Farris v. USA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:22-cv-00557-RJC
(3:18-cr-00099-RJC-DCK-1)
GARLIN RAYMOND FARRIS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) ORDER
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent. )
___________________________________ )
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner’s “Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(e)
to Reconsider Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion to Vacate and Motion for Certificate of Appealability.”
[Doc. 16].
On August 8, 2023, this Court denied and dismissed Petitioner’s motion to vacate under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the merits and addressed Petitioner’s other then-pending motions in a lengthy
Order, which the Court herein incorporates by reference. [Doc. 14]. In pertinent part, the Court
held that Petitioner failed to show prejudice relative to his claim that his trial counsel, Miranda
Mills, was ineffective for failing to interview Joseph Mays, an alleged eyewitness to the subject
drug transaction, and that Petitioner’s post-trial counsel, Roderick Davis, was ineffective for
delaying to file a motion for an extension of time to file a Rule 33 new trial motion. [Id. at 38,
44]. As to Mays, the Court concluded, in part, that Petitioner had “not shown that Mays was
available, would have testified, and would have provided exculpatory testimony.” [Id. (citations
omitted)]. As to Davis, the Court concluded:
The time to file a new trial motion … expired well before Davis was
appointed to represent Petitioner. Moreover, Petitioner told Davis
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that he had not intended to file a new trial motion during the 14-day
window and only reached that decision once Davis was appointed
to represent him. [CR Doc. 85 at 1-2]. He also told Davis that he
was not asserting that Mills was ineffective for failing to file the
motion within 14 days. [Id.]. Davis filed the motion for new trial
and motion for extension of time to file it after having obtained and
reviewed the substantial record, as well as “pages and pages and
pages and pages” of documents and cases Petitioner gave him. [See
CV Doc. 1-2 at 12-13, 18, 23-24]. Also, Davis’s decision not to
move to reconsider the Court’s denial of the motion for extension of
time and motion for new trial were well within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Such motions are rarely granted
and only in very limited circumstances that Petitioner has not
shown. [See CV Doc. 1 at 35-36].
[Doc. 14 at 44]. Finally, because Petitioner asserted an extraordinary number of grounds for relief,
related arguments, and alleged factual predicates, the Court noted that “any claims not specifically
addressed by the Court herein have been carefully reviewed and considered and the Court finds
them to be without merit.” [Id. at 31 n.4].
Now pending is Petitioner’s timely motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 16]. Petitioner asserts two primary grounds for relief.
First, Petitioner argues that the Court “patently misunderstood” his argument “wherein he rebutted
the government’s presumption” that his trial counsel’s failure to investigate Joseph Mays
“prevented Petitioner from presenting a complete defense.” [Id. at 2]. Petitioner posits that, “[t]he
district court’s review seems slanted when it failed to acknowledge Mays’ arrest record that was
presented to the Court, which Ms. Mills would have uncovered through a minor investigation or
interview.” [Id. at 5]. Second, Petitioner argues that the Court committed “error of law to not
apply the standards set forth in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S.
380 (1993) in evaluation of Petitioner’s claim” that Davis’ failure to argue “excusable neglect” in
waiting to file a motion for extension of time to file a Rule 33 new trial motion was ineffective
assistance. [Id. at 7-9]. Petitioner also argues that Davis’ late filing created a conflict of interest
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under which Davis labored, constituting ineffective assistance, and the Court erred in finding
otherwise. [Id. at 9-10].
Regarding motions to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e), the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals has stated:
A district court has the discretion to grant a Rule 59(e) motion only
in very narrow circumstances: “(1) to accommodate an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not
available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or to prevent
manifest injustice.”
Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Collison v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union,
34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, “Rule 59(e) motions may not be used to make
arguments that could have been made before the judgment was entered.” Id. Indeed, the
circumstances under which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted are so limited that
“[c]ommentators observe ‘because of the narrow purposes for which they are intended, Rule 59(e)
motions typically are denied.’” Woodrum v. Thomas Mem’l Hosp. Found., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 350,
351 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)).
Petitioner argues he is entitled to relief under Rule 59(e) “to correct error and prevent
manifest injustice.” [Doc. 16 at 1]. Notwithstanding Petitioner’s plain failure to show manifest
injustice [see id. at 1, 3], the Court notes that it did consider Petitioner’s reply brief, including his
purported showing of prejudice on this issue [see Doc. 12 at 5-10], and simply found such showing
unavailing. Moreover, there is nothing “slanted” about the Court not addressing every statement
or piece of information Petitioner presented to it. To do so in this case would have unnecessarily
and disproportionally consumed limited judicial resources. Petitioner’s arguments relative to
Davis’ handling of the Rule 33 motion and the Court’s determinations relative thereto simply
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rehash arguments Petitioner either did or could have made before final judgment was entered in
this case. There was no need for the Court to undertake an analysis of the Pioneer factors in the
context of its decision and Petitioner has not shown any “clear error of law.” Because Petitioner
has not shown the existence of the limited circumstances under which a Rule 59(e) motion may be
granted, see Hill, 277 F.3d at 708, the Court will deny Petitioner’s motion. The Court will also
deny Petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability on these issues for the same reasons it
declined to issue such certificate in its final Order in this case. [See Doc. 14 at 57-58].
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion Pursuant to Rule 59(e) to
Reconsider and Motion for Certificate of Appealability [Doc. 16] is DENIED.
Signed: October 11, 2023
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