USA v. Davis et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) Case No. 4:24 CR 343 SRC/JSD
)
SAMUEL DAVIS, 	)
)
Defendant 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE1
Defendant Samuel Davis (“Defendant” or “Davis”) filed the following pre-trial motions:
1. 	Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence and Statements (“Motion to Suppress
Evidence” or “Motion to Suppress Statements”); [ECF No. 44]2
2. 	Motion to Dismiss the Indictment or, in the Alternative, for Bill of Particulars;
[ECF 45] and,
3. 	Motion to Sever the Defendants on the Indictment; [ECF 46]
The United States of America (“government”) responded by filing its memoranda opposing
the motions. [ECF Nos. 49-51] For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS
that the motions be DENIED.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 3, 2024, a federal grand jury return an Indictment charging Davis with various
criminal offenses relating to an alleged assault of C.G. that occurred in July of 2023 while Davis
was employed as a Northwoods Police Department officer. [ECF No. 1] Counts One and Two of
1 Pretrial matters have been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b).
2 Although Davis obviously filed his Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence and Statement as one motion, the
Court addresses his requests to suppress evidence and statements separately.
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the Indictment charge Davis with committing the offenses with fellow Northwoods police officer,
Corporal Michael Hill (“Hill”). Counts Three and Four charge Davis individually with committing
the particular offenses. Count Five separately charges Hill.
In his Motion to Suppress Statements, Davis requests that this Court suppress “[a]ny
statements made by the Defendant to any law enforcement personnel on July 8, 2023 [and] [a]ny
statements made by the Defendant, written or oral, signed or unsigned, that are related [to] the
indictments filed in this matter.” [ECF No. 44 at 2] In his Motion to Suppress Evidence, he asks
that this Court suppress “[a]ny and all property, papers, information, or testimony pertaining to the
Defendant, obtained or taken from him on or about July 8, 2023[,] and at any time either preceding
or thereafter….” [Id.] Davis also attacks the Search Warrants that were issued for Google and AT&T
records. [Id. at 3]
On August 8, 2025, the Court held an evidentiary hearing relating only to the Motion to
Suppress Physical Evidence and Statements. [Id.] The government presented the testimony of
Detective Joseph Percich of the St. Louis County Police Department (“county”).3 The government
also offered, and the Court received, the following: Exhibit #1, an audio recorded phone call between
Detective Percich and Davis; Exhibit #2, an audio record of Detective Percich’s interview of Davis;
Exhibit #3, a Consent to Search form for Davis’s Samsung Galaxy cell phone; Exhibit #4, the Google
Search Warrant; and, Exhibit #5, the AT&T Search Warrant.4 After oral argument, the Court took
the matter partially under submission and granted Davis twenty-one days after the filing of the
hearing transcript to file a post-hearing brief. [ECF No. 86] The Court further granted the
3 See ECF No. 87, Clerk’s Witness List.
4 See ECF No. 88, Clerk’s Exhibit List.
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government fourteen days thereafter to file a response, at which point both Motions to Suppress
would be deemed wholly submitted. [Id.] As to the other two pending pretrial motions, the parties
agreed to submit those as written, along with any related post-hearing briefing.
The transcript was filed on September 9, 2025. [ECF No. 90 (Tr.”)] On September 24,
2025, Davis filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Post-Hearing Brief (“Motion for
Extension”) requesting an additional ten days, up to and including October 10, 2025, to file his post-
hearing brief. [ECF No. 92] After the Court granted the Motion for Extension [ECF No. 93], Davis
filed his Post-Hearing Brief and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Sever the Defendants on the
Indictment on October 10, 2025, in which he only raised arguments related to his Motion to Sever
[ECF No. 94]. The government timely filed its Response in Opposition to Defendant Davis’s Post-
Hearing Brief in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Sever on October 23, 2025, [ECF No. 95] on
which date the Court deemed the matter wholly submitted [ECF No. 96].
II. 	FINDINGS OF FACT
On July 4, 2023, Detective Percich responded to DePaul Hospital on a call for an assault
involving two Northwoods police officers. Upon arrival, he met and spoke with uniformed county
patrol officers and the purported victim, C.G., who had sustained a broken jaw. The county officers
and C.G. essentially provided Detective Percich with the same information: that C.G. had been
arrested for shoplifting and trespassing at the Walgreens in Northwoods, Missouri, where he was
handcuffed, driven to the City of Kinloch, and physically assaulted with pepper spray and a baton
by a white male Northwoods police officer.
With this information, Percich responded to the Walgreens located at 7199 Natural Bridge
Road in Northwoods, where he obtained video surveillance of the events leading to the alleged assault.
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The video recording depicted, among other things, two Northwoods police officers, whom the
Northwoods Police Chief identified as Davis and Hill, interacting with C.G. at the scene. In particular,
the video shows Davis handcuffing C.G., securing him in the rear seat of his marked patrol vehicle,
and then driving away. (Ex. #4 and # 5) Considering this, Detective Percich contacted Davis by phone.
During the recorded phone call, the two briefly discussed the matter and pleasantly agreed to meet at
St. Louis County Police Headquarters for an interview. (Id.; Ex #1; Tr. 9-10)
On July 8, 2023, as agreed, Davis met with Detective Percich and St. Louis County Police
Detective Justin Adams at police headquarters. The interview occurred in a large conference room on
the second floor. Detective Percich, who was not working that day, was dressed in jeans and a polo.
Detective Adams was wearing a shirt and tie. Neither officer was armed. The detectives sat opposite
from Davis at a large, 10-12 chair conference room table. The recorded interview lasted approximately
two hours. At the evidentiary hearing, Detective Percich explained the nature of the investigation,
characterized the interview as voluntary, and testified that Davis was not under arrest and was free to
leave. (Tr. 11-12) During the interview, Detective Percich and Davis engaged in the following
exchange:
PERCICH: Uhm, we are doing a criminal investigation.
DAVIS: Mhm.
PERCICH: Okay? Uhm, to figure out what happened to this guy. If, if whatever happened
to him is a crime, is it not, all that type of stuff.
DAVIS: Right.
(Ex. #2) Shortly after this, the two discussed the voluntary nature of the interview:
PERCICH: Uhm, do you understand that today that your statement is voluntary?
DAVIS: Yes.
PERCICH: You haven’t been, have you been threatened, compelled, promised
anything to make you be here to make a statement?
DAVIS: No, not from, not from y’all, no.
PERCICH: Okay. Uhm, has somebody else threatened you or promised you?
DAVIS: Just lots of very oddly direct, but vague conversations over the phone with
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a few other officers. It’s just been... Most, most officers have been reaching out to
me to make sure I’m doing okay.
(Ex. #2) Later in the interview, Detective Percich again confirmed that the interview was voluntary,
and that Davis was not under arrest and was free to leave, conversing as follows:
PERCICH: My side of this is it is completely voluntary.
DAVIS: Okay.
PERCICH: You are not under arrest.
DAVIS: Right.
PERCICH: Do you understand that?
DAVIS: Yes.
PERCICH: I didn’t arrest you. We spoke on the phone, you came in here voluntarily,
correct?
DAVIS: Correct.
PERCICH: You remember the door you came in?
DAVIS: Yes. [laughs]
PERCICH: If you decide you don’t like us and we’re, for whatever reason, that’s the
door to leave.
DAVIS: Right.
PERCICH: Okay. Uhm. I just want to make sure that we’re on the same page.
DAVIS: Right.
PERCICH: Alright? Any questions about that? Concerns?
DAVIS: No not at all.
PERCICH: Okay. If you do during the course of this, just ask me.
DAVIS: Gotcha.
(Ex. #2)
Davis – who had been a police officer for three years after having graduated from the police
academy in Lake St. Louis, Missouri – proceeded to speak with the detectives and answer their
questions for approximately two hours. Among other things, he acknowledged detaining and
handcuffing C.G., whom he knew as a repeat offender, for theft and trespassing at Walgreens. He also
stated that he took C.G. in his patrol vehicle to the City of Kinloch at the direction of his supervisor,
Corporal Hill. He further admitted that he did not arrest C.G. and take him to jail because he did not
want to write another police report. Moreover, Davis confessed that he did not notify the dispatcher
of his whereabouts or intentions.
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Davis explained that he removed the handcuffs from C.G. once they arrived in Kinloch. He
maintained that he then warned C.G. not to return to Northwoods because he would be assaulted.
Davis claimed that later, as he attempted to resecure his handcuffs, his pepper spray accidentally
deployed after his shirt sleeve became stuck on the canister. Davis stated that he wiped the spray from
his arm and then noticed that C.G. was on the ground. Nevertheless, Davis expressed that C.G.
indicated that he was okay. Davis said that he left the area and cleared the call for service as “GOA,”
indicating that Davis was gone on arrival.
Furthermore, Davis consented to having his cell phone examined and signed a Consent to
Search form memorializing that consent, despite the detectives’ admonition that they would need to
keep the phone for about a week. To assist with the search, Davis also provided his phone number
and passcode (Ex. #2, #3, and #5), and he identified his Google account for the detectives (Ex. #2 and
#4). At no point during the interview did the detectives, orally or in writing, advise Davis of his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), nor did Davis expressly waive his Miranda rights.
At the end of the interview, Davis departed from police headquarters. The detectives thereafter
arranged for a forensic analysis of the phone and had it returned to Davis the next day.
Continuing the investigation, on July 11, 2023, Detective Percich applied for and obtained
a search warrant for a Google account registered to Davis. (Ex. #4) In doing so, he presented the
Affidavit, Application, and Search Warrant to St. Louis County Circuit Judge John R. Lasater, who
approved the application and signed the Search Warrant, which was thereafter executed. (Id.) On
July 14, 2023, Detective Percich applied for and obtained a search warrant for Davis’s AT&T cell
phone records. (Ex. #5) In doing so, St. Louis County Circuit Judge Nicole Zellweger approved the
application and signed the Search Warrant, which was also thereafter executed. (Id.) Detective
Percich’s Affidavits included, among other things, the following information for Judge Lasater’s
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and Judge Zellweger’s review:
On Tuesday, July 4, 2023, patrol officers assigned to the St. Louis County Police
Department’s Central County Precinct received a radio assignment for a “person
down” at/near the intersection of Martin Luther King Boulevard and Hugo Avenue
in the City of Kinloch. Upon arrival, patrol officers located the victim, C.G., whose
identity is known to the affiant, in a semi-unconscious state in a field positioned off
the roadway. C.G. was bleeding from the head and face….[P]atrol officers learned
C.G. was arrested in the City of Northwoods, handcuffed, driven to the City of
Kinloch, sprayed with oleoresin capsicum or “OC”, commonly referred to as “pepper
spray”, and struck repeatedly with a baton. C.G. was reportedly released and warned
not to return to the City of Northwoods.
C.G. was conveyed to DePaul Hospital by ambulance and later determined to have
sustained “trauma”, to include, but not limited to, lacerations and abrasions to his
head, a bloody nose, and a closed fracture of the right mandibular angle (jaw).…
C.G. has returned to the hospital for a second occasion relative to back pain sustained
during the incident.
Detectives…were summoned to the hospital to assume the criminal investigation.
Detectives obtained a statement from [ ] C.G. which was consistent with the above
information. C.G. reiterated he was arrested at the Walgreen’s [sic] at 7199 Natural
Bridge Road, within the City of Northwoods, after shoplifting and trespassing. He
alleged he was handcuffed, driven to the City of Kinloch, and physically assaulted
with OC spray and a baton by a white male police officer from the Northwoods
Police Department prior to his release….
An interview with the reporting party was conducted at which time she advised she
observed a Northwoods Police Department patrol vehicle parked at the intersection
of Martin Luther King Boulevard and Hugo Avenue. She observed a uniformed
police officer, a white male, bent over at the waist standing over a red object on the
ground with his arms extended downward. The police officer then reportedly
hurriedly entered his vehicle and left the area. The reporting party initially left the
area, unaware that the red object was a person. Curious and concerned, the reporting
party returned and determined the red object she located was in fact C.G., who was
dressed in a red t-shirt.
Video surveillance footage obtained from Walgreen’s [sic] and determined C.G. was
in fact handcuffed behind his back by a white male police officer from the
Northwoods Police Department. He was then secured in the rear seat of the fully
marked patrol vehicle. A police corporal, a black male, was also on scene. C.G. was
then driven from the scene by the white male police officer.
…Colonel Dennis Shireff, Chief of the Northwoods Police Department…identified
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the white male police officer as Samuel Davis and the black male police corporal as
Michael Hill….
Further 	investigation 	revealed 	a 	police 	report 	was 	not 	authored 	and 	police
commanders from the Northwoods Police Department were not notified of a use of
force. The dispatcher was not informed of the conveyance of C.G. Furthermore,
Police Officer Davis turned off his body worn camera after he secured C.G. in the
patrol vehicle. The camera was not re-activated. As of this writing, it does not appear
as if Corporal Hill’s body worn camera was ever activated. After the incident in the
City of Kinloch, Police Officer Davis coded the call as “GOA” or “gone on arrival”,
indicating the suspect was not on scene at Walgreen’s [sic] when the police officers
arrived.
During an interview of Police Officer Davis, he advised he detained C.G., a repeat
offender for theft and trespassing at Walgreen’s [sic], in handcuffs. C.G. was then
secured in the patrol vehicle. Police Officer Davis advised he drove C.G. to the City
of Kinloch at the direction of his supervisor, Corporal Hill. Police Officer Davis said
he did not arrest C.G. and convey him to a jail in reference to the criminal offenses
because he did not want to write another police report. He also acknowledged not
notifying the dispatcher of his whereabouts or intentions.
Once in the City of Kinloch, Police Officer Davis claimed he removed the handcuffs
from C.G. He acknowledged he warned C.G. not to return to the City of Northwoods,
saying he would be assaulted if he did so. Police Officer Davis reported that that as
he attempted to re-secure the handcuffs, OC was inadvertently deployed after his
shirt sleeve became stuck on the canister. Angry, Police Officer Davis said he wiped
the OC from his own arm and then saw C.G. on the ground. He inquired if C.G. was
okay at which time he alleged C.G. waved his arm in what he interpreted as a “sign
of life”. Police Officer Davis then left the area and cleared the call for service
“GOA.”
(Ex. #4 and #5)
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Motion to Suppress Statements
In his Motion to Suppress Statements, [ECF No. 44] Davis essentially asks this Court to
suppress all statements made by him to law enforcement, related to this case. Citing United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), he argues that, during the detectives’ questioning of him,
he was a suspect and had been “seized” under the Fourth Amendment because, under the “totality
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of circumstances,” a reasonable person in his position “would have believed that he was not free to
leave” and “was detained at the time of his interrogation.” [ECF No. 44 at 3] As such, he contends
that, because he was a suspect and the detectives had seized him and failed to advise him of Miranda
warnings prior to speaking with him, any statements derived from their actions in violation of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments were not voluntary and must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous
tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
In response, the government maintains that this Court should deny the Motion to Suppress
Statements because, under the circumstances, Davis freely and voluntarily participated in his
interview with detectives, was not seized at the time, and “was not at any time detained when he
made statements on July 8, 2023.” [ECF No. 51 at 8] The government, too, cites Mendenhall and
points to several circumstances showing the voluntariness of the interview and that Davis was free
to leave at any time. Moreover, the government asserts that Davis’s statements were not obtained in
violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because he was never subject to custodial
interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. Citing United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th
Cir. 1990) and its factors in a footnote, the government argues that Davis was not “in-custody” while
speaking with the detectives.
Under Miranda, the government is prohibited from using an individual’s statements which
were obtained during custodial interrogation but were not preceded by Miranda warnings. 384 U.S.
at 444. A criminal suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings only when the suspect is subjected to
custodial interrogation. Id. An individual’s interrogation is custodial, or that person is considered
“in-custody,” when he has been placed under formal arrest or when his freedom of movement is
restricted to a degree akin to formal arrest. United States v. Ollie, 442 F.3d 1135, 1137 (8th Cir.
2006) (citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). A finding of whether or not an
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individual is “in-custody” “is an objective determination considered from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the suspect’s position.” United States v. Sanchez-Velasco, 956 F.3d 576, 580
(8th Cir. 2020) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1994)).
When a defendant seeks suppression of his statements, the government bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s statements were voluntarily made.
See United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2004); see also United States v.
McClinton, 982 F.2d 278, 283 (8th Cir. 1992). As to voluntariness, the test is whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, “pressures exerted upon a suspect have overborne his will.” See
United States v. Jorgensen, 871 F.2d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963)). “Totality of the circumstances” are also considered in the custody
determination, see United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004), and may include
both the conduct of the officers and the characteristics of the accused, see Rachlin v. United States,
723 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1983).
The Eighth Circuit in Sanchez-Velasco, 956 F.3d at 580, confirmed that this analysis focuses
on the “six non-exclusive factors enumerated in” Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349, as follows:
(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning
was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or
that the suspect was not considered under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed
unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning; (3) whether the suspect
initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to
respond to questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were
employed during questioning; (5) whether the atmosphere of the questioning was
police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the
termination of the questioning.
Here, considering the totality of the circumstances in the context of the Griffin factors, the
detectives’ questioning of Davis was not custodial at any time, Miranda warnings were not required,
and his statements were voluntarily made. Indeed, Davis, over-the-phone, freely accepted Detective
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Percich’s invitation to meet with him for an in-person interview. Detective Percich refrained from
picking Davis up at his residence and instead allowed Davis to drive himself to police headquarters
for the interview. After Detective Percich advised Davis of the nature of the investigation, he
repeatedly reminded Davis that the interview was voluntary and that he was free to leave at any
time. For his part, Davis, repeatedly acknowledged that he understood.
Furthermore, Davis had not been seized, as no reasonable person would believe that he was
not free to leave under the totality of the circumstances. The detectives never placed Davis under
arrest prior to or during the interview, and there is no evidence to the contrary showing that Davis
was under arrest before or during questioning. Moreover, neither detective nor any other officers
ever placed Davis in handcuffs prior to or while questioning him. They also never physically forced
him to remain against his wishes, restrained his freedom of movement, or applied any pressure of
any kind whatsoever. To be sure, the interview occurred in a large conference room where Davis
had the ability to leave at any time. The unrefuted evidence, as depicted by the audiotape of the
interview, is that Davis was calm, cooperative, readily answered the detectives’ questions, and
frequently volunteered unsolicited information. Tellingly, as the government mentioned in its oral
argument, the Indictment’s filing and Davis’s arrest both occurred in July 2024, about one year after
the detectives interviewed Davis and he freely walked out of police headquarters.
For all these reasons, Davis’s Motion to Suppress Statements [ECF No. 44] fails to
demonstrate that he is entitled to relief.
B. Motion to Suppress Evidence
In his Motion to Suppress Evidence, [ECF No. 44] Davis essentially requests that this Court
suppress all evidence obtained from him through the detectives’ search and seizure as a result of the
July 8 interview. He claims that the search and seizures, and interrogation, were unlawful and
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tainted, and the evidence derived therefrom should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471. Additionally, Davis challenges the Search Warrants for the Google
and AT&T records, insisting that they are both fatally defective because the supporting Affidavits
included references to illegally obtained evidence. As such, he cites United States v. Bishop, 264
F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2001) and insinuates that, without this unlawful evidence, the Affidavits
lacked sufficient probable cause to support the Search Warrants.
The government responds that this Court should deny the motion because, as already argued,
Davis’s statements to the detectives were voluntarily made. As such, the government asserts that
the Affidavits and related Search Warrants establish probable cause and lacked tainted, or illegally
obtained, information. Without any illegally obtained information referenced in the Search
Warrants here, the government distinguishes Bishop, 264 F.3d at 924, as a more obvious case where
the court “properly purged the affidavit of the offending facts and examined whether the remaining
facts still afforded a substantial basis for concluding that the search warrant was supported by
probable cause.” [ECF No. 51 at 12]
Under the Fourth Amendment, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend IV; see United States v. Kucharo, 127 F.4th 1152, 1158
(8th Cir. 2025). When deciding if there is probable cause to issue a search warrant, courts must look
to the totality of the circumstances and “make a practical, common-sense decision whether there is
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); see United States v. Ivey, 91 F.4th 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2024).
Moreover, “[t]he duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the [issuing judge] had a
‘substantial basis for…concluding’ that probable cause existed.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting
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Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1933)). In this context, “only that information which is
found within the four corners of the affidavit may be considered in determining the existence of
probable cause.” United States v. Farlee, 757 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations and
citations omitted); see United States v. Miller, 11 F.4th 944, 953 (8th Cir. 2021) (Only if the affidavit
submitted in support of a warrant application “could not have supported the existence of probable
cause will suppression be warranted.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In addition,
“[t]here must be evidence of a nexus between the contraband and the place to be searched before a
warrant may properly issue.” United States v. Tellez, 217 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 2000). When
evidence has been obtained without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that
evidence is subject to the exclusionary rule and, therefore, “cannot be used in a criminal proceeding
against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” United States v. Riesselman, 646 F.3d 1072,
1078 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). Under the
“fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,” evidence derived from such illegal police conduct is subject
to the exclusionary rule. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 485, 487-88.
Here, under the totality of the circumstances, and looking only at the information found
within the four corners of the Affidavits, both state court judges certainly had a substantial basis for
finding probable cause to issue the Search Warrants. For the reasons already stated, Davis’s
statements to the detectives were voluntarily made. Moreover, both Affidavits outline, among other
things, O.G.’s report of his detention at Walgreens and the assault he sustained in Kinloch. The
Affidavits also cite the Walgreens video surveillance and describe C.G.’s serious injuries, which
were consistent with his report that Davis apprehended him at the store and took him to Kinloch
where he assaulted him with pepper spray and a baton. The Affidavits further reference the
Northwoods Police Chief, who identified Davis and Hill, and the Kinloch witness, whose
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observations corroborated the assault. Additionally, the Affidavits explain that, despite C.G.’s
allegations and video surveillance, a police report was not generated, and the police dispatcher was
not informed of C.G.’s detention and conveyance. More to it, the Affidavits reflect that Davis turned
off his body worn camera after securing C.G. in his patrol vehicle, Hill never activated his body
worn camera, and Davis falsely coded the call “GOA” after the incident. As to the AT&T records,
specifically, the Affidavit referenced Detective Percich’s training and experience and stated that
Davis’s cell phone records would be used to ascertain his communications and whereabouts around
the time in question. For the Google records, the Affidavit also cited Detective Percich’s training
and experience and expressed that it was common for individuals engaged in criminal activity to
retain evidence of their crimes in their email accounts. Like the AT&T Affidavit, the Google
Affidavit stated that the Google records would be used to determine Davis’s communications and
whereabouts around the time in question. Considering this, the four corners of each of the Search
Warrant Affidavits established a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, and
that evidence of a crime would be found within the Google and AT&T records.
For all these reasons, Davis’s Motion to Suppress Evidence [ECF No. 44] fails to
demonstrate that he is entitled to relief.
C. Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, or, in the Alternative, for Bill of Particulars
In his Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, or, in the Alternative, for Bill of Particulars
(“Motion to Dismiss”), [ECF No. 45] Davis requests this Court dismiss Counts One through Four
of the Indictment because the charging document is fatally defective, lacks various elements of the
crimes charged, and fails to adequately state any offenses. Thus, he contends that the Indictment
fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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In response, the government argues that this Court should deny Davis’s request to dismiss
because the charges in Counts One through Four are sufficiently alleged as required by both Rule 7
and the legal standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87 (1974). For this, the government asserts that the Indictment contains sufficient facts
supporting all of the essential elements of the offenses charged, informs Davis of the charges against
him, and alleges sufficient information allowing Davis to plead an acquittal or conviction as a bar
to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117. The government
also emphasizes that all of the counts track the relevant statutory language of the particular charged
offense. See United States v. Sewell, 513 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2008). The government finally
argues that this Court should deny Davis’s alternative motion for a bill of particulars because he
wholly fails to address this request in the body of his motion.
In relevant part, Rule 7 requires that an indictment “be a plain, concise, and definite written
statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged….” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). The
United States Supreme Court established in Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, that an indictment “is
sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of
the charge against which he must defend, and second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction
in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” See United States v. Leveke, 38 F.4th 662, 669
(8th Cir. 2022). To meet this standard, “[a]n indictment is normally sufficient if its language tracks
the statutory language.” Sewell, 513 F.3d at 821 (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117); see United States
v. Palmer, 917 F.3d 1035,1039 (8th Cir. 2019). Critically, the test of sufficiency “is not whether [an
indictment] could not have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the
elements of the offense charged….” United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955, 962 (8th Cir. 2013).
“Indictments generally do not have to specify evidence or details of how the offense was
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committed.” United States v. Raniere, 384 F.Supp.3d 282, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). Moreover, “an
indictment which sets forth the words of the statute itself is sufficient, as long as those words fairly
inform the defendant of the elements necessary to constitute the offense charged.” United States v.
McKnight, 799 F.2d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 1986); see Sewell, 513 F.3d at 821. In reviewing the
sufficiency of an indictment, the district court accept[s] the allegations in the indictment as true and
ask[s] whether they can form the basis of the charged offense.” United States v. Welker, 75 F.4th
820, 822 (8th Cir. 2023).
In his motion, Davis argues that Count One “fails to state any facts which would be the
subject of the conspiracy for which, if true, would constitute a violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 241.”
[ECF No. 45 at 2] Section 241 states, in relevant part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same….
They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both;
and if … such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, … they shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may
be sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 241.
In the Indictment, Count One alleges that,
On or about July 4, 2023, … [Davis and Hill] while acting under color of law, did
knowingly and willfully conspire and agree together… to injure, oppress, threaten,
and intimidate C.G. in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right, secured and
protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to be free from
unreasonable seizure by one acting under color of law, which includes the right to
be free from the use of unreasonable force by a law enforcement officer. The
defendants’ acts included kidnapping.
[ECF No. 1 at 2]
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Reading section 241 and Count One together demonstrates that the charge contains all of
the essential elements of the offense. Also, Count One tracks the statutory language, alleges the
date of the unlawful conduct, and identifies the victim of the offense. Count One specifically
identifies the constitutional right “to be free from unreasonable seizure by one acting under color
of law, as well as the right to be free from the use of unreasonable force by a law enforcement
officer.” The charge further describes Davis’s and Hill’s criminal activity in, among other things,
conspiring as police officers to assault C.G. and violate his constitutional rights. As such, Count
One fairly informs Davis of the charge against which he must defend and enables him to invoke the
double jeopardy clause in any future prosecutions based on the same conduct. Remarkably, Count
One also includes a reference that Davis’s actions included a kidnapping, which enhances
sentencing. Indeed, Count One’s language meets the requirements of Rule 7 and Hamling.
Although Count One likely could have provided more detail, the charge is not one of the “very rare
cases” in which more detail is required by Rule 7, relevant caselaw, or the Constitution. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stringer, 730 F.3d 120, 125-26 (2nd Cir. 2013) (specification of how a particular
element of a criminal charge will be met is of such importance that it must be spelled out in the
indictment.)
For Count Two, Davis claims that the government “asserts no facts which constitute a
violation of Title 18, U.S. C. § 242 and provides only legal conclusions.” [ECF No. 45 at 2] Section
242 states, in relevant part:
Whoever, under color of any law…willfully subjects any person in any State,
Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States…shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this
section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous
weapon…shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
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both; and…if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap…shall be fined
under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be
sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 242.
By comparison, Count Two of the Indictment states that,
[Davis and Hill], while acting under color of law and aiding and abetting one another,
willfully deprived C.G. of the right, secured and protected by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, to be free from unreasonable seizure, which includes the
right to be free from the use of unreasonable force by a law enforcement officer.
Specifically, I) defendant MICHAEL HILL instructed defendant SAMUEL DAVIS
to take C.G. to Kinloch, Missouri, which is outside the jurisdiction of the NPD, and
2) defendant SAMUEL DAVIS then drove C.G. to a field in Kinloch, Missouri,
where defendant SAMUEL DAVIS physically assaulted C.G., including by striking
him with his police baton, while C.G. was handcuffed and did not pose a threat to
anyone. The defendants’ acts included kidnapping, involved the use of a dangerous
weapon, and resulted in bodily injury to C.G.
[ECF No. 1 at 2-3]
Like Count One, all of the essential elements of the offense are set out in Count Two, as
Count Two also tracks the statutory language, alleges the date of the unlawful conduct, and
identifies the victim of the offense. Count Two also identifies the constitutional right “to be free
from unreasonable seizure by one acting under color of law, as well as the right to be free from the
use of unreasonable force by a law enforcement officer.” The charge specifically describes Davis’s
and Hill’s criminal activity as police officers wherein, among other things, Davis took C.G. to a
field in Kinloch, at Hill’s instruction, and physically assaulted him with a baton while C.G. was
handcuffed. As such, Count Two fairly informs Davis of the charge against which he must defend
and enables him to invoke the double jeopardy clause in any future prosecutions based on the same
conduct. Remarkably, Count Two also includes a reference that Davis’s actions included a
kidnapping, 	which 	enhances 	sentencing. 	Indeed, 	Count 	Two’s 	language 	easily 	meets 	the
requirements of Rule 7 and Hamling.
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As to Count Three, Davis maintains that the government merely states facts alleging that
his “comments to a police dispatcher somehow would have prevented a communication to a Federal
law Enforcement Officer of the potential commission of the offense,” and, as such, fails to assert
facts which form a violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). [Id.] Section 1512, in relevant part,
states as follows:
Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another
person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another
person, with intent to…hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the
commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions
of probation[] supervised release,,[] parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).
Count Three of the Indictment states that,
[Davis] did knowingly engage in misleading conduct toward another person with the
intent to hinder, delay, and prevent the communication to a federal law enforcement
officer and judge of information relating to the commission and possible commission
of a federal offense in the Eastern District of Missouri, specifically, the offense of
Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law, as alleged in Count Two of this
Indictment. That is, defendant SAMUEL DAVIS made a misleading statement to a
police dispatcher by falsely reporting that C.G. was "GOA" or "Gone on Arrival"
when 	defendant 	SAMUEL 	DAVIS 	responded 	to 	Walgreens 	in 	Northwoods,
Missouri, on July 4, 2023, after receiving a call for service related to C.G. This
statement was misleading because, in truth and in fact, defendant SAMUEL DAVIS
knew that C.G. had been present at the Walgreens at the time NPD arrived there
because defendant SAMUEL DAVIS handcuffed C.G. at the Walgreens and
transported C.G. from the Walgreens to a field in Kinloch, Missouri.
[ECF No. 1 at 3]
Unquestionably, all of the essential elements of the offense are set out in Count Three.
Moreover, Count Three tracks the statutory language, alleges the date of the unlawful conduct, and
identifies the victim of the offense. The charge also specifically describes Davis’s criminal activity
as a police officer wherein, among other things, he falsely reported to a police dispatcher that C.G.
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was “GOA” upon his arrival at Walgreens. As such, Count Three fairly informs Davis of the charge
against which he must defend and enables him to invoke the double jeopardy clause in any future
prosecutions based on the same conduct. Indeed, Count Three’s language more than meets the
requirements of Rule 7 and Hamling.
For Count Four, Davis complains that the government’s claim that he “was obligated to
operate a body worn camera and the fact that the camera was off” is insufficient to support a charge
under Title 18, U.S.C. § 1519. [Id. at 3] Section 1519 states as follows:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or
makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or
any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or
case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1519.
Count Four of the Indictment states that Davis,
[Davis] acting in relation to and in contemplation of a matter within the jurisdiction
of the Federal Bureau of investigation, an agency of the United States, knowingly
altered, concealed, covered up, and falsified a record and tangible object with the
intent to impede, obstruct, and influence the investigation and proper administration
of that matter. Specifically, defendant SAMUEL DAVIS knowingly altered,
concealed, covered up, and falsified an NPD record by turning off his department-
issued body worn camera before concluding his interaction with C.G.
[ECF No. 1 at 3-4]
In Count Four, as with the other Counts, all of the essential elements of the offense are
clearly expressed. Count Four also similarly tracks the statutory language, alleges the date of the
unlawful conduct, and identifies the victim of the offense. The charge specifically describes Davis’s
criminal activity wherein, among other things, he falsified a record by prematurely turning off his
body worn camera. As such, Count Four fairly informs Davis of the charge against which he must
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defend and enables him to invoke the double jeopardy clause in any future prosecutions based on
the same conduct. Moreover, as the government cited in its written response, [ECF No. 49]
intentional omissions of material information, like purposefully deactivating a body worn camera,
have been found to constitute obstruction under section 1519. See, e.g. United States v. Lanham,
617 F.3d 873, 887 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that material omissions of fact are actionable under §
1519); United States v. Smith, No. 23-CR-139, 2024 WL 580543, at *3 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 13, 2024)
(denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss § 1519 charge predicated on the defendant’s
deactivation of his dash and body-worn camera as proof of falsification of records). Therefore, like
the other counts, Count Four’s language undoubtedly meets the requirements of Rule 7 and
Hamling.
Finally, the government’s argument that this Court should deny Davis’s alternative motion
for a bill of particulars is well-taken. To be sure, he has wholly failed to address this request in the
body of his motion. Regardless, a bill of particulars is unnecessary because, as mentioned above,
the indictment sufficiently explains the natures of all of the charges so that Davis can properly
prepare for trial.
For all these reasons, Davis’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, or, in the Alternative, for
Bill of Particulars, [ECF No. 45] fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief.
D. Motion to Sever the Defendants on the Indictment
In his Motion to Sever the Defendants on the Indictment (“Motion to Sever”), [ECF 46]
Davis asks that this Court sever his case from Hill’s case so that he may be tried separately. In his
Post Hearing Brief and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Sever Defendants on the Indictment,
[ECF No. 94] Davis contends that this Court should sever the cases because Hill’s testimony is
necessary to “present exculpatory evidence specifically relating to…Davis’s defense to the
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kidnapping component of Count I and Count II….” [ECF No. 94 at 1] In that context, he expresses
that his defense to the kidnapping charges is that he was acting under the supervision and direction
of his supervisor, Hill. He proffers that Hill would be needed to help establish such a defense by
testifying “that he was the only person who spoke with the victim directly regarding where the victim
requested to be taken and then relayed that information and order to Defendant Davis.” [Id. at 2]
Further, Davis stresses that his defense is valid and necessary because Hill’s order was legal and
demonstrates that Davis had no intention of kidnapping C.G. but was simply following Hill’s legal
directive to take C.G. where he wanted to go. If the Defendants remained joined, Davis alleges that
“it is likely that Defendant Hill would not testify, nor could he be compelled to, as he would likely
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege not to incriminate himself.” [ECF No. 46 at 1; see also ECF
No. 94] As such, Davis argues that, without being able to present this exculpatory evidence, he
would be prejudiced.
In response, the government first emphasizes that Davis and Hill were properly joined. The
government then argues that this Court should deny Davis’s Motion to Sever because he has failed
to show a likelihood that Hill would actually testify at trial. For that point, the government further
emphasizes that Davis has failed to demonstrate that Hill’s testimony would be exculpatory. The
government additionally acknowledges that the substance of the statements that Davis seeks to elicit
from Hill – that Hill instructed him to take C.G. to Kinloch – “is expressly pled in the Indictment
and will be presented in the government’s case-in-chief as one of many statements made in
furtherance of the conspiracy charged in Count One.” [ECF No. 95 at 4 (citing ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10)].
“When a defendant moves for severance, a district court must first determine whether
joinder was proper under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.” United States v. Ruiz, 412 F.3d
871, 886 (8th Cir. 2005). Joinder of defendants in a single indictment is proper “if they are alleged
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to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions,
constituting an offense or offenses.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). “Generally, ‘the same series of acts or
transactions’ means acts or transactions that are pursuant to a common plan or a common scheme.”
United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 848 (8th Cir. 1998). Rule 8(b) further provides that “[t]he
defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately” and that “[a]ll defendants
need not be charged in each count.”
Nevertheless, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, “[i]f the joinder of…defendants
in an indictment…appears to prejudice a defendant…the court may…sever the defendants’ trials,
or provide any other relief that justice requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). “Rule 14 leaves the
determination of risk of prejudice and any remedy that may be necessary to the sound discretion of
the district courts.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993). The rules regarding joinder
and severance “are designed ‘to promote economy and efficiency and to avoid a multiplicity of
trials, [so long as] these objectives can be achieved without substantial prejudice to the right of the
defendants to a fair trial.’” Id. at 540 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6
(1968)). Thus, the Eighth Circuit has explained that these rules should be construed liberally in
favor of joinder. See United States v. Johnson, 462 F.3d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Moyer, 313 F.3d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “[t]here is a preference in the federal system
for joint trials of defendants who are indicted together.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537. “This preference
is ‘especially compelling when the defendants are charged as coconspirators.’” Id. (quoting United
States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1997); see United States v. Sherman, 81 F.4th 800,
805-06 (8th Cir. 2023) (“The general rule is that persons charged in a conspiracy should be tried
together”).
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As such, a defendant seeking severance carries a heavy burden of showing “real prejudice”
from joinder, United States v. Payton, 636 F.3d 1027, 1037 (8th Cir. 2011), which is “something
more than the mere fact that he would have had a better chance for acquittal had he been tried
separately.” see United States v. Oakie, 12 F.3d 1436, 1441 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States
v. Adkins, 842 F.2d 210, 211-12 (8th Cir. 1988)). Where a defendant seeks severance so that his
codefendant could testify on his behalf, the Eighth Circuit has held that, to demonstrate prejudice,
a defendant must show “that the codefendant was likely to testify, and that the testimony would be
exculpatory,” or “substantially exculpatory.” United States v. Mickelson, 378 F.3d 819, 818 (8th
Cir. 2004); see United States v. Anthony, 565 F.2d 533, 538 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Delpit,
94 F.3d 1134, 1144 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, “[a] defendant is not entitled to severance on the
weight of an ‘unsupported possibility’ that a co-defendant’s testimony might be forthcoming at a
separate trial.” United States v. Easom, 569 F.2d 457, 458 (8th Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v.
Graham, 548 F.2d 1302, 1311 (8th Cir. 1977)). “A defendant’s assertion that his co-defendant might
testify at a separate trial must find some independent support in the record.” Id.; see United States
v. Caspers, 736 F.2d 1246, 1248 (8th Cir. 1984) (defense attorney’s assertion that co-defendant
would testify on defendant’s behalf not independent evidence showing likelihood that co-defendant
would actually testify at a separate trial.)
Here, without opposition from Davis, he and Hill were properly joined in the Indictment.
As Counts One and Two of the Indictment describe, they are alleged to have participated in the
same series of acts or transactions constituting the offenses. To be sure, Davis and Hill both initially
contacted C.G. at the same time on July 4, 2023, and communicated with him when he was arrested.
Neither Davis nor Hill, who was Davis’s supervisor, submitted a police report. Neither Davis nor
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Hill provided body worn camera video recording of the events. Additionally, Davis advised that he
drove C.G. to Kinloch at Hill’s direction.
With coconspirators Davis and Hill properly joined, Davis has failed to meet the heavy
burden demonstrating “real prejudice” by their joinder. As an initial matter, Davis has failed to
show that Hill would likely testify. To be sure, his claims are speculative, and he has failed to
submit any independent support, such as affidavit from Hill stating that he would testify at a
separate trial, for the alleged testimony or evidence. Instead, Davis insufficiently offers only his
attorney’s assertions relating to Hill’s proffered testimony.
Even if Davis had demonstrated that Hill would likely testify, he has nonetheless failed to
establish that the testimony would be exculpatory or substantially exculpatory. As the government
emphasized, Hill’s purported testimony establishing Davis’s “Nuremburg defense,” or defense that
he was just “following orders,” is not a valid defense. See, e.g. United States v. Cortes-Caban, 691
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012). Moreover, although Davis argues that Hill’s testimony would be
unrelated to the Nuremburg defense and would show that “Davis had no intention of kidnapping
the victim but was merely following his supervisor’s legal direction and order to take the victim to
where the victim wanted to go,” this evidence would not establish a defense, or be exculpatory or
substantially exculpatory, against the crimes prohibiting a police officer from transporting an
individual to a location, without his consent, for the purpose of assaulting him there.
Finally, and significantly, the evidence that Davis purportedly seeks to elicit from Hill –
that Hill instructed Davis to take C.G. to Kinloch – is expressly pleaded in the Indictment as one of
many statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in Count One. Moreover, the
government has stressed and acknowledged that it will present this evidence in its case-in-chief.
As such, the jury will hear the evidence at trial, and Davis’s arguments fail to support severance.
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Dated this 21st day of November, 2025.
For all these reasons, Davis’s Motion to Sever the Defendants on the Indictment, [ECF No.
46] fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant Samuel Davis’s Motion to Suppress
Statements [ECF No. 44] be DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Defendant Samuel Davis’s Motion to
Suppress Physical Evidence [ECF No. 44] be DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Defendant Samuel Davis’s Motion to Dismiss
the Indictment, or, in the Alternative, for Bill of Particulars, [ECF No. 45] be DENIED.
IT IS FINALLY RECOMMENDED that Defendant Samuel Davis’s Motion to Sever the
Defendants on the Indictment [ECF No. 46] be DENIED.
The parties are advised that they have fourteen (14) days in which to file written objections
to the foregoing Report and Recommendation unless an extension of time for good cause is
obtained, and that failure to file timely objections may result in a waiver of the right to appeal
questions of fact. Objections must be timely and specific in order to require review by a District
Court Judge. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1990); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(a).
Pretrial proceedings in this matter have concluded. This matter will be set for trial by
further order of the court, before the Honorable Stephen R. Clark, United States District Judge.
JOSEPH S. DUEKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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