Woodham v. NH Department of Safety et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Grace Woodham
v. 	Case No. 20-cv-236-SM
New Hampshire Department of Safety –
New Hampshire State Police
Bomb Squad et al. 1
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Grace Woodham, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action against three New Hampshire state agencies and certain
employees of those agencies, asserting that the defendants have
violated her federal constitutional rights and are liable to her
in tort. 	The complaint (Doc. No. 1) is before the undersigned
Magistrate Judge for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(a), and LR 4.3(d)(1).
Preliminary Review Standard
The court conducts a preliminary review of prisoner
complaints seeking relief from government agents. 	See 28 U.S.C.
1 The defendants named in the complaint documents are: the
New Hampshire Department of Safety – New Hampshire State Police
Bomb Squad (“Bomb Squad”); the New Hampshire Forensics
Laboratory (“NHFL”); the New Hampshire Fire Marshal’s Office
(“FMO”); Bomb Squad Troopers Sharon Kopp, Parkington (whose
first name is unknown (“FNU”)), FNU Flynn, and FNU Cyr; FMO
Investigators Adam Fanjoy and Matthew Wilmot; NHFL Criminalist
FNU Stillato; and John Does #1 and #2. 	The individual
defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities.
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§ 1915A(a); LR 4.3(d)(1). 	In considering whether a pro se
complaint states a claim, the court construes the pleading
liberally. 	See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam). 	The court then determines whether, stripped of legal
conclusions, and with all reasonable inferences construed in
plaintiff’s favor, the complaint contains “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
Claims may be dismissed, sua sponte, if the court lacks
jurisdiction, a defendant is immune from the relief sought, or
the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); LR 4.3(d)(1)(A).
Background
Ms. Woodham asserts in her complaint that she has been
accused of, and is presently being criminally prosecuted for,
placing explosive devices in the car of her former boyfriend,
Tucker Schaeffer, on May 3, 2019, in the car of Mr. Schaeffer’s
roommate, Audrey Hall, on April 3, 2019 and June 2, 2019, and on
the fire escape at the Littleton Courthouse on June 3, 2019.
Ms. Woodham alleges that New Hampshire State Police Bomb Squad
(“Bomb Squad”) Troopers Parkington and Sharon Kopp determined,
“based upon a pH strip test,” that the device discovered April
3, 2019 was a chemical reaction bomb (“CRB”) which showed the
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presence of a “‘strong acid.” 	Compl. (Doc. No. 1), at 8. 	The
New Hampshire Forensics Laboratory (“NHFL”), however, came to a
contrary conclusion about the suspected CRB, specifically, that
it was a “base.” 	Id.
Ms. Woodham alleges that although the device discovered May
3, 2019 was a “dud” and “obviously not live,” the Bomb Squad,
based on a preliminary field test which showed the presence of
an acid, destroyed the device with a water cannon. 	Ms. Woodham
asserts that the Bomb Squad also destroyed potentially
exculpatory evidence with the water cannon. 	NHFL Criminalist
Stillato found that the May 3, 2019 device contained a “very
acidic” liquid, but he did not report a pH level. 	Ms. Woodham
alleges that the defendants withheld information from her
concerning how the May 3, 2019 device “was tested and/or
dismantled.” 	Id.
Trooper Kopp investigated the June 2, 2019 incident and
involved the state Fire Marshal’s Office (“FMO”) in the
investigation. 	Ms. Woodham asserts that there were “obvious
inconsistencies” in the complainant’s statements, as well as
missing evidence, and the matter was outside of the FMO’s
jurisdiction.
Ms. Woodham alleges that FMO Investigator Matthew Wilmot,
in investigating the case, prepared a warrant to seize Ms.
Woodham’s cell phone, illegally detained her, interrogated her
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without an attorney present, and threatened to arrest her. 	Ms.
Woodham also claims that FMO Investigator Adam Fanjoy, after
reviewing video of Ms. Woodham shopping on June 2, 2019 at the
Littleton Co-op, falsely accused her of shoplifting because she
temporarily left the store to get her wallet out of her car.
On June 3, 2019, a suspected explosive device was found on
the fire escape of the Littleton Courthouse. 	Trooper Kopp
field-tested the device with a pH strip and claimed the liquid
in the device was “very acidic,” but failed to record a
presumptive pH range. 	Ms. Woodham asserts that a photograph of
the suspected device, however, suggests that the liquid was
“closer to neutral.” 	Id. 	Ms. Woodham alleges that the
defendants have withheld evidence regarding the June 3, 2019
device from her.
On June 8, 2019, Investigator Fanjoy searched Ms. Woodham’s
car. 	Ms. Woodham alleges that he removed several items from her
car that he did not report on the receipt listing the property
he seized, including: her purse, which contained exculpatory
evidence related to her criminal case; $80.00 in cash that had
been in her wallet; her second set of car keys; her passport;
and her tax returns. 	Ms. Woodham asserts she is attempting to
litigate the improper removal of property from her car in small
claims court.
On June 9, 2019, Investigator Wilmot searched Ms. Woodham’s
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house pursuant to a search warrant, the application for which
was prepared by Investigator Fanjoy. 	Ms. Woodham alleges that
Investigator Wilmot seized items from her house which were
outside the scope of the warrant, based on a “bad faith
representation” that Ms. Woodham was a drug dealer. 	Id. at 10.
Ms. Woodham asserts she is seeking to suppress the fruits of
that search in her criminal case.
Claims
Seeking damages, Ms. Woodham asserts the following claims
for relief in this action:
1. 	Bomb Squad Troopers Sharon Kopp and Parkington, FMO
Investigators Adam Fanjoy and Matthew Wilmot, and NHFL
Criminalist Stillato violated Ms. Woodham’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process in connection with the
criminal investigations and charges against Ms. Woodham
arising out of her alleged placement of explosive devices
on April 3, 2019, May 3, 2019, June 2, 2019, and June 3,
2019, in that:
a. 	Those defendants produced and/or relied upon
inaccurate, incomplete, and conflicting field test and
laboratory test results;
b. 	Those defendants failed to provide Ms. Woodham
with potentially exculpatory evidence in discovery in
her criminal case;
c. 	Troopers Parkington and Kopp improperly caused
potentially exculpatory evidence to be destroyed with
a water cannon on May 3, 2019; and
d. 	Trooper Kopp improperly involved the FMO in the
investigation of Ms. Woodham’s criminal cases as those
matters were not in the FMO’s jurisdiction.
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2. 	FMO Investigators Adam Fanjoy and Matthew Wilmot
violated Ms. Woodham’s Fourth Amendment rights in
connection with the June 8, 2019 search of her car and the
June 9, 2019 search of her house, when:
a. 	Investigator Fanjoy seized property from Ms.
Woodham’s car which he failed to include on the
receipt listing the property seized; and
b. 	During a search of Ms. Woodham’s home conducted
pursuant to a search warrant, Investigator Wilmot
seized items from her house which exceeded the scope
of the warrant.
3. 	FMO Investigator Adam Fanjoy is liable to Ms. Woodham
for the tort of defamation for falsely accusing Ms. Woodham
of shoplifting on June 2, 2019.
4. 	Bomb Squad Troopers Kopp and Parkington, FMO
Investigators Fanjoy and Wilmot, and NHFL Criminalist
Stillato are liable to Ms. Woodham for the torts of
assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
false imprisonment, based on their conduct underlying the
claims summarized in this Report and Recommendation as
Claims 1-3.
5. 	The New Hampshire Department of Safety/New Hampshire
State Police Bomb Squad, New Hampshire Fire Marshal’s
Office, and the New Hampshire Forensics Laboratory failed
to properly train their employees, resulting in the conduct
underlying the claims summarized in this Report and
Recommendation as Claims 1-4:
a. 	in violation of Ms. Woodham’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process;
b. 	in violation of Ms. Woodham’s Fourth Amendment
rights in connection with the June 2019 searches of
her car and house and the seizures of her person and
property; and
c. 	in a manner rendering them liable under state
tort law for negligent failure to train, defamation,
assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and false imprisonment.
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Discussion
I. 	Eleventh Amendment ( Agencies/Official Capacity Claims)
Seeking damages, Ms. Woodham has sued several state
agencies operating under the umbrella of the New Hampshire
Department of Safety. 	She has also sued all of the
individually-named defendants in this action in both their
individual and official capacities. 	Claims for damages against
state agencies and state officers in their official capacities
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 	See Town of Barnstable v.
O’Connor, 786 F.3d 130, 138 (1st Cir. 2015). 	Accordingly, the
district judge should dismiss Claim 5, which asserts claims for
damages against state agencies, and drop the state agencies from
this action. 	Further, the district judge should dismiss Claims
1-4 to the extent those claims are asserted against the
individual defendants in their official capacities.
II. 	Troopers Flynn and Cyr and John Doe Defendants
Ms. Woodham has named Bomb Squad Troopers Flynn and Cyr,
and John Does #1 and #2 as defendants in this action. 	The
complaint does not contain any facts alleging that any acts or
omissions of Trooper Flynn, Trooper Cyr, or the John Doe
defendants violated her rights. 	Accordingly, the district judge
should drop those defendants from this case at this time,
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without prejudice to Ms. Woodham’s ability to move to amend her
complaint and/or to join defendants in the future as
appropriate.
III. Remaining Claims and Younger
The complaint indicates that Ms. Woodham is currently a
defendant in a criminal case that is pending in state court.
This raises the issue of whether her remaining individual
capacity claims for damages, identified as Claims 1-4, must be
stayed at this time, pursuant to the Younger abstention
doctrine. 	See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Sirva
Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 2015)
(“only three types of state proceedings trigger Younger
abstention: (i) criminal prosecutions, (ii) ‘civil proceedings
that are akin to criminal prosecutions,’ and (iii) proceedings
‘that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts’” (citation omitted)). 	The ongoing
prosecution of Ms. Woodham is an archetypical case for the
application of Younger. 	See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,
571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (“When there is a parallel, pending state
criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining
the state prosecution.”).
Once the court concludes that the parallel state case
potentially triggers the Younger abstention doctrine, the court
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examines whether the state case provides an adequate opportunity
to raise federal defenses, and whether any of the narrow set of
exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine are applicable.
See Sirva Relocation, 794 F.3d at 192. 	Nothing in the record
here suggests that Ms. Woodham will be unable to assert federal
defenses in the state criminal case. 	And none of the exceptions
to Younger abstention, identified in Sirva Relocation, 794 F.3d
at 192, appear to be present.
Where the relief requested in Ms. Woodham’s remaining
claims includes damages, and damages are unavailable in a
criminal prosecution, Younger abstention is appropriately
effected through a stay of those claims for damages, pending
resolution of her criminal case. 	See Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d
26, 38 (1st Cir. 2007). 	Accordingly, further proceedings in
this case should be stayed, pending the issuance of a final
judgement in Ms. Woodham’s criminal case, upon approval of this
Report and Recommendation and completion of service of the
complaint upon the defendants named in Claims 1-4.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the magistrate judge recommends
as follows:
1. 	This R&R should be approved;
2. 	Claim 5 should be dismissed in its entirety; and
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Claims 1-4 should be dismissed to the extent that they seek
relief against any defendant in an official capacity;
3. 	The New Hampshire Department of Safety – New
Hampshire State Police Bomb Squad, the state Fire Marshal’s
Office, the New Hampshire Forensic Laboratory, Trooper
Flynn, Trooper Cyr, and John Does #1 and #2 should be
dropped as defendants; and
4. 	Further proceedings in this action should be
stayed, once this R&R is approved and the process of
serving the remaining defendants is completed, as directed
in the Order issued simultaneously with this R&R.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. 	See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	The fourteen-day period may be extended
upon motion. 	Failure to file specific written objections to the
Report and Recommendation within the specified time waives the
right to appeal the district court’s order. 	See Santos-Santos
v. Torres-Centeno, 842 F.3d 163, 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
__________________________
Andrea K. Johnstone
United States Magistrate Judge
September 15, 2020
cc: 	Grace Woodham, pro se
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