Wright v. Harris

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
PETE WRIGHT, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 4:24 CV 397 CDP
)
LANE HARRIS, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Self-represented plaintiff Pete Wright asserts that he was subjected to the
tortious conduct of defendant Lane Harris, a detention officer at the St. Francois
County Jail, when Wright was housed at the Jail in 2023 and 2024 as a pretrial
civil detainee. 	In this diversity action, Wright brings Missouri State-law claims of
conversion, slander, and assault and battery, alleging that Harris took and failed to
return various items of Wright’s personal property; made false statements to the
jail supervisor that Wright committed conduct violations; and grabbed Wright’s
right arm causing pain and further injury to a fractured hand; and forcibly pushed
Wright into his cell and down the hallway. 	Because the undisputed evidence
before the Court shows that Wright cannot meet the elements of conversion and
slander, I will grant Harris’s motion for summary judgment on those claims. 	I
will also grant Harris’s motion for summary judgment on Wright’s assault-and-
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battery claim under the doctrine of official immunity.
Legal Standard
When considering a motion for summary judgment, I must view the facts
and inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
As the moving party, defendant must establish that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 	Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a), (c)(1); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 	Once a motion is properly made and
supported, the nonmoving party must either proffer evidence in the record that
demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact or show that the moving party’s
proffer does not establish the absence of a genuine dispute. 	Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Conseco Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 620 F.3d
902, 910 (8th Cir. 2010); Howard v. Columbia Pub. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 797, 800-
01 (8th Cir. 2004). 	A verified complaint is equivalent to an affidavit for summary
judgment purposes. 	Hanks v. Prachar, 457 F.3d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam).
At the summary judgment stage, courts do not weigh the evidence and
decide the truth of the matter, but rather determine if there is a genuine issue for
trial. 	Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 	However, summary judgment may be
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appropriate “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it[.]”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 	In such circumstances, the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute will not serve to defeat summary
judgment; instead, the factual dispute must be “genuine.” 	Id.
Discussion
The evidence before the Court, including Wright’s verified complaint, shows
that Wright cannot establish all elements necessary to prevail on his claims of
conversion or slander. 	Additionally, video evidence before the Court discredits
Wright’s claim of assault and battery, but Harris is nevertheless entitled to official
immunity on the claim. 	As no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial on
Wright’s claims and Harris has established his entitlement to judgment as a matter
of law on the claims, I will grant Harris’s motion for summary judgment.
Conversion
Under Missouri law, “[c]onversion is the unauthorized assumption of the
right of ownership over the personal property of another to the exclusion of the
owner’s rights.” 	Cepia, LLC v. Universal Pictures Visual Programming Ltd., 177
F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1141 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (quoting Emerick v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins.
Co., 756 S.W.2d 513, 523 (Mo. banc 1988)). 	To prevail on his claim of
conversion against Harris, Wright must establish: 	1) that he was the owner of the
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property in question; 2) that Harris wrongfully appropriated the property with the
intent to exercise some control over it; and 3) that Harris deprived Wright of his
right of possession of the property. 	Id.
There is no unauthorized taking if the property owner consents to the
appropriation of his property. 	Maples v. United Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 686 S.W.2d
525, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). 	Consent can be either express or implied. 	Id.
(citing Graves v. Stewart, 642 S.W.2d 649, 650–651 (Mo. banc 1982)). 	“Implied”
means necessary deduction from the circumstances, general language, or conduct
of the parties. 	Id. (citing Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mo. v. Dryden, 492
S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973)). 	“Implied consent” is that manifested by
signs, actions or facts, or by inaction or silence which creates an inference that
consent has been given. 	Id. (citing State v. Stanfield, 1 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Mo.
1927)). 	Accordingly, if Harris believed and it reasonably appeared to him that
Wright was assenting to the taking of his property, then conversion did not occur.
Maples, 686 S.W.2d at 527-28. 	Assent is not determined by the state of mind, but
rather by the conduct of the parties and the language employed by them, judged by
a reasonable standard. 	Id.
Here, Wright asserts that Harris confiscated various items of his personal
property in July 2023 when searching his cell for contraband, and failed to return
five pieces of artwork, a trial transcript, and State-agency contact information.
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The undisputed evidence before the Court shows that on July 25, 2023,
defendant Harris and another jail staff member, Deputy Barton, went to Wright’s
cell to search for suspected contraband. 	During the search, Harris and Barton
found paperwork that contained sexually explicit references and included the
names of other staff members, which Harris and Barton perceived as threats.
Upon Wright’s protestation against the removal of the paperwork, night shift
supervisor Corporal Foot went to Wright’s cell and spoke to the three men. 	Harris
and Barton showed the paperwork to Foot and explained their reasons for concern,
upon which Foot explained to Wright that he would place the material in a manilla
envelope and provide it to the Jail Administrator, Lieutenant White, for his review.
Foot then placed all the items into a manilla envelope. 	Harris did not see the
envelope or its contents after that point.
On July 27, 2023, Lt. White met with Wright about the items in the manilla
envelope, and they discussed which items Wright could keep in his cell and which
items had to be placed in Wright’s property locker. 	Wright did not look at
everything that White returned to him, but he noticed days later when looking
through the envelope that some items were missing. 	Nearly two months later, on
September 20, Wright asked Harris to return the missing items. 	Harris informed
Wright that he did not have them.
Harris, Barton, and Foot all attest that Wright indicated that he agreed with
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Foot’s manilla-envelope solution (ECF 27-2, Harris Decl.; ECF 27-3, Barton
Decl.; ECF 27-4, Foot Decl.), and Wright presents no evidence otherwise. 	Harris
argues that this circumstance shows that Wright impliedly consented to the
appropriation of his materials. 	Although Wright avers in an unsworn statement
that he did not have a choice in the matter (see ECF 39 at ¶ 13), he appears to
argue that regardless, the conversion occurred when Harris turned over the
paperwork to Foot, which happened before Foot proposed the manilla-envelope
solution. 	Wright attests in his verified complaint that he did not consent to
Harris’s action, and evidence shows that Wright protested Harris’s initial
confiscation of the materials. 	Even so, the undisputed evidence shows that Harris
did not dispossess Wright of his claimed right to the property as he merely showed
the material to Foot for his review. 	It was Foot who allegedly determined to
remove the property from Wright’s cell and did so, and it was White who allegedly
determined which property could be returned to Wright. 	See Chemical Sales Co.
v. Diamond Chem. Co., 766 F.2d 364, 367 (8th Cir. 1985) (Missouri courts have
emphasized that the essence of conversion lies “not in the acquisition of the
property by the wrongdoer, but in the wrongful deprivation of it to the owner.”).
Because the undisputed evidence shows that Harris did not wrongfully
deprive Wright of his right of possession to his property, I will grant Harris
summary judgment on Wright’s claim of conversion.
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Slander
Slander consists of “fleeting speech” that is defamatory. 	Nazer v. Missouri
Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 313 (Mo. banc 1993). 	Under Missouri law,
defamation is established by: 	1) the publication, 2) of a defamatory statement, 3)
that identifies the plaintiff, 4) that is false, 5) that is published with the requisite
degree of fault, and 6) damages the plaintiff’s reputation. 	Overcast v. Billings
Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. banc 2000). 	The publication requirement
means “the communication of defamatory matter to a third person.” 	Dean v.
Wissmann, 996 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 	Under the doctrine of
intra-corporate immunity, however, “communications between officers of the same
corporation in the due and regular course of the corporate business . . . are not
publications to third persons” because the corporation “is but communicating with
itself.” 	Id. at 633-34. 	See also Duncan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., No. 24-CV-
04096-SRB, 2024 WL 3520847, at *6 (W.D. Mo. July 22, 2024). 	Because a
public entity must “communicate within itself” the same as a private, for-profit
corporation, intra-corporate immunity applies to public entities as well. 	Porter v.
City of Lake Lotawana, No. 07-00461-CV-W-REL, 2009 WL 10441610, at *58
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2009).
Here, Wright asserts that Harris slandered him when Harris told his
supervisor, Sergeant Hodge, and Detention Officer Reid that Wright had violated
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two rules by not wearing his identification bracelet at all times and by using his
personal cup at mealtime. 	Wright contends that those statements were false
because there were no such rules in place at the time.
Assuming that Harris’s challenged statements were capable of defamatory
meaning, there was no publication to third persons in the circumstances of this
case. 	Harris communicated his statements to a supervisory jail official in the
presence of another detention officer for the purpose of advising the officials that
Wright failed to comply with jail rules. 	Because Harris’s statements were made to
two jail officials in the ordinary course of business, they were part of the business
of a county jail communicating with itself and do not constitute publication of a
defamatory matter to third persons. 	The intra-corporate immunity doctrine
therefore bars Wright’s claim that Harris slandered him, and Harris is entitled to
summary judgment on the claim. 	See Parker v. City of Vandalia, Mo., No. 2:18
CV 13 JMB, 2021 WL 1057355, at *10-11 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2021).1
Assault and Battery
Under Missouri law, a plaintiff must prove the following elements to
1 	Contrary to his attestation in his verified complaint and his sworn deposition testimony that
Harris made the challenged statements to only Hodge and Reid (ECF 1 at ¶¶ 47, 48, 52; ECF 27-
1 at dep. pp. 40-41), Wright now makes unsworn statements that publication to third parties
occurred when Harris told Wright in the presence of other detainees that he had violated the
rules. 	(See ECF 38 at p. 5; ECF 39 at ¶ 45.) 	Wright’s unsworn statements cannot be used to
defeat summary judgment. 	Parker v. City of Vandalia, Mo., No. 2:18 CV 13 JMB, 2021 WL
1080681, at *14 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 18, 2021) (listing cases).
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establish assault: 	“(1) defendant’s intent to cause bodily harm or offensive
contact, or apprehension of either; (2) conduct of the defendant indicating such
intent; and (3) apprehension of bodily harm or offensive contact on the part of the
plaintiff caused by defendant’s conduct.” 	Phelps v. Bross, 73 S.W.3d 651, 656
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 	Battery is defined as “an intended, offensive bodily contact
with another.” 	Id.
Here, Wright asserts that Harris committed assault and battery on two
separate occasions. 	First, Wright contends that Harris grabbed him by the right
arm on February 24, 2024, in relation to the identification-bracelet rule violation,
which caused him pain and injury to his already fractured right hand and made him
fear imminent peril. 	Wright also contends that on the following day, February 25,
Harris grabbed his right arm a second time, in relation to the personal-cup
violation, and forcibly shoved him out of the meal area and down the corridor to
the supervisor’s office, again creating fear of imminent peril.
The video evidence before the Court belies Wright’s depiction of the two
events. 	But even if offensive contact was apprehended or occurred, the doctrine
of official immunity bars Wright’s claims against Harris.
First, in support of his motion for summary judgment, Harris submitted
video footage of the interactions between himself and Wright that form the basis of
Wright’s claims. 	The February 24 video shows Harris approaching Wright after
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Wright collected his meal in the jail common area. 	(ECF 28, Deft.’s Exh. H.)
Harris declares that he approached Wright because he was not wearing his
identification bracelet and informed him that he would need to be locked down in
his cell because of it. 	(ECF 27-2 at ¶ 19.) 	Harris then took hold of Wright’s left
upper arm and guided him up the stairs to his cell. 	Harris released Wright’s arm
once Wright was in the cell. 	He did not push Wright into his cell. 	The video
shows that Harris did not have any contact with Wright’s right arm at any time
during the encounter. 	(ECF 28, Deft.’s Exh. H.)
The February 25 video shows Harris approaching Wright as Wright stood in
line in the common area waiting for his meal. 	(ECF 28, Deft.’s Exh. I.) 	Harris
declares he approached Wright because Wright was holding a personal cup that he
was not permitted to use, and he reached toward Wright to confiscate the
unauthorized cup. 	(ECF 27-2 at ¶¶ 23, 24.) 	The video shows that when Wright
moved his arms and body to evade Harris’s reach, Harris grabbed Wright’s upper
right tricep with his right hand and placed his left hand on the center of Wright’s
back. 	Harris then held Wright’s upper arms from behind as he escorted him from
the meal distribution area. 	Once out of that area and in a back corridor, Harris
released Wright’s right arm but continued to hold Wright’s upper left arm as they
walked down the corridor. 	Harris did not push or shove Wright. 	Harris released
Wright’s left arm when they reached the Central Control office. 	Harris had no
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physical contact with Wright thereafter, including during his escorting Wright back
to his cell, waiting for him to collect his property, and escorting him back from his
cell and exiting the common area. 	(ECF 28, Deft.’s Exh. I.)
In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court found that video footage of a police
chase conclusively demonstrated, contrary to the plaintiff's account of the event,
that police had acted reasonably under the circumstances and had not committed a
constitutional violation, thus entitling them to qualified immunity. 	550 U.S. at
380-81. 	Indeed, the Supreme Court found the plaintiff's version of the facts to be
“so utterly discredited” by the facts depicted on the videotape “that no reasonable
jury could have believed” his claims. 	Id. at 380. 	As a result, the Supreme Court
reversed the denial of summary judgment, holding that the lower court should not
have relied on the plaintiff's “fiction[al]” statements, but instead “it should have
viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” 	Id. at 380-81. 	“When
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by
the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Id. at 380.
Here, Wright’s version of the facts so blatantly contradicts the video
evidence that no reasonable jury could believe that Harris’s conduct met any
element of assault or battery. 	Harris’s demeanor was calm throughout both
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encounters, and Wright displayed no apprehension to Harris’s conduct other than
moving his cup away from Harris’s reach on February 25. 	While Harris grabbed
Wright’s right upper arm briefly on February 25, the contact did not involve
Wright’s injured hand and Wright did not display any “substantial pain in his right
hand” as alleged in his complaint. 	(ECF 1 at ¶ 56.) 	Indeed, the video shows that
after packing his things in his cell on February 25, Wright carried his packed duffle
bag over his right shoulder with his right hand in no apparent discomfort. 	(ECF
28, Deft.’s Exh. I.) 	Wright’s assertions that Harris grabbed Wright’s forearm,
caused reinjury to Wright’s hand, and forcibly shoved him out of the common area
and down the corridor are discredited by the video footage. 	The footage also
discredits Wright’s claim that he experienced shock and fear by Harris’s conduct.
On the evidence before the Court, I cannot adopt Wright’s version of the facts to
defeat summary judgment on his assault and battery claim.
Regardless, the doctrine of official immunity bars Wright’s claim against
Harris. 	Official immunity “protects public employees from liability for alleged
acts of negligence committed during the course of their official duties for the
performance of discretionary acts.” 	Boude v. City of Raymore, Mo, 855 F.3d 930,
935 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610
(Mo. banc 2008)). 	See also Burbridge v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 2 F.4th 774, 780-
81 (8th Cir. 2021) (official immunity can apply to claims of assault and battery).
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Discretionary acts require “the exercise of reason in the adaptation of means to an
end and discretion in determining how or whether an act should be done or course
pursued.” 	Id. (quoting Fonseca v. Collins, 884 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994)). 	In Missouri, an “officer’s decision to use force in the performance of his
duties is discretionary.” 	Id.
Harris’s conduct in holding Wright’s arm(s) to guide him to his cell on
February 24 and to Central Control on February 25 were discretionary acts in the
performance of his official duty as a public detention officer. 	Although Wright
asserts that Harris’s conduct is nevertheless actionable because he acted in bad
faith or with malice by invoking unpublished rules so he could assault Wright, see
Boude, 855 F.3d at 935 (bad faith and malice exceptions to official immunity), the
undisputed evidence shows that Sgt. Hodge confirmed to Wright on February 25
that detainees were required by rule to wear their identification bracelets at all
times and that jail rules permitted only jail-issued mugs for beverages during
meals. 	(ECF 27-1, Wright Dep. at dep. pp. 32, 33, 41; ECF 27-7, Hodge Decl. at
¶¶ 3, 7, 8.) 	On this evidence, it cannot reasonably be inferred that Harris acted in
bad faith or from an improper or wrongful motive by invoking existing rules when
he observed Wright violating them. 	Whether the rules were published or not is of
no instance given Harris’s understanding of them and his personal observation of
Wright’s violations. 	Harris is therefore entitled to official immunity on Wright’s
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claim of assault and battery.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Lane Harris’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [25] is GRANTED.
An appropriate Judgment is entered separately this date.
CATHERINE D. PERRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated this 28th day of January, 2026.
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