Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

1:25-cv-01107Njd5 de mar. de 2026

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
EVERICK JAMES W.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil No. 25-1107 (RMB)
OPINION
APPEARANCES
Samuel Fishman
Chermol & Fishman, LLC
11450 Bustleton Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19116
On behalf of Plaintiff
Erica Adams
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
c/o Social Security Administration
Office of Program Litigation, Office 3
Office of the General Counsel
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235
On behalf of Defendant
1 	Due to the significant amount of personal information and privacy concerns in
Social Security cases, non-governmental parties are identified solely by first name and
last initial. See D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 1 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
2
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon an appeal filed by Plaintiff Everick
James W. (“Plaintiff”) seeking judicial review of the final determination of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”), which denied his
application for Social Security Disability benefits. For the reasons set forth herein, the
Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging an onset date of
disability of January 1, 2002, which he later amended to October 27, 2021, at his
hearing. [Administrative Record (“R.”) at 24 (Docket No. 7).] He also filed an
application for supplemental security income under Title XVI on August 12, 2022.
[Id.] Both claims were initially denied on February 13, 2023, and again denied upon
reconsideration on October 6, 2023. [Id.]
Plaintiff filed a timely written request for a hearing before an ALJ which was
held telephonically on April 16, 2024. [Id.] Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at
the hearing at which the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and Vocational Expert
Marian Marracco. [Id.] At the hearing, Plaintiff withdrew his Title II claim, leaving
only his Title XVI claim for adjudication. [R. at 50.] The ALJ issued her decision
finding Plaintiff to not be disabled under the Act on May 30, 2024. [R. at 36.] On
December 11, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review,
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 2 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
3
rendering the ALJ’s decision final. [R. at 1-4.] Plaintiff now seeks this Court’s review
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a final decision of an ALJ with regard to disability benefits, a
court must uphold the ALJ’s factual decisions if they are supported by “substantial
evidence.” Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3). “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971) (quoting Cons. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Plummer
v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).
In addition to the “substantial evidence” inquiry, the court must also determine
whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. See Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d
445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court’s
review of legal issues is plenary. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262 (citing Schaudeck v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999)).
The Act defines “disability” as the inability “to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
The Act further states,
[A]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 3 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
4
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless
of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired
if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The 	Commissioner 	has 	promulgated 	a 	five-step, 	sequential 	analysis 	for
evaluating a claimant’s disability, as outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i–v).
The analysis proceeds as follows:
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is performing
“substantial 	gainful 	activity[.]” 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	404.1520(a)(4)(i),
416.920(a)(4)(i). If he is, he is not disabled. Id. Otherwise, the ALJ moves
on to step two.
At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has any “severe
medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that meets
certain 	regulatory 	requirements. 	Id. 	§§ 	404.1520(a)(4)(ii),
416.920(a)(4)(ii). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits
[the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant lacks such an impairment,
he is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If he has
such an impairment, the ALJ moves on to step three.
At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant’s impairments
meet 	or 	equal 	the 	requirements 	of 	an 	impairment 	listed 	in 	the
regulations.” [Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir.
2010)]. If the claimant’s impairments do, he is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If they do not, the ALJ moves
on to step four.
At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s “residual functional
capacity” (“RFC”) and whether he can perform his “past relevant
work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). A claimant’s “[RFC]
is 	the 	most 	[he] 	can 	still 	do 	despite 	[his] 	limitations.” 	Id.
§§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). If the claimant can perform his past
relevant 	work 	despite 	his 	limitations, 	he 	is 	not 	disabled. 	Id.
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 4 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
5
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If he cannot, the ALJ moves on
to step five.
At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant “can make an
adjustment to other work[,]” considering his “[RFC,] ... age, education,
and work experience.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). That
examination typically involves “one or more hypothetical questions
posed by the ALJ to [a] vocational expert.” Podedworny v. Harris, 745
F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984). If the claimant can make an adjustment
to other work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a)(4)(v). If he cannot, he is disabled.
Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2019) (some alterations
omitted).
III. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court recites only the facts that are necessary to its determination on
appeal, which is narrow. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
the alleged onset date: October 27, 2021. [R. at 26.]
A. 	Plaintiff’s Educational, Work, and Medical History
Plaintiff has at least a high school education and no past relevant work
experience. [R. at 35.] Plaintiff suffers from the following physical impairments:
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and autonomic neuropathy. [R. at 26.]
He also suffers from the following mental impairments: generalized anxiety disorder;
major depressive disorder; and alcohol use disorder. [Id.]
B. 	The ALJ’s Decision
At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the alleged onset date of disability: October 27, 2021. [Id.]
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 5 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
6
At Step Two, the ALJ found all of Plaintiff’s listed impairments to be severe.
[Id.] However, at Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not suffer an impairment
or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any listed
impairment found within 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. at 27.]
At Step Four, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff had:
the [RFC] to perform light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §§] 404.1567(b)
and 416.967(b) with limitations. Specifically, he can stand and/or walk
for up to four hours and sit for up to six hours. He cannot climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds, but can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He can
occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He must avoid all
exposure 	to 	workplace 	hazards, 	such 	as 	unprotected 	heights 	and
dangerous 	moving 	machinery. 	He 	is 	limited 	to 	understanding,
remembering and carrying out simple instructions.
[R. at 29.] Due to Plaintiff’s lack of past relevant work experience, the ALJ could not
rule on the transferability of his skills. [R. at 35.]
At Step Five, the ALJ found that there were jobs existing in significant numbers
in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, considering his age, education,
work experience, and RFC. [Id.] Crediting testimony from the Vocational Expert, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff would be able to perform the requirements of representative
occupations such as electrical accessories assembler, information clerk, and furniture
rental clerk. [R. at 36.]
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises three arguments in support of his appeal. First, he argues that the
ALJ failed to resolve a conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT
as to whether Plaintiff could perform the reasoning level 3 and 4 occupations given his
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 6 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
7
limitations. Second, Plaintiff contends that the SSA cannot rely upon EM-21065 to
completely prohibit any consideration of certain parts of the DOT such as reasoning
level. Finally, he claims that the ALJ’s RFC findings are inconsistent with her finding
of severe mental impairment marked by moderate limitations in understanding,
remembering, and applying information.
A. 	The ALJ Did Not Fail to Resolve a Conflict Between the Vocational
Expert’s Testimony and the DOT Regarding Level 3 and Level 4
Occupations
Plaintiff argues that two of the occupations adopted – information clerk and
furniture rental clerk – are assigned reasoning levels of 3 or 4, resulting in a conflict
with the limitations adopted by the ALJ which places Plaintiff’s reasoning level no
higher than 2. [Pl. Br. at 4 (Docket No. 10).] The SSA argues that Plaintiff has waived
this argument by failing to object to the Vocational Expert’s testimony at any point in
the proceeding, and even if the objection has not been waived, any inconsistencies
constitute harmless error. [Def. Br. at 5 (citing R. at 69) (Docket No. 12).]
At Step Five, the Commissioner bears the burden of demonstrating that work
exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform,
given his RFC, age, education, and work experience. See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d
607, 616 (3d Cir. 2014). The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through vocational
expert testimony. See Lane v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 100 F. App’x 90, 97 (3d Cir. 2004).
When there is an “apparent conflict” between the vocational expert’s testimony and
the DOT, SSR 00-4p requires the ALJ to obtain a reasonable explanation and explain
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 7 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
8
the resolution of that conflict.2 The Third Circuit has consistently rejected the
proposition that there is a categorical conflict between a limitation to simple work and
occupations requiring a reasoning level of 3 and instead applies a fact-specific inquiry.
See Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 618.
According to the record, Plaintiff is a high school graduate and denied any
difficulty with reading, writing, or performing simple math. [R. at 29.] His mental
health treatment was conservative and limited, and his mental status examinations
reflected largely normal findings. [R. at 27-28, 31-32.] The ALJ thoroughly explained
why the record supported a restriction to simple instructions, but not more restrictive
cognitive limitations. [R. at 29-35.] In his brief, Plaintiff has failed to identify evidence
demonstrating that he is unable to perform the mental demands presented by the
level 3 occupation but rather he asks the Court to adopt a categorical incompatibility
rule. [Pl. Br. at 7-8.]
Here, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to understanding, remembering, and carrying
out simple instructions. [R. at 29.] The vocational expert identified furniture rental
clerk (reasoning level 3) and information clerk (reasoning level 4) as being within
Plaintiff’s limitations and stated her testimony was consistent with the DOT except
where it was silent. [R. at 35-36.] At no time during her testimony did Plaintiff’s
counsel voice an objection, question the inconsistent reasoning levels, nor inquire as
to the cognitive demands of both occupations. [R. at 35; 65-70.] Although failure to
2 	SSR 00-4p was rescinded on January 6, 2025, by SSR 24-3p. However, because
the ALJ issued her decision prior to its revocation, SSR 00-4p remains applicable here.
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 8 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
9
object does not automatically waive a conflict argument, it is a factor weighing against
a finding that any conflict was “apparent.” See Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 617-18 (citation
omitted).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the level 4 occupation presented a conflict, any
error would be harmless. Excluding the level 4 job, the vocational expert identified
two other occupations that amounted to over 57,000 jobs in the national economy that
Plaintiff was able to do within his RFC. [R. at 36.] The Third Circuit has repeatedly
held that substantially smaller numbers constitute “significant” work in the national
economy. See e.g., Young v. Astrue, 519 F. App’x 769, 772 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding 20,000
jobs in the national economy to be significant). Thus, even excluding the level 4
occupation entirely, the Commissioner satisfied its Step Five burden.
B. 	The ALJ Did Not Rely Upon EM-21065
Next, Plaintiff argues that the SSA cannot rely upon Emergency Message 21065
(“EM-21065”) to prohibit the consideration of reasoning levels. [Pl. Br. at 10.] After
reviewing the record, it is unclear to the Court why Plaintiff raises this argument.
As the SSA correctly notes, and Plaintiff concedes in his brief, the ALJ never referred
to this message in her decision, nor did SSA rely upon it in their argument. [Def. Br.
at 8; Pl. Br. at 10.]
As the ALJ did not invoke EM-21065, there is no need to address it. Federal
courts do not render advisory opinions, therefore, the Court declines to rule on this
argument. See McCahill v. Borough of Fox Chapel, 438 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1971);
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 9 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
10
C. 	The ALJ’s RFC Finding was Consistent with the Finding of a Severe
Mental Impairment
Plaintiff’s third and final argument asserts that once the ALJ deemed his mental
impairment to be severe and assessed moderate limitations under the Paragraph B
criteria, the RFC was legally required to contain additional functional restrictions
beyond a limitation to simple instructions. [Pl. Br. at 19.] This argument reflects a
misunderstanding of the regulatory framework.
Paragraph B findings pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a serve a specific purpose:
they are used to rate the severity of mental impairments at Steps Two and Three and
determine whether a listed impairment has been met or equaled. SSR 96-8p. In no way
do these findings constitute an RFC assessment. Id. The RFC determination must
translate the supported limitations into work-related functional terms and is not bound
to replicate the Paragraph B findings’ language. Id.
In a Notice of Supplemental Authority [Docket No. 15], Plaintiff directs the
Court to K.L.J. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 3170490 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2025). The
court in K.L.J., however, was bound by Tenth Circuit precedent that requires that
moderate limitations be expressly reflected in the RFC in functional terms beyond a
generalized limitation to simple work. Id. (citing Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1290
n.3 (10th Cir. 2012)). This Court is bound by the law of the Third Circuit. And the
Third Circuit has not adopted this approach and instead evaluates whether the ALJ’s
explanation sufficiently supports the functional limitations imposed. See Hess, 931 F.3d
at 212-13. Accordingly, within this Circuit, courts must affirm RFCs limiting plaintiffs
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 10 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
11
to 	simple 	tasks 	despite 	moderate 	Paragraph B 	limitations 	so 	long 	as 	the 	ALJ
adequately explained why the record supported the imposed degree of restriction. Id.
This is the standard that applies.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s argument has already been rejected by the Third Circuit,
which has explained that “no incantations are required at steps four and five simply
because a particular finding has been made at steps two and three.” Hess, 931 F.3d at
209. Rather, courts need only consider whether the ALJ sufficiently developed the
record and applied it to the functional limitations adopted. Id.; see also Jones v. Barnhart,
364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004).
Here, the ALJ did precisely that. The ALJ found Plaintiff to have moderate
limitations in two Paragraph B criteria and conducted a more detailed evidentiary
review when calculating his RFC. [R. at 29-35.] She noted that Plaintiff’s mental
health treatment was limited and conservative, consisting primarily of medication
prescribed by his primary care provider. [R. at 30, 34, 357-64.] She acknowledged that
Plaintiff 	successfully 	completed 	a 	short 	inpatient 	alcohol 	detox 	program 	and
subsequently 	presented 	with 	a 	largely 	normal 	mental 	status 	at 	subsequent
examinations. [R. at 32.] The record reflected Plaintiff’s mood to be stable, possessing
a logical thought process, and fair insight and judgment. [R. at 30.] 	The ALJ also
considered the medical assessments of multiple state agency psychiatric consultative
examiners who found that Plaintiff retained the mental capacity necessary to perform
simple work despite having moderate limitations under Paragraph B. [R. at 30-32.]
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 11 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>
12
Turning to the record, it is clear the ALJ did not ignore Plaintiff’s moderate
limitations, but instead, translated them into a restriction to simple instructions after
reviewing Plaintiff’s treatment history, and objective findings and evidence in the
record. [R. at 29-35.] In his appeal, Plaintiff does not identify any medical evidence
establishing greater functional deficits than those reflected in the RFC nor does he
demonstrate that the ALJ’s explanation was inconsistent or unsupported by evidence.
See Knepp, 204 F.3d at 83. In fact, Plaintiff’s RFC includes an additional restriction
beyond “light work” regarding his understanding, remembering, and carrying out
simple instructions to account for his mental limitations. [R. at 29.]
The ALJ provided a reasoned explanation of how Plaintiff’s documented
mental impairments were reflected in the functional limitations included in the RFC.
The Court cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.
Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the Court finds that
the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED. An
accompanying Order has been issued [Docket No. 15].
March 5, 2026 	s/Renée Marie Bumb
Date 	RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-01107-RMB Document 16 Filed 03/05/26 Page 12 of 12 PageID:
<pageID>

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.