Egan v. Ballantyne Country Club

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-00373-KDB-DCK
CHRISTINA EGAN,
Plaintiff,
v. MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER
BALLANTYNE COUNTRY
CLUB,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Christina Egan is a former employee of Defendant Ballantyne Country Club
(“BCC”). She alleges that BCC engaged in numerous Title VII violations and constructively
discharged her after she reported being sexually harassed by the company’s chief operating officer.
Now before the Court is BCC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12) Egan’s Amended Complaint.
The Court has carefully considered this motion and the parties’ briefs and exhibits. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will GRANT the motion.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted” tests whether the complaint is legally and factually
sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th
Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 30 (2012). A court need not accept a complaint’s “legal conclusions,
elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court,
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however, accepts all well-pled facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor.
See Conner v. Cleveland Cty., N. Carolina, No. 19-2012, 2022 WL 53977, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 5,
2022); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011).
In so doing, the Court “must view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences
to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Beach Mart, Inc., 932 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2019). Construing the facts in this manner,
a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 520 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft, 556
U.S. at 678). Thus, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) determines only whether a claim is
stated; “it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability
of defenses.” Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).
When deciding a motion to dismiss, “a court considers the pleadings and any materials
‘attached or incorporated into the complaint.’” Fitzgerald Fruit Farms LLC v. Aseptia, Inc., 527
F. Supp. 3d 790, 796 (E.D.N.C. 2019) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448).
The Court may also consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss when they are “integral
and explicitly relied on in the Complaint,” and where “plaintiffs do not challenge [the document’s]
authenticity.” Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606–07 (4th Cir. 2015).
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After working for BCC for several years, Egan learned from a colleague in January 2025,
that BCC’s Chief Operating Officer Owen Dougherty had made sexually explicit comments1 about
her to other members of leadership—including to her direct supervisor (and Dougherty’s
1 Egan asserts that a colleague reported to her that Dougherty made two comments about
her, including, “I can’t stop having sexual dreams about Christina,” and “When I’m in bed next to
my wife, I masturbate to pictures of Christina.” Doc. No. 10 ¶ 17.
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subordinate), Matthew Saggio—sometime before December 2024. Doc. No. 10-1 at 2. Also in
January, Egan learned that Dougherty had called a BCC board member a “bitch” and stated he
would “f**k her sideways.” Id.
Egan “immediately” reported the alleged sexual harassment to Human Resources (“HR”)
in mid-January 2025, and expressed concern that Saggio and others had not reported to the
department or otherwise opposed Dougherty’s comments. Doc. Nos. 10 ¶¶ 23, 26; 10-1 at 2. Egan
alleges that HR took no action against Dougherty or the individuals who heard, but did not report
Dougherty, in response to her report. Id. Therefore, on or about January 17, 2025, Egan also
reported her concerns to BCC Board President Kevin Sullivan, who she alleges took no action
other than to tell her to discuss her concerns about Saggio’s lack of reporting directly with Saggio.
Doc. No. 10-1 at 3. Egan also alleges that despite these reports, BCC allowed Dougherty to
continue to work closely with her, and that it failed to put any protective measures in place. Doc.
No. 10 ¶ 33.
However, Dougherty’s employment at BCC was terminated shortly after Sullivan’s
conversation with Egan, and the termination was promptly reported to her. Despite his termination,
and notwithstanding Egans’s concerns about having to “work” with him at the event, Dougherty
was nevertheless permitted to attend a business conference the following month because BCC had
already paid for his registration. Doc. Nos. 10 ¶¶ 35–36; 10-1 at 3. Egan alleges that after his
termination, Dougherty contacted her to invite her to attend a dinner on the first day of the event,
and that she felt so uncomfortable knowing Dougherty would be attending that she canceled her
trip. Id.
Egan further alleges that despite Dougherty’s termination, she felt “unsafe, uncomfortable,
and humiliated” at work because other employees discussed Dougherty’s comments. Doc. No. 10
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¶¶ 22, 48. Moreover, even though he failed to take any action after Dougherty made the allegedly
sexually inappropriate comments about Egan, Saggio was promoted to General Manager. Id. ¶ 44.
As a result of these events, and her ongoing feelings of emotional distress and mental anguish,
Egan contends that she was forced to terminate her employment in February 2025. Id. ¶¶ 49, 79.
After filing a Charge of Discrimination for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and
retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Council (“EEOC”), and receiving a Right to
Sue notice, see Doc. No. 10-1 at 1–3, Egan initiated the present action against BCC, asserting
claims of hostile work environment, sexual harassment, retaliation, and sex discrimination. Doc.
No. 10 at ¶¶ 50–86. BCC timely filed a motion to dismiss, to which Egan responded. See Doc.
Nos. 12, 18. The matter is now ripe for this Court’s review.
III. DISCUSSION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not impose a “heightened pleading standard in
employment discrimination suits.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). Thus,
although “a plaintiff is not required to plead facts that constitute a prima facie case in order to
survive a motion to dismiss,” the complaint must still contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (internal citations omitted); accord McCleary–
Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015).
Accordingly, Egan’s claims are evaluated under the ordinary plausibility standard
applicable at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. See Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 648 (4th
Cir. 2017) (explaining that, although a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination
to withstand dismissal, the complaint must nonetheless satisfy the plausibility requirements set
forth in Twombly and Iqbal).
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A. Constructive Discharge
Although Egan does not plead a standalone constructive discharge claim, she alleges
throughout her Amended Complaint that BCC effectively forced her resignation when it failed to
remedy Dougherty’s continual sexual harassment toward her and by allowing him to continue to
work with her during the brief period between her report and his termination.
“Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s reasonable decision to resign
because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial
purposes.” Lee v. Belvac Prod. Mach., Inc., No. 20-1805, 2022 WL 4996507, at *3 (4th Cir. Oct.
4, 2022) (first quoting Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004); and then citing
Newbury v. City of Windcrest, 991 F.3d 672, 680 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Constructive discharge is an
adverse employment action.”)). To plausibly allege constructive discharge, a plaintiff must satisfy
two elements: “First, a plaintiff must show that [her] working conditions became so intolerable
that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign. Second,
a plaintiff must actually resign because of those conditions.” Id. (quoting Perkins v. Int’l Paper
Co., 936 F.3d 196, 211–12 (4th Cir. 2019)).
Intolerability requires more than alleging that resignation appeared to be the wisest or most
desirable option, or that the employee “subjectively felt compelled” to leave. Perkins, 936 F.3d
196 at 212 (citation omitted). Instead, the inquiry is objective: “whether a reasonable person in the
employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign, … that is, whether [s]he would have had
no choice but to resign.” Id. (quoting Blistein v. St. John's Coll., 74 F.3d 1459, 1468 (4th Cir.
1996), overruled on other grounds by Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998))
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Decoster v. Becerra, 119 F.4th 332, 340 (4th Cir.
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2024). As the Fourth Circuit has emphasized, “[d]ifficult or unpleasant working conditions …
without more, are not so intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign.” Id.
Egan alleges “continuous” sexual harassment that BCC failed to remedy, but she identifies
only two comments made by Dougherty during his employment, a single dinner invitation
Dougherty made after his termination (conduct that by her own pleading was no longer imputable
to BCC), and a rude comment directed at a female BCC board member. Although Egan asserts
that BCC failed to take corrective action, she simultaneously acknowledges that BCC terminated
Dougherty promptly after her reports.
In addition, Egan alleges that she continued to work closely with Dougherty during the
short period of time between her learning of and reporting the harassment and his mid-January
termination. However, she does not allege any further harassing conduct by Dougherty during this
period. While BCC could have taken interim steps to separate them during its investigation,
Dougherty was terminated within days of Egan’s report.
Considered together, these allegations do not plausibly show that BCC rendered Egan’s
working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign,
particularly where Egan’s resignation did not occur until more than three weeks after Dougherty’s
termination and there are no allegations of further harassment after she reported Dougherty to HR
and the Board.
B. Hostile Work Environment
Turning to Egan’s first denominated claim, she alleges that Dougherty’s comments to two
male directors—describing his sexual fantasies involving her—and a crude remark directed at a
female BCC board member created a sexual harassment based hostile work environment.
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Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against an individual
“with respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of
their sex. Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54 F.4th 201, 210 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2000e–2(a)). An employer therefore violates Title VII “when it subjects an employee to a hostile
work environment.” Id. (citing Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 276–77 (4th
Cir. 2015) (en banc)). A work environment is hostile when it is “permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult” of such severity or pervasiveness that it “alter[s] the conditions
of the victim’s employment and create[s] an abusive working environment.” Id. (quoting Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)).
To state a hostile work environment claim based on sexual harassment, a plaintiff must
plausibly allege: (1) the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome conduct; (2) the conduct was based
on the plaintiff’s sex; (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of employment and create an abusive working environment; and (4) the conduct is imputable to
the employer. Bazemore v. Best Buy, 957 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d
at 277).
BCC concedes, for purposes of this motion, that Egan has plausibly alleged the first two
elements. It argues, however, that the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts satisfying the third
and fourth elements. The Court agrees. Even assuming (without deciding) that Egan was subjected
to unwelcome conduct based on her sex, the Amended Complaint contains a dearth of factual
allegations suggesting that Dougherty’s conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of her employment.
Although severity or pervasiveness is often a question of fact, dismissal is appropriate
where the complaint fails to allege facts that, if true, would meet this standard. Sunkins v. Hampton
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Roads Connector Partners, 701 F. Supp. 3d 342, 352 (E.D. Va. 2023). The Fourth Circuit has
emphasized that plaintiffs must clear a “high bar” to satisfy this test. E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals,
Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008). To be sure, a single incident may be sufficiently severe to
constitute actionable harassment. Berry v. S. States Coop., Inc., No. 5:17-CV-635-FL, 2018 WL
4365499, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 13, 2018) (citing Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 280–81). But “simple
teasing, offhand comments, and off-color jokes, while often regrettable, do not cross the line into
actionable misconduct.” E.E.O.C. v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, P.A., 609 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir.
2010). And although misconduct by a supervisor generally carries greater weight, Sunkins, 701 F.
Supp. 3d at 354 (citing id. at 329), the conduct must still meet the governing standard. See Boyer-
Liberto, 786 F.3d at 278 (explaining that the status of the harasser may be a “significant factor”
because “a supervisor’s power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular
threatening character.”).
The “severe or pervasive” inquiry contains “both subjective and objective components.”
Sunkins, 701 F. Supp. 3d at 353 (quoting EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th
Cir. 2008)) (additional citations omitted). Egan plainly alleges that she subjectively perceived
Dougherty’s conduct as hostile. The Court therefore focuses on the objective component—whether
a “reasonable person” in Egan’s position “would have found the environment hostile or abusive.”
Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998)) (internal
quotations omitted). See also Irani v. Palmetto Health, 767 F. App’x 399, 416 (4th Cir. 2019).
This determination requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including “the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.” Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
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As alleged, the conduct here does not rise to the level of being “severe or pervasive” under
the governing authorities. Egan identifies only two sexually charged comments, made to two
colleagues outside of her presence. She does not allege that Dougherty ever made comments or
overtures to her directly while he was employed by BCC, including during the brief period between
her learning of the remarks, reporting them, and Dougherty’s termination.2 And the dinner
invitation—which Egan characterizes as a sexual proposition—occurred only after BCC had
terminated Dougherty.
In sum, taken as true together with all inferences favorable to Egan, these allegations do
not plausibly describe conduct that was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of
Egan’s employment. Accordingly, the hostile work environment claim will be dismissed without
prejudice.
2 Compare Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 705 (E.D. Va. 2004), aff’d sub
nom. Jones v. Tyson Foods, 126 F. App’x 106 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding a supervisor’s alleged
conduct of asking employee if she would go out with him, stating he wanted to kiss her, grabbing
her buttocks, pressing his pelvic area into hers, and simulating sexual intercourse, not severe or
pervasive enough to create hostile work environment because no other incidents were alleged and
employer took reasonable measures to prevent re-occurrence); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that a supervisor’s alleged harassment by sexual
innuendos, jokes, and physical contact did not create a sufficiently hostile work environment),
with Okoli, 648 F.3d at 220–22 (claims of repeated propositioning—12 incidents in four months—
and physical touching by a male boss to a female subordinate sufficient to allege hostile work
environment); Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding hostile work
environment where over a period of six months, a supervisor massaged an employee’s shoulders,
stated he wanted to “make out” and “have his way” with her, falsely accused her of having an
affair with a colleague, asked her about her underwear and birth control, and made comments about
taking maternity leave); Twine v. AT&T, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 3d 959, 977–79 (E.D. Va. 2024)
(finding a female subordinate’s claims that a male supervisor repeatedly leered at her, asked about
her marriage, stated that her “husband must be happy,” and commented on her appearance before
implicitly propositioning her for sex had plausibly alleged sufficiently severe or pervasive
harassment to survive a motion to dismiss); Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.
2010), abrogated on other grounds by Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013) (finding
two-day period consisting of verbal abuse and two incidents of supervisor pressing his genitals
against plaintiff’s body to be sufficiently severe).
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C. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
In her next claim, Egan alleges that BCC violated Title VII when Dougherty made sexually
explicit comments about her to other members of the management team and later invited her to
dinner—after his termination—at a business event both were scheduled to attend. As courts have
explained, “[q]uid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when a supervisor demands sexual
consideration in exchange for job benefits,” Twine v. AT&T, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 3d 959, 972 (E.D.
Va. 2024) (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983)) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), and “consists of conditioning employment benefits upon the employee’s
submitting to the sexual advances or threatening adverse employment actions if the employee does
not submit.” Schulze v. Meritor Auto., 163 F. Supp. 2d 599, 610 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) she is a member of a protected
class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment occurred because
of her sex; (4) her response to the harassment affected a tangible aspect of her “compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment;” and (5) “the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment” and failed to take remedial action. Twine, 755 F. Supp. 3d at 972
(quoting Nixon v. Kysela Pere et Fils, Ltd., No. 22-1406, 2024 WL 3666166, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug.
6, 2024)) (citation omitted).
A “tangible employment action” refers to a significant change in employment status,
including “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Okoli, 648 F.3d at 222
(quoting Burlington Indust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). Perhaps the clearest
example of quid pro quo harassment is when a supervisor tells a subordinate, “I will fire you unless
you sleep with me.” Briggs v. Waters, 484 F. Supp. 2d 466, 479 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citation omitted).
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Here, Egan has plausibly alleged the first three elements of a quid pro quo sexual
harassment claim. However, Egan has not plausibly alleged the remaining elements. Egan asserts
that Dougherty, by virtue of his supervisory role, had the ability to control the terms and conditions
of her employment. But she does not allege that he, or BCC, ever exercised that authority in a
manner that altered, threatened, or even implicated any concrete term or condition of her
employment.
Egan further contends that her “reaction to the alleged sexual harassment affected tangible
aspects of her employment.” Doc. No. 10 ¶ 56 (emphasis added). Yet the only reactions she
identifies are feeling humiliated and choosing to report the conduct and later resign. Although she
characterizes her resignation as a constructive discharge, she pleads no facts, as explained above,
to suggest that BCC rendered her working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee in
her position would have felt compelled to quit. Instead, she offers only the conclusory assertion
that she was “forced to work in a hostile work environment” and therefore “forced” to resign. Doc.
No. 10 ¶ 48.
Egan likewise fails to allege that BCC failed to take remedial action in response to her
report. To the contrary, the Amended Complaint reflects that the company acted promptly and
decisively by terminating Dougherty shortly after receiving her complaint.3 Accordingly, Egan’s
claim of quid pro quo discrimination will be dismissed without prejudice.
3 Title VII does not mandate any particular remedial action an employer must take in
response to allegations of sexual harassment. Bazemore, 957 F.3d at 201. “[I]t is enough for an
employer to take action reasonably calculated to stop the harassment.” Id. (quoting Pryor v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488, 498 (4th Cir. 2015)).
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D. Retaliation
Next, Egan alleges that BCC retaliated against her by “requiring her to continue to work in
a sexually hostile environment,” because Dougherty was allowed to continue working with her for
a short period of time after she reported him for sexual harassment.
To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) engagement in a protected
activity; (2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and
the employment action.” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190. Again, an adverse employment action is one
that “constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.” Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 761). In addition, the plaintiff must show that a reasonable
employee would have viewed the challenged action as “materially adverse”—that is, an action that
“might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Id. (quoting Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S.
53, 68 (2006)) (internal quotations and additional citations omitted).
Although Egan need not plead facts establishing a prima facie case to withstand a motion
to dismiss, she must still allege facts sufficient to raise her right to relieve beyond “[a] speculative
level.” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190 (citations omitted); see also McCleary–Evans, 780 F.3d at 585.
BCC contends that Egan has failed to plausibly allege retaliation. The Court agrees.
Egan asserts that BCC “intentional[ly] and reckless[ly]” failed to remedy the “continuous
sexual harassment” she experienced, forcing her to terminate her employment.4 While Egan
4 The Court finds it unlikely that two sexually inappropriate comments by a supervisor
amount to “continuous” sexual harassment. If Egan had additional facts that would support her
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engaged in a protected activity when she reported Dougherty’s conduct, she has not plausibly
alleged that she suffered an adverse employment action as a consequence of the reporting. The
only purported adverse action is her alleged constructive discharge, which, as explained above, is
not supported by facts showing that BCC made her working conditions so intolerable that a
reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign.
Nor does Egan identify any other conduct by Dougherty following her report that could
constitute an adverse employment action, much less one taken because of her protected activity.
Indeed, she alleges Dougherty was terminated not long after her complaint. Thus, she has not
plausibly alleged retaliatory animus. This claim will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
E. Sex Discrimination
In her final claim, Egan alleges that BCC discriminated against her on the basis of sex by
subjecting her to harassment, creating a hostile work environment, denying her “equal protections”
under company policy, and forcing her to resign. See Doc. No. 10 ¶¶ 83–84.
Absent direct evidence of sex discrimination, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she suffered adverse employment action; (3) her performance met
her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse employment action, and (4) the
action occurred under circumstances permitting a reasonable inference of sex discrimination.”
Boney v. Trustees of Cape Fear Cmty. Coll., 366 F. Supp. 3d 756, 764 (E.D.N.C. 2019).
As noted, in the context of a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only plausibly allege a
statutory claim, along with facts that permit a reasonable inference that discriminatory animus was
at least one motivating factor. Boney, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 764–65 (first citing McCleary–Evans,
allegation of continual sexual harassment, she should have pled them with specificity. Generalized
assertions are insufficient to state a claim above a speculative level.
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780 F.3d at 585–88; and then citing Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343
(2013); and then citing Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016)).
Still, conclusory assertions of a causal connection are insufficient. Boney, 366 F. Supp. 3d at 764
(citing McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585–86) (citation omitted).
Here, as with her retaliation claim, Egan’s sex discrimination claim fails because she has
not plausibly alleged any change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment—or
any action by BCC that materially affected her employment status, let alone was “so discriminatory
that a reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign.”5 El-Reedy v. Abacus
Tech. Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 596, 603–04 (D.S.C. 2017). Absent such allegations, she cannot state
a plausible claim of sex discrimination. Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed without
prejudice.
IV. ORDER
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice; and
3. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.
SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
5 Although Egan alleges that she was denied “equal protections” under company policies
and procedures, she fails to allege that male colleagues in her situation were treated differently.
Moreover, she does not allege disparate treatment in her EEOC complaint, or in her Amended
Complaint, beyond a single conclusory sentence. See Doc. No. 10; 10-1.
Signed: February 10, 2026
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