USA v. Shostak

6:21-cr-00002Mtd4 de fev. de 2026

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1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
HELENA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
ROY ALLEN SHOSTAK,
Defendant/Movant.
CR 21–02–H–BMM
ORDER
A grand jury indicted Defendant/Movant Roy Allen Shostak for possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) on
April 8, 2021. (Doc. 1.) Shostak was convicted following a one-day jury trial in
July 2021. (See Doc. 45). The Court sentenced Shostak to 164 months of custody
on November 4, 2021. (See Doc. 50). The Ninth Circuit affirmed Shostak’s
conviction in November of 2022. (Docs. 65, 66.) Shostak now seeks federal
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Docs. 69, 90.) Shostak’s motion will be
denied.
BACKGROUND1
I. 	Trial
1 The trial transcript is cited as “(Tr. [page no.].)”
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A one-day jury trial was held in July 2021. (See Doc. 61 (transcript), 45
(verdict).) The Government called 5 witnesses, all but one of which were law
enforcement officers. (See Doc. 40.) The defense called no witnesses. The
Government’s case and the defense’s theory are outlined below.
A. 	The Case Against Shostak
Helena Police Department Sergeant Randy Ranalli received information
from a confidential source in May 2020 that Shostak was frequenting two
addresses in the Helena area and driving a black Jaguar sedan. (Tr. 37.) Law
enforcement was looking for Shostak at that time because he was considered a
probation absconder from state probation and parole. (Tr. 37.) An evidence
technician working for the Helena Police Department corroborated the fact that
Shostak was driving a black Jaguar, as Shostak recently had driven the vehicle to
the police impound lot to pick up a friend’s car. (Tr. 97.)
Sergeant Ranalli surveilled the two addresses provided by the confidential
source, ultimately observing both the black Jaguar and Shostak at the second
address on May 29, 2020. (Tr. 39–41.) Sergeant Ranalli observed several people
going in and out of the address that day, including Shostak. (Tr. 41–42.) then saw
Shostak exit the address, open the driver’s door of the Jaguar, reach inside, and
place a backpack on the front passenger seat. (Tr. 42.) Sergeant Ranalli did not
see anyone else approach the vehicle or touch the backpack during his surveillance.
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(Tr. 43, 67.) Sergeant Ranalli called for additional officers in order to execute an
arrest when Shostak went back inside. (Tr. 43.) Shostak was arrested without
incident, and law enforcement seized the Jaguar after Sergeant Ranalli observed
what appeared to be a marijuana pipe in plain view on the driver’s seat. (Tr. 43–
45.) Sergeant Ranalli also called the registered owner of the Jaguar, Jason
Conklin, who confirmed that he had sold it on May 16, 2020, to Shostak over
Facebook Marketplace. (Tr. 91–102.)
Law enforcement searched the Jaguar on June 5, 2020, pursuant to a
warrant. (Tr. 46.) Law enforcement found a Motorola cell phone and a bill of sale
from “Jason Conklin” for the Jaguar dated May 16, 2020, in the glove department.
(Tr. 49; Ex. 7.) Law enforcement also searched the backpack Shostak had placed
on the front seat. (Tr. 50.) Law enforcement found a Samsung cell phone inside
the front pocket. (Tr. 53.) Law enforcement discovered some clothing and three
baggies containing a white substance that field tested positive for
methamphetamine inside the main pocket. (Tr. 54.) Law enforcement also found
documents in the Jaguar containing Shostak’s personal information and credit card
information for a specific card. (Tr. 56–57.) The officers, subsequently, sought
search warrants for the two cell phones and ultimately discovered that their
message and text history showed numerous drug references and transactional
language. (Tr. 60–63, 72, 82–84, 93.) The contents of the Samsung phone also
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showed that the phone belonged to Shostak and contained conversations regarding
his purchase of the Jaguar. (Tr. 60, 74–75, 77, 86–87.)
Law enforcement sent the baggies of suspected methamphetamine to a Drug
Enforcement Agency lab. (Tr. 105–07.) All three baggies returned positive for
methamphetamine, totaling 356.8 grams of pure methamphetamine. (Tr. 109; Ex.
1.)
B. 	The Defense Theory
Shostak’s defense at trial was that while the Jaguar may have been his, the
Government failed to show that he knew what was in the backpack. (Tr. 139–40.)
More specifically, defense counsel focused on the fact that law enforcement had
not seen Shostak open the backpack or place drugs in the backpack. (Tr. 66.)
Defense counsel elicited testimony from Sergeant Ranalli that law enforcement
found clothing in the backpack with the methamphetamine. Sergeant Ranalli
testified that law enforcement did not retain the clothing as evidence or perform
any test on the clothing, such as for fingerprints or DNA. (Tr. 66; see Tr. 140–41.)
Sergeant Ranalli also confirmed that there were several other occupants at the
address that day, and that many of those people were known drug users. (Tr. 63–
65.) In closing, defense counsel made the following argument regarding Sergeant
Ranalli:
[he] never collected any fingerprint evidence, no DNA evidence. They
didn’t test the clothing to make sure it was Roy’s. Instead, again, this
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case boils down to the officer acting on a hunch, that he saw him place
a backpack in the car, and it must have drugs. It must have been Roy’s.
But, ladies and gentlemen, the government is required to do more than
that, to act more than on a hunch, not send - - not to have somebody
place a backpack in a car and then face this. 	I submit to you that the
government hasn’t proven that Mr. Shostak knew of the presence of the
drugs in the backpack on May 29th, 2020. And because they haven’t
proven that, they certainly cannot prove that he acted with an intent to
distribute. So you must find him not guilty.
(Tr. 141.) As it relates to drug transactions on the cell phone, defense counsel
emphasized the paucity of drug-related texts on or around the day of Shostak’s
arrest. (Tr. 89, 139.)
The Defense unsuccessfully had sought to suppress the items found in the
Jaguar before trial. (See Docs. 14, 22, 26). The defense also unsuccessfully moved
for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government’s case under Rule 28 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on the ground that “the government and
its evidence hasn’t proven that Mr. Shostak knew of the presence of the drugs in
the backpack,” (Tr. 110).
II. 	The Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal
Shostak was ultimately convicted of possession with intent to distribute 50
grams or more of pure methamphetamine, triggering a mandatory minimum 10-
year sentence. (Doc. 45.) A sentencing hearing was held on November 4, 2021.
(See Doc. 60.) With a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of
VI, Shostak’s advisory Guideline range was 210 to 262 months. (Id. at 5.) The
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Court ultimately sentenced Shostak to 164 months of custody, a downward
variance based on his age and the costs of his medical care. (Id. at 19.) Shostak
appealed. (Doc. 55.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his pretrial motion to
suppress in an unpublished memorandum disposition in November of 2022. (Doc.
65).
III. 	Current Motion
Shostak timely filed a pro se motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on
April 24, 2023, within the one year limitation period. (Doc. 69.) Counsel was
appointed. (Doc. 73). Counsel filed an amended § 2255 motion on May 10, 2024.
(Doc. 90). In his amended motion, Shostak argues that: (1) the government
violated his due process rights under either California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479
(1984), or Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), by failing to retain the
clothing found in the backpack, and (2) his trial attorney, Joslyn Hunt, provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a spoliation instruction
regarding that lost or destroyed evidence. (See Id.) Shostak filed three exhibit
photographs Sergeant Ranalli took of the clothing after it was removed from the
backpack in support of his motion. (Docs. 90-1, 90-2, 90-3.)
The Government argues that Shostak’s due process argument is procedurally
defaulted. The Government further contends that Shostak’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim fails because Shostak was not entitled to a spoliation instruction
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and, even if he fails to show prejudice. (Doc. 95.) Shostak replied on March 25,
2025. (Doc. 101.)
A NALYSIS
Shostak’s request for habeas relief relies entirely on the clothing that was
found in the backpack that was not retained or tested by law enforcement. Shostak
argues that the potentially exculpatory evidence was withheld in violation of the
Due Process Clause and that his trial counsel’s failure to request a spoliation
instruction on this point amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel in violation
of the Sixth Amendment. Shostak’s first argument is procedurally defaulted, and
his second argument fails on the merits. Shostak’s request for habeas relief will be
denied.
I. 	Due Process
Shostak first argues that Sergeant Ranalli violated his “due process rights
when he lost material exculpatory evidence without first allowing Mr. Shostak or
his counsel to inspect that evidence.” (Doc. 90 at 5.) The government argues that
this claim is procedurally defaulted because Shostak failed to raise it on direct
appeal and has not shown cause of the default. The Court agrees.
“[C]laims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review
unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.” Massaro v. United States, 538
U.S. 500, 504 (2003); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1988).
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“Cause” means “some objective factor external to the defense” that “impeded” the
defendant’s ability to raise the claim in his criminal case. Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 488 (1986). A petitioner can show cause for failure to raise the claim on
direct appeal if he can show that “the claim rests upon a new legal or factual basis
that was unavailable at the time of direct appeal.” United States v. Braswell, 501
F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 488).
Even if a petitioner successfully shows cause, “the prejudice prong of the
test requires demonstrating ‘not merely that the errors at trial created a possibility
of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,
infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)) (alternations omitted). 	Shostak
did not raise his due process claims on direct appeal. See United States v. Shostak,
2022 WL 17176384 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2022). Shostak can show neither cause for
failing to raise the claims nor actual prejudice from the alleged violation. Shostak’s
claims are procedurally defaulted.
Shostak argues that this issue could not have been raised on direct appeal
because neither the clothing nor the photographs of the clothing taken by Sergeant
Ranalli were introduced at trial. As a result, “the record on appeal contained no
visual or evidentiary basis to evaluate whether the clothing supported a third-party
ownership theory.” (Doc. 101 at 2.) Shostak correctly notes that habeas can be the
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appropriate forum for claims that require development of the factual record. See
Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505. Shostak knew that the clothing had not been collected
or tested before trial. (See Tr. 66 (defense counsel eliciting testimony on this
front).) Nothing prevented Shostak from raising the issue at trial or, failing that, on
appeal. Shostak does not argue, for example, that the Government withheld the
photographs of the clothing or any information about the clothing until after trial.
To the contrary, the record evidence shows this information was part of the
defense’s closing argument for the jury. (See Tr. 141.)
Possibly recognizing this issue, Shostak pivots a bit in his reply, arguing that
the failure to introduce this evidence at trial, or to make it an issue on appeal might
qualify as ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. To be sure,
ineffective assistance of counsel may provide “cause” to permit consideration of an
otherwise procedurally defaulted issue. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 488–89. That is
not the case here. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
petitioner must show that (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,” and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been
different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). The petitioner
must show not only that there was a deficiency, but that the deficiency was
prejudicial. Id. at 692. “[I]t is unnecessary to consider the prejudice prong of
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Strickland if the petitioner cannot even establish incompetence under the first
prong.” Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998).
Shostak has not shown that counsel’s failure to raise this due process issue
was constitutionally deficient. The Due Process Clause does not “impos[e] on the
police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material
that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.”
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236
(1941)). Rather, “[a] defendant has a constitutionally protected privilege to request
and obtain from the prosecution evidence that is either material to the guilt of the
defendant or relevant to the punishment to be imposed.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at
485 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963)).
“To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, evidence must both
possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed
and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id. at 489 (internal citation
omitted). On the other hand, if this materiality standard is not met and the
evidence at issue is merely “potentially useful,” a defendant must “show bad faith
on the part of the police” to establish a due process violation. Youngblood, 488
U.S. at 58. Evidence is merely potentially useful when “no more can be said than
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that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have
exonerated the defendant.” Id. at 57.
The clothing found in the backpack in this case falls into the latter category.
The presence of clothing in the backpack that did not match Shostak’s size “might
conceivably have contributed to [his] defense[]” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489. the
trial evidence showed that Shostak was the only person to handle the backpack
after it left the residence and that he had text and Facebook messages on his phone
showing an intent to distribute drugs. “Even if the clothing were seized, tested,
and tested negative for Shostak’s DNA, it would not have exonerated him from
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.” (Doc. 95 at 11–12.) Put
differently, all the elements of the charged offense were met even if the clothing
belonged to someone else. As a result, Shostak would have been required to show
that law enforcement acted in bad faith in failing to seize and/or test the clothing.
See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. Law enforcement acts in bad faith by failing to
preserve evidence when law enforcement knows “of the apparent exculpatory
value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.” United States v.
Zaragoza-Moreira, 780 F.3d 971, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2015).
Sergeant Ranalli did not retain the clothing found in the backpack or
perform any testing on it. Contrary to Shostak’s characterization, however, this
conduct does not compel the conclusion that Sergeant Ranalli “believed [the
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evidence] was harmful to his case against Mr. Shostak and, therefore, [was]
exculpatory.” (Doc. 90 at 7.) Sergeant Ranalli photographed the clothing, (see
Docs. 90-1, 90-2, and 90-3), and released it, as it was not contraband. All the other
items taken from the backpack and retained by law enforcement were either drugs
or drug paraphernalia. (See Doc. 22-2 at 10.) Shostak fails to show that Sergeant
Ranalli acted in bad faith. See United States v. Sivilla, 714 F.3d 1168, 1171–72
(9th Cir. 2013) (holding no bad faith where officer took pictures of the drug
smuggler’s vehicle and the drug compartment but did not retain the vehicle itself).
Shostak’s due process argument would not have succeeded at either the trial or on
appeal. Shostak cannot show prejudice from the counsels’ failure to raise the issue.
Based on the foregoing, the Court dismisses Shostak’s due process claim as
procedurally defaulted.
II. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must
show that (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,” and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must
be highly deferential.” Id. at 689. “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
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reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. The U.S. Supreme Court has
cautioned that “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.
Shostak alleges that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
for failing to request a spoliation instruction regarding the clothing found in the
backpack. This claim fails both prongs of the Strickland test. Shostak was not
entitled to a spoliation instruction and the proof against Shostak established guilt
regardless of the clothing’s ownership. In evaluating the government’s conduct in
an alleged spoliation case, “[c]ourts must balance ‘the quality of the Government’s
conduct’ against ‘the degree of prejudice to the accused,’ where the government
bears the burden of justifying its conduct and the accused of demonstrating
prejudice.” Sivilla, 714 F.3d at 1173 (quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 628
F.2d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 1979 (en banc) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 	In
evaluating the government’s conduct,
the court should inquire whether the evidence was lost or destroyed
while in its custody, whether the Government acted in disregard for the
interests of the accused, whether it was negligent in failing to adhere to
established 	and 	reasonable 	standards 	of 	care 	for 	police 	and
prosecutorial functions, and, if the acts were deliberate, whether they
were taken in good faith or with reasonable justification. It is relevant
also to inquire whether the government attorneys prosecuting the case
have participated in the events leading to loss or destruction of the
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evidence, for prosecutorial action may bear upon existence of a motive
to harm the accused.
Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Sergeant Ranalli photographed the clothing from the backpack but did not
perform any tests or retain the clothing as evidence. This decision was made
before the prosecution of the case and adhered to a reasonable standard of care as
the clothing was neither contraband nor inherently exculpatory. In total, the
quality of the government’s conduct was acceptable. Shostak therefore faces an
uphill battle in showing prejudice tips the scales in his favor:
In analyzing prejudice, the court must consider a wide number of
factors including, without limitation, the centrality of the evidence to
the case and its importance in establishing the elements of the crime or
the motive or intent of the defendant; the probative value and reliability
of the secondary or substitute evidence; the nature and probable weight
of factual inferences or other demonstrations and kinds of proof
allegedly lost to the accused; the probable effect on the jury from
absence of the evidence, including dangers of unfounded speculation
and bias that might result to the defendant if adequate presentation of
the case requires explanation about the missing evidence.
Id. at 1173–74 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The presence of clothing that did not belong to Shostak or did not fit him
could have been potentially exculpatory. This possibility does not undermine the
evidence of possession with intent to distribute established by the other proof
presented in the case. The government produced photographs of the clothing that
could have been used in the alternative to a spoliation instruction. The facts did
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not support the issuance of a spoliation instruction. I was reasonable for defense
counsel to not seek a spoliation instruction.
Finally, Shostak cannot show prejudice under Strickland from the failure to
give such an instruction. The Ninth Circuit Model Instructions merely state that an
adverse inference “may” be inferred for the government’s failures. See Ninth Cir.
Model Jury Instr. Crim. No. 3.19 (2022). Given the other evidence presented in
the case, even with an adverse inference instruction Shostak fails to show that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Shostak’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
IV. 	Certificate of Appealability
“The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it
enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2255
Proceedings. A COA should issue as to those claims on which the petitioner
makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). The standard is satisfied if “jurists of reason could disagree with the
district court’s resolution of [the] constitutional claims” or “conclude the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
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(2000)). The Court recognizes that jurists of reason could disagree with the
Court’s resolution of these claims. The Court will issue a COA.
C ONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED:
1. Shostak’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (Docs. 69, 90) is DISMISSED in PART and DENIED in PART.
2. A certificate of appealability is GRANTED. The clerk shall immediately
process the appeal if Shostak files a Notice of Appeal.
3. The clerk shall ensure that all pending motions in this case and in CV 23–
26–H–BMM are terminated and shall close the civil file by entering judgment in
favor of the United States and against Shostak.
DATED this 4th day of February, 2026.
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