USA v. Blackwell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-CR-505 MAL
MARCELLIS BLACKWELL,
Defendant.
Order
Defendant Marcellis Blackwell moved to suppress all evidence obtained
through searches of two cell phones and a Google account, alleging that the
warrants authorizing the searches were impermissibly overbroad and not
supported by probable cause. Doc. 67. 	Blackwell also requested a separate,
additional hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).1 After
an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the magistrate judge2 issued
a thorough report recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part
Blackwell’s motion to suppress. Doc. 123.
First, the magistrate judge recommended suppression of certain cell
phone data—specifically, location data and any records on or before November
8, 2022, on the basis that the Government conceded that such information was
1 Franks holds that, when a defendant makes a substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, was included by affiant in a search warrant affidavit,
and if the allegedly false statement was necessary to finding probable cause,
the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s
request. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978).
2 The Honorable United States Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Cohen.
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beyond the scope of the warrant. Doc. 123 at 16; Doc. 82 at 10 n. 6. 	Neither
Blackwell nor the Government object to this recommendation. In the absence
of an objection, the district court is not required “to give any more consideration
to 	the 	magistrate 	[judge]’s 	report 	than 	the 	court 	considers 	appropriate.”
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985). In the Eighth Circuit, courts review
unobjected-to portions of the report and recommendation for clear error.
Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Carroll,
2022 WL 375302, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2022). 	The Court finds that there is
no clear error in this portion of the report and recommendation and so adopts
this recommendation.
Second, 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	recommended 	denying 	the 	rest 	of
Blackwell’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of Blackwell’s
two cell phones and his Google account. Doc. 123 at 13–19, 28–29. 	Blackwell
objects to this. Doc. 125. 	Because Blackwell objects, the Court “shall make a
de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Under de novo review, the Court overrules Blackwell’s objections.
Thus, the Court GRANTS Blackwell’s motion to suppress location data
or any record from on or prior to November 8, 2022, seized from the cell phones.
The Court DENIES the motion to suppress in all other respects. 	The Court
adopts the magistrate judge’s report in full, except to the extent modified by
this order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Discussion
Blackwell raises three objections to the report and recommendation.
First, Blackwell objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusions that the warrants
authorizing the cell phone and Google account searches satisfied the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement and therefore were not overbroad.
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Doc. 125 at 1–3. Second, Blackwell objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion
that there was probable cause for the search. Doc. 125 at 2. Third, Blackwell
objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Blackwell was not entitled to
a special hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Doc. 125 at
3–6. 	For 	the 	reasons 	discussed 	below, 	this 	Court 	overrules 	Blackwell’s
objections 	and 	adopts 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	conclusions 	and
recommendations.
I. 	Particularity and Overbreadth
Blackwell first objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusions that the cell
phone and Google account search warrants were sufficiently particular (and
therefore not overbroad). For the reasons stated below, the Court disagrees.
A. Legal Standard
The 	Warrant 	Clause 	of 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	provides 	that 	“no
Warrants 	shall 	issue, 	but 	upon 	probable 	cause, 	supported 	by 	Oath 	or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). Thus,
the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	requires 	search 	warrants 	to 	“set 	out 	with
particularity” “the scope of the authorized search.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.
452, 459 (2011). 	“In assessing whether a warrant is sufficiently particular,
[the Court] considers the purpose for which the warrant was issued, the nature
of the items to which it is directed, and the total circumstances surrounding
the case.” 	United States v. Ivey, 91 F.4th 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2024). 	When it
comes to phones, it is often the case that “[e]vidence of the offense could [be]
found anywhere in the phone,” and “a warrant need not be more specific than
knowledge allows.” 	Id. 	Further, “particularity” is about “practical accuracy
rather than [ ] hypertechnicality.” United States v. Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 923
(8th Cir. 2014) (quotation and citation omitted). 	“The Fourth Amendment
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requires particularity in the warrant, not [in] supporting documents like an
application or affidavit.” Id. (citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004)).
B. Application of Law to Facts
Blackwell 	claims 	that 	all 	three 	warrants 	fail 	the 	particularity
requirement and therefore are overbroad. Doc. 125 at 1. Blackwell objects to
the cell phone warrants3 on the grounds that they improperly authorized
“general rummaging” of the cell phones’ data rather than a “particular” search,
which he alleges violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 2. He objected to the
two phone warrants on the grounds that they wrongly authorized a search for
“all …records…relating to the matters set forth in [each] attached Affidavit.”4
Doc. 125 at 2 (Blackwell objection).
Here, all three warrants were particular enough to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment. 	Blackwell’s “general rummaging” argument comes from United
States v. Shrum, where the Eighth Circuit stated that “[t]he particularity
requirement 	prohibits 	officers 	from 	conducting 	general, 	exploratory
rummaging 	of 	a 	person’s 	belongings, 	and 	demands 	that 	the 	warrant 	be
sufficiently definite to enable the searching officers to identify the property
authorized to be seized.” 	59 F.4th 968, 973 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
Here, there is no “general rummaging” problem. 	The cell phone warrants
3 The phone warrants are Docs. 67-2 and 67-3. The Google account warrant is
Doc. 67-6.
4 Doc. 67-2 at 3, 5 (phone warrant #1 authorizing “the forensic examination of
the Device for the purpose of identifying the electronically stored information
described in Attachment B,” which includes “all…records…relating to the
matters set forth in the attached Affidavit…”); Doc. 67-3 at 3, 5 (phone warrant
#2 doing same); see also Doc. 67-6 at 31 (Google account warrant authorizing
the seizure and search of “[a]ll information” listed in 16 categories of data
described in the warrant). The “Affidavit” referenced may be found at Doc. 67-
1 at 2–16. A separate but substantially similar affidavit for the Google Account
warrant may be found at Doc. 67-6 at 2–19.
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clearly set out the property that may be searched and seized: 	two particular
cell phones.5 	The cell phone warrants then further limit what records within
those two cell phones and that Google account may be searched. Namely, the
cell phone warrants “authorize[] the forensic examination of [the relevant
device or account] for the purpose of identifying the electronically stored
information described in Attachment B,” which in turn limits that search to
“materials…which constitute evidence, instrumentalities, and fruits of the
criminal 	violations 	of 	[18 	U.S.C. 	§] 	242,…involving 	and 	occurring 	after
November 8, 2022.”6 	The Google Account warrant is similarly limited to a
search 	of 	one 	particular 	Google 	Account 	for 	“evidence, 	fruits, 	and
instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242[.]”7
Shrum determined that a similarly phrased search warrant satisfied the
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. 	59 F.4th at 973–94. 	In
Shrum, the Court determined that a warrant permitting a search for and
seizure of “any and all other evidence related to a sexual abuse/exploitation
investigation” satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement
despite its breadth because it was “limited by the phrase ‘related to a sexual
abuse/exploitation investigation’ and the supporting affidavit described the
specific nature of the investigation at issue.” 	Id. 	So too here. 	The warrants
identify the type of investigation—one related to violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2428—and the Affidavit describes the specific nature of the investigation at
issue—Blackwell’s sexual abuse of persons who had been arrested. 	Further,
“[e]vidence of the offense could [be] found anywhere in the phone” or the Google
5 Doc. 67-2 at 3; Doc. 67-3 at 3; Doc. 67-6 at 28.
6 Doc. 67-2 at 3-4; Doc. 67-3 at 3-4.
7 Doc. 67-6 at 31.
8 Doc. 67-2 at 4; Doc. 67-3 at 4; Doc. 67-6 at 31.
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Account, and “a warrant need not be more specific than knowledge allows.”
Ivey, 91 F.4th at 918.
Blackwell argues that the magistrate judge’s conclusion was wrong
because the magistrate judge cited to United States v. Davis, 723 F. Supp. 3d
677, 687 (E.D. Mo. 2022), aff’d, 126 F.4th 610 (8th Cir. 2025), which Blackwell
claims is inapplicable. 	Doc. 125 at 3. 	Specifically, Blackwell argues that in
Davis, the warrant was limited to illegal conduct while here the warrants
“authorized searches for all records ‘relating to the matters’ in the affidavit,
whether those matters were lawful or not.” 	Doc. 125 at 3. 	Not so. 	The
warrants here specifically limited searches to “materials . . . which constitute
evidence, instrumentalities, and fruits of the criminal violations of [18 U.S.C.
§ 242].” Doc. 67-4 at 4; Doc. 67-5 at 4; Doc. 67-6 at 31. For these reasons, both
of Blackwell’s “particularity” arguments fail.
II. 	Probable Cause
Blackwell also objects to the report and recommendations on the grounds
that the warrants were not supported by probable cause. Blackwell’s objection
fails.
A. Legal Standard
Probable cause is defined as a “fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” 	United States v.
Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 	238 	(1983)). 	Probable 	cause 	is 	determined 	by 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances. United States v. Notman, 831 F.3d 1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2016).
The totality-of-the-circumstances test is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013).
Instead, courts apply a “common-sense approach and consider[] all the relevant
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circumstances [to] determine whether probable cause exists.” United States v.
Buchanan, 167 F.3d 1207, 1211 (8th Cir. 1999).
B. Application of Law to Facts
Blackwell does not explain in his objections why he thinks the warrants
were not supported by probable cause other than to cite to his original Motion
to Suppress. Doc. 125 at 2 (citing Doc. 67 at 9–10). In the Motion to Suppress,
Blackwell claims lack of probable cause to search the phones for things other
than calls, text messages, flashlight usage, and camera because only these four
things are referenced in the Affidavit supporting the warrants. Doc. 67 at 10.
Blackwell claims that internet browsing history, emails, and other phone
usage were not referenced in the affidavit, meaning there was no probable
cause to believe they would contain evidence of a crime, in turn meaning they
should not have been searched. Id. This is incorrect.
There was a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
w[ould] be found” on the phone because the Affidavit stated that Blackwell
used a phone to illuminate and potentially take pictures of the genitals of his
victims. 	Warford, 439 F.3d at 841. 	Thus, there was probable cause to search
at least some parts of Blackwell’s phones—the parts referenced in the affidavit.
Contrary to Blackwell’s contentions, Doc. 67 at 10, the fact that this allows the
government 	to 	look 	through 	some 	photos 	and 	videos 	that 	may 	not 	be
contraband or evidence of a crime does not mean there is no probable cause.
See Ivey, 91 F.4th at 918; United States v. Eggerson, 999 F.3d 1121, 1127 (8th
Cir. 2021) (probable cause supported search of entire phone).
The question then becomes whether there was “a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime w[ould] be found” on the phone’s internet
browsing history, emails, and other phone usage. 	Warford, 439 F.3d at 841.
The answer is “yes.” 	Under a common-sense approach and the totality of the
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circumstances, the Court recognizes that—as the Affidavit says—searching a
device used to perpetrate a crime may lead to evidence of “who has used or
controlled the device,” “identifying suspects; co-conspirators; persons involved
in or related to criminal activity; identifying victims; helping to establish a
timeline of events surrounding criminal activity; and documenting contact
between co-conspirators.” Doc. 67-1 at 12–13. Additionally, photos and videos
do not always stay on cell phones, but are sometimes emailed or uploaded to
the internet to be stored elsewhere. Thus, given the allegations that Blackwell
used a phone to take photos or videos, there was a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of the crime (including circumstantial evidence) would
be found via email, internet browsing history, and other phone usage. See Ivey,
91 F.4th at 917–18 (probable cause existed to search felon’s phone found with
firearm in his car because “affiant explained that…offenders often use social
media to talk about their crimes and to post images of their activities” and that
“[e]vidence of the offense could have been found anywhere in the phone”);
Eggerson, 999 F.3d at 1127 (probable cause supported search of entire phone).
Thus, this Court overrules the probable-cause objection.
III. 	Franks Hearing
Next, 	Blackwell 	objects 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	conclusion 	that
Blackwell was not entitled to a special hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978). Doc. 125 at 3–6.
A. Legal Standard
“Under Franks, a criminal defendant may request a hearing to challenge
a search warrant on the ground that the supporting affidavit contains factual
misrepresentations 	or 	omissions 	relevant 	to 	the 	probable 	cause
determination.” United States v. Arnold, 725 F.3d 896, 898 (8th Cir. 2013)
(citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56). 	But to trigger the right to a Franks
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hearing, Blackwell must make a “substantial preliminary showing” that both
(1) “the affiant…knowingly and intentionally made false statements or made
them in reckless disregard for the truth” and (2) “if the false information [were]
excised (or the omitted information [were] included), the affidavit no longer
establishes probable cause” to issue the search warrants. 	Id. (emphasis
added). 	“The requirement of a substantial preliminary showing is not lightly
met[.]” United States v. Mathison, 157 F.3d 541, 548 (8th Cir. 1998) (quotation
omitted).
B. Application of Law to Facts
Blackwell claims that he should have been given a Franks hearing
because Special Agent Boehlje made two false statements and one material
omission in the affidavit supporting the search warrants for Blackwell’s two
cell phones. Doc. 125 at 3–6 (Blackwell’s argument); see generally Doc. 67-1
(affidavit). As the magistrate judge already found, Blackwell has not made the
substantial showing required for a Franks hearing. 	For the reasons detailed
in the magistrate judge’s report, the Court finds that Blackwell has not
demonstrated that Special Agent Boehlje knowingly and intentionally made
false statements in his affidavit or that those statements were made in reckless
disregard for the truth. Doc. 123 at 20–27; see also United States v. Freeman,
625 F.3d 1049, 1052 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[a] Franks hearing must be denied unless
the defendant makes a strong 	initial 	showing of 	deliberate falsehood or
reckless disregard of the truth.”) (internal quotation omitted). 	Blackwell also
failed to make the required “substantial preliminary showing that . . . [Special
Agent Boehlje] omitted facts with the intent to mislead the issuing judge, or
omitted the facts in reckless disregard of the fact that the omissions would
mislead[.]” United States v. Riaski, 91 F.4th 933, 936 (2024). Thus, Blackwell
failed to make the showing necessary to obtain a Franks hearing based on
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omitted information. Id. 	But even if Special Agent Boehlje did either of these
things, Blackwell would not be entitled to a Franks hearing because the
affidavit in support of the warrants established probable cause even without
the allegedly false or omitted statements. Arnold, 725 F.3d at 898; Riaski, 91
F.4th at 936.
1. Alleged False Statements
Blackwell 	claims 	that 	Special 	Agent 	Boehlje 	included 	two 	false
statements in the affidavit supporting the search warrants for the two cell
phones. First, he claims that the statement that one victim “told police that he
‘believed Blackwell could have been recording with his cell phone’ during the
alleged offense” was false. Doc. 125 at 3 (citing Doc. 67 at 11; Doc. 118 at 1).
Second, he claims that Special Agent Boehlje falsely claimed in the affidavit
“that ‘multiple victims stated [that] Blackwell appeared to use . . . possibly the
[phone] camera’ during the incidents.” Doc. 125 at 4 (quoting Doc. 67-1 at 9
¶ 13) (emphasis in original).
a. Alleged False Statement 1: 	One victim “told police that
he believed Blackwell could have been recording with
his cell phone during the alleged offense.”
The 	first 	statement—that 	one 	victim 	“told 	police 	that 	he 	‘believed
Blackwell could have been recording with his cell phone’ during the alleged
offense”—was not false. At a hearing on the motion to suppress, Special Agent
Boehlje testified that the victim “had talked about using a phone with a light”
and that it “was [Special Agent Boehlje’s] understanding . . . that [the victim]
thought it was possible that [Blackwell] was using the camera.” Doc. 116 at 32,
¶¶ 3–6. 	Special Agent Boehlje further testified that this statement was not
false “[b]ecause of the information reported by [multiple victims] and the other
investigators that [he] worked with.” Doc. 116 at 41, ¶¶ 19–25. 	This makes
clear that the statement in the affidavit—that the victim “believed Blackwell
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could 	have 	been 	recording 	with 	his 	cell 	phone” 	when 	Blackwell 	put 	his
smartphone down the victim’s pants and underwear with its light on—was not
false, but rather a reasonable inference based on the totality of the information
available to Special Agent Boehlje. 	Such an inference is permissible. See
United 	States 	v. 	Brackett, 	846 	F.3d 	987, 	992 	(8th 	Cir. 	2017) 	(“[L]aw
enforcement officers may make reasonable inferences in preparing affidavits
in support of a warrant.”).
Nevertheless, Blackwell argues that this statement is false because
“when [the victim] was asked if Mr. Blackwell was filming, [the victim] did not
say yes.” Rather, “[h]is complete answer was, ‘I don’t know. I don’t know.’” Doc.
125 at 3. “[Y]et [Special Agent Boehlje] swore in the affidavit that [the victim]
had told police that he believed Mr. Blackwell could have been recording.” Id.
This is wrong for two reasons.
First, a reasonable person could have understood the victim’s response
to mean that he had not ruled out the possibility that Blackwell was filming—
i.e., that the victim “believed Blackwell could have [or could not have] been
recording with his cell phone.” Doc. 125 at 3; Doc. 67-1 at 6–7.
Second, 	Special 	Agent 	Boehlje 	never 	“swore 	that 	[the 	victim]
affirmatively stated to police that he ‘believed Blackwell could have been
recording with his cell phone.’” Doc. 125 at 4. 	To use Blackwell’s own words,
“[t]hat is simply not what the affidavit says.” Id. at 3. The affidavit says only
that “[the victim] believed Blackwell could have been recording with his cell
phone.” Doc. 67-1 at 6–7. 	Nowhere does the affidavit say that the victim
affirmatively 	stated 	this 	belief 	to 	police. 	Rather, 	the 	statement 	merely
accurately recounted Special Agent Boehlje’s understanding of what the victim
thought was possible—that the victim “believed Blackwell could have been
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recording with his cell phone” when Blackwell put his smartphone down the
victim’s pants and underwear with its light on.
Thus, Blackwell fails to show that the statement was false. 	Special
Agent Boehlje’s understanding that the victim thought it was possible that
Blackwell was videoing is consistent with the victim not knowing for sure
whether Blackwell was videoing or not. 	And nothing beyond that was sworn
to 	in 	the 	affidavit 	despite 	Blackwell’s 	mischaracterizations. 	The 	Court
concludes this statement was not false.
Even if the statement was inconsistent with what the victim had said in
questioning (it was not), there is no evidence that Special Agent Boehlje
knowingly and intentionally made a false statement or that he made a false
statement in reckless disregard for the truth. 	See United States v. Freeman,
625 F.3d 1049, 1052 (8th Cir. 2010). 	Even if the statement was not precisely
correct, a reasonable person could have understood the victim’s response to
mean that the victim had not ruled out the possibility that Blackwell was
filming—i.e., that the victim “believed Blackwell could have [or could not have]
been recording with his cell phone.” Doc. 125 at 3; Doc. 67-1 at 6–7. This does
not rise to the level of “knowing and intentional” or “in reckless disregard for
the truth.” 	Freeman, 625 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155); see
United States v. Stevens, 530 F.3d 714, 718 (8th Cir. 2008) (“An affiant
knowingly and intentionally or recklessly includes a false statement if he in
fact entertains serious doubts as to the truth of the affidavit or has obvious
reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information contained therein. Inaccurate
statements that result from negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient to
trigger relief under Franks[.]”) (cleaned up).
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b. Alleged 	False 	Statement 	2: 	“Multiple 	victims 	stated
[that] Blackwell appeared to use…possibly the [phone]
camera” during the incidents.
Next, Blackwell argues that he should get a Franks hearing because the
affidavit by Special Agent Boehlje falsely declared “that ‘multiple victims
stated [that] Blackwell appeared to use…possibly the [phone] camera’ during
the incidents.” 	Doc. 125 at 4 (quoting Doc. 67-1 at 9 ¶ 13) (emphasis in
original). Not so. Even if it were true that there was substantial evidence that
this statement was false and that Special Agent Boehlje made it “knowingly
and intentionally” or “with reckless disregard for the truth,” Blackwell would
still not be entitled to a Franks hearing because he has not demonstrated that
there would not be probable cause to search the phone, as required. 	See
Arnold, 725 F.3d at 898 (“to merit a Franks hearing, [the defendant] must show
. . . [that] if the false information is excised (or the omitted information is
included), the affidavit no longer establishes probable cause.”).
Probable cause for search and seizure exists when there is a “fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” 	Warford, 439 F.3d at 841. 	Here, even without the statement that
“multiple victims stated [that] Blackwell appeared to use…possibly the [phone]
camera” 	during 	the 	incidents, 	there 	was 	still 	“a 	fair 	probability 	that
contraband or evidence of [the alleged] crime [would] be found in” the phones
because Special Agent Boehlje also testified that:
multiple victims stated Blackwell appeared to use his personal cell
phone flashlight…during the ‘search’ Blackwell conducted on them.
Additionally Blackwell had cell phone contact, phone calls and text
messages with some of the victims following their arrests
and that:
Blackwell put his hands down the front of [the victim’s] pants and
inside his underwear, fondling [the victim’s] genitalia. Blackwell
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retrieved his cell phone and put the cell phone down [the victim’s]
pants and underwear. [The victim] noticed the camera light on the
phone to be activated…
Doc. 67-1 at 6–7, 9. 	The affidavit also stated that Blackwell was found in
possession of two cell phones capable of taking photos and videos (see Doc. 67-
1 at 8), that “other people claim[ed] to have been victims of a similar assault
upon their arrests by Blackwell (id. at 9 (emphasis added)).
As the magistrate judge put it, “it was not necessary for ‘multiple victims’
to have reported [Blackwell’s] use of his cellular phone’s light and camera
during the encounters because information that [he] used the phone during
one assault and repeatedly after other encounters was sufficient to support
probable cause for the warrants that were issued.” Doc. 123 at 26. 	The Court
overrules this objection.
2. Alleged Omission
Blackwell next claims that he should be granted a Franks hearing on the
basis that Special Agent Boehlje wrongly omitted material information from
the affidavits (Doc. 67-1; Doc. 67-6) relevant to the determination of and scope
of probable cause. 	Doc. 125 at 6. 	Specifically, Blackwell contends that “[t]he
affidavit gave the misleading impression that law enforcement had evidence of
Mr. Blackwell’s camera use spanning seven months from November 2022
through June 2023” even though “the actual information about potential
camera use spanned just three days.” Id.
Blackwell does not expressly state what text he believes was wrongly
omitted from the affidavit, so this Court is disinclined to rule that there was a
material omission. Further, as the magistrate judge noted, there is no evidence
of the required “intent to mislead the judge,” see United States v. Riaski, 91
F.4th 933, 936 (8th Cir. 2024). 	Doc. 123 at 27–28. 	The affidavits’ statements
that “[a]ll identified victims had been arrested by Blackwell from November 8,
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2022 through June 4, 2023,” is not misleading, as the affidavits do not say that
every victim claimed Blackwell used his phone during every arrest. 	See
generally Doc. 67-1; Doc. 67-6.
In fact, Blackwell would not be entitled to a Franks hearing even if the
Court understood Blackwell to be arguing that the affidavit should have
expressly stated that evidence of Blackwell’s camera use spanned just three
days, that the complained-of affidavit text was actually misleading, and that
there was evidence of an intent to mislead. Blackwell would also have to show
that—without the allegedly misleading statement—there would have been no
probable cause for the search warrants or that the scope of probable cause
would have been different. 	Riaski, 91 F.4th at 938 (denying Franks hearing
when defendant could not show search warrant applications would have
“alter[ed] the probable cause determination”). 	Blackwell cannot make that
showing 	here. 	There 	was 	a 	“fair 	probability”—and 	therefore 	“probable
cause”—for the scope of the phone searches because Special Agent Boehlje also
testified that:
multiple victims stated Blackwell appeared to use his personal cell
phone flashlight…during the ‘search’ Blackwell conducted on them.
Additionally Blackwell had cell phone contact, phone calls and text
messages with some of the victims following their arrests.
Doc. 67-1 at 9. The affidavit also stated that Blackwell was found in possession
of two cell phones capable of taking photos and videos (see id. at 2–3, 7–8) and
that “other people claim[ed] to have been victims of a similar assault upon
their arrests by Blackwell (id. at 9 (emphasis added)). 	For all these reasons,
the Court overrules this objection.
Conclusion
Blackwell’s objections to the report and recommendation regarding his
motion to suppress (Doc. 125) are overruled. The magistrate judge’s report and
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recommendation 	(Doc. 	123) 	is 	adopted 	except 	as 	altered 	by 	this 	order.
Blackwell’s 	motion 	to 	suppress 	(Doc. 	67) 	is 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and
DENIED IN PART. The Court GRANTS Blackwell’s motion to suppress with
respect to evidence of location data or any record from on or before November
8, 2022 seized from the cellular phones (which the Government concedes was
beyond the scope of the warrant (Doc. 82 at 10)) and DENIES the motion to
suppress in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
December 19, 2025
____________________________________
MARIA A. LANAHAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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