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1:24-cv-10096Njd23 de jan. de 2026

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
J.L.E.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil No. 24-10096 (RMB)
OPINION
APPEARANCES
Samuel Fishman
Chermol & Fishman, LLC
11450 Bustleton Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19116
On behalf of Plaintiff
Catherine Elisabeth Hamilton
Social Security Administration
Office of Program Litigation
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235
Lee Kouvousis
Social Security Administration
Law & Policy, Program Litigation 3
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235
On behalf of Defendant
1 Due to the significant privacy concerns in Social Security cases, any non-governmental party
will be identified and referenced solely by initials in opinions issued in Social Security cases
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. See D.N.J. Standing Order
2021-10.
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RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon an appeal filed by J.L.E. (“Plaintiff”) seeking
judicial review of the final determination of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (the “Commissioner” and the “SSA,” respectively), which denied his
application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. For the reasons set forth
herein, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”).
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI benefits under the Social
Security Act (the “Act”), alleging an onset date of disability beginning March 1, 2017. [R. at
12.] The claim was first denied on October 29, 2021, and denied again upon reconsideration
on July 15, 2022. [Id.] Plaintiff then filed a timely written request for a hearing before an
ALJ. [Id.] That hearing took place on September 27, 2023, where Plaintiff was represented
by an attorney and testified before the ALJ. [Id. at 12, 39–53.] The ALJ also heard testimony
from vocational expert (“VE”) Marian Marracco. [Id. at 53–57.] The ALJ issued her decision
on November 29, 2023, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. See infra at III.B.
On December 15, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s renewed request for review,
rendering the ALJ’s decision final. [R. at 1–5.] Plaintiff now seeks this Court’s review
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a final decision of an ALJ with regard to disability benefits, a court
must uphold the ALJ’s factual decisions if they are supported by “substantial evidence.”
Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). “Substantial
evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
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mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971) (quoting Cons. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Plummer v. Apfel, 186
F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).
In addition to the “substantial evidence” inquiry, a court must also determine whether
the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. See Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d
Cir. 1983); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). This Court’s review of the legal
issues is plenary. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262 (citing Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429,
431 (3d Cir. 1999)).
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the inability “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).
The Act further states that:
[A]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical
or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him,
or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step, sequential analysis for evaluating a
claimant’s disability, as outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i–v). The analysis proceeds as
follows:
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is performing
“substantial gainful activity[.]” 	20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),
416.920(a)(4)(i). If he is, he is not disabled. Id. Otherwise, the ALJ moves on
to step two.
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At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has any “severe
medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that meets certain
regulatory requirements. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). A “severe
impairment” is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If
the claimant lacks such an impairment, he is not disabled. 	Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If he has such an impairment, the ALJ
moves on to step three.
At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant’s impairments meet or
equal the requirements of an impairment listed in the regulations[.]” Smith,
631 F.3d at 634. If the claimant’s impairments do, he is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If they do not, the ALJ moves on to
step four.
At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s “residual functional capacity”
(“RFC”) and whether he can perform his “past relevant work.” Id.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). A claimant’s “[RFC] is the most [he]
can still do despite [his] limitations.” Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). If
the claimant can perform his past relevant work despite his limitations, he is
not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If he cannot, the
ALJ moves on to step five.
At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant “can make an
adjustment to other work[,]” considering his “[RFC,] ... age, education, and
work experience[.]” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). That
examination typically involves “one or more hypothetical questions posed by
the ALJ to [a] vocational expert.” Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218
(3d Cir. 1984). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, he is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If he cannot,
he is disabled.
Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 2021–02 (3rd Cir. 2019) (alterations in original).
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court recites only the facts that are necessary to its determination on appeal,
which is narrow. Plaintiff submitted his application at the age of forty-seven. [R. at 29.] By
the time of the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff became statutorily defined as closely approaching
advanced age. [Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.963).]
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A. Plaintiff’s Educational, Work, and Medical History
Plaintiff completed a General Educational Development program in 2021 and
previously worked as a carpet installer. [Id. at 29, 40, 239.] Plaintiff suffers the following
physical impairments: cataract, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”), diabetes,
diabetic neuropathy, obesity, anxiety disorder; pancreatitis, knee pain, carpel tunnel
syndrome, low back pain, hepatic steatosis, substance abuse disorder, hypertension, and
hyperlipidemia. [Id. at 14–15.]
B. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. At step one, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 16, 2021, the application
date. [Id. at 14.]
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s following physical impairments medically
determinable and severe: cataract, COPD, diabetes, diabetic neuropathy, obesity, and anxiety
disorder. [Id. at 14–15.] Contrariwise, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s pancreatitis, knee
pain, carpel tunnel syndrome, low back pain, hepatic steatosis, substance abuse disorder,
hypertension, and hyperlipidemia were not severe. [Id. at 15–18.]
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not suffer an impairment or combination
of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. [Id. at 18–21.] As
for Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ found the following: mild limitation in
understanding, remembering, or applying information; moderate limitation in interacting
with others; moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and a mild
limitation in adapting or managing oneself. [Id. at 19–20.]
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC:
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to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR [§] 416.967(b) except that he can
have no concentrated exposure to extreme cold and heat or humidity, dust,
odors, fumes, or other pulmonary irritants, or hazards such as heights and
moving machinery. No driving a motor vehicle. He can perform simple,
routine and repetitive tasks. He can have no public contact and occasional
contact with supervisors and co-workers.
[Id. at 21–29.] The ALJ further found that Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work
experience. [Id. at 29.]
At step five, the ALJ concluded that there were other jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, considering his age, education,
work experience, and RFC. [Id.] Crediting the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as a garment
sorter, dispatcher-router, or warehouse checker. [Id. at 29–30, 53–57.] Accordingly, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises three arguments in support of remand. First, he argues that the ALJ
erroneously formulated his RFC at step four by failing to consider his mild limitation in
adapting or managing oneself and moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining pace. [Docket No. 7 at 3–9 (“Pl.’s Br.”).] Second, he argues that the ALJ failed
to consider his mild limitation in adapting or managing oneself in light of the ALJ crediting
consultive examiner Dr. Courtney Ray’s conclusion that he “would likely have mild to
moderate difficulties adapting to normal home and work stressors”. [Id. at 9–11.] Third,
Plaintiff posits that the RFC demonstrates “glaring functional omissions” and that he cannot
perform the representative occupations determined by the ALJ at step five. [Id. at 11–18.]
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A. 	Plaintiff’s Mild Limitation in Adapting or Managing Oneself and
Moderate Limitation in Concentrating, Persisting, or Maintaining
Pace
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s step-four RFC analysis is deficient because it did not
account for his mild limitation in adapting or managing oneself and moderate limitation in
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. [Pl.’s Br. at 3–9.] Pursuant to Hess, the
Commissioner retorts that the ALJ sufficiently provided a “valid explanation” in fashioning
the RFC’s “simple, routine and repetitive tasks” limitation (“‘simple-tasks’ limitation”) to
address Plaintiff’s moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace.
[Docket No. at 12–14 (“Comm’r’s Opp. Br.”).] As for Plaintiff’s mild limitation in adapting
or managing oneself, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not have to account for it at
all because it is only a mild limitation, and that, assuming otherwise, the ALJ’s RFC
determination on this issue is supported by substantial evidence. [Id. at 14–16.]
1. Plaintiff’s Moderate Limitation in Concentrating, Persisting, or
Maintaining Pace
Preliminarily, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that Hess governs whether the
RFC’s “simple-task” limitation sufficiently addresses Plaintiff’s moderate limitation in
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. In Hess, the Third Circuit opined that “as long
as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a ‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding
that a claimant has ‘moderate’ difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’” 931 F.3d
at 211. This first issue before the Court therefore “falls squarely within the ambit of” Hess.2
See Stacey S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-20433-NLH, 2022 WL 16834673, *5–*6
2 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that the application of Hess is inconsistent with Ramirez v.
Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2004). [Docket No. at 6–7 (“Pl.’s Reply Br.”).] The Hess court
made sure to acknowledge that the “valid explanation” framework “flows directly from our
decision in Ramirez.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 211.
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(D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2022) (applying Hess to review whether RFC’s “simple-tasks” limitation
sufficiently accounted for plaintiff’s moderate limitations in understanding, remembering or
applying information and concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace).
To the ALJ’s opinion we turn. To start, the ALJ prefatorily declared that “[t]he
following residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of limitation the
undersigned has found in the ‘paragraph B’ mental functional analysis.” [R. at 21]; see also
[id. at 24 (emphasis added) (“In determining the claimant’s work-related functional capacity
at this step, the undersigned has evaluated both his impairment-caused physical and mental
limitations, as well as the extent of the restrictions that these limitations place on his work-
related abilities.”), 27 (emphasis added) (“The unde[r]signed assigned mental limitations in
his residual functional capacity as assigned to consider the conclusions in Finding 3 above.”).]
The ALJ additionally clarified that Plaintiff’s work-related abilities “include not only physical
maneuvers such as lifting and walking, but also mental tasks such as concentrating and carrying
out verbal and/or written instructions appropriately and in a timely manner.” [Id. at 24
(emphasis added).]
As will be established below, these statements reflect the ALJ’s consideration of “all
symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent
with the objective medical evidence and other evidence ….[,] the medical opinion(s)[,] and
prior administrative finding(s)”. [Id.]; see Stacey S., 2022 WL 16834673, *6 (internal quotation
mark and citation omitted) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that ALJ failed to make enumerated
findings or adequately conduct a function-by-function analysis because “the ALJ explicitly
noted that he considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can
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reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence...
[and] the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings.”).
The ALJ then proceeded to evaluate the objective medical evidence. First, the ALJ
noted that Plaintiff “underwent no significant mental health treatment during the period at
issue aside from the treatment discussed above” and “was taking no mental medications until
January 17, 2023, when he started treatment with Vistaril for his anxiety”. [R. at 26]; see also
[id. at 24 (“He had undergone no significant mental health treatment. He had never been
psychiatrically hospitalized.”), 27 (“The medical record suggests that he stabilized with
medication and talk therapy between October 2022 and the present ….”).] The ALJ arrived
at this conclusion by finding Plaintiff’s “subjective complaints to Dr. Ray’s consultative
examination to be not persuasive.” [Id. at 27]; see Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 775, 782
(3d Cir. 2004) (“In addition, Phillips’ conservative treatment history supports the ALJ’s
determination that Phillips’ subjective complaints of pain were not entitled to full credence.”);
Scott R. v. Kijakazi, 643 F. Supp. 3d 483, 495 (D.N.J. 2022) (internal citation omitted)
(“Although ALJs must consider claimants’ subjective complaints, they are not obligated to
credit them.”). From this, the ALJ ultimately concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairments
“must be evaluated from the perspective of an undertreated patient for a portion of the period
at issue, who had not shown to be refractory to treatment.” [R. at 27.]
The ALJ also considered evidence from examining physicians and psychologists. For
instance, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “was pleasant and cooperative”, “casually dressed and
groomed”, “could complete simple mathematical calculations”, and that his “concentration
was intact” during Dr. Christopher Williamson’s consultative examination. [Id. at 24 (citing
id. at 662)]; see Stacey S., 2022 WL 16834673, *6 (finding ALJ’s references to “intact
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comprehension” and “cooperative behavior … and appropriate or good mood and affect” as
supporting a “valid explanation” for “simple tasks” limitation under Hess). The ALJ also
referenced Dr. Courtney Ray’s observation that Plaintiff’s “mental state examination was
normal”, [R. at 27 (citing id. at 298)], and Dr. Jackie Rounds’s view that his “memory was
normal and he had good insight and judgment”, [id. at 24 (citing id. at 903)]. And the ALJ
found persuasive Dr. Ray’s opinion that Plaintiff “had little difficulty comprehending and
carrying out simple directions or complex instructions ….” [Id. at 28 (citing id. at 299).]
While Plaintiff’s request for “a neat organization of the analysis around each function
is preferable, failure by an ALJ to do so is not reversible error where the ALJ explains her
RFC findings and those findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Stacey S., 2022 WL
16834673, *7 (collecting cases). Talismanic phrasing or a “magic set of words or order of
analysis” is not required. Id. at *6 (citing Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004));
see also Lorie H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-13192-NLH, 2022 WL 2803168, at *6
(D.N.J. July 18, 2022) (“[A]n ALJ does not need to use particular language or adhere to a
particular format in conducting her RFC analysis.”).
The Court is satisfied that the analysis above “constitutes a sufficiently ‘valid
explanation’ to support the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff, despite his mental limitations,
was capable of performing [simple] unskilled work.” Dionisio R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
CV 23-22067, 2025 WL 428557, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2025); see Ramos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. CV 18-14155 (KM), 2019 WL 7288889, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2019) (“Moreover, this
Circuit has regularly found that a RFC limiting claimant to simple, unskilled work is adequate
to account for moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace.”) (collecting
cases); Daniel M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-10533, 2022 WL 2952912, *4–*5 (D.N.J. July
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26, 2022) (finding “valid explanation” where ALJ considered “treatment evidence” and a
“mental status examination”); cf. Vargas v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-19077, 2022 WL
17887225, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2022) (finding no “valid explanation” where ALJ “provided
only one broad, single-sentence explanation”). Remand is therefore not appropriate.
2. Plaintiff’s Mild Limitation in Adapting or Managing Oneself
Plaintiff argues next that the RCF is deficient because the ALJ did not account for his
mild limitation in adapting or managing oneself. [Pl.’s Br. at 7–9.] The Court will reject the
Commissioner’s initial point that the ALJ was not required to address this limitation because
it was only found to be mild. [Comm’r’s Opp. Br. at 14–15.] “Courts in this circuit have
‘consistently held that even mild limitations in the relevant domains of mental functioning
must be included in an RFC assessment and hypothetical question posed to the VE that the
ALJ relies upon.’” Lesko v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2:24-CV-01660-CBB, 2025 WL
3677017, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2025) (collecting cases); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2);
SSR 96-8p (“In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions
imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’”).
In any event, Plaintiff’s contention is belied by the ALJ’s exhaustive consideration of
his mental health impairments. While recognizing Plaintiff’s “problems with stress”, the ALJ
noted that he did not have similar issues with “changes in routine.” [R. at 20 (citing id. at
266).] The ALJ further found “no evidence that the claimant appeared to be malodorous,
unkempt or disheveled during the period at issue.” [Id. (citing id. at 662 (“He was casually
dressed and groomed, appearing his stated age. He was pleasant and cooperative
throughout.”))]; see [Pl.’s Br. at 12 (internal citation omitted) (“maintaining personal hygiene
and attire appropriate to a work setting” exemplifies adapting or managing oneself).] Plaintiff
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could also “manage his safety needs and could control his emotional state in public”,
according to the ALJ. [R. at 20.] In addition to the “simple tasks” limitation, the ALJ limited
Plaintiff’s RFC further so that he “can have no public contact and occasional contact with
supervisors and co-workers” (“‘contact’ limitation”). [Id. at 21.] For these reasons, as well
as all those discussed above, a “valid explanation” supports the ALJ’s RFC determination
with respect to Plaintiff’s mental impairments. See, e.g., J.M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV
24-8438 (ZNQ), 2025 WL 3312259, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2025) (finding that ALJ provided
“valid explanation” for “simple tasks” limitation in light of plaintiff’s moderate limitations in
understanding, remembering or applying information, concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining pace, and in adapting or managing oneself). Consequently, the ALJ’s findings
are supported by substantial evidence set forth in the record and there exists no factual or legal
basis to disturb the same.
B. 	Dr. Courtney Ray’s Medical Opinion
Plaintiff’s second argument is a repackaging of the first. The ALJ found Dr. Courtney
Ray’s following conclusion “to be persuasive as it is consistent with the other medical
evidence of record for the reasons noted above”: Plaintiff “would likely have mild to moderate
difficulties adapting to normal home and work stressors”. [R. at 28.] Despite crediting this
conclusion, Plaintiff claims the ALJ “failed to adopt any limitations on [his] ability to adapt
and manage himself or even concentrate, persist, and maintain pace.” [Pl.’s Br. at 10.]
As reviewed above, the ALJ wholistically examined and weighed Dr. Ray’s
conclusion with the other objective medical evidence with respect to Plaintiff’s mental
impairments in arriving at the RFC’s “simple tasks” and “contact” limitations. “[T]his
argument is essentially a request by Plaintiff for the Court to re-weigh the evidence in his
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favor, something the Court may not do.” J.M., 2025 WL 3312259, at *7 (citing Chandler v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011)) (“[C]ourts are not permitted to re-weigh
the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.”). As such, the ALJ did not
reversibly error in her treatment of Dr. Ray’s opinion and remand is therefore not warranted
under the circumstances.3
C. 	Plaintiff’s Cataract and Representative Occupations
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC “presents glaring omissions” and
“demonstrates an obvious failure to consider critical Agency policy” in light of his cataract
physical impairment. [Pl.’s Br. at 11–18.] At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s cataract to
be a severe physical impairment, which, after considering the objective medical evidence, the
ALJ “assigned environmental limitations and a limitation from driving”: Plaintiff “can have
no concentrated exposure to … hazards such as heights and moving machinery. No driving
a motor vehicle.” [R. at 21, 26.] Plaintiff contests that the medical evidence “clearly
necessitate[d] the inclusion, or at the very least, the consideration of the limitations described
in SSR 96-9p, including a limitation to seeing small objects.”4 [Pl.’s Br. at 13.] “Nonetheless,”
Plaintiff contends, “the ALJ failed to question the VE regarding job erosion or to consider the
issue in the decision, which she was required to do.” [Id.]
3 For this reason, the Court declines to address the Commissioner’s alternative arguments as
to Dr. Ray’s apparent vagueness and lack of vocational specificity. [Comm’r’s Opp. Br. at
18.]
4 As to visual limitations or restrictions, SSR 96-9p reads: “Most sedentary unskilled
occupations require working with small objects. If a visual limitation prevents an individual
from seeing the small objects involved in most sedentary unskilled work, or if an individual is
not able to avoid ordinary hazards in the workplace, such as boxes on the floor, doors ajar,
or approaching people or vehicles, there will be a significant erosion of the sedentary
occupational base. These cases may require the use of vocational resources.” SSR 96–9p,
1996 WL 374185, at *8 (July 2, 1996).
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Plaintiff’s reliance on SSR 96–9P is misplaced. SSR 96–9P applies to an “‘unskilled
sedentary occupational base,’ where[as] Plaintiff was determined to be capable of performing
‘light work.’ Therefore, SSR 96–9P does not apply.”5 Virden v. Astrue, No. Civ 11-3926 RBK,
2012 WL 3018254, at *11 (D.N.J. July 24, 2012) (internal citations omitted); [R. at 21]; see
Edwin J. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 24-9362 (RK), 2025 WL 2506278 , at *7 n.10 (D.N.J.
Sept. 2, 2025) (emphasis in original) (“Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s decision
contravened two Social Security regulations, though both are inapplicable here. First, Plaintiff
avers that Judge Shelton failed to account for pushing, pulling, and manipulative limitations,
as required by SSR 96-9p, but this regulation is only about unskilled sedentary jobs, not light
work jobs.”); Barker v. Colvin, No. 1:15-CV-574, 2016 WL 4408997, at *9 (M.D. Pa. July 27,
2016) (“Here, we find that SSR 96-9p is inapplicable because the ALJ limited Mr. Barker to
the performance of light, rather than sedentary, work.”), R & R adopted, No. 1:15-CV-574,
2016 WL 4366952 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2016).
Plaintiff also argues that he cannot perform the three occupations testified to by the
VE—garment sorter, dispatcher – router, and warehouse checker—because each requires
“Near Acuity”, or the “ability to use near-vision”. [Pl.’s Br. at 15.] “Because there was no
evidence that [his] vision problems were resolved,” Plaintiff contends that he is unable to
perform these occupations, necessitating a remand to resolve this discrepancy. [Id. at 15–18.]
The Court disagrees.
5 The Court is also unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that his RFC somehow falls in the
middle ground between sedentary and light work, requiring resolution on remand. [Pl.’s Br.
at 14.] The ALJ’s RFC determination is consistent with unskilled light work. See 20 CFR
§ 416.967(b).
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At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that his doctor, at an unspecified time in 2021,
diagnosed him with “a white cataract with anterior capsular fibrosis in the right eye” and
“told” Plaintiff that he could not drive as a result. [R. at 49–50.] Plaintiff further testified that
he is “completely blind” in his right eye, noting that if he “got to pour something in a glass, I
have to be really careful because my depth – like I’m constantly spilling things on the counter,
like pouring things, you know, thinking its going in a cup.” [Id.] Plaintiff also testified that
he has a cataract in his left eye, but that he “can see through it still”, albeit “nearsighted.” [Id.
at 50–51.] The ALJ noted this testimony in her opinion, [id. at 21], but, “[a]fter careful
consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms;
however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects
of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence
in the record for the reasons explained in this decision”, [id. at 22]; see also [id. at 25 (“In this
case, a careful review of the record does not document sufficient objective medical evidence
to substantiate the severity of the pain and degree of functional limitations alleged by the
claimant.”).] In assessing the objective medical evidence, the ALJ notably opined “[a]s to the
claimant’s cataract” as follows:
[T]he claimant’s vision during his examination with Dr. Oxenberg was not
consistent with his examination with an ophthalmologist 8 days prior to his
evaluation with Dr. Oxenberg. On September 7, 2021, the claimant exhibited
visual acuity with correction at 20/70 on the right and 20/20 on the left. His
vision was reduced on the right due to his cataract but he wanted to wait for
surgery suggesting that surgery would have been recommended in 2021. The
claimant underwent no evaluation in 2022 for his cataract and did not return
for another cataract examination until 2 years after his September 7, 2021
evaluation. At that time, he was no longer a candidate for an anterior
capsulotomy and he was referred for a pars plana lensectomy. At that time, his
visual acuity was hand motion on the right and 20/70 on the left. The
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undersigned assigned environmental limitations and a limitation from driving
to consider his cataract.
[Id. at 26.]
Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s alleged detrimentally-impaired farsightedness or
otherwise complete blindness in his right eye, see [Pl.’s Br. at 11–18; Pl.’s Reply Br. at 1–4],
the ALJ determined that “the objective medical evidence fail[ed] to document the presence
of any impairment or combination of impairments that could reasonably be expected to result
in pain or other symptoms of such a severity or frequency as to preclude the claimant’s
residual functional capacity as assigned”, [R. at 26]. There was no failure on the ALJ’s part
to “resolve[ ]” the issue of his cataract in light of the objective medical evidence, as Plaintiff
avers. Based on the finding above, the ALJ limited the RFC by prohibiting Plaintiff from
concentrated exposure to “hazards such as heights and moving machinery” and “[n]o[t]
driving a motor vehicle.” [Id. at 21, 26.]
The ALJ properly considered the objective medical evidence with respect to Plaintiff’s
cataract and fashioned an RFC limitation to account for it. That determination is supported
by “substantial evidence,” and the Court detects no inconsistencies between the RFC and the
ALJ’s hypothetical posed to the VE.6 This Court is not tasked with reweighing the evidence
in Plaintiff’s favor; that lies within the original purview of the ALJ. See J.M., 2025 WL
3312259, at *7. All this Court must determine is whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by
“substantial evidence,” “a low bar”. Michelle S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 24-9721 (GC),
2025 WL 2717806, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2025) (citing Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503
(3d Cir. 2004)). Such is the case here. Remand is consequently unnecessary.
6 Consequently, any (unelaborated) reliance by Plaintiff on SSR 83-14 or 85-15, to the extent
they are even instantly applicable, is unavailing. See [Pl.’s Br. at 13.]
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V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED. An accompanying
Order shall issue.
January 23, 2026 	/s/Renée Marie Bumb
Date 	RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge
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