Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
JOSE ANTONIO NEGRETE
RAMIREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the United
States Department of Homeland
Security, et al.,
Respondents.
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No. 1:25-cv-00206-CMS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Jose Antonio Negrete Ramirez, a citizen of Mexico, has lived in the United
States for 19 years but has never been lawfully admitted into the country. See (Doc. 1
at 4); see also (Doc. 9 at 1). He is currently detained, awaiting immigration
proceedings. (Doc. 9 at 1). Negrete Ramirez petitions the Court for a writ of habeas
corpus, asking the Court to order Respondents (collectively, “the Government”) to
either release him or give him an individualized bond hearing, in addition to other
relief. (Doc. 1 at 18–19). The parties disagree over which section of Title 8 governs
Negrete Ramirez’ case, Section 1225(b)(2) or Section 1226(a). (Doc. 1 at 10); (Doc. 9
at 4–5). If Section 1225(b)(2) governs, then the Government must detain Petitioner
without bond. If Section 1226(a) governs, then an individualized bond hearing may
be permitted in some circumstances.
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For the reasons stated below, Section 1225(b)(2) dictates the outcome of this
case and requires detention of Petitioner Negrete Ramirez without bond pending his
immigration proceedings. The Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
(Doc. 1).
Factual Background
The facts are not in dispute. Negrete Ramirez is neither a citizen nor a national
of the United States. (Doc. 1 at 4). He is a citizen of Mexico. Id. He entered the United
States without inspection in 2006 and has been in the United States ever since. Id. at
1. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained Negrete Ramirez on November 6,
2025, and he has been in custody since that date. Id. at 2. He did not request expedited
consideration prior to his hearing before the Kansas City Immigration Court on
December 15, 2025. He is currently being detained by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement at the Ste. Genevieve, Missouri, Detention Center. Id. at 1.
Negrete Ramirez filed this petition on December 3, 2025, asserting that his
detention violates his rights to due process under the United States Constitution and
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. Id. at 2. He requests the
following relief: an order granting his immediate release; an order prohibiting the
Government from transferring him out of the Eastern District of Missouri or the
Eighth Circuit during the pendency of the proceedings; a declaration that his detention
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; a temporary restraining
order either requiring his release and enjoining his continued detention or requiring
the Government to show cause why his petition should not be granted; an order
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setting a bond hearing within seven days; an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs; and any further relief the Court deems just and proper. Id. at 18–19.
Analysis
8 U.S.C. § 1225 Applies to Petitioner Negrete Ramirez
As the Supreme Court has noted, “‘[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful
executive detention.’” Dept. of Homeland Sec’ty v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 119
(2020) (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)) (alteration in original).
Petitioner Negrete Ramirez asks the Court to order his release or, alternatively, that he
be granted an individualized bond hearing under the framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
See (Doc. 1 at 19).
The dispositive question is whether Section 1225(b)(2) or Section 1226(a)
governs Negrete Ramirez’ detention. While the latter section generally permits bond,
the former does not: “aliens falling within the scope of § 1225(b)(2) ‘shall be detained
for a [removal] proceeding.’” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018) (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)) (alteration in original).
The Government argues that Section 1225(b)(2) applies in this case. That
section requires, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the
examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a
proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis
added). According to the United States Supreme Court, “[r]ead most naturally, §§
1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) . . . mandate detention of applicants for admission until
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certain proceedings have concluded.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297.
By contrast, Negrete Ramirez argues that Section 1226(a) applies. Section
1226(a) provides: “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States.” Section 1226(a)(2)(A) further allows that the Attorney General
“may” release the alien on bond. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 (“Section 1226(a) also
permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond”).
When interpreting a statute, the Court begins “with the statute’s plain language,
giving words the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them.” Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 113 F.4th 823, 833 (8th Cir. 2024) (quotation
omitted). But “[w]hen a statute includes an explicit definition of a term, we must
follow that definition, even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning.” Van Buren v.
United States, 593 U.S. 374, 387 (2021) (quotation omitted).
Under Section 1225(b)(2), when an alien is “an applicant for admission, if the
examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.” The
question is whether Negrete Ramirez is an “applicant for admission” as defined by
Section 1225, as he does not assert that an immigration officer determined that he is
“clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
Under Section 1225(a)(1), “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not
been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall be deemed for purposes of
this chapter an applicant for admission.” Negrete Ramirez is an “alien” because he is a
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citizen of Mexico. (Doc. 1 at 1). He is, admittedly, “present in the United States.” Id. at
4. He “has not been admitted” according to Section 1225(a)(1) because he did not
“lawful[ly] ent[er] . . . into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer,” Section 1101(a)(13)(A) (defining “admission” and “admitted”).
The Supreme Court in Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287, noted that, under Section 1225, “an
alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not
been admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for admission.’” Thus, according to the
plain language of the statute, Negrete Ramirez is “an applicant for admission,”
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies, and he is not entitled to a bond hearing.
Negrete Ramirez nonetheless maintains that Section 1225(b)(2) should not
apply because he has been present in the country for a long period of time and
therefore is not “seeking admission.” (Doc. 1 at 13). Negrete Ramirez points to cases
from other districts that interpret this phrase to require “present tense action.” Id.; see
also, e.g., Alejandro v. Olson, No. 1:25-cv-02027-JPH-MKK, 2025 WL 2896348, at
*7 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2025) (“The phrase ‘seeking admission,’ accordingly, means
that a noncitizen must be actively ‘seeking’ ‘lawful entry.’”). In other words,
Petitioner argues Section 1225 “does not apply to noncitizens ‘already present in the
United States’ . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 13–14) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303).
Negrete Ramirez’ argument fails for several reasons. First, two cases in this
District recently addressed precisely this issue and rejected the same argument. See
Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-00168-JMD, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D. Mo. Nov.
10, 2025); Suarez v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-00202-JMD, 2025 WL 3312168 (E.D. Mo.
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Nov. 28, 2025). Other district courts to consider the issue, but not all, likewise have
decided that Section 1225(b)(2) applies. See, e.g., Chavez v. Noem, 801 F.Supp.3d
1133, 1140 (S.D. Cal. 2025); but see Eshdavlatov v. Arnott, No. 25-00844, 2025 WL
3217838 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2025).1 This Court agrees with the prior decisions of
this District and of the other courts holding that Section 1225(b)(2) applies in this
circumstance.
As the court concluded in Mejia Olalde, “to ‘seek’ is a synonym of to ‘apply’
for.” Id. at *3 (citing Apply (for), Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/thesaurus/apply%20for (last visited Nov. 6, 2025)). As already stated,
Negrete Ramirez definitionally is an “applicant for admission” under Section
1225(a)(1). As an “applicant for admission,” Negrete Ramirez is also “seeking
admission” within the meaning of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). This is so despite that
Congress used slightly different terminology with the phrases “seeking admission”
and “applicant for admission.” See Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3 (quoting
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Law: A Primer on How to Read Statutes and
the Constitution 111 (2016) (“reasoning that ‘meaningful variation of terminology
within a statute ought not be as powerful a consideration as ordinary meaning’ and
concluding that ‘the Legislature is not required to be overly repetitive in its choice of
language’”).
1 Recently, the Board of Immigration Appeals also interpreted Section 1225(b)(2) to apply
to an alien who had resided in the United States for over two years. Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 228 (BIA 2025). Applying Section 1225(b)(2), the Board
determined that an immigration judge lacked authority to hold a bond hearing for that
alien. Id.
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Also, under Section 1225(a)(3), titled “Inspection,” “[a]ll aliens . . . who are
applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission . . . shall be inspected by
immigration officers” (emphasis added). The implication of the word “otherwise,”
which is defined as “1: in a different way or manner: DIFFERENTLY,” Otherwise,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002), is that being an applicant for
admission is another way of “seeking admission.” Thus, the context of Section 1225
also supports the interpretation of “applicant for admission” as synonymous with an
alien “seeking admission.” See Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3.
Further, Section 1225(b)(2) includes no time limit. If Congress intended that
an alien no longer is “seeking admission” after some amount of time in the United
States, it could have said so. See id. at *4. As in Mejia Olalde, this Court will not
insert into a statute an “arbitrary time limit” where none is provided. Id. (quoting
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 304).
Negrete Ramirez next argues that applying Section 1225(b)(2) to him would upend
decades of agency practice. (Doc. 1 at 8). This Court need not defer to agency practice
when the agency acts outside its statutory authority. See Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024). The regulation cited by Negrete Ramirez, 62 Fed.
Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997), states, “Despite being applicants for admission, aliens
who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens
who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.” Id.
(emphasis added). The regulation first designates aliens like Negrete Ramirez “applicants
for admission,” then purports to render such aliens “eligible for bond.” Id. The regulation
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clearly contravenes the plain language of Section 1225(b)(2) that “an applicant for
admission . . . shall be detained.” Suffice it to say this Court, in exercising its
independent judgment, will not adopt an agency’s interpretation so obviously contrary to
the plain meaning of the statute. See Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 412–13.
Finally, Negrete Ramirez claims that applying Section 1225(b)(2) here would
render portions of The Laken Riley Act, a recent amendment to Section 1226,
superfluous. (Doc. 1 at 14). The Laken Riley Act added another category of alien that
the Attorney General “shall take into custody”: “any alien who—(E)(i) is inadmissible
under paragraph (6)(A) . . . of this title; and (ii) is charged with, is arrested for, is
convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute”
certain specified crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A).
Petitioner argues the Act would have no effect if aliens who have not been admitted
are already subject to custody under Section 1225(b)(2). (Doc. 1 at 15). That
argument fails.
Again, this argument was rejected in Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942. The
first and most convincing reason that a proper reading of Section 1225 does not render
the Laken Riley Act superfluous is that the latter “may apply to situations where
[Section] 1225 might not.” Id. at *4. For instance, an individual who has been
admitted by fraud would not be an “applicant for admission” under Section 1225(a),
which applies only to individuals who have “not been admitted” See Mejia Olalde,
2025 WL 3131942, at *4 (quoting Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (“‘Any alien who, by
fraud . . . has procured . . . a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United
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States . . . is inadmissible.’”)) (emphasis added). The Laken Riley Act, on the other
hand, “may require that person to be detained even if [Section] 1225 would not
apply.” Id.
Second, as explained in Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *4, “even
assuming there were surplusage, that cannot trump the plain meaning of [Section]
1225(b)(2).” According to the Supreme Court, “‘when confronted with a choice
between an interpretation that honors a statute’s plain meaning but produces
surplusage, and an interpretation that ignores the plain meaning but avoids surplusage,
there is no choice at all—the plain meaning must control.’” Id. (quoting Artola v.
Garland, 996 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2021)).
For all of these reasons, Section 1225(b)(2) applies, and Petitioner Negrete
Ramirez must be detained pending removal proceedings.
Petitioner’s Detention Does Not Violate
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Negrete Ramirez briefly argues for a declaratory judgment that his detention
without an individualized custody determination violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 17–18). Though the Due Process Clause applies to
aliens “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent,”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001), the Supreme Court has approved
mandatory detention of deportable criminal aliens pending removal proceedings,
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527–28 (2003).
Petitioner’s argument relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in
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Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. (Doc. 1 at 17). But Zadvydas is distinguishable here on the
same basis the Supreme Court distinguished it in Demore, 538 U.S. at 527–28. In
Zadvydas, unlike here and in Demore, the Court dealt with the possibly indefinite
detention of an alien whose “removal was ‘no longer practically attainable.’” Id. at
527 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
Though Demore involved mandatory detention of a criminal alien under
Section 1226(c), its rationale holds true in this case. First, this Court is following the
mandate of Congress in Section 1225 that “applicants for admission” shall be
detained. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. Second, like
Demore and unlike Zadvydas, Negrete Ramirez’ detention pending removal
proceedings will be of a short duration, and certainly is not “‘indefinite’ and
‘potentially permanent.’” Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. Thus, here, as in Demore,
“[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that
process.” Id. at 531. The Government has not denied Petitioner due process by
detaining him without a bond hearing pending removal proceedings.
Conclusion
Petitioner Negrete Ramirez’ detention is mandated by Section 1225(b)(2) and
does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. He is lawfully
detained pending removal proceedings.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
(Doc. 1) is DENIED.
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Dated this 30th day of January, 2026.
_________________________________
CRISTIAN M. STEVENS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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