The Wrex Group, LLC v. A&R Logistics, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
THE WREX GROUP, LLC, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:25-CV-00982-CMS
)
A&R LOGISTICS, INC., et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Remand Case to State Court of Plaintiff
The Wrex Group, LLC, d/b/a Chuck’s Wrecker Service, (Doc. 15). Because 28 U.S.C. § 1446
requires consent from all defendants “[w]hen a civil action is removed solely under section
1441(a),” and Defendant A&R Logistics, Inc., has not consented to removal, the Court will
GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Case to State Court, (Doc. 15).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff The Wrex Group, LLC (“Wrex”), is a towing and recovery operator registered,
and with its primary place of business, in Missouri. (Doc. 1 at 2); (Doc. 4 at 2). Plaintiff originally
filed this action against Defendant A&R Logistics, Inc. (“A&R”) and Defendant Baseload Power
Generation Parts and Services, Inc. (“Baseload”) in Missouri state court on May 23, 2025. See
(Doc. 4 at 1). Plaintiff claims that Defendant A&R breached its contract with Plaintiff by not
paying Plaintiff for its services, including the amounts that Plaintiff had to pay to third-party
contractors. (Doc. 4 at 2–3).
Plaintiff requested the Circuit Court issue summons for both Defendants. (Doc. 1, Ex. B at
17–24). A&R was served its summons, (Doc. 1, Ex. B at 31), on June 10, 2025. (Doc. 1, Ex. B at
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36). Baseload was served its summons, (Doc. 1, Ex. B at 40), on June 5, 2025. (Doc. 1, Ex. B at
39).
On July 2, 2025, Defendant Baseload removed this case from Missouri state court to this
Court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 1); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a). On August
23, 2025, Plaintiff moved to remand this case to state court, arguing that the unanimity rule, 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2), requires this Court to remand. (Doc. 16 at 2). Neither Defendant has opposed
the Motion for Remand within fourteen (14) days as is required by E.D. Mo. L.R. 4.01(B) or
requested an extension of time to file a memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by
Constitution and statute.” Minnesota by Ellison v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 63 F.4th 703, 708 (8th Cir.
2023) (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)). Federal district courts have original
jurisdiction over all civil actions between citizens of different states “where the matter in
controversy exceeds . . . $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Generally, a civil action brought in state court may be removed by the defendant to federal court,
provided that the action could have originally been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
“Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). “If at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded” to state
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Courts should resolve all doubts about federal jurisdiction in favor of
remand to state court. See Johnson v. Midwest Div. - RBH, LLC, 88 F.4th 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2023).
However, “[f]ederal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to decide cases that fall within
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their jurisdiction.” Wassef v. Tibben, 68 F.4th 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
DISCUSSION
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) vests this Court with subject-matter jurisdiction over this
action. Neither party has disputed that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Plaintiff’s
Complaint seeks $126,393.77 in its first count alone, (Doc. 4 at 5), and Plaintiff has not challenged
Defendant Baseload’s argument that the “aggregate amount in controversy, exclusive of interests
and costs, exceeds the $75,000 threshold required under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” (Doc. 1 at 3).
Plaintiff and Defendant Baseload agree that complete diversity of citizenship exists, given that
Plaintiff is a citizen of Missouri, (Docs. 1 at 2; 4 at 2), Defendant A&R is a Maryland company
with its principal place of business in Maryland, (Docs. 1 at 3; 4 at 2), and Defendant Baseload is
a Texas company with its principal place of business in Texas, (Docs. 1 at 3; 4 at 2). Despite the
amount in controversy and the existence of complete diversity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), Plaintiff
asserts that Defendant A&R has not consented to removal as required by Section 1446(b)(2).
Therefore, according to Plaintiff, the removal of this case violated the rule of unanimity, and
remand is required. (Doc. 16 at 2).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) authorizes removal of civil actions brought in state court by a
defendant to federal court when that action could have otherwise originally been brought in federal
court. Defendant Baseload removed the civil action solely under Section 1441(a) because the
action could have originally been brought in this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under
Section 1332(a). See (Doc. 1 at 2). Section 1446(b)(2)(A) mandates that “[w] hen a civil action is
removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served
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must join in or consent to the removal of the action.” This provision codified what is known as the
“rule of unanimity.” See Couzens v. Donohue, 854 F.3d 508, 514 (8th Cir. 2017).
Before the 2011 amendments to Section 1446, “the later-served defendants ... had thirty
days from the date of service on them to file a notice of removal with the unanimous consent of
their co-defendants.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests.,
L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2001)). The 2011 amendments added Section 1446(b)(2)(C),
which states: “If defendants are served at different times, and a later-served defendant files a notice
of removal, any earlier-served defendant may consent to the removal even though that earlier-
served defendant did not previously initiate or consent to removal.”
The most recent Eighth Circuit opinion on the statute as amended, Couzens, 854 F.3d at
514–15 (citing cases), interprets Section 1446 as potentially doing away with the 30-day time limit,
but acknowledges that courts have reached differing opinions. The Eighth Circuit declined to apply
a time limit for consent to removal under Section 1446(b)(2)(C). Id. at 515. Instead, it found
consent when a non-removing defendant filed its consent thirty-one days after the removing
defendant had filed its notice of removal, but also noted some evidence that the non-removing
defendant had consented before the thirty-day mark. Id. The Eighth Circuit’s only real guidance
was that it was “reluctan[t] to apply the unanimity requirement in a ‘hypertechnical and unrealistic
manner . . . .’” Id. (quoting Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1187
(8th Cir. 2015)).
As of the time of this writing, more than four months have passed since Defendant Baseload
filed its Notice of Removal on August 2, 2025, and Defendant A&R has not filed anything, let
alone a consent to removal. See (Doc. 1). Regardless of whether the thirty-day time limit has been
repealed, this Court would not be applying the unanimity requirement in anything approaching a
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“‘hypertechnical and unrealistic manner’” by finding that Defendant A&R has not consented to
removal. See Couzens, 854 F.3d at 515 (quoting Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187); see also (Doc. 1)
(showing filing date of August 2, 2025).
The Court will remand this action on the basis that Defendant A&R has not consented to
removal and the rule of unanimity is not satisfied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Case to State
Court (Doc. 15) is GRANTED, and this matter is remanded to the Circuit Court of St. Louis
County, Missouri.
A separate Order of Remand will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
So ordered this 9th day of December 2025.
CRISTIAN M. STEVENS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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