4:24-cv-00114•Madill et al v. T-Mobile West LLC et al
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Case 4:24-cv-00114-SPW Document 103 Filed 01/29/26 Page1of15
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
GREAT FALLS DIVISION
JASON MADILL, TAMARA
MADILL, and FOUR TEN CENTRAL CV 24-114-GF-SPW
LLC,
Plaintiffs, ORDER ON T-MOBILE
WEST LLC’S MOTION TO
vs. DISMISS COUNTS 3, 4, AND
5 OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST
T-MOBILE WEST LLC, DOES 1+4, AMENDED COMPLAINT
and X, Y, Z COMPANIES,
Defendants/Third-
Party Plaintiffs,
VS.
LEGACY
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendant.
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff T-Mobile West LLC (“T-Mobile”) has filed
a Motion to Dismiss Counts 3, 4, and 5 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 49). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for the Court’s review. (See Docs.
50, 54, 57).
For the following reasons, the Court grants T-Mobile’s Motion.
Case 4:24-cv-00114-SPW Document103_ Filed 01/29/26 Page 2of15
I. Background
In 2017, Jason and Tammy Madill purchased real property, colloquially
known as the “Strain Building,” in Great Falls, Montana.! (Doc. 41 at 3-4). T-
Mobile is a limited liability company operating and doing business in the wireless
communications industry, including in Montana. (Doc. 14 at 3). Plaintiffs’ action
arises from T-Mobile’s installation of new cellular equipment on the existing cellular
tower located on the Strain Building’s roof.
In July 2020, T-Mobile approached Plaintiffs about using the Strain
Building’s cellular tower for its network. (Doc. 41 at 7). T-Mobile claimed the
installation would be “quick, timely, [and] non-invasive” and that all work personnel
would be “competent, qualified, and experienced.” (Jd. at 7-8, 13). It did not
anticipate that workers or equipment would be on the roof and represented to
Plaintiffs that most work would occur on the elevated platform, which held the
cellular tower. (/d. at 8). Ifroof access was needed, T-Mobile assured that protective
matting would be used to prevent damages. (Jd. at 9). However, according to
Plaintiffs, T-Mobile’s representations about the scope and impact of the work were
“knowingly false.” (Id. at 8).
' Four Ten Central LLC assumed ownership of the property on April 10, 2024. (Doc. 41
at 5).
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In August 2020, Jason sent an email to one of T-Mobile’s contractors asking
if any of the equipment would “create any radiation or anything that could be
considered detrimental.” (Jd. at 11). T-Mobile’s response allegedly “concealed the
true material facts” regarding the danger of the equipment, including the amount of
radiation emissions and that the installment would require special warning signs to
be placed on the roof. (/d. at 11-12).
Based on the above representations, Plaintiffs entered into a Site Lease
Agreement (“Agreement”) (Doc. 41-1) with T-Mobile on July 3, 2021, after which
T-Mobile began the installation. (Doc. 41 at 14). One provision of the Agreement
required T-Mobile to coordinate and pay for repairs caused by T-Mobile or its
contractors. (/d.). However, Plaintiffs allege that T-Mobile “knew it had no
intention of ever complying” with that provision. (/d.).
Ultimately, T-Mobile’s work caused significant damage to the Strain
Building’s roof, supporting structure, and interior. During installation, the roof
began leaking after T-Mobile made cuts, tears, and holes in the synthetic membrane.
(Id. at 15). When the sixth floor experienced water damage, T-Mobile was notified
and temporarily fixed the leaks with Flex Seal and Gorilla Tape. (/d.). T-Mobile
worked on the roof without protective mats and on one occasion, left an unsecured
communication box unattended, which froze, thawed, and damaged the roof’s
membrane. (Jd. at 16). Workers used, stored, and moved heavy equipment across
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the roof. (id. at 16-17). Plaintiffs allege “177 instances of piercings, holes,
lacerations, tears and places where the roof has been pulled away from the building.”
(Id. at 18).
After the installation, T-Mobile placed signs at the roof’s entrance warning
that radio frequency fields exceeded Federal Communications Commission limits.
(id. at 24). Additional signs were placed on the roof warning about levels of
radiation emissions. ‘(/d. at 25).
Plaintiffs fault T-Mobile for hundreds of thousands of dollars spent on repairs
and mitigation, claiming that the roof’s membrane, substrate, and supporting
structure need replacement due to T-Mobile’s installation. (/d. at 23-24). They also
seek to hold T-Mobile responsible for the access restrictions and risks of radiation
emissions now in place on the roof. (id. at 26).
On October 1, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint (Doc. 1-1) against T-
Mobile in the Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County. T-Mobile
removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Docs. 1, 4). T-
Mobile subsequently answered Plaintiffs’ Complaint on December 20, 2024. (Doc.
4).
By leave of Court, T-Mobile filed a Third-Party Complaint against Legacy
Telecommunications, LLC (“Legacy”) in March 2025. (Doc. 14). Legacy filed a
motion to dismiss the Third-Party Complaint and Counts 3—5 (deceit, negligent
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misrepresentation, and constructive fraud) of Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14(a)(2)(C), 12(b)(6), and 9(b). (Doc. 20). The
Court granted Legacy’s motion on July 22, 2025, and provided Plaintiffs leave to
amend. Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on August 21, 2025,
realleging Counts 3-5. (Doc. 41). The FAC alleges negligence (Count 1), breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count 2), deceit (Count 3),
constructive fraud (Count 4), negligent misrepresentation (Count 5), and breach of
contract (Count 6) against T-Mobile.
Il. Legal Standard
A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a pleading. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 739 (9th Cir. 2001). To
survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim is plausible if the complaint alleges enough facts to draw a
reasonable inference that the accused is liable. Jd. Though the complaint does not
need to provide detailed factual allegations, it cannot merely assert legal
conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept the complaint’s well-
pled factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the
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non-movant. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).
“Dismissal . . . is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal
theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v.
Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
Ill. Discussion
A. Timeliness of T-Mobile’s Motion
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should deny T-
Mobile’s Motion because, in their view, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) bars
a party from moving to dismiss allegations in an amended complaint when those
allegations were already answered in an earlier pleading. (Doc. 54 at 6). The Court
disagrees.
In general, “an amended complaint super[s]Jedes the original complaint and
renders it without legal effect.” Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 925, 927
(9th Cir. 2012). However, unlike a complaint, “Rule 15(a)(3) does not render a prior
response to a prior pleading moot.” KST Data, Inc. v. DXC Tech. Co., 980 F.3d 709,
715 (9th Cir. 2020). For example, “[a] defendant is not required to file a new answer
to an amended complaint when the allegations in the amended complaint do not
‘change the theory or scope of the case.’” Jd. (quoting Stanley Works v.
Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F. Supp. 659, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1990)). At the same time,
Ninth Circuit district courts have followed the general rule that “an amended
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complaint does not revive the right to file a post-answer motion to dismiss,” except
when the plaintiff alleges new matter. Brooks v. Caswell, No. 3:14-cv-01232, 2016
WL 866303, at *1 (D. Or. Mar. 2, 2016). Accordingly, if a plaintiff alleges new
matter, or changes the theory or scope of the case, then a responsive pleading is
allowed and pursuant to Rule 12(b), a defendant is required to file a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion before answering the pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b) (A Rule 12(b)(6) motion
“must be made before a pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.”). Thus,
whether a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is permitted in this instance turns on Plaintiffs’
construction of and allegations in their FAC.
Plaintiffs rely on Brooks, and other district court cases like it, to support the
notion that the FAC does no more than substantiate their existing claims, and flesh
out additional facts, which should prohibit T-Mobile from filing their Motion. (Doc.
54 at 6-8 (citing Balcom v. Peterson, No. 3:23-cv-00528, 2024 WL 923533, at *5
(D. Or. Feb. 16, 2024); Pascal v. Concentra, Inc., No. 19-cv-02559, 2020 WL
4923974, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020); Power Probe Grp., Inc. v. Innova Elecs.
Corp., 670 F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1147 (D. Nev. 2023); Best Fresh LLC v. Vantaggio
Farming Corp., No. 3:21-cv-00131, 2022 WL 4112231 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2022))).
The Brooks court considered the defendant’s motion to dismiss untimely
because it was filed after the defendant had already answered the initial complaint
multiple times, and the amendments did not introduce new claims justifying a post-
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answer motion to dismiss. 2016 WL 866303, at *2. However, the “dispositive
question” was whether the plaintiff's amendments to her initial complaint “so
transformed one or more of the claims in the [aJmended complaint . . . to restore
[d]Jefendants’ opportunity to file a motion to dismiss.” Jd. at *3. The court found
that they did not. Rather, the amendment “merely . . . correct[ed] insufficient
allegations and flesh[ed] out arguments that were previously bare.” Jd. For that
reason, the defendants had no basis to file a post-answer motion to dismiss.
By contrast, T-Mobile relies on Best Fresh LLC, to argue that while the district
court may bar a defendant from challenging existing claims, it may allow a defendant
to challenge causes of action that were previously dismissed and filed anew in the
amended complaint. (Doc. 57 at 14). The Best Fresh LLC court, like Brooks,
“follow[ed] the general rule that only new allegations—and arguments previously
unavailable—{could] be considered in resolving the . . . [mJotion to [d]ismiss. Best
Fresh LLC, 2022 WL 4112231, at *10. Though the amended complaint mostly
substantiated claims asserted in the original complaint, the court considered only
those arguments that were based on new factual allegations. Jd. The court otherwise
rejected arguments previously available as waived and untimely.
Here, unlike most of the cases cited by Plaintiffs, the Court dismissed Counts
3—5 of Plaintiffs’ original complaint for lacking sufficient factual detail to support a
cognizable legal theory. Plaintiffs’ FAC therefore necessitates new and additional
Case 4:24-cv-00114-SPW Document103_ Filed 01/29/26 Page9of15
facts to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court. By arguing that their FAC
merely substantiates the previously dismissed claims, Plaintiffs effectively admit
that the FAC does not comply with the Court’s prior ruling and as such, will not
satisfy the pleading standards under Rules 12(b) and 9.
In light of the Court’s prior ruling, the prevailing practice in Ninth Circuit
district courts, and to promote efficient resolution of these issues, the Court
concludes that Plaintiffs have purportedly alleged new facts and therefore T-
Mobile’s Motion is timely.
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
Counts 3-5 of the FAC are subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading
standard as fraud-based claims. See Let’s Get Moving, Lip v. Lagestics, LLC, No.
CV-23-14-BU, 2023 WL 8111595, at *3 (D. Mont. Nov. 22, 2023); Deveraux v.
Meadowlark of Billings LLC, No. CV 22-136-BLG, 2023 WL 2330311, at *2 (D.
Mont. Mar. 2, 2023). Under Rule 9(b), a plaintiff “must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud.” This means “[a] complaint must ‘identify the
who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false
or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent statement, and why it is false’ to
satisfy the heightened pleading standard.” Let’s Get Moving, 2023 WL 8111595, at
*3 (quoting Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)). “And
to do so, [a complaint] cannot rely on hindsight; rather, it must explain ‘why the
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statements were false or misleading at the time they were made.’” Jn re Cloudera,
Inc., 121 F.4th 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting In re Rigel Pharms., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 697 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Previously, the Court dismissed Counts 3—5 because Plaintiffs failed to allege
sufficient facts to meet the second prong of this test—namely, what was false or
misleading about the allegedly fraudulent statements, and why. (Doc. 31 at 16, 18,
20). Plaintiffs have again missed the mark.
In the Ninth Circuit, Rule 9(b) fulfills two primary functions. First,
“allegations of fraud must be ‘specific enough to give defendants notice of the
particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they
can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything
wrong.” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th Cir. 1993)). Second, the rule functions
“to deter the filing of complaints as a pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs,
to protect [defendants] from the harm that comes from being subject to fraud
charges, and to prohibit plaintiffs from unilaterally imposing . . . enormous social
and economic costs absent some factual basis.” Jd. at 1018 (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996)). “By
requiring some factual basis for the claims, the rule protects against false or
unsubstantiated charges.” United States v. United Healthcare Ins., 848 F.3d 1161,
10
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1180 (9th Cir. 2016). Pertinent here, “mere conclusory allegations of fraud are
insufficient.” Wool v. Tandem Computs. Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987),
overruled on other grounds by, Nayab v. Cap. One Bank (USA), N.A., 942 F.3d 480
(9th Cir. 2019).
For a second time, Plaintiffs set forth broad allegations lacking particularized
supporting detail. The highly repetitive FAC restates the same core allegations and
substantive ideas across multiple sections, almost word-for-word. Though the FAC
is sufficient to “give [T-Mobile] notice of the particular misconduct which is
alleged,” it is insufficient to show the allegations have any “factual basis.” Bly-
Magee, 236 F.3d at 1018-19.
For instance, Plaintiffs allege that T-Mobile knew the scope and impact of the
work would not be “quick, timely, [or] non-invasive,” and that this representation
otherwise induced Plaintiffs to enter the Agreement. (Doc. 41 at 7-8, 36-37, 45—
46, 53-54). Likewise, Plaintiffs allege that T-Mobile knew the installment would
require the presence of workers and equipment on the roof without protective
matting, despite promising otherwise. (Jd. at 8-9, 37, 46, 54). Plaintiffs further
allege that T-Mobile knew it would not provide a “competent, qualified, and
experienced” crew. (ld. at 13-14, 38, 46-47, 54-55). These allegations describe
some detail of a generalized scheme but provide no specific facts showing how T-
Mobile knew the falsity of the statements at the time they were made.
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Plaintiffs further fail to identify contemporaneous facts, documents, or
knowledge contradicting the efficacy of the alleged false statements. For example,
Plaintiffs allege that T-Mobile knew its representations were false based on its
specialized experience with cellular installations, prior lawsuits arising out of
substandard work, and one comment from T-Mobile’s engineer that Plaintiffs
“correctly” blamed T-Mobile for causing roof damage. However, these allegations
rely on vague, generalized knowledge and speculative implications garnered from
the benefit of hindsight. They do not explain with particularized facts why the
statements were false or misleading at the time they were made. Plaintiffs more
aptly allege that T-Mobile should have known the work was not going to go as
planned. While this type of allegation invokes a negligence standard, it does not
invoke the standards for deceit, negligent misrepresentation, or constructive fraud.
Plaintiffs also allege that T-Mobile never intended to comply with the
contractual provision to coordinate and pay for repairs, though the Agreement stated
otherwise. (/d. at 14, 40-41, 48-50, 56-58). Again, Plaintiffs make no showing that
this contractual provision was falsely made. Plaintiffs include no contemporaneous
facts, documents, or knowledge to indicate that T-Mobile never intended to
coordinate or pay for repairs. Rather, Plaintiffs assert that because the work did not
go as planned, T-Mobile must have been fraudulent. This allegation also relies
heavily on the benefit of hindsight and more aptly invokes a breach of contract
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standard, not the standards for deceit, negligent misrepresentation, or constructive
fraud.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that T-Mobile knew the cellular equipment would
emit radiofrequency radiation requiring warnings and special precautions, despite
representing otherwise. (/d. at 10-13, 24-25, 39-40, 47-48, 55-56). To support
this allegation, Plaintiffs assert the following:
Jason specifically asked if any equipment [T-Mobile] wanted to install
at the Strain Building would create any radiation or anything that could
be considered detrimental. Given its experience with cellular
equipment and networks, [T-Mobile] . . . knew the equipment it
intended to install at the Strain Building would cause and emit
radiofrequency radiation and require warnings and special precautions.
Instead of disclosing these material facts to Plaintiffs and in response
to Jason’s specific email asking for this information, [T-Mobile] .. .
concealed the true material facts and made knowingly false
representations. [T-Mobile] ... falsely represented . . . that [the]
equipment posed no danger, no radiation or radio waves would be
emitted ... , and no warnings or special precautions would be required
(Id. at 11).
Though this allegation moves in the right direction, it ultimately falls short of
meeting Rule 9(b)’s standard. It is not enough to allege generalized knowledge of
the risks of radiation. Plaintiffs needed to assert contemporaneous facts
demonstrating T-Mobile’s representations with particularized information
contradicting those representations. Indeed, Plaintiffs presumably possess the
precise statements included in T-Mobile’s response email but fail to include them
13
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here. Without them, the allegation is framed at a high level of generality insufficient
to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.
A similar defect undermines Plaintiffs’ attempt to use T-Mobile’s Form 10-K
to show knowledge. According to Plaintiffs, T-Mobile’s assurances concerning
radiation risks were knowingly false because its Form 10-K acknowledges potential
health risks from wireless transmission equipment. (Jd. at 39). However, this public
filing does not link T-Mobile’s actual knowledge of falsity to a statement made to
Plaintiffs. The allegation is again too generalized without identifying which
statements were false or what information contradicted them, let alone how the two
are linked.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs fail to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading
standard and ultimately, fail to state claims for deceit, negligent misrepresentation,
and constructive fraud.
C. Leave to Amend
Leave to amend should be granted unless “the pleading could not possibly be
cured by the allegation of other facts.” Bly-Magee, 236 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)). “This approach is required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which provides that leave to amend should
be freely granted ‘when justice so requires.’” Jd. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)).
Plaintiffs have now had two opportunities to allege sufficient facts to support a
14
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cognizable legal theory. Plaintiffs have also had the benefit of engaging in and
utilizing discovery before filing their FAC. Despite this, Plaintiffs’ FAC merely
quadrupled the length of the original complaint with repetitious generalizations and
conclusory assertions insufficient to meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements.
Accordingly, the Court finds that a third amended complaint would be futile and
therefore denies leave to amend.
IV. Conclusion
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
(1) T-Mobile’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 3, 4, and 5 of Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint (Doc. 49) is GRANTED.
(2) Counts 3-5 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Doc. 41) are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(3) T-Mobile shall have 14 days from the date of this Order to file its answer
to the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 41).
Yf~ft_
DATED this .7Y day of January, 2026.
Low Phot
SUSAN P. WATTERS
United States District Judge
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