Bradley v. Evans et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
COURTNEY-A OF THE FAMILY: 	)
BRADLEY, a living soul and 	)
breathing Man, in proper person, 	)
sui juris, Executor of the 	)
Courtney-A Bradley Cestui Que Trust, 	) 	No. 4:25-CV-254 HEA
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	)
)
KIM EVANS, Director of the Missouri 	)
DSS-FSD, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, filed
by Plaintiff Courtney-A of The Family: Bradley ( “Plaintiff”) pursuant to Rule 59(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 (ECF No. 25). Defendants Kim Evans and
Patrick Luebbering oppose the motion. Plaintiff failed to file a reply memorandum,
and the time to do so has expired. Consequently, the motion is ripe for review. For
the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment will be
denied.
1 Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se without the assistance of counsel.
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In this action, Plaintiff brought suit against Kim Evans, Director of the
Missouri Department of Social Services (“DSS”) and Family Support Division
(“FSD”), and Patrick Luebbering, Chief Financial Officer of Missouri DSS and FSD.
Plaintiff challenged the lawful authority, jurisdiction, and procedures under which
DSS-FSD has pursued administrative actions against him in the enforcement of child
support orders. He alleged that Defendants unlawfully pursued child support against
him “without a valid judgment, verified contract, lawful due process, or proper
subject matter jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 5 at 2). He further alleges that he “was not
provided notice, a lawful hearing before a competent tribunal, nor any opportunity
to rebut the presumption of liability with competent witnesses,” and that “[a]ll
enforcement actions taken by DSS-FSD occurred from administrative process
lacking judicial oversight or lawful standing.” (Id. at 2-3).
On 	July 	22, 	2025, 	Defendants 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	claims.
Defendants argued, among other things, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred
Plaintiff from bringing his claims in federal court. The parties filed legal memoranda
in support of and in opposition to the motion, and on October 22, 2025, the Court
granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, finding that the Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear this dispute under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
In the motion presently before the Court, Plaintiff moves that the Court
reverse the dismissal of his claims. 	Plaintiff argues that the Court misapplied the
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Rooker-Feldman doctrine. He contends that he is not seeking review of a state court
judgment, but 	rather 	he challenges 	DSS-FSD’s 	“independent 	and 	continuing
administrative actions.” 	(ECF No. 25 at 1). 	He also asks the Court to consider
evidence that was not in the record at the time the Court ruled on Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss.
Discussion
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows any party aggrieved by a
judgment to file a motion to alter or amend the judgment ‘no later than 28 days after’
the judgment has been entered.” Chapman v. Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC,
862 F.3d 1103, 1111 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). 	Motions
pursuant to Rule 59(e) “serve the limited function of correcting manifest errors of
law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence and cannot be used to introduce
new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments which could have been
offered or raised prior to entry of judgment.” Ryan v. Ryan, 889 F.3d 499, 507 (8th
Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). “A district court has broad discretion in determining
whether to grant or deny a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule
59(e).” Briscoe v. Cnty. of St. Louis, Missouri, 690 F.3d 1004, 1015 (8th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff has not established that he is entitled to relief under Rule 59(e). First,
Plaintiff has not shown that the Court erred in applying the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “with the exception of habeas
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corpus petitions, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over challenges
to state court judgments.” Lemonds v. St. Louis Cnty., 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir.
2000) (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923)). 	A plaintiff, who
was unsuccessful in state court, “is barred from seeking what in substance would be
appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court based on the
losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.”
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–1006 (1994) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S.
at 482; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416). This jurisdictional bar extends not only to
“straightforward appeals but also [to] more indirect attempts by federal plaintiffs to
undermine state court decisions.” Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 492. Thus, federal district
courts may not “exercis[e] jurisdiction over general constitutional claims that are
‘inextricably intertwined’ with specific claims already adjudicated in state court.”
Ballinger v. Culotta, 322 F.3d 546, 548–49 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Feldman, 460
U.S. at 492-93).
In his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Plaintiff argues, as he argued
before in response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, that he is not challenging a
state court order, but rather, seeks relief from Defendants’ administrative actions. In
his complaint, Plaintiff is challenging the enforcement of child support orders, but
he is also challenging the validity of those orders. 	He alleges “[child support]
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obligations have been pursued without a valid judgment, verified contract, lawful
due process, or proper subject matter jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 5 at 2). 	For relief,
Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin further enforcement of the DSS-FSD proceedings
against him, and that the Court order “removal and termination of any ongoing
garnishments or obligations tied to the challenged support order.” 	(Id. at 3). As
stated 	before, 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	and 	his 	request 	for 	relief 	are 	“inextricably
intertwined with a state court decision.” Prince v. Ark. Bd. of Exam’rs in Psych., 380
F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 2004). 	Plaintiff has not shown that the Court erred in
applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in this case.
Second, Plaintiff states in his Motion to Alter Judgment that he has obtained
additional evidence showing that DSS-FSD “reported alleged arrears to Equifax as
a collection account, therefore acting as an unauthorized creditor,” and this evidence
will show that his injury “stems from Defendants’ independent administrative acts
rather than any state-court adjudication.” (ECF No. 25 at 2).
In order to be entitled to relief based on newly discovered evidence, a plaintiff
must show: “(1) that the evidence was discovered after the court’s order, (2) that the
movant exercised diligence to obtain the evidence before entry of the order, (3) that
the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching, (4) that the evidence is
material, and (5) that the evidence would probably have produced a different result.”
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Ryan, 889 F.3d at 508 (citing Miller v. Baker Implement Co., 439 F.3d 407, 414 (8th
Cir. 2006)). See also Briscoe, 690 F.3d at 1015–16 (applying same standard).
Plaintiff has not shown that the evidence he asks the Court to consider was
unavailable before the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, let alone
that he exercised diligence to obtain the evidence. But even if Plaintiff had submitted
the evidence in response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, it would not change the
Court’s ruling. 	On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the Court reviews the
allegations contained in the complaint to determine whether the Court has subject
matter jurisdiction. See Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 n.1 (8th Cir. 1993); Osborn
v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). 	Evidence of Defendants’
collection efforts does not change the fact that in in his Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff is challenging the validity of a state court ruling, and he is asking the Court
to enjoin enforcement of state court child support orders. Plaintiff is not entitled to
the relief he seeks because he has not shown how the outcome would have been
different had the Court considered his evidence when it decided Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss.
In sum, Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is without
merit.
Accordingly,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Courtney-A of The Family:
Bradley’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is DENIED. (ECF No.
25).
Dated this 16 th day of December, 2025.
_________________________________
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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