USA v. Daniel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:24-CR-00209-MEO-DCK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID DANIEL,
Defendant.
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ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, to Suppress and Memorandum in Support” (“Motion”) (Doc. No. 25); the
Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”) of the assigned Magistrate Judge recommending
that the Motion be denied (Doc. No. 40); and Defendant’s “Objections to Memorandum &
Recommendation (Evidentiary Hearing and Oral Argument Requested)” (“Objections”). (Doc.
No. 45).
The Court has carefully considered the Motion, M&R, and Defendant’s Objections de
novo. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will DENY the Motion and ADOPT the
Magistrate Judge’s M&R.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may refer a motion to dismiss an indictment or a motion to suppress
evidence to a magistrate judge for a recommendation pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 59(b)(1). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may object
to the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations, and the court “shall make a
de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
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recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Objections to the
magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations must be made “with sufficient specificity
so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.” United States v.
Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1157 (2007). However, “in the
absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead
must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation” and need not give any explanation for adopting the M&R. Diamond v. Colonial
Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). After reviewing the
record, the court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge” or “recommit the matter with instructions.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
No party has objected to the Magistrate Judge’s statement of the factual and procedural
background of this case as set forth in the M&R. See (Doc. No. 40 at Section I). Therefore, the
Court adopts the factual and procedural background.
On October 02, 2025, Magistrate Judge David Keesler issued the M&R. Id. The M&R
considered Defendant’s arguments and recommended the Motion be denied. Id. at 10. On October
27, 2025, Defendant filed Objections to the M&R. (Doc. No. 45). Defendant raised three issues
with respect to both the dismissal and suppression components of the Motion. Defendant objected
to (1) the portion of the M&R which Defendant asserts “relies heavily on only two opinions, which
are not binding and merely persuasive authority. . .”; (2) the Court’s decision not to “make any
finding about [Defendant’s] factual assertion that this case would not have arisen but for the
investigation in his January 6 case”; and (3) the Court’s alleged failure to “provide substantive
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reasoning for its conclusion that there is no due process violation.” (Doc. No. 45 at 1-3, 9).
III. DISCUSSION
In January 2025, President Trump issued a proclamation “grant[ing] a full, complete and
unconditional pardon to . . . individuals convicted of offenses related to events that occurred at or
near the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” (the “Pardon”). Proclamation No. 10887, 90
Fed. Reg. 8331 (Jan. 29, 2025). The Pardon went on to “direct the Attorney General to pursue
dismissal with prejudice to the government of all pending indictments against individuals for their
conduct related to the events at or near the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” Id.; see
also (Doc. No. 25-1 at 1) (emphasis added).
Defendant argues the Pardon requires this Court to dismiss the child exploitation charges
in this matter or, alternatively, to suppress the evidence the Government obtained during its
investigation. As an initial matter, the Court finds that child exploitation is not “conduct related
to the events at or near the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.” The Pardon’s plain language
does not apply to the indictment in this case.1 To argue that it does “strains credulity for even the
most casual user of words.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Moreover, Defendant’s due process argument regarding selective prosecution fails.
See (Doc. No. 35 at 8). Whether the Government has made an inconsistent argument in another
case involving wholly different alleged crimes is of no moment, considering the broad nature of
prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)
(recognizing that “in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [federal
1 The Court notes the Magistrate Judge reached the same conclusion. See (Doc. No. 40 at 9) (“It
appears to the undersigned that the Pardon’s scope does not extend to the child exploitation
offenses charged in the instant matter.”). Defendant also acknowledged that “[t]he charges here
are unrelated to the January 6 case.” (Doc. No. 25 at 1).
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prosecutors] have properly discharged their official duties”) (quoting United States v. Chemical
Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)). Nor does Defendant point to any similar prosecution
where the alleged relevant conduct identified during the January 6 investigation involves receipt
and possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation of minors.
The Court has reviewed Defendant’s Motion and objections and has conducted a full de
novo review of the M&R and other documents of record. Having done so, the Court hereby finds
that the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is, in all respects, in accordance with the law and
should be approved. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge. Defendant’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to suppress is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:
1. The Magistrate Judge’s M&R, (Doc. No. 40), is ADOPTED as described herein; and
2. Defendant’s “Motion To Dismiss, Or In The Alternative, To Suppress And
Memorandum In Support” (Doc. No. 25), is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: January 27, 2026
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