Murphy v. Strafford County Department of Corrections et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Shawn Murphy
v. 	Case No. 19-cv-1162-PB
Opinion No. 2022 DNH 022
Strafford County et al.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Shawn Murphy filed an excessive force action against
Strafford County and several “John Doe” correctional officers on
the last day of the three-year limitations period applicable to
his claims. 	A few months later, he amended his complaint to
name five correctional officers as defendants. 	The issue I must
resolve on summary judgment is whether Murphy can meet his
burden to show that his claims against the individual officers
are timely because they relate back to the date of the original
complaint. 	I apply the familiar summary judgment standard when
resolving this issue. 	See French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116, 123
(1st Cir. 2021).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) sets out three ways
in which an amendment to a complaint can relate back to the
original. 	In a prior show-cause order, I explained why Rules
15(c)(1)(B) and 15(c)(1)(C) do not apply here, but I asked for
supplemental briefing on the applicability of Rule 15(c)(1)(A).
See Doc. No. 58. 	That issue is now teed up for resolution.
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Rule 15(c)(1)(A) permits an amendment to relate back to a
timely pleading when the applicable state law allows relation
back. 	New Hampshire law authorizes amendment of pleadings when
“necessary for the prevention of injustice” so long as “the
rights of third persons shall not be affected thereby.” 	N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 514:9. 	When an amendment seeks to substitute
a defendant after the statute of limitations has expired, both
potential injustice to the plaintiff and potential prejudice to
the intended defendant exist. 	Dupuis v. Smith Props., Inc., 114
N.H. 625, 628 (1974). 	The “crucial” question in the prejudice
inquiry is “whether the intended defendant received actual
notice of the suit prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations.” 	Sharifova v. Riley, No. 2014-0122, 2014 WL
11485774, at *1 (N.H. Nov. 12, 2014); accord Bonnvie v.
Beaulieu-Lindquist Real Est., Inc., No. 2006-0047, 2007 WL
9619440, at *3 (N.H. Mar. 13, 2007). 	“Informality will not
nullify the notice so long as defendant receives actual
knowledge.” 	Dupuis, 114 N.H. at 630.
It is undisputed that the individual defendants did not
have actual knowledge that Murphy had filed this lawsuit before
the statute of limitations expired. 	The officers have offered
sworn affidavits to that effect, which Murphy has not
controverted. 	Instead, Murphy argues that the officers had
actual notice of his claims before he filed his complaint and
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that his complaint was sufficiently detailed to put them on
constructive notice that they were the intended defendants.
Murphy’s argument that the individual defendants knew about
his claims before the lawsuit was filed is both factually and
legally deficient. 	First, he has not offered evidence from
which a reasonable factfinder could infer such knowledge. 	The
evidence shows, at most, that Murphy’s counsel had informed
Strafford County’s counsel about the underlying incident, the
nature of Murphy’s claims, and his intent to sue if the County
were to reject his settlement demand. 	There is no evidence that
Strafford County’s counsel informed any of the officers about
Murphy’s claims, settlement demand, or the impending litigation.
Second, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has rejected
Murphy’s argument that “actual notice of the lawsuit is
unnecessary and [that] actual notice of the plaintiffs’ claims
is sufficient to preclude prejudice to the new defendant.”
Sharifova, 2014 WL 11485774, at *2. 	The plaintiffs in Sharifova
were passengers injured in a motor vehicle collision who
intended to sue the driver of the other vehicle. 	They instead
sued the driver’s sister, who owned that vehicle. 	Before the
lawsuit was filed, the driver knew that the plaintiffs were
pursuing claims for bodily injury with the vehicle’s insurer.
There was no evidence, however, that the driver had learned of
the litigation during the three days between the filing of the
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complaint and the expiration of the statute of limitations. 	Id.
at *1. 	Under those circumstances, the court was unpersuaded
that the driver’s awareness of the plaintiffs’ claims was enough
to overcome the prejudice to the driver. 	See id. at *2.
Instead, the court reiterated that “allowing a plaintiff to
amend a writ to add a new defendant who did not have notice of
the suit prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations
prejudices that defendant.” 	Id. (citing Perez v. Pike Indus.,
153 N.H. 158, 162-63 (2005)).
Murphy’s next argument fares no better. 	He contends that
the officers had constructive knowledge of the lawsuit because
his complaint was sufficiently detailed to put them on notice
that they were the intended defendants. 	The New Hampshire
Supreme Court has foreclosed this argument as well. 	In
Sharifova, the plaintiffs likewise argued that the complaint had
“clearly indicated” whom they intended to sue, so the intended
defendant “would immediately know” she was the intended party.
Id. 	Rejecting this argument, the court repeated that the
plaintiffs had to show that the intended defendant had actual
notice of the litigation. 	Id.; see also Graham v. Church, 2015
DNH 013, 2015 WL 247910, at *6 (D.N.H. Jan. 20, 2015) (finding
Rule 15(c)(1)(A) inapplicable when plaintiff claimed it was
“simply unimaginable” that intended defendant was unaware of
claims against it when complaint was filed).
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Finally, Murphy suggests that I should weigh the injustice
he would suffer if his claims were time-barred against the
prejudice to the defendants. 	Even if a balancing test applies,
a reasonable factfinder could not conclude based on the summary
judgment record that Murphy’s interests outweigh the prejudice
to the officers. 	Cf. Sharifova, 2014 WL 11485774, at *3
(assuming, without deciding, that the test for relation back
involves balancing prevention of injustice against prejudice to
third parties). 	Murphy had three years to investigate his
claims. 	Yet he chose to file his complaint naming “John Doe”
defendants the day before the expiration of the limitations
period, leaving himself virtually no room for timely amendments.
Further, as the officers point out, Murphy was not completely in
the dark about their identities. 	For example, more than ten
months before he filed the complaint, Murphy sent a letter to
the prison superintendent that identified by last name four of
the five officer defendants as those involved in the incident.
See Doc. No. 45-16. 	On analogous facts, the court in Sharifova
agreed with the trial court that any injustice to the plaintiffs
was diminished and could not outweigh the prejudice to the
intended defendant who did not receive timely notice of the
lawsuit. 	See 2014 WL 11485774, at *3. 	Specifically, the court
observed that there was an avenue available to the plaintiffs to
identify the correct defendant before they sued and that their
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choice to sue only three days before the limitations period
expired carried the risk that their ability to add a new
defendant would be foreclosed. 	See id. 	For the same reasons,
strict adherence to the statutory deadline for bringing claims
is required in this case.
Because Murphy has not met his burden to show that the
relation back doctrine can save his untimely claims against the
officers, I grant the Strafford County defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 45).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro
Paul J. Barbadoro
United States District Judge
March 2, 2022
cc: 	Counsel of Record
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