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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI SOUTHERN DIVISION
YAMPIER MARIN-MENDOZA
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Petitioner,
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V.
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Case No. 6:26-cv-3185-MDH
JIM ARNOTT, et. al.,
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Respondents.
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ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner has been detained by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and parole has been terminated without prior written notice. Pending is his Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in which he argues federal statutes and the Due Process Clause require that he be released. The Court agrees with Petitioner's Constitutional arguments, and on that basis, it concludes the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Marin-Mendoza is a 32-year-old asylum-seeker from Peru who entered the U.S. without inspection on or around March 13, 2023. DHS briefly detained him and released him on his own recognizance on or about March 14, 2023. (Doc. 1-3). The Order of Release on Recognizance, DHS Form I-220A, states:
You have been arrested and placed in removal proceedings. In accordance with section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1226] and the applicable provision of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, you are being released on your own recognizance provided you comply with the following conditions:
Those conditions required him, inter alia, to "report for any hearing or interview as directed by [DHS] or [EOIR]"; "surrender for removal from the U.S. if so ordered;" report in person to the
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AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
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ICE Chicago Office – Non-Detained Unit on March 27, 2023 (which he did); not change his
residence without permission; “not violate any local, State, or Federal laws or ordinances;” and
“assist the [DHS] in obtaining any necessary travel documents.” Id. Upon his release, Mr. Marin-
Mendoza settled in Chicago, Illinois.
On March 27, 2023, DHS commenced removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a by
filing a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) with the Chicago Immigration Court. (Doc. 1-4). The NTA
charges Mr. Marin-Mendoza solely under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (entry without inspection or
admission.) Id. The Chicago Immigration Court scheduled his first Master Calendar hearing for
March 10, 2027. (Doc. 1-5).
Mr. Marin-Mendoza has established a life in Chicago, where he lives with his long-time
girlfriend and their infant U.S.-born son, works to support his family, and is pursuing an asylum
claim. He has no criminal history. In September 2024, Mr. Marin-Mendoza submitted an asylum
application (Form I-589) to the immigration court. (Doc. 1-6). In April 2025, he received
employment authorization based on the pending asylum application, valid through April 13, 2030.
(Doc. 1-7). Since his 2023 entry, Mr. Marin-Mendoza has been checking in with ICE regularly as
required and complying with all other requirements in the Order of Release on Recognizance. His
last in-person check-in was at the ICE office in Chicago on April 22, 2025, and at that appointment,
they scheduled him for his next annual check-in on April 22, 2026. (Doc. 1-8).
On or about February 19, 2026, DHS detained Mr. Marin-Mendoza without notice or
explanation. As he was about to enter his Chicago home, four unidentified men approached, asked
if he was Venezuelan (he is not) and demanded his ID. They did not identify themselves or their
employer, wore no identifying clothing, and did not know his name or country of origin. He
believed they were bounty hunters. He showed his valid work authorization card; they handcuffed
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him anyway. One of the men forced him to pose for a cell-phone photo with the others, then they
drove him to the ICE office. They did not show him a warrant. He still does not know why he was
detained. Respondents now assert that DHS did issue a warrant to for Petitioner. However,
Respondents do not assert, and the record does not show that officers possessed a warrant when
they arrested him. Respondents do not dispute Petitioner’s account of the arrest.
Further Respondents present a submitted “Memorandum to File,” signed by an unidentified
individual, that purports to cancel Mr. Marin-Mendoza’s own recognizance release “for the reasons
stated in form I-213 dated 02/19/2026” – a form Respondents have neglected to provide. The
unidentified signature on the document is also oddly dated February 18, 2026, despite citing to a
document issued one day in the future.
After processing in Chicago, DHS transferred him to a detention center in Clay County,
Indiana, and about three days later, to the Greene County Jail in Springfield, Missouri, where he
remains. Due to his location, EOIR transferred his removal proceedings to the Kansas City
immigration court.
Now, he has filed this writ seeking release, or at a minimum, any process at all. The matter
has been fully briefed by each party. Petitioner bases the writ on statutory and Constitutional
grounds under the Fifth Amendment.
While the statutory grounds upon which Petitioner relies has, for the past twenty-nine years
and five presidential administrations, been interpreted to mean that he was entitled to a bond
hearing during his removal proceedings, the new presidential administration has adopted a novel
interpretation of that statutory scheme.
A divided panel of the 8th Circuit recently agreed with this administration’s interpretation,
in a decision still subject to rehearing, en banc rehearing, or appeal. At this time, however, this
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Court is bound by the panel’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. So, given this change in long
standing statutory interpretation, this Court is left to analyze the writ on Constitutional grounds.
While on these facts, it is apparent to the Court that no process has been afforded to
Petitioner and he has been deprived of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, courts have typically
relied on a more detailed and contextualized analysis, and the Court will do so below.
DISCUSSION
“No person shall … be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. Const. amend. V. First, Yampier Marin-Mendoza is a person. He is a person who was
exercising the full civil liberties awarded to him over three years ago. Those liberties were stripped
by government action. What is left for this Court to decide is whether he received due process of
law in those actions. Respondents claim issuance of a Notice to Appear satisfied Petitioner’s Due
Process rights.
Respondents claim Petitioner is treated as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A), and therefore he is entitled to no process beyond the issuance of a Notice to Appear.
They contend they can detain him for an indefinite period of time without any opportunity for a
hearing. Respondents rely heavily on Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103
(2020) and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1714, 155 L. Ed. 2d 724 (2003).
However, these cases recognize limited procedural rights in the admission context, not the
detention context, and are factually distinct from the case at hand.
The petitioner in Thuraissigiam did not seek release from custody; he sought additional
review of his asylum claim. The Court expressly noted that “the legality of his detention is not in
question.” Id. at 122. Petitioner here does not ask this Court to admit him or to alter his immigration
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status, so the only holding in Thuraissigiam is inapposite. Here, Petitioner seeks only what due
process requires: an opportunity to have his custody reviewed.
The facts in Thuraissigiam are distinct from the facts of the present case. The petitioner
there was apprehended “25 yards” inside the United States, effectively at the border. Id. at 139. By
contrast, Mr. Marin-Mendoza has lived in the United States for over three years pursuant to release
on his own recognizance by DHS during asylum proceedings. He was arrested as he was returning
to his home in Chicago.
These distinctions are dispositive and Thuraissigiam is inapposite. A lengthy discussion of
the plenary power to control which individuals outside the United States may be permitted to enter
is not the relevant question here. The issue here is whether the United States can suddenly and
indefinitely detain a previously released three-year resident with zero review or oversight.
The court in Demore did not discuss detention of all noncitizens, it explicitly discussed
“detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens” who had committed
serious crimes. Id. at 518. It found that mandatory detention under §1226(c) was constitutionally
permissible for the specific subset of people Congress listed including aggravated felons who had
already had their Due Process rights during their criminal proceedings. Id. at 510. The court in
Demore did not rule out Constitutional challenges for people like Petitioner who have no criminal
convictions or other factors which mandate classification under §1226(c). Demore does not
preclude Petitioner’s Due Process claim.
Due Process Analysis
"Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Due Process] Clause protects." Zadvydas
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v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001). Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of “liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
The Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s Due Process rights are
limited solely to the issuance of a Notice to Appear. Under Mathews, Due Process is “flexible”
and:
identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (emphasis added).
The Court has reviewed the warrant and memo to file provided by the Respondents. As far
as a Due Process ruling is concerned, the Court still finds that Respondents’ interpretation of the
process due Petitioner violates his Due Process rights. Respondents do not argue that Mr. Marin-
Mendoza is a flight risk or a danger, and they have provided no reason for his re-detention. Instead,
they simply assert that he is categorically entitled to no process and must remain detained. Under
the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person shall … be deprived of …liberty…without due process of law.”
Mr. Marin-Mendoza was re-detained without notice, hearing, or individualized findings. He is a
person who has been detained without due process of law and this deprivation of liberty will not
be tolerated.
Private Interest
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Undoubtedly, the private interest at stake here “is the most elemental of liberty interests—
the interest in being free from physical detention[.]” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529, 124
S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004). Petitioner has been held in a county jail—in conditions
indistinguishable from criminal incarceration— since February 19, 2026. He is unable to return to
his family, newborn son, and the life he has created over the last three years. Every day that passes
under this unlawful detention is a day that cannot be recovered. See Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978
F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (first Mathews factor strongly satisfied where petitioner was "locked
up in jail" and "could not maintain employment or see his family or friends or others outside normal
visiting hours").
Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
After the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on interpretation of the statutory arguments in this case, the
court in Alfonzo-Mujiuca v. Thompson, Case No. SA-26-CA-00457-XR (W.D. Tx. 03/13/2026)
found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioners’ rights in these cases is high. The Court
found:
Our immigration law has long recognized that noncitizens have an interest in an
individualized hearing prior to detention in connection with immigration
proceedings. See Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101. And the Supreme Court has
required individualized hearings for deprivations of interests less fundamental
than Petitioner's interest in freedom from detention. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 268 (1970) (requiring an individualized hearing prior to the
termination of welfare benefits). Here, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
Petitioner's rights is high. Without an individualized hearing, there is substantial
risk that noncitizens with a substantial presence in the United States who pose
neither flight risk nor danger to the community will be detained. An
individualized assessment before an immigration judge substantially reduces
this risk. Cf Demore, 538 U.S. at 531-32 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reasoning
that "due process requires individualized procedures to ensure there is at least
some merit to the" charge and detention). An individualized analysis ensures the
purpose of detention is not punitive.
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Alfonzo-Mujiuca at 23.
“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews at 333. Petitioner’s continued detention
without an opportunity to be heard is the type of erroneous deprivation Mathews intends to stop.
The basis for his detention and sudden revocation of his previous release require, and deserve, a
hearing. Nothing in the record shows Petitioner poses a danger or flight risk. He has lived in the
United States for over three years. He has a newborn son at home, and he has complied with ICE
check-ins and other release conditions. He has no criminal history.
Balancing of Interests
The final factor directs the Court to weigh the private interests at stake and the risk of
erroneous deprivation of those interests against Respondents’ interests in persisting with the
regulation, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of an additional or substitute procedural
requirement. Mathews at 335. The government identifies no interest in detaining Petitioner based
on danger, flight risk, or obstruction of removal. A bond hearing would not undermine immigration
enforcement; it would ensure that detention is exercised lawfully and in accordance with the
Constitution. Here, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without Due Process is
minimal.
In sum, the Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner, and the court finds that his
continued detention violates his Due Process rights. Petitioner shall be immediately released.
Release is the customary remedy in habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (the habeas shall
"dispose of the matter as law and justice require."); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,484 (1973)
(finding "that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody").
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Additionally, ordering a bond hearing under these circumstances would require the Immigration
Judge to do that which he believes he lacks authority to do following Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025), and would be futile.
Immigration courts have concluded there is no jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing. DHS
provides no alternative mechanism for individualized custody review. Petitioner has no forum,
administrative or judicial, through which he may seek release based on his circumstances. This is
not minimal process. It is zero process. Respondents’ position, that no such process is required,
cannot be reconciled with the Fifth Amendment.
Attorneys’ Fees
Petitioner requests an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Pursuant to the EAJA,
a court shall award to a prevailing party fees and other expenses incurred by that party in any civil
action, brought by or against the United States, unless the court finds that the position of the United
States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C §
2412(d)(1)(A). To be eligible for fees under the EAJA, a petitioner must submit an application
within thirty days of final judgment, and the petitioner's net worth must be less than two million
dollars at the time the civil action was filed. See id. §§ (d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B)(i). The EAJA was
enacted with the purpose of removing the financial disincentive for individuals challenging or
defending against government action and encouraging challenges to improper government action
as a means of helping formulate better public policy. See, e.g., Comm'r, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S.
154, 163 (1990) (“[T]he specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the
financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions.” (citation omitted));
Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1114 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The EAJA was passed partly to encourage
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challenges to improper actions by government agencies. The drafters perceived legal actions as
helping to formulate public policy.” (citations omitted)).
As explained throughout, the Court finds the position of the United States is not
substantially justified. Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner’s procedural Due Process rights are
limited solely to the issuance of a Notice to Appear is misguided. Thus, Petitioner may pursue an
award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes Petitioner’s right to procedural due process has been violated, and he
is entitled to immediate release. Accordingly, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is
GRANTED as follows.
1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody.
2. Respondents shall make accommodations available for Petitioner until such time as
arrangements can be made for Petitioner to be returned to the location of arrest or other
location agreed by the parties.
3. Petitioner shall promptly report to the Court any failure to comply with this Order by
Respondent.
4. Petitioner may submit an application for fees under the EAJA within thirty days of the
entry of final judgment.
5. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents are enjoined from relocating Petitioner
outside the jurisdiction of this Court prior to compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 15, 2026
/s/ Douglas Harpool
DOUGLAS HARPOOL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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