only two of these factors: whether medical opinions were (1) based on ‘objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations’ and (2) consistent with other medical opinions in
the record.” Zaborowski v. Comun'’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir, 2024)(quoting 20
CLER. § 404.1520c(c)). The ALJ need not specifically use the magic words “supportability” and
“consistency” when evaluating a medical opinion. fd. at 640.

When faced with conflicting opinion evidence, an ALJ has significant discretion in
choosing whom to credit. Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir, 2011) (“[T]he ALJ is entitled
to weigh all evidence in making its finding... [and] is not bound to accept the opinion or theory
of any medical expert, but may weigh the medical evidence and draw its own inferences.”)
(internal citation and quotation omitted). However, when presented with conflicting evidence, the
ALJ “cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d
1058, 1066 (3d Cir, 1993) (internal citation and quotation omitted); Plummer vy. Apfel, 186 F.3d
422, 429 (3d Cir, 1999) (“The ALJ must consider all the evidence and give some reason for
discounting the evidence she rejects.”). The ALJ's factual findings do not need to follow a
particular format so long as “there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of
findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004).

1. Supportability
Petitioner asserts that the ALJ failed to comply with the regulations, which required her to

consider the supporting explanations for Dr. Lawler’s and Dr, Ledakis’ opinions. However, the

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ALJ expressly considered the evidence of record when rejecting both doctors’ medical source
statements and found that Dr. Lawier’s and Dr. Ledakis’ opinions concerning Petitioner’s
functional limitations were not supported by these doctors’ own examination findings and the
testing results reflected in the record. (A.R. 36.)

For example, in a December 8, 2022 Medical Source Statement, Dr. Lawler concluded that
Petitioner is “unable to meet competitive standards” for any of the cognitive abilities “needed to
perform skilled, professional work duties” identified on the form. (A.R. 866.) In a January 26,
2025 Medical Opinion, Dr. Lawler opined that Petitioner has “extreme” limitations in an ability to
remember work-like procedures and an ability to understand and remember very short and simple
instructions, (A.R, 862,) Dr, Lawler also found, inter alia, “marked” limitations in Petitioner’s
ability to carry out very short and simple instructions and ability to ask simple questions or request
assistance. (Cd,) In support of her December 2022 findings, Dr. Lawler noted that
“(njeuropsychological testing (11/03/2022) documented significant memory impairment, with
rapid forgetting of new information.” (A.R. 867.) In support of her January 2025 findings, Dr.
Lawler noted that “[nJeuropsychological testing (11/03/2022) documents significant and rapid
forgetting of new information over a short time frame (within minutes)” and that “[t{his
impairment makes it impossible for him to be gainfully employed in any capacity.” (A.R. 862.)
Petitioner argues that the ALJ failed to consider the supportability of Dr. Lawler’s opinions.
However, Dr. Lawler’s explanations on the December 2022 and January 2025 forms make clear
that her assessment was based on the testing she conducted in November 2022, and the ALJ
expressly considered these test results when evaluating Dr. Lawler’s opinions. (A.R. 35.) The ALT
specifically noted Dr. Lawler’s test results “support[] finding some limitations, but they do not

support the marked to extreme limitations noted by Dr. Lawler in her check-box and fill-in-the-

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blank opinions.” (id.} The ALJ also considered Dr, Lawler’s treatment notes, which indicated that
Petitioner had “an average immediate recall, low average subsequent recall, low average free
recall, very superior immediate recall and high average learning and memory for visual materials,
intact language functioning, high average executive functioning, very superior intellectual
functioning [and] high average word reading abilities.” (/d.) Accordingly, the ALJ expressly
concluded that Dr. Lawler’s opinion concerning the extent of Petitioner’s functional limitations
was not supported by Dr. Lawler’s own treatment notes and test results. The Court thus finds that
the ALJ did not err by failing to consider the supportability of Dr. Lawler’s opinion.

With respect to Dr. Ledakis, he opined in an April 4, 2024 Medical Source Statement that
Petitioner is unable to perform and/or unable to meet competitive standards in most areas of
cognitive abilities “needed to perform skilled, professional work duties,” including an inability to
frequently utilize short instruction memory, an inability to frequently maintain regular attendance,
and an inability to frequently understand, remember and carry out short and detailed instructions.
(A.R, 884.) Dr. Ledakis noted on the form that his opinion was supported by his
neuropsychological evaluation of Petitioner from February 21, 2024. (A.R. 885.) The ALJ
reviewed the testing performed by Dr. Ledakis in February 2024 and explicitly noted Dr, Ledakis’
findings that Petitioner “had a superior range of intellectual functioning, a mild relative weakness
in executive functioning, ... had relatively intact visual memory, had an impairment in verbal
memory, and his memory impairment was particularly evident after longer delays.” (A.R. 36.)
While acknowledging Dr. Ledakis’ finding concerning Petitioner’s memory impairment, the ALF
concluded that such impairment “does not support finding he is unable to perform in most areas
of mental functioning,” particularly in light of Petitioner’s “generally normal mental examinations

except for the memory impairment,” his superior intelligence, and his ability to engage in activities

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of daily living. Ud.) The ALJ thus considered the supportability of Dr. Ledakis’ medical source
statement but found it was not supported by the evidence of record, As such, the ALJ did not enr
by failing to consider the supportability of Dr. Ledakis’ opinion.

2. Consistency

The ALJ also properly considered the consistency of Dr. Lawler’s and Dr. Ledakis’
opinions with the broader record, After reviewing the record in its entirety, the ALJ concluded that
the record supported Petitioner’s assertion that he has memory impairments that limit his abtlity
to work, but the evidence did not support his contention that his impairments prevented him from
working at all. (A.R. 34, 37.)

First, the medical source opinions are based on Petitioner’s “rapid forgetting of
mformation,” but they do not account for the strategies that Petitioner employs to mitigate the
functional limitations of his memory impaitment.’? The ALJ explicitly noted the records of
Petitioner’s cognitive therapy, which allowed Petitioner “to develop compensatory strategies to
compensate for his memory problems.” (A.R. 37.) The record demonstrates that Petitioner utilizes
strategies such as setting alarms and reminders on his smartphone and taking notes to compensate
for his cognitive deficits. (AR. 423, 628.) These strategies are noted by the ALJ to have helped
Petitioner in his actrvilies of daily living and have served to accommodate Petitioner’s memory

deficiencies. (A.R. 34, 37.) Because the functional limitations in Dr, Ledakis’ and Dr. Lawler’s

* Indeed, Dr. Lawler’s opinions, as well as the opinion of Petitioner’s cognitive therapist, Annie
Bilinsky, are based on Petitioner’s condition as of December 2022. (A.R. 862-63, 864-67, 878-
81.) Subsequently, between January 2023 and March 2023, Petitioner attended twelve cognitive
therapy sessions by which he learned to implement a variety of external and internal memory aids.
(A.R. 421.) Petitioner was noted to have made “significant gains in his functional limitations”
through the strategies developed in cognitive therapy. (/d.)

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medical source statements do not account for these strategies, there is substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s conclusion that these opinions are not consistent with the record in its entirety.

Moreover, the ALJ discussed the inconsistency between Dr. Ledakis’ and Dr. Lawler’s
medical source statements and the other medical evidence of record. With respect to both doctors’
opinions, the ALJ stated that Petitioner’s “generally normal mental examinations except for some
delayed memory deficiencies are not consistent with’ Dr. Lawler’s and Dr. Ledakis’ opinions.*
(A.R. 35, 36.) Likewise, the ALJ discussed the inconsistency between these providers’ opinions
and the non-medical evidence of Petitioner’s ability to engage in activities of daily living. (/d.)
The ALJ specifically noted in her decision that Petitioner, infer alia, does not need reminders to
take care of his personal needs, drives, manages his own healthcare appointments, shops for
necessities, prepares simple meals, and participates in social activities such as volunteer work.
(A,R. 32.) The ALJ concluded:

The claimant has reported memory loss, difficulty concentrating, and difficulty

completing tasks following the surgery. Mental examinations are somewhat

consistent with the claimant’s reported linilations. Testing has found generally

intact short-term memory, but a limited delayed memory with concentration

difficulties, The claimant attended therapy to develop compensatory strategies to

compensate for his memory problems. Additionally, testing has also found he

continues to have intact activities of daily living, very superior intellectual abilities,

and average verbal fluency. Overall, the record is consistent with finding limitations

that prevent the claimant from performing his past work, but il is not consistent
with the limitations alleged by the claimant.

> At oral argument, Petitioner’s counsel noted that the ALJ did not expressly indicate that she
considered the consistency between Dr. Lawler’s and Dr. Ledakis’ opinions. “A written evaluation
of every piece of evidence is not required, as long as the ALJ articulates at some minimum level
her analysis of a particular line of evidence.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 775, 780 (3d Cir.
2004); Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F, App’x 130, 133 (d Cir. 2004) (“There is no requirement that the
ALJ discuss in its opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record.”). The ALJ’s decision
makes clear that she considered the consistency between the medical opinions, as well as their
consistency with the other evidence of record. (A.R, 35, 36.)

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(A.R, 37.) By identifying specific evidence from the record that contradicted Dr. Lawler’s and Dr.
Ledakis’ medical source statements, the Court finds that the ALJ sufficiently articulated the
consistency factor.

In summary, the Court rejects Petitioner’s argument that the ALJ rejected the opinions of
Dr. Lawler and Dr. Ledakis for erroneous reasons. Despite Petitioner’s assertion that the ALJ failed
to address the supportability and consistency of these providers’ opinions, the ALJ explicitly
addressed both of these factors. The ALJ identified inconsistencies with the record and made
findings that were consistent with the treatment notes and test results of these providers. The Court
concludes that the ALJ’s analysis is supported by substantial evidence.

B. The ALJ’s finding that Petitioner does not satisfy the criteria of Listing 12.02
is supported by substantial evidence

To satisfy the requirements of the Listing, Petitioner was required to demonstrate an
extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, areas of adaptive fanctioning. Listing
12,02(B). The regulations require the ALJ to evaluate limitations based on a five-point scale from
“no limitation” to an “extreme limitation.” Listing 12.00F2. Relevant here, the SSA defines
moderate limitation as a “fair” ability to function in a particular area independently, appropriately,
effectively, and on a sustained basis, and a marked limitation as a “seriously limited” ability to
function in such area. Listing 12.00F2(c)-(d).

The ALJ found as follows with respect to the Paragraph B criteria:

¢ Understanding, remembering or applying information: Petitioner has a moderate
limitation.

® Concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace: Petitioner has a moderate limitation.

e . Interacting with others: Petitioner has a mild limitation.

e Adapting or managing oneself: Petitioner has a mild limitation.

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(ALR. 32.)

Petitioner contends that the ALJ erred because she should have concluded that Petitioner
has marked limitations, rather than moderate limitations, in the first two categories. Petitioner
relies solely on Dr. Lawier’s medical source statements, arguing that “had Dr. Lawler’s opinion
been credited, the ALJ would have been compelled to find Plaintiff disabled” because “her findings
support a conclusion that [Petitioner] has marked limitations in his ability to remember or carry
out instructions as well as his ability to concentrate, persist or maintain pace.” (Pl.’s Br. 6, Dkt.
No. 7.) The Court, however, has already concluded that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Lawler’s medical
source statements was appropriate, and Petitioner does not identify any other evidence of record
to support a finding that he meets the criteria of Listing 12.02." Therefore, the Court rejects any
arguinent that the ALJ erred in her Step 3 finding that Petitioner did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment.

Cc. Dr. Lazarus’ opinien

The ALJ found the opinion of the consultative examiner, Dr. Lazarus, to be “minimally
persuasive” because Dr. Lazarus’ findings were “generally normal.” (A.R. 35.) The ALJ noted that
“during the March 2024 consultative examination, the claimant had a coherent and logical thought
process, was fully oriented, had moderately limited memory skills with 3 out of 3 items recalled
immediately and 1 out of 3 recalled after a delay, had mildly compromised attention and

concentration, and had average intellectual functioning. At that time, the claimant reported he used

4 At oral argument, Petitioner argued that the Court should remand on this basis alone because the
Commissioner failed to address it in the opposition brief. However, because Petitioner’s argument
concerning the Listing is that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Lawler’s opinion, and the
Commissioner addressed the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Lawler’s opinion, the Court does not deem
this argument waived.

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compensatory strategies for things that require reminders and performs volunteer work.” (A.R.
34.) The ALJ found that Dr, Lazarus’ examination supported some limitations based on Petitioner’s
memory issues, but, viewing the record in its entirety, the ALJ concluded that Petitioner’s
concentration difficulties and poor long-term memory supported a restriction to simple tasks in a
setting without strict production quotas. (A.R. 34.)

Like his challenges to the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Lawler’s and Dr. Ledakis’ opinions,
Petitioner argues that the ALJ erred in her consideration of Dr. Lazarus’ opinion because the
opinion was purportedly supported by objective evidence and explanations and was consistent with
the other evidence of record. Petitioner contends that Dr, Lazarus’ examination findings were not
“generally normal’ and that the ALJ ignored Dr. Lazarus’ opinion that “vocational rehabilitation
was problematic due to the cognitive sequelae from Petitioner’s surgery.” (PL.’s Br. at 11.)

The Court finds no error with respect to the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Lazarus’ opinion. The
AL] extensively discussed Dr. Lazarus’ findings, accepting some and rejecting others. Petitioner
disagrees with the ALJ’s assessment that Dr, Lazarus’ findings were “generally normal,” but Dr.
Lazarus’ observations included that Petitioner was “cooperative and generally friendly,” his social
skills were “appropriate,” his gait and posture were normal, his motor behavior was unremarkable,
his eye contact was appropriate, his speech was fluent, his thought processes were coherent and
logical, his affect was full and appropriate to speech and thought content, he was alert and oriented
in all spheres, and he was able to perform simplistic mental calculations and his insight and
judgment were intact. (A.R. 628.) While Dr. Lazarus also observed that Petitioner was noted to
have some word finding difficulties, and his memory skills were “moderately” limited, Dr. Lazarus
concluded that Petitioner was “estimated to be functioning in the average range.” (/d.) Thus, the

ALI’s assessment of “generally normal” findings by Dr. Lazarus is supported by substantial

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evidence. The ALJ also addressed the consistency of Dr. Lazarus’ finding with the other testing in
the record, which supported a finding of that Petitioner had “concentration difficulties and reduced
long-term memory.” (A.R. 35.) The ALJ incorporated these findings into the RFC, concluding that
they supported restrictions to simple tasks without production quotas. (/d.} Accordingly, the Court
finds no basis to disturb the ALJ’s findings based on her evaluation of Dr. Lazarus’ consultative
exaniination.

D. The RFC Includes All Credibly Established Limitations

The ALJ is exclusively responsible for determining the RFC, by considering the medical
and other evidence under the agency’s framework. The ALJ is under no obligation to adopt the
functional restrictions identified by Petitioner’s medical providers. See Tifterington v. Barnhart,
174 BK App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is no legal requirement that a physician have made the
particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC, Surveying the medical
evidence to craft an RFC is part of the ALI’s duties.”).

The RFC represents “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [their] limitations.” 20
CER. § 404,.1545(a)(1), As outlined in SSR 96-8, an RFC assesses “an individual's ability to do
sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing
basis.” In determining the RFC, the ALJ considers “all of the relevant medical and other evidence”
in the record. 20 C.E.R. § 404.1545(a)(3), However, the ALJ need not incorporate limitations that
are not credibly established. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir, 2005), To that
end, the ALJ may discount a claimant’s subjective complaints if they are inconsistent with the
evidence of record. Schaudeck vy. Comim’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999); see also
20 CLE.R. § 404,1529(c), At bottom, “so long as ‘there is sufficient development of the record and

233

explanation of findings to permit meaningful review[,]’” a reviewing court will not disturb the

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ALJ's RFC findings. Tompkins v. Astrue, No. 12-1897, 2013 WL 1966059, at *13 (D.N.J. May
10, 2013) (quoting Jones, 364 F.3d at 505).

Petitioner contends that the RFC failed to include all of Petitioner’s credibly established
limitations, including the ability to remember and carry out short and simple instructions.
However, the Court finds no merit fo Petitioner’s argument that the RFC was deficient.

The ALJ reviewed all of the evidence related to Petitioner’s mental limitations but, as
already discussed, ultimately determined that the medical evidence supported no greater limitations
than those included in the RFC. The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s assessment of these cognitive
limitations. Petitioner asserts that the ALJ should have accepted the extreme and marked
limitations found by Dr. Lawler, Dr. Ledakis and/or Dr. Lazarus, but the Court has already
concluded that the ALJ’s rejection of these providers’ opinions was appropriate.

The ALJ’s decision reflects consideration of an RFC based on the consistent reports of
mild to moderate functional limitations, Petitioner’s use of coping strategies to mitigate the effects
of his memory impairment, and his ability to engage in activities of daily living, including that he
does not need reminders to take care of his personal needs, volunteers, manages his own healthcare
appointments, shops for necessities, prepares simple meals, and performs some household chores
in maintaining his home, including cleaning and doing laundty, as reflected in the record. The ALJ
acknowledged that “none of the claimant’s activities of daily living are dispositive,” but found that
“taken together and considered in conjunction with the medical evidence of record, they suggest
that the claimant can perform work within the above parameters on a sustained and continuous
basis.” (A.R. 37.) Petitioner may disagree with the conclusion the ALJ drew, but the Court finds

that the RFC is supported by substantial evidence.

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E, The Jobs Identified by the ALJ At Step 5

Finally, Petitioner argues that even if the RFC is appropriate, the jobs cited by the VE could
not be performed with the limitations of Petitioner’s RFC. Petitioner specificaliy argues in this
regard that the proposed jobs all have a Reasoning Level of 2, which requires the worker to follow
“detailed” instructions and exceeds the capacity to follow “simple” instructions as provided in
Petitioner’s RFC. In response, the Commissioner points to two cases, Money v. Barnhart, 91 F.
App'x 210, 215 Gd Cir. 2004) and Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 618 (d Cir. 2014), in which
the Third Circuit held that an RFC contaming a limitation to simple, routine, and repetitive work
does not conflict with occupations that involve working at Reasoning Level 2. In reply, Petitioner
notes that the cases cited by Defendant discuss an ability to perform simple, routine and repetitive
work and not an ability to follow simple instructions.

The DOT defines Reasoning Level 2 as an ability to carry out “detailed but uninvolved
written or oral instructions,” DOT, Appendix C, 1991 WL 688702. By contrast, the DOT defines
Reasoning Level 1 as an ability to carry out “simple one- or two-step instructions,” Jd. The issue
here is whether an ability to follow “simple instructions” can include jobs that require an individual
to perform “detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions” as provided in Reasoning Level
2. The Fourth Circuit has noted that “a short and simple instructions restriction shares the word
‘simple’ with the Level 1 definition but could permit instructions of more than two steps” but “[o]n
the other hand, it is not entirely clear to [the court] that a person limited to short and simple
instructions can-also carry out Level 2 jobs that include ‘detailed but uninvolved’ instructions.”
Keller v, Berryhill, 754 F. App'x 193, 198 (th Cir, 2018),

In Money v. Barnhart, the Third Circuit held that a job with a Reasoning Level 2 does not

“contradict the mandate that [the claimant's] work be simple, routine and repetitive.” 91 BR App’x

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at 215 (emphasis added). In Zirnsak v. Colvin, the Third Circuit noted that “there is no bright-line
rule stating whether there is a per se conflict between a job that requires level 3 reasoning and a
finding that a claimant should be limited to simple and routine work.” 777 F.3d at 618. As
previously noted, these cases address an ability to perform simple “work” and do not specifically
address an ability to perform simple “instructions.” However, in a different context, the Third
Circuit has stated that “[a] limitation to ‘simple tasks’ is fundamentally the same as one ‘to jobs
requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only
simple work-related decisions[.]’” Hess, 931 F.3d at 210.

Other courts within the Third Circuit have held that an RFC limited to simple instructions
is not inconsistent with Reasoning Level 2. For example, in Antonio R. v. Commm'r of Soc. Sec., No.
25-01980, 2026 WL 810050, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar, 24, 2026), the court rejected the argument that
Petitioner makes here, ie., that Money and Zirnsak are distinguishable because they considered
limitations to “simple tasks” rather than “simple instructions,” In Anfonio R., the court referred to
this as merely a “semantic distinction” and found that “reasoning level 2 jobs do not inherently
conflict with a limitation to simple instructions or simple tasks.” Id. at *12.° See also Dance ¥.
Conun’r of Soe. Sec., No. 20-3141, 2021 WL 3144696, at *9 (D.N.I. July 26, 2021) (ejecting
argument that plaintiff could perform jobs having a Reasoning Level of 2 when plaintiff’s RFC
limited plaintiff to jobs with only “simple tasks and instructions”); Cowher vy. O'Malley, No, 21-

178, 2024 WL 3161865, at *7 (W.D. Pa. June 24, 2024) (“courts generally find that a limitation to

> But see Radford y. Saul, No. 18-161, 2019 WL 3729565, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2019) (“The
Court finds that a meaningful difference exists between a limitation to perform only simple,
routine, repetitive tasks ... and a limitation to only receive and follow short, simple instructions|[. ]
The first limitation accounts for a claimant's ability to perform certain job tasks while the second
limitation accounts for a claimant's ability to comprehend job tasks[.]”), aff'd, 807 F. App’x 276
(4th Cir, 2020).

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‘simple instructions,’ like the one included in Cowher’s RFC, is consistent with jobs at both R1
and R2”),

The Court recognizes that there are cases in which courts have held that an RFC limited to
simple instructions may be inconsistent with Reasoning Level 2. See, e.g., Susan A. v. Comimn'r of
Soc. Sec., No. 21-07949 USM), 2022 WL 2304666, at *8 (D.N.J. June 27, 2022) G@emanding where
RFC limited claimant to “understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions with only
occasional changes to essential job functions and... make simple work-related decisions” and
jobs identified by VE all had Reasoning Level 2). Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has noted that “a job
rated reasoning level one requires the ability fo understand and carry out simple instructions,
whereas a job rated reasoning level two requires the ability to understand and carry out detailed
instructions.” Lucy v. Chater, 113 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir, 1997).

Here, the RFC was not limited to simple “tasks;” the RFC rather limited Petitioner to an
ability to follow simple “instructions.” Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the Third Circuit
concluded in Hess that a limitation to simple “tasks” is equivalent to a limitation to simple
“instructions,” and concluded in Money that simple “work” may fall within Reasoning Level 2.
The Court finds no meaningful distinction between simple “work” and simple “tasks.” Therefore,
reading Hess and Money together compels the conclusion that jobs with Reasoning Level of 2 do
not inherently conflict with a limitation to simple instructions.

In summary, the RFC here limited Petitioner to simple instructions, simple work-related
decisions, and only occasional changes in a routine setting. The VE identified jobs that require
Reasoning Level 2, No apparent unresolved conflict exists between those jobs and the limitations
in the RFC. Moreover, because the ALJ identified at least one job that existed in significant

numbers which Petitioner could perform, her determination is supported by substantial evidence.

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Case 1:25-cv-17141-KMW Document16- Filed 10/14/26 Page 17 of 17 PagelD:

Ii.

<pagelD>

CONCLUSION

In conciusion, the final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED,

ORDER
For the reasons set forth herein, and for good cause shown,
IT IS this 14" day of October 2026 hereby,

ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

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i

~WAREN M. WILLIAMS
United States District Judge

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