United States of America v. Lang et al

9:24-cv-00033Mtd3 de dez. de 2025

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
MISSOULA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TAYLN LANG, HEIRLOOM
REMEDIES, and HEIRLOOM
CURIOSITIES, LLC,
Defendants.
CV 24-33-M-KLD
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court Plaintiff United States of America’s
motion for default judgment against Defendants Tayln Lang, Heirloom Remedies,
and Heirloom Curiosities, LLC. (Doc. 25). The motion is granted for the reasons
outlined below.
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
On March 18, 2024, the United States filed this action against Lang and his
two businesses—a gift shop named Heirloom Curiosities, and a marijuana
dispensary named Heirloom Remedies. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 5-6). The facts as alleged in
the Complaint are as follows.
On May 4, 2021, Lang applied for an Economic Injury Disaster Loan
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(“EIDL”) from the Small Business Association (“SBA”) on behalf of his business,
Heirloom Curiosities. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 32-34). Lang listed the “business activity” on
the EIDL application as “retail” and “flea market,” stated that the business had
three employees, and listed gross receipts of $362,784.16 for fiscal year 2019 and
$65,843.96 for fiscal year 2020. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 32). He checked the box on the
application’s “eligible entity verification” that “[a]pplicant is not engaged in any
illegal activity (as defined by Federal guidelines)” and answered “no” to an
eligibility question asking: “Is Applicant engaged in any illegal activity (as defined
by Federal guidelines), including selling recreational or medical marijuana?” (Doc.
1 at ¶ 33).
Based on the representations in Lang’s application, the SBA approved
Heirloom Curiosities for an EIDL program loan of $66,000 on May 4, 2021. (Doc.
1 at ¶ 34). Lang electronically signed the Loan Authorization and Agreement that
same day, certifying, among other things, that: “All representations in the
Borrower’s Loan application (including all supplementary submissions) are true,
correct and complete and are offered to induce SBA to make this Loan.” (Doc. 1 at
¶ 34).
Contrary to this certification, however, Lang’s EIDL application included
false statements. In actual fact, Lang reported the employees and gross income
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from his marijuana dispensary, Heirloom Remedies, together with income from
Heirloom Curiosities. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 35). Those false statements were material to the
SBA. Had Lang reported the correct number of employees and gross income for
just Heirloom Curiosities, or conversely, had he correctly identified that Heirloom
Remedies was in the business of selling marijuana—which is prohibited by federal
law—Heirloom Curiosities would not have received the $66,000 loan from the
SBA. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 36).
On May 27, 2021, Lang applied for an SBA guaranteed Paycheck Protection
Program (“PPP”) loan through a third-party lender. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 38). On the
application, Lang listed his “DBA or Tradename” as “Heirloom
Remedies/Heirloom Curiosities, LLC,” stated that his total gross revenue in 2019
was $215,093, and indicated that he had one employee. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 38). Lang
responded “no” to a question asking: “Is the Applicant or any owner of the
Applicant an owner of any other business, or have common management
(including a management agreement) with any other business?” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 39).
And by signing the application, Lang certified that “[t]he Applicant is not engaged
in any activities that is illegal under federal, state or local law.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 40).
Like his EIDL application, Lange’s PPP application also contained false
information that was material to the SBA. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 41-42). Specifically, the
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gross revenue Lang reported on his PPP application was derived from his
marijuana business Heirloom Remedies. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 41). Had Lang correctly
reported this information, his PPP loan would not have been approved. (Doc. 1 at ¶
42).
Lang’s application was approved for a PPP loan of $20,833 on May 31,
2021. The money was transferred to Lang’s personal checking account on June 28,
2021. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 43). Lange applied for forgiveness of the PPP loan on
September 7, 2021, and certified on the application that he complied with all SBA
rules on eligible uses of the PPP loan proceeds, including the amount that must be
used for payroll costs. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 44). Lang also certified that the forgiveness
application was true and correct in all material respects. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 44). On
September 10, 2021, Lang’s forgiveness application was accepted and the original
principal of $20,833 and interest of $43.95 were forgiven by the SBA. (Doc. 1 at ¶
45).
The United States filed its Complaint on March 18, 2024, seeking treble
damages and civil penalties for violations of the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A) (Count 1), and asserting claims for damages and other
monetary relief under common law theories of unjust enrichment (Count 2) and
payment by mistake (Count 3). (Doc. 1 at 13). On March 28, 2024, Lang executed
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a waiver of service of summons on behalf of all Defendants and this document was
filed with the Court on March 29, 2024. (Doc. 5). On November 11, 2024, the
United States moved for entry of default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(a) based on the Defendants’ failure to appear, plead, or otherwise
defend the action. (Doc. 10). On November 19, 2024, the Clerk of Court entered
default against Defendants. (Doc. 13).
On November 22, 2024, Lang filed an “Answer Pro Se” requesting “an
opportunity to defend himself” against the allegations in the Complaint. (Doc. 15).
In response to Lang’s filing, the United States filed an unopposed motion to vacate
the entry of default, which the Court granted on December 13, 2024. (Docs. 16,
17). The Court gave Defendants until January 13, 2025, to file a responsive
pleading. (Doc. 17). Defendants failed to answer or otherwise appear, and on April
3, 2025, the United States file a second motion for entry of default. (Doc. 21). On
April 4, 2024, the Clerk of Court again entered default against Defendants pursuant
to Rule 55(a). (Doc. 23).
Defendants failed to answer or otherwise appear as required by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A) by the Court ordered deadline. On May 21, 2025,
the United States filed the pending motion for entry of default judgment pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). (Doc. 25). The United States asks the
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Court to enter default judgment against Defendants Tayln Lang, Heirloom
Remedies, and Heirloom Curiosities, LLC, jointly and severally, in the total
amount of $312,651.10. (Doc. 25). As of the date of this Order, Defendants still
have not answered, responded to, or otherwise defended against the allegations in
the Complaint and Lang has made no further filings in the case.
II. 	Discussion
“The district court’s decision whether to enter default judgment is a
discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). A
district court considering whether default judgment is appropriate should consider
the following factors: “(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits
of the claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount of money at
stake, (5) the possibility of factual disputes, (6) whether default is due to excusable
neglect, and (7) the policy favoring decisions on the merits.” State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Croft, 2019 WL 6311136, at *1 (D. Mont. Nov. 25, 2019) (citing
Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).
“At this stage of the proceedings, well-pleaded factual allegations, except
those related to damages, are deemed admitted and are sufficient to establish the
unresponsive defendant’s liability.” Grayson v. Midland Group & Associates, LLC,
2025 WL 901677, at *2 (D. Mont. Mar. 25, 2025) (citing Geddes v. United Fin.
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Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). As to damages, “the amount claimed
must be reasonable and substantiated by the plaintiff’s evidence.” Grayson, 2025
WL 901677, at *2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); Cement & Concrete Workers Dist.
Council Welfare Fund v. Metro Found. Contrs. Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir.
2012)).
A. 	Eitel Factors
The Court finds that the first Eitel factor, the possibility of prejudice to the
plaintiffs, weighs in favor of granting default judgment. The United States explains
that PPP loans were not secured with collateral, and the security interest on the
EIDL loan at issue consists of collateral that is, at least in part, a controlled
substance (marijuana) and related paraphernalia that has no value to the
government because it is illegal under federal law. (Doc. 26 at 7-8). As alleged in
the Complaint, the PPP and EIDL loans would not have been approved had Lang
correctly reported the true nature of the Defendant businesses. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 36,
42). If default judgment is not entered, the possibility of prejudice is high because
the government will be left without a means to recover the loan proceeds
wrongfully obtained by Defendants.
The second and third factors require consideration of the merits of the claims
and the sufficiency of the complaint, Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471, both of which weigh
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in favor of entering default judgment. Taken as true, the allegations in the
Complaint state a claim under Section 3729(a)(1)(A) of the FCA, which requires
proof of the following elements: “(1) a false or fraudulent claim (2) that was
material to the decision-making process (3) which defendant presented, or caused
to be presented, to the United States for payment or approval (4) with knowledge
that the claim was false or fraudulent.” Hooper v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 688
F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
As summarized above, the United States has pled facts establishing that
Lang violated the FCA on behalf of himself and his companies by falsely
certifying eligibility for both the EIDL and the PPP loans. First, Lang represented
on the EIDL application for Heirloom Curiosities that it was a “retail” and “flea
market” but included the gross of income and employees of Heirloom Remedies,
his marijuana dispensary, and falsely answered “no” to an eligibility question
asking whether the applicant was engaged in illegal activities, including selling
recreational or medical marijuana. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 32, 33, 35; Doc. 26-1 at 5-11).
Second, on the PPP application for “Heirloom Remedies/Heirloom Curiosities,
LLC” Lang falsely certified that the applicant was not engaged in illegal activity
under federal law and again reported gross revenue from the marijuana dispensary.
(Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 40-41; Doc. 26-1 at 19-20).
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Had Lang truthfully indicated on his EIDL application that he was including
his marijuana business on the application or reported the correct employees and
gross income for Heirloom Curiosities, he would not have received the loan. (Doc.
1 at ¶ 36). Likewise, had Lang truthfully stated on his PPP application that
Heirloom Remedies was engaged in illegal activities, the loan would not have been
funded. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 42). Based on the loan applications specifically excluding
activity illegal under federal law—"including selling recreational or medical
marijuana”—Lang knew, or should have known, that he was providing false
statements and certifications on the loan applications. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 33, 40).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the well-pled allegations of the Complaint
establish that Defendants violated the FCA. The second and third Eitel factors are
thus satisfied.
The fourth Eitel factor considers the amount of money at stake weighed
against the culpability of the defendant’s conduct. Croft, 2019 WL 6311136, at *3.
The FCA authorizes treble damages and civil penalties. 31 U.S.C. § 3729; 28
C.F.R. § 85.5. The United States seeks to recover $94,919.70 in principal amounts,
interest and fees for the loans wrongfully obtained by Defendants, plus treble
damages and civil penalties. (Doc. 26 at 8). Because the $94,919.70 in damages
arises directly from Defendants’ misconduct, and the treble damages and penalties
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are statutorily authorized, they are reasonable and proportional to Defendants’
conduct. The fourth Eitel factor thus weighs in favor of default judgment.
The fifth and sixth factors—possible factual disputes and excusable
neglect—also favor entering default judgment. Because Defendants did not answer
the United States’ Complaint, no facts are in disputes. See PepsiCo, Inc. v.
California Sec. Cans., 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Defendants
were properly served, and although the Court granted Defendants additional time
to appear and defend against the United States’ claims, they failed to do so. Nearly
eleven months have passed since the January 13, 2025, deadline for the Defendants
to respond to the Complaint, and there is nothing in the record to support a finding
of excusable neglect. Accordingly, the fifth and sixth Eitel factors also weigh in
favor of default judgment.
The final factor, the policy favoring a decision on the merits, generally
weighs against entering default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. But this factor,
standing alone, is not dispositive. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177.
Because this factor is outweighed by all the other Eitel factors, and Defendants’
failure to appear makes it impossible for the Court to render a decision on the
merits, default judgment is appropriate.
B. 	Damages
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The party seeking default judgment “has the burden of proving damages
through testimony or written affidavit.” Luxottica Group S.p.A. v. Thornton, 2022
WL 216785 at *8 (C.D. Cal. May, 2, 2022) (citing Bd. of Trustees of the
Boilermaker Vacation Tr. v. Skelly, Inc., 389 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1226 (N.D. Cal.
2005)). The Court may hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of
damages, but “no hearing is necessary ‘if the amount of damages can be
determined from definite figures contained in the documentary evidence or in
detailed affidavits’.” Luxottica, 2022 WL 2167685, at *8 (quoting Bravado Int’l
Grp. Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Quintero, 2013 WL 12126750, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
27, 2013)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (“The court may conduct
hearings…when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to…determine the
amount of damages.”).
The United States has submitted sufficient evidence to substantiate the
amount of damages requested, including the declaration John Nielsen, a fraud
investigator with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the District of Montana. (Doc. 26-
1). As reflected in Nielsen’s declaration and attached exhibits, the principal
balance of the EIDL is $66,000.00, and the interest amount is $5,542.75, totaling
$71,542.75. (Doc. 26-1 at 2 ¶¶ 2-3, 13-17). For the PPP loan, the principal
forgiveness amount is $20,833.00, the interest forgiveness amount is $43.95, and
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the PPP processing fee paid by the SBA is $2,500.00, totaling $23,376.95. (Doc.
26-1 at 2-3 ¶¶ 4-6, 40). The evidence thus establishes that the United States paid
Defendants a total of $94,919.70 as a result of Lang’s false statements and
misrepresentations regarding the nature of his business activities.
Any person who violates the FCA is liable to the United States for three
times the amount of damages sustained by the government, plus a civil penalty of
$5,000 to $10,000 per violation, adjusted in accordance with the Federal Civil
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended. (Doc. 26 at 12, citing 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)).
Under the FCA, Defendants are thus liable for three times the damages
amount of $94,919.70, which is $284,759.10. See Cook County v. United States ex
rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 132 (2003); see also Fresenius Med. Care Holdings,
Inc. v. United states, 2013 WL 1946216, at *6 (D. Mass. May 9, 2013) (“[T]he
government need only prove its single damages, after which multiple damages are
applied as a matter of course.”).
For civil penalties assessed after February 12, 2024, whose associated
violations occurred after November 2, 2015, the civil penalty amounts range from
a minimum of $13,946 to a maximum of $27,894. (Doc. 26 at 13, citing 28 C.F.R.
§ 85.5.). The United States asks the Court to impose the minimum statutory
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penalty of $13,946.00 for each of the two FCA violations, the first of which related
to the EIDL loan and the second to the PPP loan. See United States v. Mackby, 221
F.Supp.2d 1106, 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“The Ninth Circuit and other federal
courts have consistently found that civil penalty awards in which the amount of the
award is less than the statutory maximum do not run afoul of the Excessive Fines
Clause.”).
Accordingly, the United States has satisfied its burden of establishing that
pursuant to the FCA it is entitled to treble damages of $284,759.10 and two civil
penalties totaling $27,892.00, for a total award of $312,651.10.
III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, and good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that the United States’ Motion for Default Judgment (Doc.
25) is GRANTED. Default judgment is hereby entered in favor of the United
States and against Defendants Tayln Lang, Heirloom Remedies, and Heirloom
Curiosities, LLC, jointly and severally, in the total amount of $312,651.10. Interest
shall accrue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 until the judgment is paid in full.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2025.
________________________________
Kathleen L. DeSoto
United States Magistrate Judge
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