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1:25-cv-01443Njd27 de fev. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
OLGA S.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
No. 25-cv-01443
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Olga S., Pro Se
Hannah Marie Dawson
Sarah Noel Hibbert
S OCIAL S ECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF P ROGRAM LITIGATION
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235
On behalf of Defendant.
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O’HEARN, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Olga S.’s1 (“Plaintiff”) appeal from a denial
of 	Social 	Security 	disability 	benefits 	and 	supplemental 	security 	income 	by 	the 	Acting
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). (ECF No. 1). The Court did not hear oral
argument pursuant to Local Rule 78.1. For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the
Commissioner’s decision.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court recites herein only those facts necessary for its determination on this appeal.
A. Administrative History
Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) on January 26, 2023,
alleging a disability onset date of July 23, 2020. (AR 57). She claims physical disabilities related
to arthritis, and various mental health issues. (Id.). Her claim was initially denied on May 15, 2023,
and was denied again upon reconsideration on August 26, 2023. (AR 66–70, 75–78).
On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 79–83). The ALJ held a hearing by video conference on March 28, 2024. (AR
25–46). Plaintiff testified at the hearing and, as she does here, appeared pro se before the ALJ.
(Id.).
The ALJ issued a Decision denying Plaintiff’s application for DIB on May 6, 2024. (AR
8-21). Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Appeals Council, (AR 103–105), which denied her
request for review on December 20, 2024. (AR 1–3). Plaintiff timely filed this appeal on February
24, 2025. (ECF No. 1).
1 Pursuant to this Court’s Standing Order 2021-10, this Opinion will refer to Plaintiff solely
by first name and last initial.
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B. Plaintiff’s Background and Testimony
At the time of her alleged onset date of July 23, 2020, Plaintiff was 38 years old. (AR 57,
132). Despite having a college education, Plaintiff has never worked and has no past relevant work
history. (AR 32–33). She is a native Russian speaker and has limited proficiency in English. (Pl.’s
Br. ECF No. 8 at 12–14).
At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified, in English, that her mental and physical
problems prevented her from interacting with people and from working. (AR 33–37). Specifically,
she testified that she suffers from anxiety, depression, schizoaffective disorder, and posttraumatic
stress disorder (“PTSD”). (AR 33–34). She further testified that she has arthritis primarily causing
pain in her left leg. (AR 35–37). She also reported difficulty interacting with people, concentrating,
sitting or standing for too long, and an inability to carry any weight due to issues in her leg. (AR
34–36). However, Plaintiff can perform multiple household tasks, such as shopping for groceries,
preparing meals, cleaning, and doing laundry, and also participates in recreational activities like
jewelry making and attending yoga classes. (AR 37–38, 332, 382–383, 437, 528–531).
C. Medical History
Numerous medical providers have evaluated Plaintiff over the course of her disability
claim. She alleges disability based on her physical impairments in her left hip, and various mental
impairments. (AR 57).
1. 	Physical Impairments
On June 21, 2022, Plaintiff saw treating orthopedic surgeon Joseph Bernardini, M.D. (“Dr.
Bernardini”) for her left hip pain. (AR 332–333). Notes from her visit indicate she had surgery on
her left hip in 2001. (Id.). Plaintiff reported to Dr. Bernardini that she experienced pain while doing
exercises and stretches. (Id.). Dr. Bernardini’s evaluation notes indicate that Plaintiff had lost
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approximately 5–10 degrees of internal and external rotation, but that her abduction was otherwise
normal. (AR 333). Overall, Dr. Bernardini concluded that Plaintiff was doing well enough not to
refer her for hip arthroplasty. (Id.).
On September 12, 2022, Plaintiff saw treating orthopedic surgeon Mark Levitsky, M.D.
(“Dr. Levitsky”) for her left hip pain. (AR 334–344). Dr. Levitsky reviewed x-rays that were taken
during Plaintiff’s prior visit to Dr. Bernardini and concluded that there were significant
degenerative changes in Plaintiff’s left hip. (AR 335). But Dr. Levitsky noted that Plaintiff
otherwise walked with a normal gait pattern and that her neurological status was intact. (Id.).
On April 18, 2023, Plaintiff saw examining family medicine physician Juan Cornejo, M.D.
(“Dr. Cornejo”) for her left hip pain. (See AR 527–535). On a ten-point scale, with ten being the
most painful, Plaintiff rated her hip pain as a four. (AR 527). Plaintiff also reported to Dr. Cornejo
that she had difficulty with frequent bending, prolonged walking and sitting, and heavy lifting.
(AR 531). Dr. Cornejo opined that Plaintiff walked with an effective gait and exhibited no
difficulty with partially squatting and no significant deficit to light touch and pinprick sensations.
(AR 529–530). Dr. Cornejo concluded that Plaintiff had no significant balance limitations, and
that she was more than likely able to handle, carry, and lift objects ranging in sizes from fine to
medium. (AR 531).
Finally, on August 22, 2023, state agency physician Dr. Kenneth DeFusco (“Dr. DeFusco”)
evaluated Plaintiff, and opined that Plaintiff could sit for six hours and stand and/or walk for four
hours in an eight-hour workday. (AR 61–64).
2. 	Mental Impairments
Plaintiff has a documented history of depression, bipolar disorder, schizoaffective disorder
and PTSD. (AR 265). On August 15, 2020, Plaintiff saw treating physician assistant Allendre
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Lindor, P.A. (“Mr. Lindor”), for her depression and other mental ailments. (AR 265–268). Mr.
Lindor concluded that Plaintiff was oriented to time, place, person, and situation, and that she
showed appropriate mood and affect with normal insight and judgment. (AR 267). Mr. Lindor
further noted that Plaintiff was currently without psychotic features. (Id.).
From September 16, 2020 through May 17, 2022, Plaintiff saw treating therapist Katherine
Maull, L.P.C. (“Ms. Maull”) for symptoms of depression, anxiety, sadness, hopelessness,
helplessness, loss of energy, poor focus, forgetfulness, and psychosis. (See AR 368–526). During
that time, Ms. Maull noted that Plaintiff was angry, depressed, subject to paranoid thoughts, and
afflicted with a mildly impaired memory. (AR 358–385).
On May 19, 2022, in response to a request from the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation
Services, Plaintiff underwent a consultative examination by clinical psychologist Alan Gordon,
Ed.D (“Dr. Gordon”). (AR 322–331). At the examination, Plaintiff complained of depression,
anxiety, insomnia, poor memory, poor concentration, paranoia, and difficulty being around others.
(AR 323). Dr. Gordon diagnosed Plaintiff with PTSD and paranoid thoughts and further noted that
treatment 	options 	were 	limited 	due 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	refusal 	to 	pursue 	treatments 	such 	as
psychotherapy. (AR 328).
From March 14, 2023 through August 15, 2023, Plaintiff saw counselor Marnique Funches,
L.S.W. (“Ms. Funches”) for treatment related to her complaints of hopelessness, anxiety, and
depression. (See AR 546–588). Ms. Funches’ August 15, 2023 treatment plan reflects that Plaintiff
continued to experience significant depressive and anxiety symptoms, including daily irritability,
social conflict, social withdrawal, impaired concentration, visual and auditory hallucinations,
paranoia, hypervigilance, sleep disturbance, and depression rated at eight to nine on a scale of one
to ten. (AR 578–581).
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During that same year, between April 4 and August 8, Plaintiff saw treating advance
practice nurse Sauda Umutesi, A.P.N. (“Ms. Umutesi”) for her complaints of sadness, low energy,
poor focus, and low motivation. (See AR 596–616). Ms. Umutesi’s treatment notes indicate that
Plaintiff exhibited poor insight, but that she was alert, oriented to three spheres, and exhibited
intact memory, attention, and concentration. (AR 597–604).
Finally, on August 17, 2023, state agency psychologist Dr. Bryan McIntyre, Ph.D. (“Dr.
McIntyre”) evaluated Plaintiff for her mental impairments. (See AR 57–60). Dr. McIntyre opined
that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in interacting with others, concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining pace, and a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information.
(AR 59).
D. Testimony of Vocational Expert
At the hearing before the ALJ, the ALJ posed several hypotheticals to the VE. (AR 40–
43). According to the VE, all responses to the hypotheticals were consistent with the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). (AR 42).
The first hypothetical assumed an individual with Plaintiff’s vocational profile with the
following limitations:
[This individual] can occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds and frequently lift and
carry ten pounds. This individual can sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday and
stand or walk for a total of four hours in an eight-hour workday. This individual
can occasionally climb ramps and stairs and crouch, but never climb ladders, ropes,
and scaffolds, kneel or crawl. This individual has no Limitation with respect to the
ability to stoop or balance on uneven or slippery surfaces. And can understand,
remember, and carry out simple instructions for two-hour intervals over the course
of an eight-hour workday and 40-hour work week. This individual can tolerate
occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public. And can
adapt to simple changes in workplace routine.
(AR 40). The VE testified that such an individual could do work as a price marker, small parts
assembler, and electrical assembly work. (AR 40–41).
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The second hypothetical incorporated the limitations in the first hypothetical, and added
the limitation that the “individual would be off task for 20 percent of the workday due to symptoms
relating to physical and mental impairments.” (AR 41). The VE testified that such a limitation
would rule out all work. (AR 41–42).
The third hypothetical also incorporated the limitations in the first hypothetical, and added
the limitation that the “individual would need to be absent from work two days per month.” (AR
42). The VE testified that such a limitation would rule out all work and, generally, that any absence
over one day per month would not be tolerated by employers. (Id.).
Plaintiff cross-examined the VE and posed an additional hypothetical. (AR 42–43). This
hypothetical assumed the conditions in the first hypothetical posed by the ALJ, but added the
limitations that the “individual can only lift and carry less than five pounds . . . can sit, stand, and
walk for less than two hours each in an eight-hour workday. . . [and] can never climb ramps, stairs,
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, kneel, and crawl, stoop, balance, or crouch.” (AR 42). The VE
testified that such limitations would rule out all work. (Id.).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing applications for Social Security disability benefits, this Court has the authority
to conduct a plenary review of legal issues decided by the ALJ. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83
(3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). In contrast, the Court reviews the ALJ’s factual findings to
determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir.
2000) (citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The United States Supreme
Court has explained this standard as follows:
Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative
record and asks whether it contains sufficient evidence to support the agency’s
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factual determinations. And whatever the meaning of substantial in other contexts,
the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this
Court has said, is more than a mere scintilla. It means—and means only—such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration
omitted); see also Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 354 F. App’x 613, 616 (3d Cir. 2009).
The substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard, and an ALJ’s decision cannot
be set aside merely because a Court “acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.”
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted); see e.g.,
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided
the factual inquiry differently.”) (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit cautions that this standard of review is not “a talismanic or
self-executing formula for adjudication.” Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983).
“The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise without which our review of
social security disability cases ceases to be merely deferential and becomes instead a sham.” Id.
The Court has a duty to “‘review the evidence in its totality,’ and ‘take into account whatever in
the record fairly detracts from its weight.’” K.K. ex rel. K.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-2309,
2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2018) (quoting Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F. Supp.
277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997)). Evidence is not substantial if “it is overwhelmed by other evidence,”
“really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion,” or “ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict
created by countervailing evidence.” Wallace v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 722 F.2d 1150,
1153 (3d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Although an ALJ is not required “to use particular language
or adhere to a particular format in conducting [the] analysis,” the decision must contain “sufficient
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development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones v.
Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
B. Sequential Evaluation Process
The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step, sequential analysis for evaluating a
claimant’s disability, as outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). The analysis proceeds as
follows:
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is performing “substantial
gainful activity[.]” If [s]he is, [s]he is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ moves on
to step two.
At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has any “severe medically
determinable 	physical 	or 	mental 	impairment” 	that 	meets 	certain 	regulatory
requirements. 	A 	“severe 	impairment” 	is 	one 	that 	“significantly 	limits 	[the
claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” If the claimant
lacks such an impairment, [s]he is not disabled. If [s]he has such an impairment,
the ALJ moves on to step three.
At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal
the requirements of an impairment listed in the regulations[.]” If the claimant’s
impairments do, [s]he is disabled. If they do not, the ALJ moves on to step four.
At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s “residual functional capacity”
(“RFC”) and whether [s]he can perform [her] “past relevant work.” A claimant’s
“[RFC] is the most [she] can still do despite [his] limitations.” If the claimant can
perform [her] past relevant work despite [her] limitations, [s]he is not disabled. If
[s]he cannot, the ALJ moves on to step five.
At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to
other 	work[,]” 	considering 	[her] 	“[RFC,] 	. 	. 	. 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience[.]” That examination typically involves “one or more hypothetical
questions posed by the ALJ to [a] vocational expert.” If the claimant can make an
adjustment to other work, [s]he is not disabled. If [s]he cannot, [s]he is disabled.
Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal citations and footnote
omitted) (alterations in original).
III. ALJ DECISION
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
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since the application date of January 26, 2023. (AR 13).
At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: left
hip osteoarthritis, major depressive disorder, and schizophrenia. (Id.).
At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, individually or in
combination, met or medically equaled the requirements of any listing in the regulations. (Id.).
Specifically, in evaluating the “paragraph B” criteria of the regulations, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had moderate limitations in three broad areas: interacting with others; concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. (AR 14–15). The ALJ further
found that Plaintiff had a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information.
(Id.). The ALJ also found the “paragraph C” criteria were not satisfied because the record did not
establish that Plaintiff had marginal adjustment capabilities, which requires a claimant to have a
minimal capacity to adapt to changes in their environment or to demands not already a part of the
claimant’s life. (AR 15).
Before making the step four determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to
perform light work subject to the following limitations:
[She] can occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds and frequently lift and/or carry
10 pounds. She can sit for 6 hours and stand/walk for a total of 4 hours in an 8-hour
workday. She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs and crouch, never climb
[ladders], kneel or crawl. She has no limitation with respect to the ability to stoop
or balance on uneven or slippery surfaces. She can understand, remember and carry
out simple instructions for 2-hour increments in an 8-hour workday 40-hour
workweek. She can tolerate occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors and
the general public. She can adapt to simple changes in workplace routine.
(AR 15). In formulating this RFC, the ALJ considered the entire record, including Plaintiff’s
testimony, treatment history, and opinion evidence. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely
consistent with the medical and other evidence in the record. (AR 16–19). The ALJ noted that
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Plaintiff’s mental status examinations showed intact cognitive functioning, memory, attention, and
concentration; imaging of her left hip showed only moderate osteoarthritis; and other objective
clinical findings showed that Plaintiff had an effective gait and no significant neurological deficits.
(Id.).
The ALJ also found partially persuasive the opinion of Dr. McIntyre, the state agency
psychologist, and persuasive the opinion of Dr. DeFusco, the state agency physician. (AR 19–20).
Specifically, the ALJ credited Dr. McIntyre’s opinion that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in
interacting with others, concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing
herself, and that she had mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information.
(AR 19). The ALJ also credited Dr. McIntyre’s opinion that Plaintiff could: understand and retain
simple and complex instructions; complete simple and complex tasks for six to eight hours in an
eight-hour period at an appropriate pace; relate effectively with public and prospective co-workers;
and adapt to most changes and task demands on a sustained basis. (See AR 57–64). The ALJ found
Dr. McIntyre’s opinions consistent with the record and other testimony, except for the opinions
that Plaintiff could understand and retain simple and complex instructions, and complete simple
and complex tasks for six to eight hours in an eight-hour period at an appropriate pace.2 (AR 19–
20). In short, the ALJ found Dr. McIntyre’s opinion only partially persuasive due to some
inconsistencies with evidence in the record, specifically his opinions that Plaintiff had difficulty
remembering and concentrating, maintaining focus and attention, and following instructions. (AR
2 	The ALJ inadvertently referenced Dr. Defusco when explaining which part of Dr.
McIntyre’s opinion was inconsistent with the record. However, given the context of the decision
and that the ALJ cited to Dr. McIntyre’s report, it is clear to the Court that this was a typographical
error and not indicative of any reference to Dr. Defusco’s opinion, which the ALJ separately
explained to be fully consistent with the record and thus persuasive.
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19–20, 57–64, 138–145, 527–535).
The ALJ found the opinion of Dr. DeFusco persuasive and consistent with the objective
medical evidence when formulating the RFC. (AR 19). Specifically, Dr. DeFusco opined that
Plaintiff could lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and that Plaintiff
could sit for six hours as well as stand and/or walk for four hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id.).
At step four, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (AR 20).
At step five, relying on the VE’s testimony and considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform other work in the national
economy. (AR 20). Specifically, the ALJ identified the occupations of price marker,3 small parts
assembler, and electric assembler as work Plaintiff could perform that exists in significant numbers
in the national economy. (AR 20–21). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled.
(AR 21).
IV. DISCUSSION
In this appeal, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in three respects. First, Plaintiff argues
that several of the ALJ’s conclusions as to the existence and severity of her impairments are not
supported by substantial evidence. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 9–13). Second, Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ failed to consider her language and cultural barriers in formulating the RFC and in posing the
various hypotheticals to the VE. (Id. at 13–16). Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not follow
3 	The ALJ’s decision referred to the “document preparer” position, but cited the DOT number
corresponding to “price marker.” (AR 21). The record makes clear that reference to “document
preparer” was a typographical error. At the hearing, the VE identified the job as “price marker”
and provided its corresponding DOT number, which matches the one cited in the ALJ’s decision.
(See AR 40–41). The ALJ’s decision also listed 64,000 available positions, the same figure the VE
gave for the price marker occupation. (See AR 21, 41). This context reveals that the ALJ meant to
identify the “price marker” position in substance, and thus the Court proceeds with its review
accordingly.
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the appropriate evaluation process, ignoring applicable statutes and regulations. (Id. at 8, 10–12).
The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments unpersuasive and, for the reasons that follow, affirms the
decision of the ALJ.
A. The ALJ’s Decision Is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence at multiple
steps of the sequential evaluation. Specifically, she contends that the ALJ: (1) ignored relevant
medical evidence from Drs. Levitsky and Gordon; (2) failed to consider the combined effects of
her impairments, particularly by understating the severity of her mental health limitations at step
three; (3) did not adequately address the side effects of her prescribed medications; and (4)
formulated a RFC unsupported by substantial evidence.4 (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 9–12, 14–16).
Because “substantial evidence” is only “more than a mere scintilla,” and thus not a high evidentiary
bar, Biestek, 587 U.S. at 102; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court finds each of Plaintiff’s
arguments unavailing.
1. 	The ALJ Appropriately Evaluated the Medical Opinions of Drs. Levitsky and
Gordon, and the ALJ’s Findings are Supported by Substantial Evidence
“The ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants—must make
the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356,
4 In her Reply Brief, Plaintiff alleges errors that were not concretely set forth in her Opening
Brief. Although some overlap with her initial arguments, others are entirely new. For example,
unlike the Opening Brief—which did not substantively challenge the ALJ’s step three findings or
analyze any specific listing—the Reply Brief asserts that the ALJ misapplied Listings 1.15, 12.03,
12.04, and 12.06 and contends that the record establishes “marked” or extreme limitations
sufficient to satisfy those listings. (Compare Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 6–19, with Pl.’s Reply Br.,
ECF No. 11 at 2–3). Considering Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will construe all her allegations
as to errors liberally. But to the extent Plaintiff advances arguments for the first time in her Reply
Brief, the Court declines to consider them. See Ribaudo v. Saul, No. 17-7207, 2020 WL 5088635,
at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2020) (recognizing that courts may decline to address arguments raised
for the first time in a reply brief in a Social Security appeal).
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361 (3d Cir. 2011). In making that determination, the ALJ is entitled to weigh all the evidence in
the record and is not bound by specific medical expert opinions. Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193,
196 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). When an ALJ affords greater weight to one medical expert’s
opinion over another, they must clearly explain their rationale in order for that finding to be
supported by substantial evidence. Id. (citation omitted). As long as their reasoning is adequate,
the ALJ has discretion to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the weight the
competing opinions should be given. Id. at 196–97.
Here, the ALJ considered all of the opinions from the treating and consultative medical
providers, with specific reference and analysis as to each opinion when determining Plaintiff’s
RFC. (AR 16–20). Specific to Dr. Levitsky, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in excluding or ignoring
Dr. Levitsky’s medical examination that purported to “limit [her] activity” to no more than 30
minutes of standing and noted her inability to climb or stoop. (See Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 10–12).
However, Dr. Levitsky’s report was explicitly mentioned in the ALJ’s decision, and otherwise
does not support the limitations Plaintiff asserts. Rather than suggesting any durational or other
specific physical limitations, Dr. Levitsky opined, and the ALJ credited, that Plaintiff walked with
a normal gait and exhibited “intact neurological functioning throughout her left lower extremity.”
(AR 18, 334–44). The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Levitsky’s medical
examination records as it is based on substantial evidence.
Plaintiff makes a similar argument regarding Dr. Gordon’s opinion, contending that the
ALJ erred by only giving “some weight” to the opinion, and that Dr. Gordon’s opinion as a
“treating physician” was entitled to controlling weight. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 11–12). The Court
disagrees. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Dr. Gordon was not a “treating physician,” but rather
evaluated Plaintiff once in response to a request from the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation.
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(AR 322). Regardless, the ALJ appropriately considered Dr. Gordon’s opinion, noting that
Plaintiff suffered from a mild cognitive deficit, and like Dr. Levitsky’s findings, Dr. Gordon’s
conclusions are not accurately characterized by Plaintiff. (AR 17, 322–331). For example,
Plaintiff’s assertion that Dr. Gordon noted “many concerns on employment possibility” is not
accurate. (See Pl.’s Br. ECF No. 8 at 9). Dr. Gordon did not opine that Plaintiff could not perform
basic work activities, nor did he assess any limitations regarding persistence, pace, attendance, or
social functioning in a competitive employment environment. Rather, Dr. Gordon’s report only
notes that Plaintiff is “not a viable candidate for the rehabilitation process at this time,” referring
to vocational rehabilitation programs offered by the Division, and not to any disability finding or
her ability to work. (AR 328).
Although the ALJ’s discussion of Drs. Levitsky’s and Gordon’s medical opinions was not
as thorough as that of other medical providers, such as Drs. DeFusco, Cornejo, and McIntyre, there
is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s findings. (See AR 18–20). And, “a
reviewing court may not undertake a de novo review of the ALJ's decision and may not re-weigh
the evidence of record.” Manuel v. Astrue, 697 F. Supp. 2d 576, 581 (D. Del. 2010) (citing
Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986)). Plaintiff’s arguments amount
to nothing more than asking the Court to do so here.
2. 	The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing the Cumulative Effect of Plaintiff’s
Impairments, Nor in Assessing Claimant’s Mental Health Impairments
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the cumulative effects of all her
impairments. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 10, 12, 14 (citing McDonald v. Astrue, 293 F. App'x 941,
946 (3d Cir. 2008); Torres v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 279 F. App’x 149 (3d Cir. 2008); Ramirez v.
Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546 (2004)). Based on the cases Plaintiff relies upon, it appears she takes issue
with the ALJ’s step three finding that Plaintiff’s impairments or combination of impairments do
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not “meet[] or medically equal[] the severity of one of the listed impairments” in the regulations.
(AR 13). So construed, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the cumulative effects of
her 	rheumatoid 	arthritis, 	PTSD, 	anxiety, 	depressive 	disorder, 	and 	side 	effects 	from 	her
antipsychotic medication, such that, if properly considered, she would have been found disabled
at step three. (See id.)
At step three, the claimant bears the burden of showing that an impairment meets or
medically equals a listed impairment in “Appendix 1” of the regulations. Torres, 279 F. App’x at
151. The ALJ must consider all medically determinable impairments, severe and non-severe alike,
both individually and in combination. Luna v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-6953, 2016 WL
3763339, at *5 n.1 (D.N.J. July 13, 2016); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The ALJ’s decision
need not employ particular language to survive substantial evidence review—so long as the record
is adequately developed and the ALJ explains the findings sufficiently to permit meaningful
review, the Court will not disturb them. Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004).
Here, the ALJ set forth a reasoned analysis that is supported by substantial evidence. At
step three, the ALJ identified listings in the regulations and considered whether Plaintiff’s physical
and mental limitations “singly and in combination” meet or medically equal the criteria in those
listings. (AR 12–13). As to her physical limitations, the ALJ identified Listing 1.18 for Plaintiff’s
left hip osteoarthritis, stated the listing’s requirement of a documented medical need for a walking
assistive device (e.g. bilateral canes), and found no such evidence, citing examinations reflecting
an effective gait, intact neurological functioning, and no prescription for an assistive device. (AR
13). There is substantial evidence in the record to support these findings.
As to Plaintiff’s mental limitations, the ALJ made specific note of each alleged mental
impairment—including her PTSD, anxiety, and depression—and compared them with the medical
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evidence in the record. (AR 14–20). The ALJ then identified Listings 12.03 and 12.04 for
Plaintiff’s mental impairments, which require evidence of “one extreme limitation or two marked
limitations in a broad area of functioning.” (AR 14). The ALJ found only mild or moderate
limitations in the paragraph B criteria, relying on mental status examinations showing intact
cognition, memory, attention, and cooperative behavior, the claimant’s conservative treatment
history, and her reported daily activities. (Id.). In doing so, the ALJ credited that Plaintiff “has
difficulty being around others, experiences paranoia, and has strained relationships with family
members,” but also noted the conflicting evidence that the “objective clinical findings on mental
status examinations showed that the claimant presented as cooperative and communicative.” (AR
14 (citing AR 345–526, 536–616)). Thus, because the record does not establish one extreme or
two marked limitations, or marginal adjustment under paragraph C, the ALJ’s findings that the
claimant’s impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment is supported by
substantial evidence. (AR 14–15).
In sum, Plaintiff’s arguments are unconvincing, and the Court finds Holloman v.
Commissioner of Social Security persuasive in this regard. 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016).
There, the Third Circuit stated:
[The plaintiff] also complains in vague terms that certain impairments were not properly
compared, separately and in combination, to the listings. But he does not identify specific
avenues for meeting or equaling specific listings that the ALJ should have considered but
did not. Whether or not the ALJ's analysis of these impairments was sufficiently thorough,
[the plaintiff] offers no explanation of how further analysis could have affected the
outcome of his disability claim. Even if we found a portion of the ALJ’s step-three analysis
to be deficient, we would have no reason to conclude that the deficiency in analysis was
harmful to [the plaintiff’s] claim.
Id. at 814. Here, the ALJ adequately considered the combined effects of Plaintiff’s medically
determinable impairments and did not ignore or minimize any of them. As such, the ALJ’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence.
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3. 	The ALJ Adequately Considered Plaintiff’s Medication-Related Side
Effects
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred by failing to address her medication-related side
effects. (Pl.’s Br. ECF No. 8 at 14–16). She argues that the ALJ failed to consider that her
antipsychotic medication caused side effects such as sedation, drowsiness, cognitive impairment,
and “[m]ovement [d]isorders.” (Id. at 17).
This argument lacks any merit. A review of the record fails to reveal any objective medical
evidence corroborating Plaintiff’s now-claimed side effects from her medication. Thus, Plaintiff’s
arguments in this regard are not supported by the record. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
546, 554 (3d Cir.2005) (noting that the ALJ need not include any impairments and limitations that
are not “medically established” by the record).5
4. 	The ALJ’s RFC Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ cherry-picked and mischaracterized medical findings and gave too much
weight to the findings of the agency specialists, Drs. McIntyre and DeFusco. (Pl.’s Br. ECF No. 8
at 10–12). The Court disagrees.
“Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual is still able to do
despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 359 n.1 (3d Cir.
5 To the extent Plaintiff relies on vague self-reported side effects referenced for the first time
at the March 28, 2024 hearing, (see AR 34 (Plaintiff stating that her “medication for [her] mental
health” is “only worse for me”)), the ALJ was only required to consider her statements about the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms insofar as they were supported by
medical or other evidence in the record. See Hopkins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 813 F. App’x 775,
780 (3d Cir. 2020) (affirming discounting of subjective symptom testimony unsupported by the
record). No such evidence exists here.
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1999)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC
to perform light work subject to the following limitations:
[S]he can occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds and frequently lift and/or carry 10
pounds. She can sit for 6 hours and stand/walk for a total of 4 hours in an 8 hour workday.
She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs and crouch, never climb [ladders], kneel or
crawl. She has no limitation with respect to the ability to stoop or balance on uneven or
slippery surfaces. She can understand, remember and carry out simple instructions for 2
hour increments in an 8 hour workday 40 hour workweek. She can tolerate occasional
interaction with coworkers, supervisors and the general public. She can adapt to simple
changes in workplace routine
(AR 15).
In determining an individual’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all relevant evidence—
including “medical records, observations made during formal medical examinations, descriptions
of limitations by the claimant and others, and observations of the claimant’s limitations by others.”
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)); see 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2), 404.1545(a), 404.1546; Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121. The ALJ’s finding
must “be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explanation of the basis on which it rests,”
sufficient for a reviewing court to determine if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704–05 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ, however, is not required “to make
reference to every relevant treatment note in a case where the claimant . . . has voluminous medical
records.” Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42. When presented with conflicting evidence, the ALJ may choose
whom to credit but “cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.” Mason v.
Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999).
And, at bottom, the RFC need only include “credibly established” limitations. Rutherford, 399
F.3d at 554.
In this case, the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ
summarized Plaintiff’s testimony regarding pain and other symptoms due to her medically
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determinable physical impairments and acknowledged that those impairments could reasonably be
expected to produce such symptoms. (AR 15–16). However, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements
as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms not fully consistent with the
record. (Id.). The ALJ methodically compared each of Plaintiff’s allegations with the objective
medical evidence, identifying specific inconsistencies, and concluding that the opinions of Drs.
McIntyre and DeFusco were persuasive because both were supported by “analysis and consistent
with the medical evidence of record.” (AR 18–19). For example, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s
claim that she could not lift or carry any weight because imaging showed only moderate
osteoarthritis, examinations reflected a normal gait, and there were no significant neurological
deficits. (AR 16, 332–33, 335, 438). The ALJ also noted that during a September 12, 2022 visit,
despite complaints of hip pain with range of motion, Dr. Levitsky observed a normal gait and intact
neurological functioning in the left lower extremity. (AR 18). On this record, the ALJ’s RFC
assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ’s RFC analysis regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments is equally supported by
substantial evidence.6 The ALJ first noted that Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the intensity of her
symptoms did not align with the medical and other evidence of record. (AR 16). Specifically, the
ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s “ability to perform multiple household chores, prepare meals, shops for
groceries, and make jewelry as well as mental status examinations showing intact cognitive
6 Plaintiff also contends that the RFC omitted “[t]ime off-task due to mental health symptoms
due [to] work place stress.” (See Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 8). Because of this omission, Plaintiff
argues, the VE hypotheticals were defective. (See id.) But this argument may be waived, as
Plaintiff did not raise it during the administrative proceedings. See Fetting v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th
332, 337 (7th Cir. 2023) (holding that objections to VE testimony not raised below are waived).
In any event, the RFC is supported by substantial evidence and an ALJ is required to include in
hypotheticals to the VE only those limitations that are credibly established by the record.
Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554.
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functioning, memory, attention, and concentration.” (AR 16–17). The ALJ then analyzed
Plaintiff’s testimony as to intensity against the medical evidence of record, tracking Plaintiff’s
treatment by various doctors, therapists, physician assistants, and counselors from 2020 through
early 2024. (AR 17–20). For example, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony inconsistent with Ms.
Umutesi’s observations “that the [Plaintiff] presented as alert, oriented to three spheres, and
exhibited intact memory, attention, and concentration.” (AR 18). Accordingly, the ALJ’s
assessment of Plaintiff’s mental impairments is supported by substantial evidence.
B. The ALJ Did Not Commit Harmful Error in Failing to Consider Plaintiff’s Language
and Cultural Barrier
Plaintiff is a native Russian speaker who has limited proficiency in English. (Pl.’s Br. ECF
No. 8 at 12–14). She contends that because the ALJ’s hypotheticals to the VE did not account for
any language or cultural limitations, the VE’s testimony was flawed and, in turn, the ALJ’s
decision relying on that testimony is unsupported.7 (Id. at 12–13).
In response, the Commissioner correctly notes that, since April of 2020, there is a new rule
in place governing how to evaluate a claimant’s ability to communicate in English. (Def.’s Br.,
ECF No. 10 at 9); see Removing Inability to Communicate in English as an Education Category,
85 Fed. Reg. 10586 (Feb. 25, 2020) (to be codified 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416). Pursuant thereto, the
Commissioner “no longer consider[s] whether an individual is able to communicate in English at
the fifth and final step of the sequential evaluation process (step 5).” 85 Fed. Reg. 10586, 10587.
7 	Plaintiff did not raise any argument concerning language or cultural barriers during the
administrative proceedings and now contends for the first time that the VE’s testimony was flawed
for failing to account for them. Ordinarily, “a claimant who does not object to a VE’s testimony
during the administrative hearing forfeits those objections.” Fetting, 62 F.4th at 337. Nonetheless,
given Plaintiff’s pro se status both below and before this Court, and the inquisitorial rather than
adversarial nature of administrative Social Security proceedings, the Court will address the
argument on the merits. See Carr v. Saul, 593 U.S. 83, 95 (2021).
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Despite seemingly erecting a categorical bar, courts in this Circuit have not interpreted the
new regulation as a strict prohibition against considering a claimant’s ability to communicate in
English. See, e.g., Grullon v. O’Malley, No. 23-745, 2024 WL 4643518 (M.D. Pa. 2024). In
Grullon, the court identified a “macro-economic component to disability analysis” as grounds for
continuing to consider English fluency after the new rule. Id. at *1. Although the revised
regulations altered several aspects of the disability framework, the court declined to read them as
“silently repealing or amending” the Department of Labor’s DOT to render English fluency wholly
immaterial. Id. at *8. Rather, the court there held that, at step five, “English language fluency
remains a relevant factor in determining the actual ability of a claimant to do certain types of
work.” Id. at *9. Because the record there was “replete” with evidence of the plaintiff’s “inability
to communicate in any meaningful way in English”—including her need for an interpreter during
disability proceedings—the court reversed the ALJ’s step five finding that she could perform
DOT-listed jobs that, as a matter of economic and practical reality, “require a level of language
which the record indicates [she] simply does not possess.” Id. at *2, 10.
But here, even if the ALJ was required to consider, in some way, the language and cultural
barriers Plaintiff alleges, such error was harmless because, unlike Grullon, there is ample
documentation in the record confirming her English language proficiency. Most evidently,
Plaintiff represented herself and, as evidenced by the relevant transcript, participated meaningfully
in the proceedings below, which were entirely conducted in English without the assistance of an
interpreter. There is nothing in the record that would support a finding that Plaintiff had any
difficulty whatsoever in communicating or understanding the proceedings. To the contrary, the
record is rife with further examples that belie Plaintiff’s claims regarding her difficulty in
communicating in English, (see AR 29, 50, 60, 131, 179, 323, 345, 371, 439, 445), including a
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September 30, 2020 treatment note that explicitly ascribes that Plaintiff’s “[p]referred language is
English.” (AR 630). As such, beyond being not raised below, Plaintiff’s assertions of error in this
regard lack merit.
C. The ALJ Followed the Appropriate Five Step Sequential Analysis
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the “ALJ failed to apply all applicable statutes and
regulations.” (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 8 at 8). The argument also underlies many of her arguments
discussed above. (See, e.g., id. at 11 (alleging a violation of SSR 96-8p in the context of Plaintiff’s
argument that the RFC was not supported in substantial evidence.)). However, as described above,
the ALJ appropriately adhered to the five-step sequential analysis and based the RFC and all other
conclusions on substantial evidence. Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to reweigh the evidence
and reach a different conclusion. That request exceeds the limited scope of judicial review under
the Social Security Act. See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610–11 (3d Cir. 2014); Chandler,
667 F.3d at 359 (“Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual
determinations.”). Here, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential framework, and for all the
reasons discussed herein, the resulting findings are supported by “more than a mere scintilla” of
evidence. Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the final decision of the Acting
Commissioner. An appropriate Order will follow.
CHRISTINE P. O’HEARN
United States District Judge
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