Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Mike Makuraza
v. Case No. 1:26-cv-122-JL-AJ
Opinion No. 2026 DNH 042
David Wesling, et al.
ORDER ON PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Petitioner Mike Makuraza seeks immediate release from his ongoing immigration
detention after an Immigration Judge denied his release in a custody redetermination
(bond) hearing. Makuraza’s criminal history includes criminal charges of operating a
vehicle under the influence of alcohol and driving to endanger in 2022. At a March 9,
2026 bond hearing, the IJ found, based on his criminal history, that he was a danger to the
community. Makuraza now challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the bond hearing
under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. Respondents
argue that the IJ’s determination was constitutionally sufficient, that this court lacks
jurisdiction to review the IJ’s order under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), and that the petitioner has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the IJ’s decision to the BIA.
Having reviewed the parties’ briefing and held oral argument, the court finds that §
1226(e) does not preclude review of the IJ’s decision for constitutional sufficiency, nor
was the petitioner required to exhaust his administrative remedies, but that the IJ did not
violate Makuraza’s due process rights when she found by clear and convincing evidence
that he was a danger to the community.
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I. Background
Makuraza, a Burundian national, entered the United States in 2016 on an F1
student visa.1 Later that year, the University of North Carolina canceled his student
status, but he remained in the United States and applied for asylum in early 2017.2 He is
married to a U.S. citizen and has a pending Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative.3 He
lives in Maine.
In 2022, Makuraza was arrested and charged with operating a vehicle under the
influence of alcohol and driving to endanger in Cumberland County, Maine. He
eventually pled guilty to one count of driving to endanger.4 The Superior Court
suspended his license for 30 days and ordered him to pay a fine of $730.5
ICE detained Makuraza on February 14, 2026.6 He filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus with this court, but received a bond hearing with an IJ without the court’s
intervention on March 9. At the hearing, DHS submitted as evidence Makuraza’s
criminal history, which included police reports and court records.7 During the hearing,
counsel for DHS argued that Makuraza was a danger to the community based on his
driving under the influence of alcohol and his guilty plea.8 Counsel for Makuraza made
several arguments against a finding of dangerousness. She argued that the driving
1 Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (doc. no. 1) at 2.
2 Id.; Resp’ts’ Opp. (doc. no. 13) at 2.
3 Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (doc. no. 1) at 2.
4 IJ Order, Ex. H (doc. no. 9-3) at 41.
5 Id.
6 Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus (doc. no. 1) at 2.
7 IJ Order, Ex. H (doc. no. 9-3) at 15-41.
8 Bond Hr’g Tr. (doc. no. 9-2) at 4. DHS also argued that Makuraza was a flight risk, but the IJ
made no finding on that issue.
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offense took place several years ago, when he was under severe emotional stress from his
mother being admitted to the ICU, and that he has taken the incident very seriously,
attending the classes he was required to take, paying the fine, and being careful not to
drink excessively or drive after consuming alcohol. She noted that he has not offended
again. Without any further argument from DHS, the IJ found that Makuraza “[had] been
shown to be a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence based on the
criminal history.”9 The petitioner filed a status report with the court, requesting
immediate release.10 The respondents objected.11
II. Jurisdiction
This court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a person held “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). Although 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) provides that “[n]o court may set aside any
action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of
any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole,” the respondents concede that this
court may review an IJ’s decision to deny bond to determine “whether the petitioner
received the constitutional due process to which he was entitled.”12
Makuraza challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the bond hearing, arguing
that the IJ violated his due process rights by failing to apply the proper standard of proof,
9 Id. at 7.
10 Pet. Mot. Release (doc. no. 9).
11 Resp’ts’ Opp. (doc. no. 13).
12 Id. at 3 (citing Massingue v. Streeter, No. 3:19-cv-30159-KAR, 2020 WL 1866255, at *4 (D.
Mass. Apr. 14, 2020)).
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and that the evidence before the IJ was insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a
finding by clear and convincing evidence that he was a danger to the community, as
required by Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). Based on the
respondents’ concession, this court joins others in finding that “[a]lthough the court may
not review the IJ’s discretionary judgment, the IJ does not have discretion to fail to apply
the burden of proof that due process requires.” See Mayancela Mayancela v. FCI Berlin,
Warden, No. 25-CV-348-LM-TSM, 2025 WL 3215638 at *5 (D.N.H. Nov. 18, 2025)
(McCafferty, J.); see also Massingue, 2020 WL 1866255 at *4; Dos Reis v. Vitello, No.
CV 25-10497-RGS, 2025 WL 1043434 at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2025).
III. Administrative exhaustion
“There are two species of exhaustion: statutory and common-law. The former
deprives a federal court of jurisdiction, while the latter ‘cedes discretion to a [federal]
court to decline the exercise of jurisdiction.’” Brito v. Garland, 22 F.4th 240, 255 (1st Cir.
2021) (quoting Anversa v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., 835 F.3d 167, 174–76 (1st Cir.
2016). Since no statute requires exhaustion, “sound judicial discretion governs.” Morgan
v. Garland, 120 F.4th 913, 927 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S.
140, 144 (1992)). In making the decision, the court “must balance the interest of the
individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing
institutional interests favoring exhaustion.” Anversa, 835 F.3d at 176 (quoting McCarthy,
503 U.S. at 146). “[I]f the situation is such that ‘a particular plaintiff may suffer
irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate judicial consideration of his
claim,’ exhaustion may be excused even though ‘the administrative decisionmaking
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schedule is otherwise reasonable and definite.’” Portela-Gonzalez v. Sec'y of the Navy,
109 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147 (1992).
Petitioner’s case warrants waiver of exhaustion under that standard. The petitioner
is suffering irreparable harm in the form of loss of liberty while detained. Brito v.
Garland, 22 F.4th 240, 256 (1st Cir. 2021) (“[E]xhaustion might not be required if [the
petitioner] were challenging her incarceration ... or the ongoing deprivation of some other
liberty interest.” (quoting Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1986))). Petitioner
points out that BIA bond appeals currently exceed 200 days, longer than the
presumptively reasonable six-month detention established by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001). Considering the potential length of
detention for an appeal of the IJ’s finding of dangerousness, which based on an offense
for which the Cumberland County Superior Court awarded no jail time, the court finds
that the petitioner is not required to exhaust his administrative remedies in this case.
IV. Analysis
Although this court has authority to consider Makuraza’s claim, that authority is
“limited.” Mayancela Mayancela, 2025 WL 3215638 at *5 (citing Diaz Ortiz v. Smith,
384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 143 (D. Mass. 2019)). “To obtain habeas relief, a petitioner must
show that the IJ failed to place the burden of proof on the government to show
dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence by ‘either point[ing] to the language of
the [IJ’s] opinion or demonstrate[ing] that ‘the evidence itself could not – as a matter of
law – have supported’ the [IJ’s] decision to deny bond.’ ” Id. Although “IJs generally
must sufficiently explain their reasoning to permit appellate or judicial review of their
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decisions… an IJ ‘need not spell out every last detail of [her] reasoning where the logical
underpinnings are clear from the record.’ ” Id. at 6 (citing Barnica-Lopez v. Garland, 59
F.4th 520, 530 (1st Cir. 2023) and López-Gómez v. Bondi, 154 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2025)).
Makuraza has not made this showing. He has two essential arguments. First, he
argues that at the hearing, the IJ failed to place the burden on the government and to
articulate a non-conclusory basis for her decision. Second, he argues that his criminal
history could not, as a matter of law, support a finding of dangerousness by clear and
convincing evidence.13 The IJ issued her decision orally at the end of the bond hearing,
and the record contains no written memorandum of decision by the IJ. Accordingly, the
court bases its analysis on the audio recording and transcript of the bond hearing.14
Language of the decision. The IJ did not specify that the government bore the
burden of proof at the hearing, but began the merits portion of the hearing by asking DHS
for its substantive argument.15 After argument by both sides addressing the issue of
dangerousness, the IJ stated that “[Makuraza] has been shown to be a danger to the
community by clear and convincing evidence based on the criminal history.”16 The court
13 Makuraza also argues that the IJ’s failure to consider alternatives to detention or other less
restrictive means to address the risk of danger posed by the petitioner to the community was
constitutionally deficient. He points to Brito v. Garland, in which the First Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that “[i]f due process requires an IJ to consider alternatives to detention before
making a determination about dangerousness or risk of flight, the IJs in the petitioners’ cases
might well have reached different decisions as to whether to release the petitioners on bond.” 22
F.4th at 255. The First Circuit did not reach the question of whether due process requires an IJ to
consider alternatives to detention in a bond hearing. The court declines to hold that such a
requirement exists without binding authority or more affirmative appellate guidance.
14 Doc. nos. 9-1 and 9-2.
15 Bond Hr’g Tr. (doc. no. 9-2) at 4.
16 Id. at 7.
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recognizes that this language barely goes beyond a recitation of the standard, but under
the facts and circumstances present here, it is sufficient to show that she based her
decision on the petitioner’s criminal history. See Mayancela Mayancela, 2025 WL
3215638 at *6 (“The logical underpinnings of the IJ’s reasoning are clear from her
written memorandum of decision.”). With the criminal record in evidence, including the
police reports and the petitioner’s plea, the IJ heard arguments from both parties about the
relative weight to assign the evidence. Based on this record and her mention of the
criminal record, it is not impossible to determine the basis for her decision. Id.
Evidence as a matter of law. The petitioner argues that, as a matter of law, his
criminal history cannot prove that he is a danger by clear and convincing evidence. The
court disagrees. The petitioner points to factors from Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37,
40 (BIA 2006) that IJs should consider in a bond determination. The factors addressing
dangerousness include “the alien’s criminal record, including the extensiveness of
criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the seriousness of the offenses.” Id.
While some courts may have weighed the evidence available to the IJ differently or
reached a different conclusion, a relatively recent incident of driving under the influence
of alcohol—falling asleep inside a running car at a gas station with a blood alcohol
content of .29—could support a finding that the petitioner was a danger to the community
by clear and convincing evidence, especially when confirmed by a criminal conviction
for the offense of “driving to endanger.”17 Makuraza emphasizes that the IJ failed to
17 IJ Order, Ex. H (doc. no. 9-3) at 15-41 (emphasis added).
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consider the petitioner’s rehabilitation and the length of the sentence served for the
criminal conviction (or lack thereof). But “an immigration judge ‘can consider all the
evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence
submitted by a party.’” Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 144 (quoting NRLB v. Beverly
Enters.-Mass., Inc., 174 F.3d 13, 26 (1st Cir. 1999)). The petitioner provides no binding
authority showing that the petitioner’s criminal conviction cannot, as a matter of law,
meet the clear and convincing standard for dangerousness to the community. Ultimately,
he disagrees with the IJ’s weighing of the evidence before her, which this court has no
jurisdiction to review. Id.
V. Conclusion
Because the petitioner has not demonstrated that the IJ failed to apply the
constitutional standard in her bond determination, the court denies the petitioner’s motion
for immediate release.18
SO ORDERED.
Joseph N. Laplante
United States District Judge
Dated: April 20, 2026
cc: Counsel of record
18 Doc. no. 9.
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