Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
SURKHAB SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD BLANCHE,1 et al.,
Respondents.
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Case No. 6:26-cv-03096-RK
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Surkhab Singh’s Motion to Enforce Court Order. (Doc. 12.)
The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 14, 15.) After careful consideration and review, and for the
reasons explained below, the Court ORDERS that the motion is DENIED.
Discussion
Petitioner Surkhab Singh is a citizen of India who entered the United States without
authorization on May 9, 2023. In July 2023, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear but otherwise
released on his own recognizance under an Order of Supervision. Two years later, on November
22, 2025, Petitioner was detained by federal immigration authorities and held without a bond
hearing. Prior to his detention, Petitioner had submitted an application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), which application remained
pending at the time of his detention.2
On February 11, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. The Court granted habeas corpus relief on March 6, 2026. (Doc. 10.) Specifically, the
Court found that, as a matter of statutory interpretation of federal immigration law, Petitioner was
not subject to mandatory detention without a bond hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), but
was instead subject to discretionary detention under 28 U.S.C. § 1226, which requires a bond
hearing. (See generally id.) Accordingly, the Court ordered that Petitioner be released or granted
a bond hearing within 10 days of the Court’s Order (or by March 16, 2026). (Id. at 3.) It appears
1 Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Todd Blanche as Acting Attorney
General of the United States is substituted for Respondent Pam Bondi.
2 As best as the Court can tell, Petitioner’s application remains pending.
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that a bond hearing was held on March 10, 2026, after which the Immigration Judge denied bond.
(See Doc. 12 at 61-64.)
In his motion to enforce, Petitioner argues that the bond hearing violated the Court’s habeas
Order. The Immigration Judge denied bond based in part on the likelihood Petitioner would be
granted favorable relief as to his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
(See generally Doc. 12 at 64-61.) Petitioner asserts that the Court’s habeas Order included “clear
instructions . . . that Petitioner’s pending [asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT] claims would
not be a persuasive factor in deciding custody.” (Doc. 12 at 5.) Petitioner misreads the Court’s
habeas Order in this regard. In context, the Court only found that the fact of Petitioner’s pending
application for asylum and other relief did not change its analysis whether his detention was lawful
under 28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) or was instead grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1226. (See Doc. 10 at 3
(citing Bashir K.A. v. Klang, No. 25-cv-4559 (KMM/DJF), 2026 WL 452353, at *7 (D. Minn. Feb.
17, 2026).) 	The Court did not address whether or how the pending application for asylum and
other relief should (or could) be weighed by the Immigration Judge in the context of the required
bond hearing. In short, Petitioner’s argument that the Immigration Judge’s decision to deny bond
violated the Court’s habeas Order in this way is without merit.
Petitioner also raises a due process challenge to the bond hearing. 	He argues that the
hearing did not comply with due process because it did not require the Government to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger or flight risk, but that the Immigration
Judge instead placed the burden on Petitioner. The Court questions whether this claim is properly
asserted in a post-judgment motion to enforce the Court’s habeas Order brought pursuant to Rule
70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	Regardless, the Court finds that considering a
subsequent development in binding circuit caselaw, the instant motion to enforce is not the proper
vehicle for a due process challenge to the bond hearing and is instead rendered moot.
Following the Court’s habeas Order and Petitioner’s bond hearing held pursuant to the
Court’s habeas Order—but prior to Petitioner’s motion to enforce—the Eighth Circuit addressed
the same statutory interpretation issue on which the Court had granted Petitioners’ motion for
habeas relief in an appeal from a different case. In Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026),
the Eighth Circuit held that aliens present in the United States without authorization (under similar
circumstances as Petitioner here) could lawfully be detained (without a bond hearing) as a matter
of federal immigration law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. at 1133-38. Petitioner did
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not address Avila in his motion to enforce. In his reply, however, Petitioner “acknowledges that
Avila is adverse on the detention-authority question” but asserts that it “does not resolve the
question now before the Court: whether the [bond determination] hearing” complied with due
process. (Doc. 15 at 3-4.) The Court disagrees with Petitioner’s assessment of the impact of Avila
as to the relief requested pursuant to the instant motion to enforce.
To be sure, at the time of the Court’s habeas Order and the required bond hearing before
the Immigration Judge, the Eighth Circuit had not yet decided for this circuit whether an alien in
similar circumstances as Petitioner here could be detained without a bond hearing pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). After Avila, the prevailing law in the Eighth Circuit is that an alien in
similar circumstances as Petitioner here can be lawfully detained under federal immigration law
without a bond hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). As Petitioner acknowledges, Avila
is directly at odds with the Court’s prior habeas Order which granted habeas relief solely on
Petitioner’s statutory interpretation argument.
Notwithstanding any other potential avenue of relief that may be available to Petitioner,
Avila effectively forecloses or renders as moot the relief Petitioner requests here to enforce the
prior habeas Order. See Lang v. Soc. Sec’y Admin., 612 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The test
for mootness is whether the relief sought would, if granted, make a difference to the legal interests
of the parties.” (internal quotation marks omitted; quotation modified)); Kennedy Building
Associates v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 745 (8th Cir. 2004) (“A case becomes moot if it can be
said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the violation will recur or if interim
relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effect of the alleged violation.”).
Considering Avila, the Court finds that Petitioner’s post-judgment motion to enforce is not
the proper vehicle to address the broader issue underlying Petitioner’s argument, which considers
what is required for an immigration bond hearing to satisfy due process. A necessary prerequisite
to this question is that Petitioner is entitled to an immigration bond hearing as a matter of due
process in the first instance. The habeas Order Petitioner seeks to enforce granted habeas relief
finding that a bond hearing was required under federal immigration law as a matter of statutory
interpretation. The Eighth Circuit’s subsequent decision in Avila, which is binding precedent on
this Court, establishes, effectively, that Petitioner may be detained without a bond hearing under
federal immigration law. 	Petitioner’s motion to enforce the prior habeas Order raising a due
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process challenge to the bond detention hearing conducted in accordance with the Court’s habeas
Order is therefore moot.
Conclusion
Accordingly, after careful consideration and review, and for the reasons explained above,
the Court ORDERS that Petitioner’s motion to enforce, (Doc. 12), is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark
ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: July 6, 2026
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