Cox v. Commissioner Department Of Human Services et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Samuel Cox,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner Department of
Human Services, (Jane/John
Doe/Unknown Names); MSOP
Administration(s), (Jane and John
Doe Names unknown and/want
Identified); BEU Staff; BEU Hearing
Officiers; Amanda Sjoberg, BEU
Lead Staff; Justin L. Joslin, Unit
Director on Omega-1; Bruce Brekke,
Security Counselor; Security
Counselor, (Jane/John
Doe/Unknown Name); Phil Olson,
1C Unit Director; and Charles Fai,
1C Clinical Supervisor,
Defendants.
Case No. 26-cv-1984-LMP-EMB
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This is one of five lawsuits that plaintiff Samuel Cox, a client of the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”), has filed in recent months
attacking the legality of conditions at MSOP. Cox did not pay the filing fee
for this case, instead applying for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. That IFP
application is now before the Court and must be considered before any other
action may be taken in this matter.
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After review of the IFP application, the Court concludes that Cox
qualifies financially for IFP status. That said, an IFP application will be
denied, and an action will be dismissed, when an IFP applicant has filed a
complaint that fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir.
1996) (per curiam). In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on
which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all the factual
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Aten v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2008);
Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 474 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Although the factual allegations in the complaint need not be detailed, they
must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In assessing
the sufficiency of the complaint, the court may disregard legal conclusions
that are couched as factual allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678–79 (2009). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they still
must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced. See Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
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The problem with Cox’s complaint in this matter is that the document
consists entirely of broad, conclusory allegations rather than specific factual
allegations which, if later proved true, would establish that one or more of
the defendants had violated the law. This is a problem for two reasons.
First, conclusory allegations—that is, allegations that merely assert a
legal conclusion, like that Cox has been “denied access to the court” (Compl.
at 2 [Dkt. No. 1]) or that MSOP officials have imposed “excessive
punishment” or committed “harassment” (id.)—are not entitled to the
assumption of truth that is afforded to plausible factual allegations. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Not much remains of the pleading after these
conclusory allegations are shorn away.
Second, a litigant seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
constitutional violations must allege not only that their rights have been
violated but also plausible facts that the specific defendant or defendants
named to the action are personally responsible for the violation. In other
words, to succeed on a claim under § 1983, “a litigant must prove that the
specific defendant being sued acted unlawfully himself or herself.” See
Washington v. Craane, No. 18-cv-1464-DWF-TNL, 2019 WL 2147062, at *2
(D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2019) (citing Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208
(8th Cir. 1990) (“Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct
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responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”)). The complaint lacks
allegations tying any specific defendant to any specific wrongdoing.
Accordingly, it is recommended that this matter be dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to § 1983 and that Cox’s application to proceed IFP be
denied. Cox’s motion for appointment of counsel should be denied, as it is
unlikely that appointment of counsel will benefit either Cox or the Court in
any appreciable manner. Finally, Cox is warned that, should he continue to
file duplicative complaints that fail to set forth a plausible basis for relief, it
may become necessary to impose restrictions on his ability to initiate
litigation in this District absent representation by counsel or the advance
authorization of a judicial officer of this District.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. This matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
2. The application to proceed in forma pauperis of plaintiff Samuel
Cox (Dkt. No. 2) be DENIED.
3. Cox’s motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 4) be DENIED.
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Dated: April 9, 2026 /s/ Elsa M. Bullard______________
Elsa M. Bullard
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or
judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations
within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a
copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses
must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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