Jackson v. Trans Union LLC

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:24-CV-01069-MEO-DCK
CONNIE L. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
TRANS UNION, LLC,
Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification
of Claims Against Defendant Trans Union, LLC (Doc. No. 39). For the reasons
explained below, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) requires that a proposed class satisfy four
criteria in order to be certified as a class action: numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). Additionally, the
Fourth 	Circuit 	has 	recognized 	that 	“Rule 	23 	contains 	an 	implicit 	threshold
requirement” of “ascertainability.”
Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 925 F.3d 643,
655 (4th Cir. 2019). Under this requirement, “a class cannot be certified unless a court
can readily identify the class members in reference to objective criteria.”
Id. (quoting
EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014)). Once these initial
requirements of 23(a) are satisfied, a plaintiff must then demonstrate that the
proposed class meets the requirements of at least one of the three types of class action
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enumerated in Rule 23(b).
A 	plaintiff 	seeking 	class 	certification 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	proof,
	Int’l
Woodworkers of Am. v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., 659 F.2d 1259, 1267 (4th Cir.
1981), and must present evidence that the putative class complies with Rule 23.
EQT
Prod. Co. at 357. However, the Court “has an independent obligation to perform a
‘rigorous analysis’ to ensure that all of the prerequisites have been satisfied.”
Id. at
358 (quoting in part
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011)). To
satisfy this obligation, the Court may “probe behind the pleadings before coming to
rest on the certification question.”
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the decision to certify a
class action is within the discretion of the Court.
Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc.,
348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003).
II. 	FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Connie L. Jackson alleges she was the victim of a debt collection
scheme. (Doc. No. 53 ¶ 15). According to Plaintiff, as part of the scheme, Defendant
Trans Union, LLC (“TransUnion” or “Defendant”), a consumer reporting agency,
furnished a consumer report about Plaintiff to non-party Liberty Credit Management
(“Liberty”) in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681
et seq. (the
“FCRA”).
Id. ¶¶ 13, 26–33.
A. Defendant’s Relationship with Liberty
In September 2014, Mitchell Evans established Liberty, a sole proprietorship.
See (Doc. No. 46-2 at 2–3). Shortly thereafter, Liberty—through Evans—submitted
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an application to receive credit reports as a TransUnion subscriber.
See (Doc. Nos.
46-1 at 6; 46-2 at 2–3). Liberty represented itself as a debt collector (Doc. No. 46-2 at
2) and informed Defendant that it intended to use credit reports “[i]n connection with
a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom the information is to be
furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an account
to the consumer.” (Doc. No. 46-3).
Before permitting Liberty to obtain consumer reports, Defendant credentialed
Liberty. (Doc. No. 46-1 at 12). As part of that process, Defendant performed a series
of checks to evaluate whether Liberty’s intended purpose to access consumer reports
aligned with a permissible purpose under the FCRA.
See id. at 5. Among other things,
Defendant reviewed Liberty’s application and conducted an on-site inspection of
Liberty’s physical address.
Id. at 6–7. Defendant and Liberty also executed a Master
Subscriber Agreement, certifying that Liberty would not access consumer reports
without a permissible purpose.
Id. at 7. At the time of Liberty’s credentialling in 2014,
Defendant was unable to find any website or Google results for Liberty. (Doc. No. 42-
4 at 3). Defendant later recredentialed Liberty on at least one occasion in 2019. (Doc.
No. 46-1 at 12). Between 2020 and 2025, Defendant sold Liberty over 800,000
consumer reports. 1
See (Doc. No. 42-11 at 3–5).
B. Plaintiff’s Experience
In or about September 2022, Plaintiff received a debt collection letter from
1 Plaintiff’s allegations concern Defendant’s collection prioritization engine (“CPE”)
reports. CPE reports aid debt collectors in prioritizing accounts for collection. (Doc.
Nos. 46-7 at 9:18–10:1; 46 at 4).
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Blackwater Legal Group (“Blackwater”).
See (Doc. No. 40-2 at 2). In the letter,
Blackwater claimed Plaintiff owed $980.76 for a line of credit and fraudulent bank
activity
. Id. 	Unless Plaintiff paid, Blackwater threatened “immediate legal action”
and warned that it would run Plaintiff’s credit report, which would “significantly
impact [Plaintiff’s] credit score.”
Id. According to Plaintiff, Plaintiff owed nothing to
Blackwater (Doc. Nos. 53 ¶ 19; 40-21 ¶ 6). After receiving the letter, Plaintiff obtained
her TransUnion credit report and saw an inquiry from Liberty on August 19, 2022.
(Doc. No. 40-3 at 2).
C. FTC Action and Debt Collection Scheme
On February 24, 2025, the FTC filed a sealed complaint (the “FTC Complaint”)
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California.2 (Doc. No.
40-1). The FTC Complaint alleged that Liberty and Evans, among others (the “FTC
Defendants”), violated, among other things, the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1692
et seq. (the “FDCPA”) by deceiving and threatening consumers into
paying debts that consumers did not actually owe or the FTC Defendants did not have
authority to collect. (Doc. No. 40-1 at 3–4). According to the FTC Complaint,
“Defendants’ fraudulent scheme include[d] sending consumers letters representing
that (1) consumers owe some purported amount from an outstanding payday loan; (2)
Defendants are law firms and plan on imminently filing a lawsuit; (3) consumers’
credit scores are being damaged due to these purportedly outstanding debts; and (4)
2 Compl.,
FTC v. Blackrock Services, Inc., No. 8:25-cv-00363-HDV-ADSx (C.D. Cal.
Date), (Doc. No. 1).
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consumers can avoid a lawsuit if they pay to settle the purported debt.”
Id. ¶ 3.
The court subsequently issued an
	ex parte temporary restraining order
freezing the FTC Defendants’ assets and appointing a receiver (the “Receiver”). (Doc.
No. 40-6). On March 13, 2025, the Receiver filed a preliminary report with the court.
(Doc. No. 40-7). The report detailed how Evans and his brother Ryan ran parallel debt
collection operations through multiple companies including Liberty. (Doc. No. 40-7 at
10, 13–15). Under their business model, the FTC Defendants bought debt from a
broker and “‘scrub[bed]’ [the debt] for bankruptcy via TransUnion and obtain[ed the]
consumer’s personal information.”
Id. at 14. The FTC Defendants then sent letters
demanding payment and threatening litigation.
Id.
According to the report, Evans acknowledged renting Liberty’s office “only to
satisfy TransUnion’s physical office requirement.” (Doc. No. 40-7 at 14). The Receiver
described the office as “tiny, with no equipment, no files, and no personnel.”
Id. at 4.
Evans and his brother also acknowledged that they had not paid taxes in several
years and did not use accounting software.
	Id. at 8. Ultimately, the Receiver
concluded that “[u]nlawful practices” had been central to the FTC Defendant’s debt
collection process for years and that they were “incapable of operating a compliant
debt collection operation.”
Id. at 5. The Receiver also noted that the Evans brothers
destroyed data and records related to their scheme.
Id. at 5, 9–11.
D. Plaintiff’s Lawsuit
On August 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit asserting claims against
Defendant for violating the FCRA when it provided Liberty a copy of her Report. (Doc.
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No. 1 ¶¶ 5–6). In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to represent a class for Defendant’s
alleged violations of Sections 1681b and 1681e(a), defined as:
All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who
were the subject of a report sold by Defendant; (b) in the
five 	years 	predating 	the 	filing 	of 	this 	Complaint 	and
continuing 	through 	the 	date 	which 	the 	class 	list 	is
prepared; (c) in which Defendant furnished the report to a
user pursuant to a certification asserting a permissible
purpose under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A); and (d) where
the user lacked any interest in or authority to collect on any
account attributable to such person.
Excluded from the class definition are any employees,
officers, directors of Defendant Trans Union, any attorney
appearing in this case, and any judge assigned to hear this
action.
(Doc. No. 1 at 11, 14).
On May 20, 2025, Plaintiff moved for class certification. (Doc. No. 39). On June
23, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and refined the proposed class to:
All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who
were the subject of a report sold by Defendant; (b) on or
after August 12, 2019 and continuing through the date on
which the class list is prepared; (c) in which the Trans
Union subscriber showing in Defendant’s records is Liberty
Credit Management.
Excluded from the Class are all persons who have signed a
written release of their claim, and/or are counsel in this
case, or employed by the Federal Judiciary.
(Doc. No. 53 at 11). The Court held a status conference on April 21, 2026, and
questioned the parties on the outstanding motions in this case.
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III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Merits Arguments and the FCRA
Defendant opens its brief by arguing the merits of the case. (Doc. No. 46 at 17–
19). However, the “likelihood of the plaintiff[’s] success on the merits . . . is not
relevant to the issue of whether [class] certification is proper.”
Thorn v. Jefferson-
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2006). As the Supreme Court explained,
a court’s “rigorous” class-certification analysis “may ‘entail some overlap with the
merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim.’”
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr.
Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 465–66 (2013) (quoting
Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351). But “Rule 23
grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification
stage.”
Id. at 466. Instead, a court should only consider merits arguments to the
extent they “are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class
certification are satisfied
.”
Id.
Accordingly, the Court will not opine on Plaintiff’s likelihood of success and
will consider the merits only to the extent they are relevant to the Court’s class
certification analysis. With that principle in mind, the Court now turns to the
relevant legal framework.
The FCRA restricts Consumer Reporting Agencies’ (“CRAs”) ability to provide
consumers’ credit information to third parties. In particular, under Section 1681b of
the 	FCRA, 	CRAs 	may 	only 	furnish 	consumer 	reports 	for 	“certain 	statutorily
enumerated purposes.”
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 23 (2001) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b)). Relevant to this case, CRAs may furnish consumer reports:
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To a person which it
has reason to believe—
intends to use the information in connection with a credit
transaction 	involving 	the 	consumer 	on 	whom 	the
information is to be furnished and involving the extension
of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the
consumer.
15 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1681b(a)(3)(A) 	(emphasis 	added). 	Whether 	a 	consumer 	report 	is
ultimately used for an enumerated purpose—often called permissible purpose—is not
determinative of a CRA’s liability under § 1681b.
See Bugoni v. Emp. Background
Investigations, Inc., No. CV SAG-20-1133, 2022 WL 888434, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 25,
2022),
aff’d, No. 22-1548, 2023 WL 3721210 (4th Cir. May 30, 2023).
The FCRA also requires CRAs to maintain reasonable procedures to limit the
furnishing of consumer reports to the permissible purposes in § 1681b. 15 U.S.C. §
1681e(a). Section 1681e(a) provides:
Every 	consumer 	reporting 	agency 	shall 	maintain
reasonable 	procedures 	designed 	to 	avoid 	violations 	of
section 1681c of this title and to limit the furnishing of
consumer reports to the purposes listed under section
1681b of this title. These procedures shall require that
prospective users of the information identify themselves,
certify the purposes for which the information is sought,
and certify that the information will be used for no other
purpose. Every consumer reporting agency shall make a
reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new prospective
user and the uses certified by such prospective user prior
to furnishing such user a consumer report. No consumer
reporting agency may furnish a consumer report to any
person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the
consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in
section 1681b of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a).
Any person who willfully fails to comply with the FCRA is liable to the
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consumer for “any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure
or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1).
The consumer may also recover “such amount of punitive damages as the court may
allow.”
Id. § 1681n(a)(2).
B. Plaintiff’s Proposed Class Definition
As a threshold matter, Defendant argues in its opposition that the Court
should not consider Plaintiff’s unpled class definition. (Doc. No. 46 at 19–22). Since
the filing of the Motion, Plaintiff amended her Complaint to include a revised class
definition consistent with her motion to certify.
See (Doc. No. 53). Defendant’s
argument is, therefore, moot. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Motion, the Court
analyzes Plaintiff’s proposed class definition from her Amended Complaint:
All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who
were the subject of a report sold by Defendant; (b) on or
after August 12, 2019 and continuing through the date on
which the class list is prepared; (c) in which the Trans
Union subscriber showing in Defendant’s records is Liberty
Credit Management.
Excluded from the Class are all persons who have signed a
written release of their claim, and/or are counsel in this
case, or employed by the Federal Judiciary.
(Doc. No. 53 at 11).
C. Rule 23 Requirements for Class Certification
The Court now turns to class certification. Rule 23(a) sets four criteria for class
certification: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). Additionally, the Fourth Circuit has recognized that
“Rule 23 contains an implicit threshold requirement that the members of a proposed
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class be ‘readily identifiable.’”
Krakauer, 925 F.3d at 654–55 (quoting
EQT Prod. Co.,
764 F.3d at 358). The Court discusses each requirement below.
1. 	Numerosity
Rule 23 requires that a proposed class be “so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Plaintiff estimates that the
proposed class is over 800,000, and in its opposition, Defendant does not contest that
the proposed class satisfies Rule 23’s numerosity requirement. Based on the record,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has met the numerosity requirement.
2. 	Ascertainability
In order to be certified, a class must also be ascertainable. This “mean[s] a
court can readily identify the class members in reference to objective criteria.”
Glover
v. EQT Corp., 151 F.4th 613, 621 (4th Cir. 2025). “[I]f class members are impossible
to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or ‘mini-trials,’ then a
class action is inappropriate.”
Id. (citing
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d
583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)). However, a plaintiff “need not be able to identify every class
member at the time of certification.”
Id.
Here, the Court finds the class members are readily identifiable. Plaintiff seeks
to certify a class of individuals who were the subject of a report sold by Defendant “in
which the Trans Union subscriber showing in Defendant’s records is Liberty Credit
Management.” (Doc. No. 53 at 11). Defendant maintains both electronic inquiry and
billing records, which would allow Defendant to identify the subjects of reports sold
by Defendant to Liberty. (Doc. No. 42-1 at 3–5).
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Defendant 	argues, 	however, 	that 	the 	class 	is 	not 	ascertainable 	because
Plaintiff cannot further identify which reports were subsequently shared by Liberty
with its “co-conspirators or to identify the recipients of fraudulent dunning letters
sent by [those] co-conspirators and Blackrock . . . .” (Doc. No. 46 at 22). Defendant
notes that according to the Receiver’s Report in the FTC Action, the FTC Defendants
destroyed relevant evidence.
Id. And in some instances, Liberty may have owned or
have been authorized to collect consumer debt.
Id. In sum, Defendant argues that the
class is not ascertainable because there is a possibility Liberty may have had a
permissible purpose for acquiring some reports or Liberty’s co-conspirators may not
have used all reports as part of the fraudulent scheme.
The Court disagrees for two reasons. First, the record does not establish
Liberty ever purchased a report for a permissible purpose. In fact, the Receiver
Report—which is relied upon by both parties—concluded that “[u]nlawful practices”
had been central to the FTC Defendant’s debt collection process for years and that
they were “incapable of operating a compliant debt collection operation.” (Doc. No. 40-
7 	at 	5). 	But 	even 	assuming 	Defendant’s 	hypothetical 	held 	some 	merit,
“ascertainability does not require that every member of the class must be knowable
to an absolute certainty.”
Gaston v. LexisNexis Risk Sols., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 3d 318,
334 (W.D.N.C. 2020). In other words, Plaintiff need not disprove every hypothetical
in order to meet her burden on ascertainability.
Second, Defendant’s argument conflates the threshold question of whether the
proposed class members are identifiable with Rule 23’s commonality and typicality
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requirements. Defendant appears to be arguing that the proposed class is not
ascertainable because Plaintiff cannot identify and then prove that each proposed
class member had the exact same experience as Plaintiff. Specifically, after receiving
the report, Liberty improperly shared the proposed class member’s consumer report
with its co-conspirator, and the co-conspirator then sent a fraudulent dunning letter
to the consumer. As discussed below, whether a proposed class is ascertainable is a
separate inquiry from whether there are questions common to a class or whether a
representative’s claims or defenses are typical of the class. Here, because the Court
is able to readily identify the proposed class members in reference to objective
criteria, the ascertainability requirement is satisfied.
3. 	Commonality
Rule 23 further requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “[A] common question is one where ‘the same evidence
will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is
susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.’”
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577
U.S. 442, 453 (2016) (quoting 2 W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:50, pp.
196–97 (5th ed. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Common questions
suffice for class certification where the ‘determination of [their] truth or falsity will
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.’”
Spurlock v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 175 F.4th 232, 246–47 (4th Cir. 2026)
(quoting
Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350). “Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’”
Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350–51
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(citation omitted).
Plaintiff 	has 	advanced 	at 	least 	three 	questions 	that 	fulfill 	Rule 	23’s
commonality requirement. First, whether Defendant had “reason to believe” Liberty
had a permissible purpose in obtaining the report.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3).3
Second, whether Defendant maintained reasonable procedures designed to limit the
furnishing of consumer reports to permissible purposes under the FCRA. Third,
whether Defendant’s purported violations were willful under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
Here, 	the 	Court 	finds 	these 	questions 	satisfy 	Rule 	23’s 	commonality
requirements. With respect to the first question—whether Defendant had “reason to
believe” Liberty had a permissible purpose in obtaining the report—Defendant
concedes in its brief that under the FCRA, “[t]he ultimate use by the recipient of the
consumer’s information is not determinative of the consumer reporting agency’s
liability.” 	(Doc. 	No. 	46 	at 	17). 	Therefore, 	the 	Court 	need 	not 	undertake 	an
individualized assessment of what occurred with a specific report. Instead, the
question will be answered by common evidence showing what Defendant knew about
Liberty when it approved its application through its credentialing process in 2014
and what Defendant may have subsequently learned about the company.
In 	fact, 	Defendant’s 	own 	merits 	argument 	demonstrates 	that 	whether
Defendant has a “reason to believe” is a common question. In its brief, Defendant
argues that Defendant had reason to believe Liberty “was requesting consumer
3 The Court has revised the questions in its analysis to more accurately reflect the
applicable legal standards. For example, in its brief, Plaintiff asserts, “[i]t is a
common question whether or not Trans Union had a permissible reason to sell class
member reports to Liberty.” (Doc. No. 42 at 15).
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reports only when it had a permissible purpose” because (1) Defendant credentialed
Liberty, (2) Liberty certified it was debt collector each time it requested a report, (3)
Liberty contractually agreed it would only request reports when it had a permissible
purpose, and (4) there was no evidence Defendant knew Liberty was not using
consumer reports for permissible purposes. (Doc. No. 46 at 18). Each of these
arguments would apply to each proposed class members’ claims. And if Defendant’s
position is correct, all class members’ Section 1681b claims fail—not just Plaintiff’s.
Similarly, 	whether 	Defendant 	had 	reasonable 	procedures 	or 	Defendant 	acted
willfully will be resolved based on the same common facts (
e.g. the same procedures)
and the same law for every class member.
Relying on
Stafford v. Bojangles’ Rests., Inc, 123 F.4th 671 (4th Cir. 2024),
Defendant argues that the putative class is too overinclusive to ensure commonality.
(Doc. No. 46 at 25–26). However, Defendant’s reliance on
Stafford is misplaced. In
Stafford, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s certification of
a class action involving allegations of unpaid off-the-clock work and unauthorized
edits to employee time records. 123 F.4th at 675. As the Fourth Circuit explained, the
classes’ “sole defining characteristic” was that they contained “shift managers who
worked for the company during a three-year period” in either North or South
Carolina. 123 F.4th at 681. The district court found commonality based on the
application of a generalized policy to all class members across both states.
See id. at
679–80. Specifically, the court estimated that 80% of prospective class members likely
worked an opening shift during the relevant time period and therefore had conducted
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off-the-clock pre-shift work while completing tasks on a common checklist.
Id. at 679.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that “conclusory assertions” of the application
of “some highly generalized company policy” were insufficient to show commonality
across the class.
Id. at 680.
Applying
Stafford to the facts of this case is a poor fit. The district court found
commonality in
Stafford based on the application of a general policy to the work
experiences of numerous employees across two states and in multiple stores. Here,
the inquiry is narrowly focused on Defendant’s actions or inactions related to a single
entity—Liberty—which 	are 	dispositive 	of 	the 	proposed 	class 	members’ 	claims.
Further, the Court’s class definition that is the subject of this Order limits the class
to consumers for whom a CPE report was provided to Liberty, a smaller category than
Plaintiff proposed. Accordingly, the Court finds the common questions of law and fact
in this case satisfy the commonality requirement.
4. 	Typicality
Next, Rule 23 requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). “The
essence of the typicality requirement is captured by the notion that ‘as goes the claim
of the named plaintiff, so go the claims of the class.’”
Deiter v. Microsoft Corp., 436
F.3d 461, 466 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc.,
155 F.3d 331, 340 (4th Cir. 1998)).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are typical of her fellow class members.
Plaintiff will pursue her claims under the FCRA based on evidence of (1) whether
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Defendant had sufficient information to form a reason to believe Liberty would use
the report for a permissible purpose; (2) whether Defendant’s procedures were
reasonable; and (3) whether any alleged violations were willful. Plaintiff’s claims will
rise or fall on the same evidence as all other class members. Similarly, Defendant’s
defenses are typical across all the class members. Indeed, all class members’ claims
fail if Defendant had reason to believe Liberty was using reports for permissible
purposes 	and 	its 	procedures 	were 	reasonable—regardless 	of 	whether 	Liberty
ultimately used all or some of the reports for impermissible purposes.
5. 	Adequacy
Federal Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the “representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). In its opposition,
Defendant does not contest the adequacy of Plaintiff or her counsel to represent the
class. Based on the record, the Court similarly finds that they will fairly and
adequately represent the proposed class. Plaintiff has met her burden under Rule
23(a).
D. Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements
Because all Rule 23(a) requirements are satisfied, Plaintiff now “bears the
burden of demonstrating that the proposed class fits into one of the specific forms of
class adjudication provided by Rule 23(b).”
Krakauer, 925 F.3d at 655. Here, Plaintiff
asserts that the proposed class satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements, as “questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
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fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The Court
analyzes each factor.
1. 	Predominance
Predominance and commonality are intertwined.
Stafford, 123 F.4th at 679.
“Predominance 	presupposes 	that 	a 	common 	question 	exists 	and 	measures 	the
question’s significance to the pending litigation.”
Id. “While commonality serves to
ask whether class-wide proceedings are even possible, predominance ‘tests whether
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’”
Id. (quoting
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) and
Gariety v.
Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2004)). “The predominance inquiry
asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more
prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual
issues.”
Tyson Foods, 577 U.S. at 453 (citation omitted). “When one or more of the
central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate,
the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important
matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative
defenses peculiar to some individual class members.”
Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the Court finds the predominance factor is satisfied. Common questions
as to whether Defendant had reason to believe Liberty would use the reports for a
permissible purpose, whether Defendant’s procedures were reasonable, and whether
Defendant’s actions were willful predominate over any issues specific to individual
class members. Defendant’s argument to the contrary is unavailing.
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Defendant relies on
Mott v. Trinity Fin. Servs. LLC, No. 2:1-cv-01754, 2018
WL 7501128 (D. Nev. Sep. 27, 2018). Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy
predominance, because “whether TransUnion reasonably believed that [Liberty] had
a 	permissible 	purpose 	to 	obtain 	each 	putative 	class 	member’s 	report 	is 	an
individualized inquiry.” (Doc. No. 46 at 30). But
Mott is not binding on this Court,
and even if it were, the case is inapposite.
Mott concerned the liability of a user of a
credit report under a different provision of the FCRA—not the liability of a CRA like
TransUnion. 2018 WL 7501128, at *1. The district court did not apply or even
consider the “reason to believe” standard.
Id. at *1–2. Additionally, as previously
explained, whether TransUnion had reason to believe Liberty had a permissible
purpose in requesting credit reports does not require an individualized inquiry.
2. 	Superiority
In deciding whether a class action is superior to other methods of litigation,
courts consider, among other things, the Rule 23(b)(3) factors: “(A) class members’
interests in individually controlling the prosecution . . . of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun . . . ; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation in this . . . forum and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action . . . .”
Cheng v. Liu, No. 23-1806,
2024 WL 3579606, at *4 (4th Cir. July 29, 2024) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1139 (2025). With these factors, the Court is comparing “the
possible alternatives to determine whether Rule 23 is sufficiently effective to justify
the expenditure of the judicial time and energy that is necessary to adjudicate a class
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action and to assume the risk of prejudice to the rights of those who are not directly
before the court.”
Stillmock v. Weis Mkts., Inc., 385 F. App’x 267, 274 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting 7AA Wright & Miller’s Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1779 (3d ed. 2005)).
Here, given the common predominant questions of law and fact, it is far more
efficient and manageable to resolve these issues through a class action. Moreover, the
record does not demonstrate that class members have a strong interest in individual
litigation in this case. The FCRA provides for statutory damages for willful violations
of “not less than $100 and not more than $1,000” along with “such amount of punitive
damages as the court may allow.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). Given this modest recovery
compared to the time and expense of litigation, it is unsurprising that no other cases
have been filed arising under the same set of circumstances.4 A class action will also
help promote consistency of results. Neither party has suggested the current forum
is undesirable, and this factor is neutral. Based on the Rule 23(b)(3) factors and the
record, the Court finds Plaintiff has satisfied the superiority requirement.
E. Appointment of Counsel
Having concluded that Plaintiff has met her burden on class certification under
Rule 23, the Court must appoint counsel under Rule 23(g). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(1)(B).
When appointing class counsel, the Court must consider the work counsel has done
in identifying or investigating the potential claims, counsel’s relevant experience and
knowledge of the applicable law, and the resources that counsel will commit to
representing the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A). Also, the Court may consider any
4
See (Doc. No. 46 at 30).
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other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B).
Here, the Court has considered all the Rule 23(g)(1) factors and the record in
this case.
See e.g. (Doc. Nos. 40-19, 40-20). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel
will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class and appoints them as
class counsel.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification of Claims Against Defendant
Trans Union LLC (Doc. No. 39) is GRANTED, and the case shall proceed
as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3);
2. 	Plaintiff Connie Jackson is designated as class representative;
3. 	The class for Plaintiff’s Claims is defined as:
All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who
were the subject of a CPE report sold by Defendant; (b) on
or after August 12, 2019 and continuing through the date
on which the class list is prepared; (c) in which the Trans
Union subscriber showing in Defendant’s records is Liberty
Credit Management.
Excluded from the Class are all persons who have signed a
written release of their claim, and/or are counsel in this
case, or employed by the Federal Judiciary.
4. 	The law firms of Consumer Litigation Associates, P.C. and Flores Law,
PLLC, who are the attorneys of record for the appointed class
representative, are hereby APPOINTED to serve as class counsel; and
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5. 	The Court DIRECTS the parties to confer and submit, within fourteen
(14) days, a jointly prepared draft Notice to the class consistent with this
order and Rule 23(c)(2).
SO ORDERED.
Signed: June 2, 2026
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