Whitetail General Contractors, LLC v. Northcon, Inc. et al

1:24-cv-00064Mtd2 de fev. de 2026

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION
UNITED STATES, for the use of,
WHITETAIL GENERAL
CONSTRUCTORS, LLC, a Montana
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NORTHCON, INC., an Idaho
corporation, and NATIONWIDE
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
an Ohio corporation,
Defendants.
CV 24-64-BLG-SPW-KLD
FINDINGS &
RECOMMENDATION
and
ORDER
This contract case comes before the Court on Defendants Northcon, Inc. and
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment on all
claims (Doc. 35) and Plaintiff United States for the use of Whitetail General
Constructors, LLC’s (“Whitetail”) cross-motion for partial summary judgment
(Doc. 42). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment should be granted as to Whitetail’s statutory failure to timely pay claim
(Count 4) but denied in all other respects, and Whitetail’s motion for partial
summary judgment should be denied.
I. 	Background
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The dispute between the parties arises out of a construction project to build
an 18-plex apartment building in Crow Agency, Montana (“the Project”). (Doc. 47
at ¶ 8). On September 12, 2023, Defendant Northcon, Inc. (“Northcon”) entered a
prime contract with United States Department of Health and Human Services,
Indian Health Service (“IHS”) to act as the prime contractor for construction of the
Project. (Doc. 47 at ¶ 9). IHS is the owner/government agency of the Project. (Doc.
47 at ¶ 10).
On September 29, 2023, Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
(“Nationwide”) issued a payment bond for the Project on behalf of Northcon.
(Doc. 44 at 2 ¶ 2, 9). The payment bond lists Northcon as the principal and
Nationwide as the surety, states that Nationwide agrees to “bind[] itself, jointly and
severally with the Principal, for the payment of” the bond amount, and provides
that the obligation to pay the bond amount “is void if the Principal promptly makes
payment to all persons having a direct relationship with the Principal or a
subcontractor of the Principal for furnishing labor, material or both in the
prosecution of the work provided for in the contract” between IHS and Northcon.
(Doc. 44 at 9).
Around the same time, in mid-September 2023, Northcon executed two
subcontracts with Whitetail, one for Whitetail to perform electrical work on the
Project and the other for Whitetail to perform plumbing work on the Project. (Doc.
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47 at ¶¶ 13-14). The subcontracts were lump sum contracts pursuant to which
Whitetail agreed to perform specific plumbing and electrical work for specific
lump sum amounts. (Doc. 47 at ¶ 15). Under such a lump sum contract, progress
payments are typically made based on the value associated with the percentage of
work completed. (Doc. 47 at ¶ 30). Consistent with this general practice, Whitetail
would submit payment applications to Northcon, and Northcon would in turn
submit payment applications to IHS. (Doc. 47 at ¶ 47). After receiving payments
from IHS, Northcon would generally disburse payments to Whitetail. (Doc. 47 at ¶
47). The subcontracts made payment from IHS to Northcon “an absolute condition
precedent” to Northcon’s obligations to make progress or final payment to
Whitetail. (Doc. 47 at ¶ 48; Doc. 36-1 at 3; Doc. 36-2 at 3).
As set forth in the subcontracts, the scope of Whitetail’s work on the Project
was subject to modification by way of written change orders. (Doc. 58 at ¶ 4; Doc.
36-1 at 4; Doc. 36-2 at 4). According to Whitetail, Northcon significantly changed
the scope of its work under the subcontracts by, for example, increasing the
number of void forms used to encase underground lines and forcing additional void
forms into Whitetail’s scope of work. (Doc. 58 at ¶ 4). Northcon disagrees that the
change orders regarding void forms significantly changed the scope of Whitetail’s
work (Doc. 58 at ¶ 4), and claims that a number of problems arose after Whitetail
began performance of the subcontracts, including issues with Whitetail’s pay
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applications, failure to order materials before receiving payment, and payroll
submissions. (Doc. 47 at ¶¶ 33, 35-37, 39-40). For example, Northcon asserts that
(1) Whitetail’s pay applications did not focus on the percentage of work completed
and were instead driven by the amount of Whitetail’s labor burden (Doc. 47 at ¶
33); (2) in contravention of the standard practice for federal construction projects,
Whitetail would not generally order materials until first receiving payment, thereby
precluding Northcon from reviewing invoices from vendors to substantiate
payment (Doc. 47 at ¶¶ 35-37); and (3) Whitetail had challenges correctly
submitting certified payroll during the Project, which is a requirement on
government projects (Doc. 47 at ¶¶ 39-40).
It is undisputed that the subcontracts did not require Whitetail to obtain a
performance or payment bond prior to commencing work on the Project, and
Whitetail’s bids for the Project did not include a price for a bond. (Doc. 58 at ¶ 5;
Doc. 44 at 3 ¶ 6). After Whitetail had begun its work on the Project, however,
Northcon sought a bond or other assurance from Whitetail for its obligations under
the subcontracts. (Doc. 47 at ¶ 42). According to Northcon, it did so based on its
concerns about Whitetail’s performance, as well as concerns about Whitetail’s
creditworthiness based on a prior bankruptcy filing. (Doc. 47 at ¶¶ 25-27, 42, 44).
By email dated November 30, 2023, Northcon advised Whitetail that it would pay
Whitetail’s payment applications “half now with the other half released pending
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receipt of [Whitetail’s] bond.” (Doc. 58 at ¶ 6; Doc. 44 at 12). Whitetail responded
by letter on December 5, 2023, offering to obtain an irrevocable letter of credit
(ILOC) assuring its work for the Project, on the condition that Northcon would
agree to release the balance due on Whitetail’s initial payment applications and to
not hinder payment on Whitetail’s second payment applications. (Doc. 58 at ¶ 7;
Doc. 44 at 17). With that understanding, Whitetail initiated the process of
obtaining an ILOC. (Doc. 44 at 17). As Whitetail informed Northcon in an email
two weeks later, however, Whitetail’s bank declined its request for an ILOC. (Doc.
36-6 at 2). It is undisputed that Whitetail did not furnish an ILOC for the Project.
(Doc. 47 at ¶ 46).
During December 2023, Northcon made payments to Whitetail for work
performed in October and November of 2023. (Doc. 58 at ¶ 9; Doc. 47 at ¶ 54;
Doc. 36-9 at 3). Northcon did not make any additional payments to Whiteail after
December 2023. (Doc. 58 at ¶ 9). On February 21, 2024, Whitetail requested an
update on its most recent payment application. (Doc. 44 at 21). Northcon
responded on February 22, 2024, advising Whitetail that IHS would be “releasing
funding to us tomorrow” and Northcon would “start cutting checks” by Monday,
February 26, 2024. (Doc. 58 at ¶ 8; Doc. 44 at 19). Northcon did not pay Whitetail
on or after February 26, 2024. (Doc. 58 at ¶ 8).
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On February 28, 2024, Northcon’s Senior Project Manager, Marc Donnot,
emailed Whitetail’s Project Manager, Tommy Baxter, and explained that “part of
the hold up” with payment involved change orders. (Doc. 58 at ¶ 10; Doc. 44 at
24). Donnot wrote: “I need these [change orders] signed to get things processed.
My bad, apologies, it totally slipped by me they were sitting in the file since
Christmas.” (Doc. 44 at 24). Later that day, Baxter emailed Donnot to confirm—as
they had apparently discussed on the phone—that “Whitetail is halting production
on plumbing and electrical work at Crow 18 until funding has been released.”
(Doc. 47 at ¶ 58; Doc. 36-10 at 2).
On March 1, 2024, Whitetail emailed Northcon a “Statutory Notice of Work
Stoppage for Non-Payment.” (Doc. 47 at ¶ 60; Doc. 36-13 at 2-4). The Notice of
Work Stoppage asserted that an outstanding balance in the amount of $855,609.99
was “due from Northcon to Whitetail for work, materials, equipment, and labor”
on the Project, and stated that “Whitetail has not been paid for ANY item or scope
of work performed for the last 90 Days.” (Doc. 36-13 at 4). The notice additionally
stated that Whitetail had “every intention of returning to work immediately once
funding has been brought current” but “if all payment obligations owed to
Whitetail are not satisfied within 30 days from the date of suspension,” Northcon
should consider the subcontracts statutorily terminated pursuant to Montana law.
(Doc. 36-13 at 4). Northcon responded by email the same day and asked Whitetail
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to “remove all their equipment and trailers from the jobsite starting on Monday the
4th until you are complete.” (Doc. 44 at 28).
At around this time, IHS rejected Northcon’s February 2024 payment
application because IHS apparently determined that it had overpaid Northcon for
electrical and plumbing work based on the amounts billed compared to the
progress made. (Doc. 36 at ¶ 18; Doc. 36-12). Just a few hours after receiving
Whitetail’s March 1, 2024, Notice of Work Stoppage, Northcon advised Whitetail
that IHS had denied the February 2024 payment application “due to lack of
performed work on the contract” and “not providing necessary invoices for
materials requested for payment.” (Doc. 47 at ¶ 59; Doc. 36-11 at 2). According to
Northcon it resubmitted the February 2024 payment application to reflect a
$320,000 credit to IHS for electrical and plumbing work, but by the time it did so
Whitetail had stopped work on the Project. (Doc. 36 at ¶ 18; Doc. 56-1). Northcon
sent Whitetail a Notice of Default on March 8, 2024. (Doc. 47 at ¶ 70; Doc. 36-14).
It is undisputed that Whitetail did not complete its electrical or plumbing scope of
work under the subcontracts. (Doc. 47 at ¶¶ 71-72).
On June 3, 2024, Whitetail filed this action against Northcon asserting six
claims for relief. (Doc 1). Count 1 alleges a claim against Northcon and
Nationwide on the payment bond in the amount of $895,551.98 pursuant to the
Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3131-3134. Counts 2 through 6 are alleged against
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Northcon only, as follows: Count 2 for breach of the subcontracts; Count 3 for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; Count 4 for failure to
timely pay; Count 5 for negligent misrepresentation; and Count 6 for tortious
interference. (Doc. 1 at 3-7). Northcon has asserted counterclaims against Whitetail
for breach of the subcontracts and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. (Doc. 13).
Defendants move for summary judgment on all six claims alleged in the
Complaint and also ask the Court to rule as a matter of law that Whitetail is not
entitled to consequential damages, including lost profits. (Doc. 35). Northcon
additionally moves for partial summary judgment on liability as to its contract
counterclaims. (Doc. 35). Whitetail cross-moves for partial summary judgment on
liability on its Miller Act payment bond claim, leaving the issue of damages for
trial. (Doc. 42).
Before considering these motions on the merits, the Court addresses two
procedural challenges raised by Defendants. First, Defendants move to strike
Whitetail’s summary judgment response brief, statement of disputed facts, and the
declaration of Whitetail’s owner, Jasper Jones, as untimely. (Doc. 48). Under the
Local Rules for the District of Montana, responses to motions “for summary
judgment must be filed within 21 days after the motion was entered on the docket.”
L.R. 7.1(d)(1)(B)(i). Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on June
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26, 2025, which means Whitetail’s response was due on July 17, 2025. Because
Whitetail did not file its response brief (Doc. 45) and other opposition materials
(Docs. 46, 47) until July 18, 2025, Defendants argue the filings should be stricken
as untimely. Although Whitetail’s responsive filings were a day late, Defendants
had the opportunity to file a reply brief and there is no indication or allegation that
they were prejudiced as a result of the minimally late filings. Defendants’ first
motion to strike is denied.
Second, Defendants move to strike Whitetail’s motion for partial summary
judgment, supporting brief, and statement of undisputed facts, and Jones’s
supporting affidavit on the ground that they are untimely. (Doc. 51). On January
13, 2025, the Court entered an order extending the fully briefed motions deadline
to July 31, 2025. (Doc. 34). Summary judgment response briefs are due 21 days
after the motion is filed, and reply briefs are optional. L.R. 7.1(d)(1)(C) (“The
moving party may file a reply within 14 days after the response was entered in the
docket.”) (emphasis added). Motions are “deemed ripe for ruling at the close of the
time for response, unless otherwise indicated in the scheduling order.” L.R.
7.1(d)(1)(D). Whitetail filed its motion for summary judgment on July 9, 2025
(Doc. 42), and the motion was fully briefed for purposes of the scheduling order
with the filing of Defendants’ response 21 days later, on July 30, 2025. (Doc. 57).
Whitetail’s motion was thus timely, and Defendants’ motion to strike is meritless
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and thus denied. Having dispensed with Defendants’ procedural motions, the Court
turns to the merits of the summary judgment motions.
II. 	Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The
movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its
motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, that it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A material fact is one that might affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must
go beyond the pleadings and designate by affidavits, depositions, answers to
interrogatories or admissions on file, “specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “The mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is
that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48
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(emphasis in original). If the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at
trial as to an element essential to its case, and that party fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that
element, then summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court “may not make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50. The court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
justifiable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
When presented with cross-motions for summary judgment on the same
matters, the court must “evaluate each motion separately, giving the non-moving
party the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” American Civil Liberties Union of
Nevada v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003).
III. 	Discussion
Before addressing the pending summary judgment motions on the merits, the
Court provides a brief overview of the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131 et seq.
A. 	The Miller Act
The Miller Act governs surety bonds on federal construction projects that
cost more than $100,000. Alameda Electric Distributors, Inc. v. Eco Engineering
Inc., 2025 WL 3079873, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). The purpose of the
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Miller Act is “to protect persons supplying materials and labor for federal projects,
and it is to be construed liberally in their favor to effectuate this purpose.” United
States for use of Morgan v. Harry Johnson Plumbing & Excavation, Inc., 2020 WL
12833584, at *4 (E. D. Wash. Apr. 3, 2020) (quoting U.S. for Use and Benefit of
Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v. Avanti Constructors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759, 761
(9th Cir. 1984)).
Before a construction contract of more than $100,000 is awarded, a
contractor must post both a performance bond and a payment bond for the project,
“which become binding when the contract is awarded.” 40 U.S.C. § 3131(b). The
statute authorizes any “person that has furnished labor or material in carrying out
work provided for in a contract for which a payment bond is furnished under
section 3131 of this title and that has not been paid in full within 90 days after the
day on which the person did or performed the last of the labor or furnished or
supplied the material for which the claim is made” to bring “a civil action on the
payment bond or the amount unpaid at the time the civil action is brought[.]” 40
U.S.C. § 3133(b)(1). Any civil action under § 3133 must be filed “in the name of
the United States for the use of the person bringing the action.” 40 U.S.C. §
3133(b)(3)(A).
A “surety’s liability on a Miller Act bond must be at least coextensive with
the obligations imposed by the Act if the bond is to have its intended effect.” Apple
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Valley Communications, Inc. v. Budget Electrical Contractors, Inc., 2021 WL
1502713, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021) (quoting United States ex rel. Sherman v.
Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 215-16 (1957)). “Therefore, ‘the liability of a surety and its
principal on a Miller Act payment bond is coextensive with the contractual liability
of the principal only to the extent that it is consistent with the rights and
obligations created under the Miller Act.’” Apple Valley, 2021 WL 1502713, at *6
(quoting U.S. for Use and Benefit of Walton Tech., Inc. v. Westar Engineering, Inc,
290 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2002)). In other words, “[w]here a subcontract’s
terms are consistent with the Miller Act’s provisions, the surety’s liability on the
Miller Act bond is coextensive with the contractual liability of its princip[al].”
United States v. Sierra Range Construction, 2024 WL 1377642, at *8 (D. Nev.
March 31, 2024) (citing Sherman, 353 U.S. at 215-16).
“The liability of a surety under the Miller Act is controlled by federal law,
rather than state contract law[.]” Apple Valley Communications, Inc. v. Budget
Electrical Contractors, Inc., 2020 WL 8385651, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2020)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also F.D. Rich Co. v. United
States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 127 (1974) (“The Miller Act
provides a federal cause of action, and the scope of the remedy as well as the
substance of the rights created thereby is a matter of federal not state law.”). The
court may, however, “look to state law when interpreting contractual provisions” in
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a Miller Act case. Apple Valley Communications¸ 2020 WL 8385651, at *5 n. 5.
“[T]he measure of recovery under the Miller Act is generally determined by
the terms of the subcontract.” Apple Valley Communications, 2021 WL 1502713,
at *6 (citing Taylor Construction, Inc. v. ABT Serv. Corp. 163 F.3d 1119, 1222
(9th Cir. 1998) (“The Ninth Circuit has consistently ... used the underlying bonded
subcontract as the measure of recovery in Miller Act cases. Sources from other
authorities show there is no doubt that under the Miller Act recovery for work
performed under the subcontract is the amount due under the subcontract.”).
Because a surety’s liability on a Miller Act bond is generally coextensive
with the contractual liability of the principal, the Court will address the parties’
contract claims before turning to Whitetail’s Miller Act claim.
B. 	Contract Claims
1. 	Breach of Contract
Under Montana law, “[t]he essential elements of a breach of contract claim
claim are: (1) a valid and enforceable contract; (2) breach of an express or implied
contract duty or obligation; and (3) resulting contract damages.” Kostelecky v. Peas
in a Pod LLC, 518 P.3d 840, 859 (Mont. 2022).
Whitetail’s breach of contract claim is set forth in Count 2 of the Complaint.
(Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 17-19). Whitetail alleges that Northcon breached the subcontracts by:
failing to timely pay in full for Whitetail’s work; wrongfully terminating Whitetail
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under the subcontracts; mismanaging the Project, including the change order and
pay applications processes; improperly withholding amounts due under the
subcontracts; improperly back-charging amounts to Whitetail, including
purchasing materials and labor “on behalf” of Whitetail without notice or
justification; and unjustifiably making payment in part by joint check to Whitetail
and a subcontractor. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 18). Northcon, in turn, asserts a counterclaim
alleging that Whitetail breached the subcontracts by failing to perform the required
work, wrongfully walking off the jobsite, overbilling the Project, and performing
defective work. (Doc. 13 at 10-11).
Northcon argues that Whitetail’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of
law for several reasons and moves for partial summary judgment on liability as to
its breach of contract counterclaim. Northcon first contends that regardless of any
payment dispute, the subcontracts required Whitetail to continue its work on the
Project, which it failed to do. (Doc. 39 at 5-6). Defendants rely on Section 7 of the
subcontracts, which governs “Claims” and provides in relevant part:
If any dispute shall arise between Contractor and Subcontractor regarding
performance of the work, or any alleged change in the work, Subcontractor
shall timely perform the disputed work and shall give written notice of a
claim for additional compensation for the work within the time proscribed in
the Prime Contract or within ten (10) calendar days (whichever is shorter)
after commencement of the disputed work. …
(Doc. 36-1 at 4; Doc. 36-2 at 4). Defendants read this language too broadly.
Section 7 applies specifically to disputes between a contractor and subcontractor
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“regarding performance of the work, or any alleged change in the work” and says
nothing about disputes regarding payment like those that have arisen here.
Accordingly, to the extent Defendants assert that the Section 7 required Whitetail
to continue its work on the Project notwithstanding its payment dispute with
Northcon, the Court is not persuaded.
Defendants next argue the record establishes that Whitetail breached the
subcontracts by failing to perform its scope of work on the Project and deliberately
stopping its work, such that it was in default and Northcon was entitled to suspend
any further payment. (Doc. 39 at 6-7). Whitetail counters that it was Northcon who
breached the subcontracts by failing to timely pay Whitetail in full for its work on
the Project. Whitetail takes the position that it rightfully suspended work on the
Project because Northcon’s prior breach excused it from any further performance.
(Doc. 45 at 7).
The Montana Supreme Court “has held that where a party to a contract
materially breaches a contract, the injured party is entitled to unilaterally suspend
his performance.” King Resources, Inc. v. Oliver, 59 P.3d 1172, 1178 (Mont. 2002)
(citing Liddle v. Petty, 816 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Mont. 1991)); see also James Talcott
Construction, Inc. v. P&D. Land Enterprises, 141 P.3d 1200, 1207 (Mont 2006)
(“[A] party who breaches a contract cannot claim entitlement to the contract’s
benefits after such breach.”). Whitetail argues, and the Court agrees, that there are
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genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment in Northcon’s favor
on the breach of contract claims.
One such issue involves Whitetail’s assertion that Northcon wrongfully
failed to pay all amounts due on Whitetail’s first payment application. Whitetail
points to Northcon’s email dated November 30, 2023, stating that it would pay
Whitetail’s application for payment only “half now with the other half released
pending receipt of [Whitetail’s] bond.” (Doc. 44 at ¶ 7, citing Doc. 44 at 12).
According to Whitetail, it offered to obtain an ILOC but Northon failed to meet
Whitetail’s conditions for doing so—specifically, that Northcon release the balance
due on Whitetail’s initial payment application and not hinder payment on
Whitetail’s second payment application. (Doc. 44 at ¶ 8, citing Doc. 44 at 17).
Under Montana law, “if reasonable grounds exist to believe that a party to a
contract will breach by non-performance, the other party may demand adequate
assurance of performance and suspend his own performance on the contract, if
reasonable, until adequate assurance is received.” Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet
Indian Reservation v. Blaze Construction, Inc., 108 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1140 (citing
Julian v. Montana State Univ., 747 P.2d 196, 199 (1987), citing Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 251 (1979)). The purpose of this rule “is to give a party
recourse in the event the other party to a contract indicates he will not perform, but
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his actions do not yet rise to a level of anticipatory repudiation.” Blackfeet Tribe,
108 F.Supp.2d at 1140 (citing Julian, 747 P.2d at 199-200).
Northcon argues it had reasonable grounds to believe that Whitetail would
not fulfill its obligations under the subcontracts and was therefore entitled to
suspend payment until it received adequate assurance. Northcon cites concerns
about Whitetail’s performance—including billing and payroll practices—and
Whitetail’s creditworthiness based on a prior bankruptcy filing.1 (Doc. 38 at ¶¶ 25-
28, 33, 35-37, 39-46, 49-53). Whitetail disputes many of these factual assertions.
(Doc. 47 at ¶¶ 25-28, 33, 35-37, 39-46, 49-53). On the record as presented and
argued by the parties, the Court finds that whether Northcon had reasonable
grounds to believe that Whitetail would not perform its obligations under the
subcontracts such that it was entitled to withhold payment pending adequate
assurance is a genuine issue of material fact. Additionally, it is not clear based on
the summary judgment record what amounts were withheld by Northcon based on
1 To the extent Defendants argue that Section 6 of the subcontracts gave Northcon
the contractual right to direct Whitetail to obtain a bond or some other assurance of
future performance, the Court is not persuaded. Section 6 governs “Changes in
Work” and provides, in part: “Contractor shall have the right by written order to
direct changes, additions, deletions, or alterations to the Subcontract Work or the
time of performance. … No changes in the work covered by this Agreement shall
exonerate any surety or any bond given in connection with this Agreement.” (Doc.
36-1 at 4; Doc. 36-2 at 4). Section 6 addresses changes in work but says nothing
about Northcon’s right to require a bond or other assurance that Whitetail would
perform the work required.
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Whitetail’s alleged failure to provide adequate assurance, and whether Northcon
later released any withheld funds.
Other issues of fact center on whether Northcon wrongfully failed to pay
Whitetail for work performed between December 2023 and February 2024.
Whitetail’s owner, Jasper Jones, states in a supporting affidavit that by Northcon’s
own calculations, the payment balance due to Whitetail as of March 4, 2024, was
$809,797.00.” (Doc. 44 at ¶ 15, citing Doc. 44 at 32). The spreadsheet Jones relies
on shows that between October 2023 and February 2024, Whitetail billed Northcon
a total of $1,268,103.00, and Northcon paid a total of $458,306—including joint
check and amounts withheld for payment of vendors—leaving a balance due of
$809,797.00. (Doc. 44 at 32). As Northcon points out, however, this spreadsheet
was prepared by Northcon’s Chief Financial Officer, Erik Panke. (Doc. 56 at ¶ 5).
Panke states that the document reflects “the amount that Northcon understood that
Whitetail was demanding based on the records available at that time,” and “is not
an acknowledgment that the amounts Whitetail asserted to be due, were in fact
due.” (Doc. 56 at ¶ 5).
According to Panke, Whiteail did not submit and complete and accurate
payment applications every month, billed Northcon for progress not made, and
billed excessively. (Doc. 56 at ¶ 3). But according to Jones, Whitetail’s payment
applications were certified and were accurate, Whitetail did not overbill, and as of
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February 28, 2024 there were a number of unexecuted change orders for which it
had not been paid. (Doc. 44 at ¶ 11, citing 44 at 24, Doc. 44 at ¶ 12). These
competing affidavits raise a genuine issue of material fact that is relevant to
whether Northcon paid Whitetail all amounts due under the subcontracts.
Northcon also argues it permissibly withheld certain payments pursuant to
Section 2 of the subcontracts, which authorized Northcon to “withhold amounts
otherwise due…to cover…contractor’s reasonable estimate of any liability
Contractor has incurred or may incur for which Subcontractor may be
responsible…subject to adjustment when the exact amounts of liability are
determined.” (Doc. 39 at 8, citing Doc. 36-1 at 3 and 36-2 at 3). Again citing
Panke’s affidavit, Northcon explains that leading up to the time Whitetail stopped
working on the Project, Northcon was prepared to release additional funds to
Whitetail by way of joint checks to Whitetail and its material suppliers, but
Whitetail did not provide the requisite invoices. (Doc. 58 at 22 ¶ 17, citing Doc. 56
at ¶ 11). Northcon also points to evidence that it made purchases on Whitetail’s
behalf through March 1, 2024. (Doc. 47 at ¶ 50, citing Doc. 36-7). But it is not
clear based on the summary judgment briefing and materials of record whether, or
exactly how, the amounts Northcon claims it spent on materials and was prepared
to pay by joint check affect any payment due at the time Whiteail stopped work.
Northcon next argues that under the subcontracts’ pay-if-paid provisions
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Whitetail was not entitled to payment for work unless and until Northcon received
payment from IHS, and because Northcon’s original February 2024 payment
application was denied, Whitetail was not entitled to further payment at the time it
stopped work.2 (Doc. 39 at 7-8). IHS initially rejected Northcon’s February 2024
payment application because it apparently determined that it had overpaid
Northcon for electrical and plumbing work based on the amounts billed compared
to the progress made. (Doc. 36 at ¶ 18; Doc. 36-12). According to Northcon it
resubmitted the February 2024 payment application to reflect a $320,000 credit to
IHS for electrical and plumbing work, but by the time it did so Whitetail had
stopped work on the Project. (Doc. 36 at ¶ 18; Doc. 56-1).
As Whitetail points out, however, Northcon did not advise Whitetail that the
February 2024 payment application had been denied until after Whitetail gave
notice that it was suspending work on the Project for nonpayment (Doc. 46 at ¶
17), and after Northcon asked Whitetail to remove all its equipment and trailers
2 The Ninth Circuit has held that a pay-if-paid provision in a contract does
not relieve a contractor or surety from liability under the Miller Act. See United
States for the Use and Benefit of Walton Technology, Inc. v. Weststar Engineering,
Inc., 290 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002). (“A subcontractor that has performed as
agreed need not await the Government's payment of the contractor before initiating
an action under the Miller Act against the contractor or the surety.”). A pay-if-pay
provision may, however, be used as a defense to a breach of contract claim. See
e.g. United States for the use and benefit of Mountain Utilities, Inc. v. Fidelity and
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 2022 WL 1538707, at *4 (D. Idaho May 16, 2022).
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from the jobsite. But even assuming the paid-if-paid provisions are an available
defense to Whitetail’s claim that Northcon failed to pay it for work billed in the
February 2024 payment application, whether Whitetail was entitled to further
payment for prior work not covered by the February 2024 payment application is
in dispute. Although Northcon asserts that it paid all funds to which Whitetail was
entitled through December 2023 (Doc. 39 at 7, citing Doc. 38 at ¶¶ 49-54),
Whitetail legitimately disputes this assertion. (Doc. 47 at ¶¶ 49-54). As addressed
above, for example, whether Northcon wrongfully failed to pay all amounts due on
Whitetail’s first payment application is a genuine issue of material fact and is
unrelated to the February 2024 payment application. Accordingly, to the extent
Northcon contends Whitetail’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law
based on the subcontracts’ paid-if-paid provisions, the Court is not convinced.
In sum, on the record as presented and argued by the parties, the Court finds
there are genuine issues of material fact regarding (1) whether, as Northcon asserts,
Whitetail breached the subcontracts by stopping its work on the Project, such that
Northcon was entitled to suspend further payment, or (2) whether, as Whitetail
asserts, Northcon breached the subcontracts by failing to pay Whitetail for work
performed on the Project, such that Whitetail was entitled to suspend performance
pending payment. Given the factual issues identified above, Northcon has not met
its summary judgment burden of demonstrating that Whitetail’s breach of contract
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claim fails as a matter of law or that it is entitled to summary judgment on liability
for its breach of contract counterclaim.
2. 	Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In Montana, “every contract, regardless of type, contains an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767,
775 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Arrowhead School District No.
75 v. Klap, 79 P.3d 250, 264 (Mont. 2003). “The covenant is a mutual promise
implied in every contract that the parties will deal with each other in good faith and
not attempt to deprive the other party of the benefits of the contract through
dishonesty or abuse of discretion in performance.” Knucklehead Land. Co., Inc. v.
Accutitle, Inc., 172 P.3d 116, 121 (Mont. 2007) (citation and internal quotations
omitted). “The conduct required by the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade.” Mont. Code Ann. § 28-1-211 (2023). The nature and
extent of the obligations of good faith and fair dealing are measured by the
“justifiable expectations” of the parties, and a “breach of the covenant constitutes a
breach of the contract.” Hardy v. Vision Service Plan, 120 P.3d 402, 405 (Mont.
2005).
In Count 3 of the Complaint, Whitetail alleges that Northcon breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by: failing to remedy its
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mismanagement of the pay application process; failing to cooperate with Whitetail
regarding the pay application process; failing to act in good faith by requiring
Whitetail to provide a bond or other assurance for the Project; failing to act in good
faith in resolving disputes with Whitetail; wrongfully terminating Whitetail under
the subcontracts; misrepresenting information in its Project-related
communications with Whitetail; and improperly interfering with Whitetail’s
employment relationship with its employees. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 23). Northcon, in turn,
asserts a counterclaim alleging that Whitetail breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing by failing to perform work in good faith, wrongfully
walking off the jobsite, and overbilling the project and performance of defective
work. (Doc. 13 at 11 ¶ 27).
These competing claims for breach of the implied covenant are largely
duplicative of the breach of contract claims discussed above, and the parties
address all contract-based claims collectively in their summary judgment briefing.
(Doc. 39 at 5-9, Doc. 45 at 7-11). The same genuine issues of fact that preclude
summary judgment on breach of contract also preclude summary judgment on
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
To the extent Northcon does address the implied covenant directly in the
briefing, its arguments highlight the factual nature of the dispute. Northcon accuses
Whitetail of breaching “its duty of good faith and fair dealing by implementing a
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scheme to cause Northcon to violate its prime contract obligations to IHS to
maintain the project schedule.” (Doc. 39 at 6). Northcon additionally asserts that
by stopping work, Whitetail aimed to cause Northcon to miss a critical project
milestone that depended on Whitetail first completing certain items of work, and
that Whitetail’s “objective in doing so was to create leverage over Northcon to
recover more money.” (Doc. 39 at 7). These are factual issues. Northcon’s motion
for summary judgment on breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing should be denied accordingly.
3. 	Consequential Damages
Northcon asks the Court to rule as a matter of law that Whitetail is not
entitled to consequential damages for breach of contract, including lost profits.
Under Montana law, “[d]amages for lost profits may be awarded if such loss is
shown to be ‘the natural and direct result of the act of the defendant’ and if the loss
is not speculative.” Topco, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Highways, 912 P.2d 805, 810
(Mont. 1996) (quoting Olson v. Parchen, 816 P.2d 423, 427 (Mont. 1991)). Lost
profits must be “proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.” Riverview Homes
II, Ltd. v. Canton, 38 P.3d 848, 854 (Mont. 2001). While lost profits must “be
proven with the best evidence under the circumstances which will support a
reasonably close estimate of the loss,” expert testimony is not required. Lee v.
Kane, 893 P.2d 854, 856 (Mont. 1995) (internal quotation marks and brackets
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omitted).
Whitetail first identified lost profits as consequential damages for breach of
contract in its Rule 26(a) initial disclosures. (Doc. 37-5 at 4-5). Whitetail disclosed
that it has incurred lost profit damages totaling $555,000 for the subcontracts at
issue, and $1,379,000 for seven other projects. (Doc. 37-5 at 4-5). In opposition to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on consequential damages, Whitetail
relies on the declaration provided by Jones, who similarly states that Whitetail has
suffered lost profit damages totaling $555,000.00 for the subcontracts at issue and
$1,379,700 for other projects Whitetail was performing or had committed to
performing. (Doc. 46 at ¶¶ 26-29). According to Jones, Whitetail was unable to
continue or begin performing on these other projects because of Northcon’s failure
to timely pay for Whitetail’s work on the Project.
Although Whitetail has not provided contracts or other documentation to
substantiate these alleged damages, the information provided in Jones’s declaration
is sufficient—albeit barely—for Whitetail’s claim for lost profit contract damages
to survive summary judgment.
C. 	Miller Act Claim
As set forth in Count 1 of the Complaint, Whitetail’s Miller Act claim
alleges that the obligations and conditions of the payment bond required
Defendants to promptly pay Whitetail for its work on the Project. Whitetail claims
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that Defendants breached their obligations under the payment bond because they
failed to make timely payment in full for Whitetail’s work, and as a result of
Defendants’ failure to do so Whitetail has been damaged in the principal sum of
$895,551.98. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 13-16).
To prevail on a claim under the Miller Act, a plaintiff must establish that (1)
the labor or materials were supplied in prosecution of the work provided for in the
contract; (2) the supplier of the labor or materials has not been paid; (3) the
supplier had a good faith belief that the materials were intended for the specified
work; and (4) the jurisdictional requisites were met. United States for Use &
Benefit of Hawaiian Rock Prod. Corp. v. A.E. Lopez Enters., Ltd., 74 F.3d 972, 975
(9th Cir. 1996); United States es rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v. Avanti
Constructors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1984). The jurisdictional
requirement refers to meeting the statute's time limitations on notice and filing.
Hawaiian Rock Prods., 74 F.3d at 975. The filing provision requires a plaintiff to
file suit within one year of “the day on which the last of the labor was performed or
the material was supplied[.]” 40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(4).
Whitetail argues the evidence of record establishes that the above elements
are satisfied and asks the Court to rule as a matter of law that Defendants are liable
on its Miller Act claim. (Doc. 43 at 6). The first and third elements are not
genuinely in dispute, as the record is clear that Whitetail supplied labor and
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materials for the Project and Defendants do not appear to contest that Whitetail had
a good faith belief that the labor and materials were intended for the Project. (See
e.g. Doc. 58 at ¶ 2). The record reflects that the fourth element is also satisfied. In
compliance with the Miller Act’s time limitation on filing, Whitetail filed suit June
3, 2024—approximately three months after it provided its Notice of Work
Stoppage.
The parties’ summary judgment arguments center on the second element of a
Miller Act claim—whether Whitetail has been paid all amounts due for the labor
and materials provided on the Project. With the possible exception of the paid-if-
paid provisions, it appears that the terms of the subcontracts are consistent with the
Miller Act and the parties do not argue otherwise. As determined above, whether
Whitetail has been paid all amounts due for its work is in dispute. Because there
are genuine issues of material fact on the second element of Whitetail’s Miller Act
claim, neither party is entitled to summary judgment on Count 1.
D. 	Remaining Claims
1. 	Failure to Timely Pay
Count 4 of the Complaint alleges a claim against Northcon for failure to
timely pay pursuant to Title 28, Chapter 2, Part 21 of the Montana Code
Annotated, which governs payment of construction contractors and subcontractors.
(Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 26-31). Northcon argues Part 21 does not apply here because IHS, as
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a federal agency, is not an “owner” within the meaning of the statute. The Court
agrees.
The statute defines a “subcontract” as “a contract between a contractor and a
subcontractor…the purpose of which is the performance of all or part of the
construction contract.” Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-2101(8). A “construction
contract” is defined as “a written agreement between and owner and a contractor to
construct or improve…an improvement to real property,” and a “contractor” is
defined as “a person who has signed a construction contract with an owner.” Mont.
Code Ann. § 28-2-2101(1), (2). An “owner” means “a governmental entity or
private entity that has a legal interest in the real property improved or to be
improved by the performance of the construction contract.” Mont. Code Ann. § 28-
2-2101(6). A “governmental entity,” in turn, is defined as “a city, town, county,
consolidated municipal-county government, school district, or other special
district.” Mont. Code. Ann. § 28-2-2101(3).
Because IHS is a federal agency, it is not a “governmental entity,” and
consequently, Northcon is not a “contractor” and the prime contract is not a
“construction contract” within the meaning of Title 28, Chapter 2, Part 21.
Whitetail does not address the statutory language, but argues the statutes applies
because it is undisputed that “IHS is the owner/government agency of the project.”
(Doc. 45 at 11, citing Doc. 47 at ¶ 10). But a stipulation by the parties does not
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override the plain language of the statute, which makes clear that “owner” does not
include the federal government or its agencies. The Court therefore concludes that
Title 28, Chapter 2, Part 21 of the Montana Code Annotated does not apply to the
Project and subcontracts, and Whitetail’s statutory claim for timely payment fails
as a matter of law. See Zumar Industries, Inc. v. Cyamus Corp., 418 P.3d 936, 939-
41 (Ct. App. Ariz. 2017) (concluding that “owner” under comparable Arizona
statute did not include the federal government or its agencies, and the statute
therefore did not apply to a contract for a federal project). Northcon is entitled to
summary judgment on Count 4 of the Complaint.
2. 	Negligent Misrepresentation
Count 5 of the Complaint alleges a claim against Northcon for negligent
misrepresentation. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 32-42). To prevail on a claim for negligent
misrepresentation under Montana law, a plaintiff must establish six elements:
(1) the defendant made a representation as to a past or existing material fact;
(2) the representation was untrue; (3) regardless of actual belief, the
defendant made the representation without any reasonable ground for
believing it to be true; (4) the representation was made with the intent to
induce the plaintiff to rely on it; (5) the plaintiff was unaware of the falsity
of the representation and justified in relying upon the representation; (6) the
plaintiff, as a result of reliance, sustained damage.
Lundeen v. Lake County, 571 P.3d 995, 999-1000 (Mont. 2024) (citation omitted).
Whitetail’s negligent misrepresentation claim is premised on Northcon’s February
22, 2024, email to Whitetail stating that IHS would be “releasing funding to us
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tomorrow” and Northcon would “start cutting checks” to Whitetail on Monday,
February 26, 2024. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 33; Doc. 44 at 19). Northcon argues this statement
is not actionable because “[i]t did not result in any reliance or damages,
particularly considering Whitetail had an ongoing obligation to perform its scope
of work and the short time period between the purported dates—a matter of days.”
(Doc. 39 at 16). Whitetail counters, and the Court agrees, that there are genuine
issues of material fact regarding the elements of its claim, including whether
Northcon reasonably believed its statement was true, whether it intended Northcon
to rely on it, whether Whitetail justifiably relied on the statement, and whether
Whitetail suffered any damages as a result of its reliance. Northcon’s motion for
summary judgment on Count 5 should be denied.
3. 	Tortious Interference
Count 6 of the Complaint alleges a claim against Northcon for tortious
interference. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 41-46). To establish a prima facie claim of tortious
interference under Montana law, “the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s acts
were (1) intentional and willful, (2) calculated to cause damage to the plaintiff in
his business, (3) done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage or loss,
without right or justifiable cause on the part of the actor, and (4) that actual
damages and loss resulted.” Hughes v. Lynch, 164 P.3d 913, 920 (Mont. 2007).
Whitetail’s tortious interference claim alleges that during Whitetail’s work
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on the Project, Northcon intentionally and willfully enticed or induced Whitetail
employees to leave Whitetail’s employment, that Northcon’s actions were without
right or justifiable cause, and that Whitetail suffered damages and loss in its
business as a proximate result of Northcon’s actions. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 42-45).
Northcon argues Whitetail’s claim fails as a matter of law due to lack of
proof on each essential element. As clarified during discovery, Whitetail’s tortious
interference claim is premised on the theory that before Whitetail stopped work on
the Project, Northcon arranged to hire some of Whitetail’s employees to complete
Whitetail’s scope of work for compensation by Northcon. (Doc. 47 at ¶ 65; Doc.
46 at ¶ 25). According to Jones, “[e]ssentially, Northcon stole Whitetail’s
employees.” (Doc. 46 at ¶ 25).
Northcon argues this claim fails as a matter of law because Whitetail does
not cite to legal authority supporting its theory of liability and makes no showing
as to the intentional and willful element, that any arrangement was somehow
calculated to cause Whitetail damages, and that any arrangement was done with an
unlawful purpose. (Doc. 61 at 4). While Jones’s declaration testimony is somewhat
sparse, the Court finds that his sworn statements are sufficient to survive summary
judgment. Northcon’s motion for summary judgment on Count 6 should be denied.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above,
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IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Response in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48) and Motion
to Strike Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 51) are DENIED.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) be GRANTED as
to Count 4 of the Complaint but be DENIED in all other respects.
(2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) be DENIED.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of
the Findings and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge upon the
parties. The parties are advised that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, any objections to
the findings and recommendations must be filed with the Clerk of Court and copies
served on opposing counsel within fourteen (14) days after entry hereof, or
objection is waived.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2026.
______________________________
Kathleen L. DeSoto
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:24-cv-00064-SPW Document 65 Filed 02/02/26 Page 33 of 33

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