Massaquoi v. 20 Maitland Street Operations LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Brown Y. Massaquoi
v. Civil No. 18-cv-00296-LM
Opinion No. 2019 DNH 209
Genesis HealthCare, LLC, et al.
O R D E R
Plaintiff Brown Massaquoi brings this employment
discrimination suit against his former employers, 20 Maitland
Street Operations LLC d/b/a Harris Hill Center (“Harris Hill”)
and Genesis HealthCare, LLC (“Genesis”) (collectively
“defendants”). Defendants move for summary judgment on all
Massaquoi’s claims. Doc. no. 26. Massaquoi objects. On
December 6, 2019, the court heard oral argument on defendants’
motion. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court ruled
on nearly all the issues presented by the motion from the bench.
This order provides a summary of the court’s oral rulings on
each of Massaquoi’s claims as well as rulings on the claims that
the court did not rule on at the hearing.
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I. Count I(A): Discrimination on the basis of race, color, and
national origin in violation of Title VII
In count I(A),1 Massaquoi alleges that defendants
discriminated against him on the basis of his race, color, and
national origin in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq. For the reasons stated on the record, defendants’ motion
for summary judgment is denied as to the race discrimination
claim and granted as to the claims of national origin and color
discrimination.2
II. Count I(B): Discrimination on the basis of race, color, and
national origin in violation of state law
Similarly, count I(B) alleges that defendants discriminated
against Massaquoi on the basis of his race, color, and national
origin in violation of New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated
§ (“RSA”) 354-A:7. As explained at the hearing, the court’s
analysis of the state-law discrimination claims is the same as
those under Title VII. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
is denied with respect to the state-law claim of race
1 Count I of the complaint alleges four legally distinct
claims. For clarity’s sake, the court has denoted these four
claims as I(A), I(B), I(C), and I(D).
2 Based on Massaquoi’s counsel’s exchange with the court
during the hearing, Massaquoi concedes that, in this case, the
color theory of discrimination is duplicative of the race
theory. In counts I(A) and I(B), therefore, the sole claim
remaining for trial is a race discrimination theory.
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discrimination and granted with respect to the state-law claims
of national origin and color discrimination.
III. Count I(C): Retaliation in violation of Title VII
In count I(C), Massaquoi alleges that defendants retaliated
against him after he filed a charge of discrimination against
them with the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights
(“NHCHR”). He alleges two theories of retaliation: (i)
defendants retaliated against him by failing to reinstate him to
his position at Harris Hill; and (ii) defendants retaliated
against him by terminating him from his subsequent position at
Laconia Rehabilitation Center (“Laconia Center”). As explained
at the hearing, the court grants summary judgment to defendants
on the first theory of retaliation liability. As to Massaquoi’s
second theory of liability, the court deferred ruling at the
hearing and now denies summary judgment.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation
of Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: “(i) she undertook
protected conduct, (ii) she suffered an adverse employment
action, and (iii) the two were causally linked.” Bonilla-
Ramirez v. MVM, Inc., 904 F.3d 88, 95 (1st Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted). If plaintiff sets out a prima facie
case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer “to
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articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
challenged actions.” Xiaoyan Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A., 821
F.3d 206, 219 (1st Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted). If the employer meets its burden of production, the
burden shifts back to plaintiff to show “that the employer’s
reason for the adverse action was pretextual.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
With respect to the prima facie case, defendants challenge
only causation. A plaintiff pursuing a retaliation claim must
prove traditional but-for causation with “proof that the
unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of
the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Univ.
of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013).
The sequence of events here suggests causation. Massaquoi
engaged in the protected activity of filing a charge of
discrimination with the NHCHR on August 26, 2015. Doc. no. 27-
18. Defendants contend, and Massaquoi does not dispute, that
they learned of the charge in or about October 2015. Almost a
year later, on August 29, 2016, defendants received a request
for information from the NHCHR in the course of its
investigation into Massaquoi’s discrimination charge. Shortly
thereafter, on September 6, 2016, Laconia Center—an entity
affiliated with Harris Hill—hired Massaquoi. Defendants then
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learned that Massaquoi had been hired at Laconia Center while
gathering documents and other information to respond to the
NHCHR’s request for information.
On September 19, 2016, defendants sent a letter to the
NHCHR informing it that Massaquoi had been “mistakenly” hired at
Laconia Center and that, based on the reason for his prior
termination, defendants would be terminating his employment
there. Doc. no. 27-14. The very next day, Massaquoi was
terminated from Laconia Center. See doc. no. 27-19 at 4. Thus,
Massaquoi’s termination from Laconia Center occurred very close
in time to defendants’ participation in the NHCHR’s
investigation into Massaquoi’s charge of discrimination. See
Soni v. Wespiser, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2019 WL 3891515, at *5
(D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2019) (“Temporal proximity can create an
inference of causation.”). Viewing these facts in the light
most favorable to Massaquoi, they provide sufficient evidence of
causation. See Amos v. McNairy Cty., 622 F. App’x 529, 538 (6th
Cir. 2015) (finding sufficient evidence of causation to survive
summary judgment when plaintiff was terminated seventeen days
after Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s onsite
investigation into plaintiff’s discrimination charge).
Defendants have met their burden of production to
articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
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termination. Defendants assert that after Massaquoi’s prior
termination from Harris Hill, he was deemed ineligible for
rehire by any other affiliated entity. They claim that
Massaquoi was mistakenly hired at Laconia Center due to an
oversight of his ineligibility for rehire. Once they learned of
the mistake, they terminated him. The burden therefore shifts
back to Massaquoi to show pretext.
Massaquoi’s termination from Laconia Center was based on
essentially the same alleged non-discriminatory reason as his
initial termination from Harris Hill—a substantiated incident of
resident abuse. For that reason, the court relies on the same
evidence of pretext in support of the retaliation claim as it
discussed at the hearing in support of the discrimination
claims. And there is additional evidence of pretext in support
of the retaliation claim. The record demonstrates that
defendants stated two different reasons for Massaquoi’s
termination from Laconia Center: his ineligibility for rehire
after his termination from Harris Hill (doc. no. 27-14); and his
apparent falsification of records (doc. no. 27-19 at 4). See
Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 432 (1st
Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen a company, at different times, gives
different and arguably inconsistent explanations, a jury may
infer that the articulated reasons are pretextual.”). Although
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perhaps thin, when viewed in the light most favorable to
Massaquoi, the court finds sufficient evidence to allow the
retaliation claim based on Massaquoi’s termination from Laconia
Center to reach the jury.
IV. Count I(D): Retaliation in violation of state law
Count I(D) alleges that defendants retaliated against
Massaquoi in violation of RSA 354-A:19. As with the state-law
discrimination claims, the court’s analysis of the state-law
retaliation claims is the same as the Title VII retaliation
claims. Defendants’ motion is granted with respect to the first
theory of retaliation liability (failure to reinstate) and
denied with respect to the second (termination from Laconia
Center).
V. Count II: Defamation
Although the parties presented argument on this claim at
the hearing, the court deferred ruling. Following the hearing,
Massaquoi notified the court that he is withdrawing this claim.
Accordingly, the defamation claim is no longer before the court
and the motion for summary judgment on that claim is denied as
moot.
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VI. Summary
The court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(doc. no. 26) in part and denies it in part. The court grants
summary judgment to defendants on the federal and state claims
of national origin and color discrimination and the first theory
of liability on the federal and state retaliation claims. The
motion for summary judgment is otherwise denied. The following
claims survive summary judgment: counts I(A) and I(B) to the
extent they assert race discrimination and counts I(C) and I(D)
to the extent they assert retaliation claims based on
Massaquoi’s termination from Laconia Center.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________
Landya McCafferty
United States District Judge
December 16, 2019
cc: Counsel of Record
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