Ware v. Jordan et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
NORTHERN DIVISION
OMAR WARE, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 2:24-CV-48-ZMB
)
ROBERT J. JORDAN, JR., et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Clay Stanton’s Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 16. After Plaintiff
Omar Ware voluntarily dismissed his official-capacity claims against Stanton, Doc. 19, all that remains
are his individual-capacity claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stanton contends that qualified immunity
requires dismissal of these claims. After drawing all reasonable inferences in Ware’s favor, the Court
finds his allegations sufficient to overcome qualified immunity as to the failure-to-supervise and
failure-to-protect claims at this early stage of litigation. However, Ware has failed to show that any
failure to train prison officials proximately caused his injuries, entitling Stanton to qualified immunity
on that front. Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part Stanton’s Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Factual Background
The following allegations from the Complaint are accepted as true for purposes of this motion.
In 2023, Ware was incarcerated at the Northeast Correctional Center (NECC) in Bowling Green,
Missouri—a prison run by the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC). Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1–2. At
all relevant times, Defendant Robert Jordan was a correctional officer at NECC, and Stanton was
both his supervisor and warden of the facility. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. John Does 1–5 were NECC correctional
officers who shared responsibility for supervising Jordan. Id. ¶ 5.
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Ware alleges that Jordan sexually assaulted him at least six times from April to June 2023.
Id. ¶¶ 20–21. Jordan similarly used his position to sexually assault other inmates. Id. ¶¶ 22–23, 28–29.
Ware claims that Stanton and other supervisors knew about this pattern of abuse. Id. ¶¶ 23, 31–32, 34.
In particular, Ware gave prison supervisors an inappropriate letter he received from Jordan, and
NECC staff witnessed an episode of Jordan assaulting Ware on surveillance video. Id. ¶¶ 12–14, 24–27.
Nevertheless, Ware claims, the supervisors never reported the abuse or disciplined Jordan. Id. ¶ 42.
MDOC has a zero-tolerance policy for sexual abuse, including consensual sexual contact.
Id. ¶ 38–40. NECC also has a policy for management “to determine the appropriate level of access
to the facility for all employees and to respond to all grievances or complaints made by inmates.”
Id. ¶ 33. Stanton and the John Does 1–5 were specifically responsible “for ensuring that employees
at NECC received training on the policies and procedures of [MDOC], that staff strictly adhered
to site operating procedures and plans, and that staff followed the policies and procedures of
[MDOC] while working at NECC.” Id. ¶ 36.
II. 	Procedural Background
Ware filed this case in July 2024. Id. His Complaint includes section 1983 claims against
Stanton, Jordan, and John Does 1–5, as well as two state-law tort claims against Jordan. Id. ¶¶ 45–87.
Ware brought claims against Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. Id. ¶¶ 3–5.
While collapsing his section 1983 claims against Stanton in a single count, Ware identifies
12 overlapping constitutional violations:
62. Defendant Stanton . . . was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of
harm and violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by:
a. Failing to implement and[] enforce adequate policies and procedures for the
care, supervision of NECC correctional officers including Defendant Jordan;
b. Failing to properly respond to complaints of sexual harassment, verbal
harassment, and sexual assault by Defendant Jordan;
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c. Failing to properly investigate complaints of harassment and sexual abuse
of inmates including Plaintiff;
d. Failing to properly train NECC staff about the Prison Rape Elimination Act
and MODOC policies;
e. Failing to train and[] instruct NECC employees, agents and servants to
properly supervise and monitor inmates;
f. Failing to train and[] instruct NECC employees, agents, and servants to
report inappropriate relationships or interactions between NECC
correctional officers and inmates;
g. Failing to remove Defendant Jordan from working with inmates;
h. Failing to ensure there was sufficient supervision of the facility so that
Defendant Jordan could not take inmates into private and unmonitored areas;
i. Failing to monitor the surveillance cameras to ensure sexual assaults did not
occur at NECC;
j. Failing to implement and enforce policies that kept inmates from being
sexually assaulted or harassed;
k. Failing to implement and enforce existing policies and procedures including
failing to take action knowing that Defendant Jordan had been accused of
sexual harassment, inappropriate relationships, and sexual assault by NECC
inmates; and,
l. Failing to properly monitor staff by allowing Defendant Jordan to sexual[ly]
abuse Plaintiff for months while Plaintiff was in the custody and care of the
State of Missouri.
Id. ¶ 62. These allegations appear to fall into three broader categories of failure to supervise, failure
to train, and failure to protect. See Doc. 17 at 6, 9; see also Doc. 18 at 7, 10–11, 15.
Stanton timely moved to dismiss all claims against him, raising sovereign immunity as a
defense to the official-capacity claims, invoking qualified immunity for the individual-capacity
claims, and arguing that Ware did not adequately allege the elements for a failure to train or supervise.
Doc. 16. In response, Ware voluntarily dismissed the official-capacity claims but opposed the
dismissal of the individual-capacity claims. Docs. 18–19. Because the deadline for Stanton’s reply
has long since passed, see E.D. MO. L.R. 4.01(c), the motion to dismiss is ripe for ruling.
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LEGAL STANDARD
I. 	Motion to Dismiss
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The purpose of such motions “is to test
the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Ford v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 553 F. Supp. 3d 693,
697 (E.D. Mo. 2021). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must include “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief” and providing notice
of the grounds on which the claim rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). Additionally, the complaint must include sufficient detail to make
a claim “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
Although “[s]pecific facts are not necessary,” the plaintiff must include “either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable
legal theory.” Delker v. MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 21 F.4th 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 2022) (quotations
omitted). The question is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff
is entitled to present evidence in support of the claim. Id.
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court must accept as true the factual allegations in the
complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Brokken v. Hennepin
Cnty., 140 F.4th 445, 450 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). However, the Court does not “presume
the truth of legal conclusions.” Jones v. City of St. Louis, 104 F.4th 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 2024)
(citation omitted); see also Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.3d 637, 641 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he court is free
to ignore legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences and sweeping legal
conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”). Ultimately, this analysis is “a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009).
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II. 	Qualified Immunity
“Government employees sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 may assert the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity.” Cannon v. Dehner, 112 F.4th 580, 585 (8th Cir. 2024)
(citation omitted). “Qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.” Vandevender v. Sass, 970 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). As such,
qualified immunity shields a government official “unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at
the time of the challenged conduct.” Faulk v. City of St. Louis, 30 F.4th 739, 744 (8th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). “A right is ‘clearly established’ when its
contours are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” Ryno v. City of Waynesville, 58 F.4th 995, 1004 (8th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted).
Moreover, “[g]overnment officials are personally liable only for their own misconduct.” S.M. v.
Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015). “Thus, the doctrine of qualified immunity requires
an individualized analysis of each officer’s alleged conduct.” Id. (quotation and alterations omitted).
DISCUSSION
In his Motion to Dismiss, Stanton largely quibbles with the allegations in the Complaint.
Stanton insists he had no advanced notice of unlawful behavior and that he swiftly removed Jordan
upon hearing reports of misconduct. Doc. 17 at 5, 6. He also insists that, as warden, he had no
direct supervisory authority over Jordan. Id. at 6. That may all be true. The problem is these facts
are not properly before the Court, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of Ware at this early
stage. Viewed through this lens, the Complaint sufficiently alleges failure-to-supervise and failure-
to-protect claims against Stanton. However, Ware fails to show that any purported failure to train
corrections officers was the proximate cause of his injuries, so the Court dismisses that claim.
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I. 	Failure to Supervise
Stanton resists supervisory liability by claiming that he lacked notice of any unlawful
conduct and that he promptly took action when he learned of allegations against Jordan. Doc. 17
at 9. But his argument would require the Court to ignore the standard of review by discounting
Ware’s allegations, accepting facts outside the Complaint, or both. Thus, at this stage of the case,
Stanton’s assertion of qualified immunity as to his failure to supervise falls short.
To establish a section 1983 claim for failure to supervise, Ware must plead facts that show
that Stanton “(1) had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by subordinates; (2)
was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized those acts; and (3) failed to take sufficient
remedial action; (4) proximately causing injury to [Ware].” Brewington v. Keener, 902 F.3d 796,
803 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Allegations of generalized notice are
insufficient; notice requires a pattern of conduct very similar to the conduct giving rise to liability.
Jennings v. Nash, 2020 WL 234678, at *23 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 2020) (internal citations omitted).
Deliberate indifference is present when “in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or
employees the need for more or different . . . supervision . . . is so obvious, and the inadequacy so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the [supervisor] can reasonably be said
to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” S.M. v. Lincoln Cnty., 874 F.3d 581, 585 (8th
Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
Stanton primarily challenges the notice element. Specifically, he claims that the Complaint
“fails to show that [he] had notice that any alleged unlawful events were happening.” Doc. 17 at 9.
But Ware expressly alleges that Stanton knew Jordan had engaged in a pattern of sexual misconduct,1
1 As a threshold matter, Jordan’s alleged sexual assaults of Ware are unconstitutional acts. See Glover v. Paul, 78
F.4th 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2023) (“As a general proposition, it is clearly established that the sexual assault of an inmate
by a guard violates the inmate’s constitutional rights.”) (quotation omitted).
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which included multiple instances of sexual assaults against Ware and other inmates at the NECC.
Doc. 1 ¶¶ 4, 12–14, 21–23, 31, 34, 61. While the Complaint does not specify precisely when
Stanton became aware of this abuse,2 it implies that he knew about Jordan’s other victims before
Ware’s assault. Id. ¶ 31. Moreover, it directly asserts that Stanton “ignore[ed] reports and complaints
about” Jordan and “allow[ed] [him] to sexually harass and assault [Ware]. Id. ¶ 61. Because the
Court must draw all reasonable inference in Ware’s favor at this stage, it is constrained to accept
that Stanton knew about Jordan’s sexual abuse before he assaulted Ware. See Cook, 952 F.3d at 938;
see also Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1124–25 (8th Cir. 2014). Thus, the pleaded facts
establish that Stanton had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts committed by his subordinate.
As for deliberate indifference and remedial action, Stanton claims that he placed “Jordan
on administrative leave and separated him from the institution” as soon as he learned there were
allegations of misconduct. Doc. 17 at 5. Stanton’s account, if true, indicates that he took sufficient
remedial action as Jordan’s supervisor. However, as Ware correctly notes, the Court cannot
consider facts outside the pleadings for purposes of this motion to dismiss. Zean v. Fairview Health
Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir. 2017). And even if it could, it must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of Ware, who alleges that Stanton took no remedial action against Jordan after
he became aware of Jordan’s sexual assaults. Doc. 1 ¶ 42; Doc. 18 at 7. Accepting this version of
events, Stanton displayed deliberate indifference, as it is obvious that a supervisor should have
immediately disciplined Jordan if he knew he was sexually abusing inmates. For similar reasons,
given Ware pled that Stanton took no disciplinary action, the Court must find the Stanton took
insufficient remedial action, as disciplinary action plainly would be warranted.
2 If Stanton learned of the misconduct after June 2023, he would not have had notice, which would be fatal to a claim of
failure to train or supervise. See Brewington, 902 F.3d at 803. But any such claim must wait until summary judgment.
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On a final note, Stanton does not meaningfully grapple with the issue of proximate cause.
But given that Ware’s allegations indicate that Stanton knew about Jordan’s sexual misconduct in
time to prevent the abuse he endured, see Doc. 18 at 15, the Court concludes that the purported
decision to not intervene proximately caused Ware’s injuries. See Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821
F.2d 499, 508 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a city’s failure to address a persistent problem of sexual
misconduct by a police officer proximately caused the subsequent sexual assault committed by the
same police officer). Accordingly, Ware has satisfied his burden to plead facts that show Stanton’s
failure to supervise violated his constitutional rights.
II. 	Failure to Train
Stanton and Ware both analyze the failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims in
tandem. Doc. 17 at 9; Doc. 18 at 10–13. And for good reason. “Under § 1983, a claim for failure
to supervise requires the same analysis as a claim for failure to train.” Atkinson v. City of Mountain
View, 709 F.3d 1201, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Here, however, the Court reaches
divergent conclusions as to these supervisory claims because Ware has failed to establish
proximate cause with respect to a failure to train.
For the most part, Ware’s allegations about the NECC training program are conclusory:
There was a failure “to properly train NECC staff about the Prison Rape Elimination Act and
MODOC policies” and how to “properly supervise and monitor inmates.” Doc. 1 ¶ 62. The only
specific allegation Ware makes regarding NECC training procedures was that NECC staff were
not trained “to report inappropriate relationships or interactions between NECC correctional
officers and inmates.” Id. But even accepting these allegations as true, Ware fails to show how any
training deficiencies were the proximate cause of his injuries. See Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d
1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[The identified deficiency in a [] training program must be closely
related to the ultimate injury such that the deficiency in training actually caused the [trainee’s]
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offending conduct.”) (internal quotations omitted). For example, he does not suggest that
additional training would have led Jordan’s supervisors to intervene in time to prevent his abuse.
And while Ware does in conclusory fashion argue in his brief that Stanton’s “lack of . . . training
of Defendant Jordan created the deficiencies that led to Plaintiff’s injuries,” Doc. 18 at 15, the
Complaint is what matters, and it is certainly an “unwarranted inference” that training would have
stopped Jordan from abusing Ware if the other allegations are true. See Kulkay, 847 F.3d at 641.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Ware’s failure-to-train claims.
III. Failure to Protect
Finally, Stanton argues that he cannot be held liable for a failure-to-protect claim because
he is “involved in this matter only as Warden of NECC,” and when “he became aware of any
alleged unlawful contact between [Ware] and [] Jordan, he placed [] Jordan on administrative leave
and removed him from the institution.” Doc. 17 at 6. Additionally, he contends that, as warden, he
was not Jordan’s direct supervisor. Id. Once again, Stanton attempts to introduce facts outside the
pleadings and ignores allegations in the Complaint.
Ware must make two showings to prevail on a failure-to-protect claim: “(1) an objective
component, that there was a substantial risk of harm to the inmate, and (2) a subjective component,
that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to that risk.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845,
851 (8th Cir. 2018) (alterations omitted). “A risk of sexual assault is ‘substantial’ if it ‘occur[s]
with sufficient frequency that prisoners are put in reasonable fear for their safety.’” Dean v.
Bearden, 79 F.4th 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2023). “While a ‘reign of violence’ is not required to show
a pervasive risk, ordinarily, a ‘pervasive risk of harm’ may not ‘be shown by pointing to
a single incident or isolated incidents.’” Dunahue v. Culclager, 2025 WL 868196, at *9 (E.D. Ark.
Feb. 26, 2025) (quoting Vandevender, 970 F.3d at 977).
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Stanton claims that Jordan was not his subordinate and that he took immediate remedial
action, but those facts are not in the Complaint and cannot be considered for purposes of this
motion to dismiss. See Zean, 858 F.3d at 526. Ware has alleged that Jordan sexually assaulted him
several times and that Jordan previously abused other prisoners. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 21, 31. These
allegations, taken as true, rise beyond a few “isolated incidents” and are sufficient to establish a
substantial risk of harm to Ware. The Court has already explained above how the Complaint,
viewed in the light most favorable to Ware, is sufficient to establish that Stanton was deliberately
indifferent to the risk of Ware being sexually assaulted by Jordan. Thus, at this stage of litigation,
Ware has met his burden of pleading facts that show his constitutional rights were violated by
Stanton’s failure to protect.
IV. Clearly Established Right
“Proving the [constitutional] violation itself, however, is only half the battle.” Dean, 79
F.4th at 989. In addition, Ware also “has the burden to show that the law is clearly established,”
meaning “every reasonable official” in that position “would have understood” that the challenged
conduct violated his rights. Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Though [he] need not provide a case
directly on point, some existing precedent must place the question beyond debate, or the conduct
must be so obviously unconstitutional that no precedent is needed.” Est. of Walker v. Wallace, 881
F.3d 1056, 1061 (8th Cir. 2018).
To state what should be obvious, it is clearly established that a prison supervisor violates
an inmate’s constitutional rights if they know about a particular subordinate’s ongoing pattern of
sexual abuse against inmates but fail to take any corrective action.3 See, e.g., Williams v. Prudden,
67 F. App’x 976, 977–78 (8th Cir. 2003); Phelps v. Cabieles, 2025 WL 2463081, at *4 (D. Neb.
3 This section focuses only on the failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise violations because Ware did not establish
that Stanton violated a constitutional right through a failure to train.
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Aug. 26, 2025). Thus, by pleading facts that show that Stanton failed to supervise Jordan and failed
to protect him by preventing the pattern of sexual abuse, Stanton cannot benefit from qualified
immunity for those claims on a motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Ware, the Court concludes that
Ware’s allegations are sufficient to defeat Stanton’s assertion of qualified immunity at this stage
of litigation as to his failure-to-supervise and failure-to-protect claims. However, to the extent
Ware asserts a failure to train claim, his allegations are insufficient, and Stanton is entitled to
qualified immunity.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Stanton’s [16]
Motion to Dismiss, specifically dismissing the failure-to-train claims against Stanton.
So ordered this 22nd day of January 2026.
ZACHARY M. BLUESTONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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