Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Mohammed A.A.,
Petitioner,
v.
James Tadman, Sheriff, Polk County, MN;
David Easterwood, Director of St. Paul Field
Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United
States, each in their official capacity,
Respondents.
Civ. No. 26-1734 (JWB/ECW)
ORDER ON
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Abdinasir M. Abdulahi, AMA Law Office LLC, counsel for Petitioner.
David W. Fuller, Esq., and Jesus Cruz Rodriguez, Esq., United States Attorney’s Office,
counsel for Respondents.
This case asks whether Respondents may detain a noncitizen under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) after previously releasing him from custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and
placing him in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229. The answer is no.
Petitioner Mohammed A.A.’s attempt to enter Canada and subsequent compulsory
return to the United States pursuant to the Safe Third Country Agreement do not render
him a noncitizen “seeking admission” under § 1225. And because Respondents exercised
authority to release Petitioner under § 1226, that statute—not § 1225—governs detention
for his pending removal proceeding. Thus, the Petition is granted to the extent that it
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requests release.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Somalia. (Doc. No. 1, Petition ¶ 17; Doc. No. 7, Patrin
Decl. ¶ 5.) On February 2, 2024, Petitioner entered the United States and was
encountered by United States Border Patrol (“CBP”) near San Ysidro, California.
(Petition ¶ 17; Patrin Decl. ¶ 6; Doc. No. 7-1 at 1; Doc. No. 7-5 at 2–3.) Petitioner
claimed a fear of persecution and torture if returned to Somalia. (Petition ¶ 20; Doc.
No. 7-5 at 2–3.)
That same day, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear designating him a
noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.” (Petition
¶ 18; Doc. No. 1-1; Patrin Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8; Doc. No. 7-1.) The Notice placed Petitioner in
removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), which governs full removal
proceedings before an Immigration Judge. (See Doc. No. 1-1 at 1; Doc. No. 7-1 at 1.)
Petitioner was released from custody on his own recognizance. (Doc. No. 6 at 2;
Patrin Decl. ¶ 7; Doc. No. 7-3; Doc. No. 7-5 at 2–3; Doc. No. 7-6.) The Order of Release
on Recognizance (“OREC”) states that it was “[i]n accordance with section 236 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act,” which corresponds with 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (Doc.
No. 7-3 at 1.) Neither side has submitted evidence showing that Petitioner’s OREC has
been cancelled or revoked.
On August 15, 2024, Petitioner filed a timely application for asylum based on past
persecution and fear of future persecution. (Petition ¶¶ 19–20; Patrin Decl. ¶ 9; Doc.
No. 7-5 at 3.) That application remains pending, and Petitioner is scheduled to appear
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before an Immigration Judge in Seattle, Washington on March 13, 2026. (Petition ¶ 19;
Doc. No. 7-5 at 2–3.)
Petitioner attempted to flee to Canada on February 21, 2026, fearing that increased
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) activity would result in his deportation
to Somalia. (Petition ¶ 22; Patrin Decl. ¶ 10.) When he was apprehended by the Canadian
Border Services Agency, Petitioner made an asylum claim which was denied under the
Safe Third Country Agreement (“STCA”) between Canada and the United States. (Patrin
Decl. ¶ 10; Doc. No. 7-4 at 1–3, 6–7; Doc. No. 7-5 at 2–3.)
Under the Safe Third Country Agreement (“STCA”), asylum seekers who present
themselves at a land port of entry between the United States and Canada are generally
required to pursue their asylum claim in the first of the two countries they entered, and
will be returned to that country accordingly, unless one of four exceptions applies: a
qualifying family member in the receiving country, unaccompanied minor status,
possession of certain valid documents, or a public interest exception. See Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada
for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of Third
Countries, Can.–U.S., Dec. 5, 2002, T.I.A.S. No. 04-1229 (2004).
The Canadian authorities “immediately” returned Petitioner to the United States,
pursuant to the STCA, on February 21, 2026. (Petition ¶ 23; Patrin Decl. ¶ 10; Doc.
No. 7-4 at 8–9; Doc. No. 7-5 at 2–3.) He was delivered to the Pembina, North Dakota
port of entry and received there by CBP officers. (See Doc. No. 7-4 at 8; Doc. No. 7-5
at 2.)
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The next day, CBP served Petitioner with an arrest warrant and detained him,
citing § 1225(b)(2). (Patrin Decl. ¶ 11; Doc. No. 7-2.) That same day, CBP turned him
over to ICE for removal proceedings pursuant to INA § 240. (Patrin Decl. ¶ 12; Doc.
No. 7-5 at 3.) He has since remained detained at the Northwest Regional Corrections
Center in Polk County, Minnesota. (Petition ¶¶ 1–2, 9, 12, 25; Patrin Decl. ¶ 13.)
Petitioner has no criminal history and alleges that he has complied with all
immigration requirements. (Petition ¶ 21; Doc. No. 7-5 at 3.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	Legal Standard
A writ of habeas corpus may issue where a petitioner is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The petitioner bears the burden of
establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged detention lacks a
lawful statutory basis. See Aditya W. H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn.
2025) (collecting cases).
Immigration detention, like all civil detention, must rest on an express
congressional grant of authority and bear a reasonable relation to its statutory purpose.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687, 690 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715, 738 (1972)). Section 2241 confers jurisdiction to determine whether the Executive
Branch has statutory authority to detain an individual, including in the immigration
context. See id. at 687–88.
II. 	Analysis
Petitioner challenges only the lawfulness of his detention under federal law. He
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does not contest any removal order, the conduct of removal proceedings, or the execution
of removal. Therefore, jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to review the legal basis
for custody. See, e.g., Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1154–55 (D. Minn.
2025). Because the Petition is not directed at removal, statutory channeling provisions do
not apply. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018).
Respondents appear to assert two grounds for detaining Petitioner. First, they
assert that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
because he is an applicant for admission at the border who is also “seeking admission” to
the United States through his pending asylum application. Second, Respondents allude to
Petitioner’s alleged violation of his OREC as grounds for his arrest. Neither justifies
Petitioner’s detention.
A. 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) distinguishes between inspection,
removal proceedings, and detention authority. In general, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs the
process for inspecting noncitizens arriving to the country.
A noncitizen present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States is considered an “applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission, as well as those who are “otherwise seeking
admission or readmission,” must be inspected by immigration officers. Id. § 1225(a)(3).
“Inspection” is the process by which immigration officers determine whether such
noncitizens are admissible to the United States. See id. § 1225(a). Importantly, though,
inspection does not equate to detention.
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Detention authority is provided within § 1225(b), which creates two categories of
specific inspection procedures.
First is § 1225(b)(1), which applies to a noncitizen who “is arriving” and is
determined to be inadmissible due to “fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid
documentation.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A). The noncitizen might be subject to detention if they
claim asylum, but only after certain determinations are made about their claim. See id.
§§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii)(IV).
Second is § 1225(b)(2), which is a “catchall provision” for inspecting “other”
noncitizens. Id. § 1225(b)(2); Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837. Under that provision, detention
is mandatory for a noncitizen “seeking admission” who is found by the inspecting officer
to be inadmissible. Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In that case, the noncitizen must be detained “for
a proceeding under § 1229,” indicating that § 1225(b)(2) detention is tethered to the
initiation of removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge. Id.
Respondents assert that Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2); they do
not invoke § 1225(b)(1). (See Doc. No. 6 at 2–5.)
Respondents specifically argue that Petitioner is subject to § 1225(b)(2) because
he is an applicant for admission who is not subject to § 1225(b)(1). (Doc. No. 6 at 2–4.)
This interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) has been litigated extensively and largely rejected by
this District. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1142–48, 1150–52 (D.
Minn. 2025); Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968–970 (D. Minn. 2025);
Mayamu K. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819, at *7–8 (D.
Minn. Oct. 20, 2025). Such an expansive reading of § 1225(b)(2) collapses the statutory
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structure Congress enacted and renders the “seeking admission” phrase meaningless.
Respondents also seem to argue that Petitioner is nonetheless “seeking admission”
because he has a pending application for asylum. (Doc. No. 6 at 4–5.) As this Court and
others have observed, this argument “blur[s] two distinct legal concepts” by equating
seeking asylum, which concerns status, with “seeking admission,” which concerns legal
entry. Junior O.P.V. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-890, Doc. No. 9 at 5 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2026)
(noting that an asylum application would not make petitioner a noncitizen “seeking
admission” under § 1225); see also Gabriel J. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-865 (SRN/LIB),
2026 WL 295192, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2026); Yao v. Almodovar, Civ. No. 25-9982
(PAE), 2025 WL 3653433, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025). A pending application for
asylum does not mean that Petitioner is perpetually “seeking admission” within the
meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Although Respondents do not explicitly argue that Petitioner’s return to the United
States pursuant to the STCA constitutes “seeking admission,” the argument is at least
implicitly raised by their supporting declaration. (See Patrin Decl. ¶¶ 10–12.) The facts
presented here do not support that conclusion. Petitioner was returned to the United
States by Canadian officials pursuant to an agreement between the two nations and was
then taken into custody by Respondents. Petitioner may have qualified as an applicant for
admission pursuant to § 1225(a)(1) and therefore had to be inspected under § 1225(a)(3).
But an administrative transfer pursuant to an international agreement does not equate to
“seeking admission.”
The record instead shows that Petitioner was attempting to do the opposite—to
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leave the United States and seek refuge in Canada. He returned only because Canadian
officials transferred him back under the STCA. On these facts, the detention authority in
§ 1225(b)(2) does not apply. But see Barrow v. Noem, Civ. No. 26-1029 (JMG/ECW),
2026 WL 445500, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2026) (denying habeas relief to noncitizen
who was returned to the United States pursuant to the STCA).
Another important consideration reinforces this conclusion. Respondents had
already inspected Petitioner, placed him in removal proceedings before an Immigration
Judge, and exercised their discretion to release him under § 1226 when he first arrived to
the United States in February 2024. (Patrin Decl. ¶¶ 6–7; Doc. No. 1-1; Doc. No. 7-5 at
3–4.) Treating Petitioner’s later encounter at a port of entry as resetting the governing
detention statute would ignore that procedural posture.
Congress has not said that leaving the country and returning during a pending
removal case necessarily resets the statutory authority governing detention while that
case proceeds. Reading such a rule into the statute would elevate geography over the
statutory framework Congress enacted and require this Court to invent or infer a
mechanism that Congress has not created. This Court declines to do so.
To illustrate why not, consider a slightly different scenario. Detroit, Michigan and
Windsor, Ontario sit directly across the Detroit River from one another, connected by an
international bridge. A noncitizen residing in Detroit—already in removal proceedings
and released pursuant to § 1226—might briefly visit family in Windsor and, upon
returning across the bridge to Detroit, suddenly become subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b)(2), even though the same removal proceeding continues uninterrupted.
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Petitioner’s case here is even simpler. He did not choose to cross the border at all; he was
transferred across it by the authorities. But in either circumstance, an existing removal
proceeding and custody determination are not unwound by § 1225(b)(2) merely because
the noncitizen returned to a port of entry.
Detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is “for” a removal proceeding. Read in the
context of the surrounding inspection provisions, the proceeding for which detention is
authorized is not just any removal proceeding; it is one that results from the inspecting
officer determining that the noncitizen is not clearly entitled to admission. See
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). That determination leads to the initiation of removal proceedings before
an Immigration Judge through the issuance of a Notice to Appear under § 1229(a).
This Court and many others have generally recognized that § 1225 applies to
border encounters, while § 1226 governs detention during removal proceedings within
the interior of the country. But the mere fact that a noncitizen is encountered at a port of
entry is not dispositive of detention authority. The facts must still fit the inspection and
detention provisions Congress enacted § 1225. Here they do not. Petitioner was not
“seeking admission” when he was involuntarily returned to a United States port of entry,
and Respondents did not detain him “for a proceeding under 1229a” initiated as the result
of a § 1225 inspection. Accordingly, § 1225(b)(2) does not authorize his detention.
B. 	Order of Release on Recognizance
Respondents also suggest that Petitioner was arrested because he violated the
conditions of his OREC. (Doc. No. 6 at 1–3.) Petitioner’s OREC notes that he must get
written permission from his immigration case officer before changing his place of
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residence and that he “must not violate any local, State, or Federal laws or ordinances.”
(Doc. No. 7-3.) The OREC also warns that failure to comply with these conditions “may
result in revocation of your release and your arrest and detention by the Department of
Homeland Security.” (Id.) The document also includes a specific section for cancelling
the OREC, to be completed, signed, and dated by an immigration officer. (Id.)
According to Respondents, Petitioner failed to comply with his OREC when he
attempted to seek asylum in Canada and thereby change his place of residence without
permission from his immigration officer. (Doc. No. 6 at 1–2.) However, the record does
not show that any immigration officer actually cancelled Petitioner’s OREC. See Salazar
v. Noem, Civ. No. 26-1040 (JMG/EMB), 2026 WL 381889, at *1–2 (D. Minn. Feb. 11,
2026) (recognizing that noncitizens released on recognizance are entitled to “a suite of
procedural protections,” including the administrative process for revoking release, and
finding detention unlawful where the petitioner’s OREC had not been formally revoked).
Although Respondents submitted an arrest warrant, the warrant does not invoke
the alleged breach of Petitioner’s OREC. Instead, it relies on the “pendency of ongoing
removal proceedings” and records indicating that Petitioner “is removable under U.S.
immigration law” to establish probable cause for arrest. (Doc. No. 7-2.) Nothing in the
record shows that Respondents revoked Petitioner’s OREC. It instead shows that
Petitioner remains subject to the conditions of his February 2, 2024 release.
On this record, Petitioner’s continued detention rests on a statute and an
interpretation that do not apply and is therefore unlawful. See Khalid B.Q., Civ. No. 25-
4584, Doc. No. 10 at 6; Xuseen A., Civ. No. 25-4514, Doc. No. 16 at 7. Thus, Petitioner is
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entitled to a writ of habeas corpus directing his immediate release subject to the
conditions of his 2024 Order of Release on Recognizance. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S.
674, 693 (2008) (describing release as the “typical remedy” for “unlawful executive
detention”).
Respondents argue that if Petitioner has been misclassified under § 1225, the
proper remedy is a bond hearing under § 1226 rather than release. But a bond hearing
presupposes lawful detention authority under § 1226. Where that authority has not been
invoked or established, ordering a bond hearing would treat the absence of statutory
power as a mere procedural defect rather than a substantive one. Habeas relief addresses
the lawfulness of custody itself, not merely the adequacy of procedures that might attend
some other, uninvoked basis for detention. See Wajda v. United States, 64 F.3d 385, 389
(8th Cir. 1995). When detention lacks a lawful predicate, release is the appropriate
remedy. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693.
Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a valid statutory basis for
detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through further proceedings.
Because Petitioner has shown that Respondents have not invoked a provision of the INA
that authorizes his continued detention, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted.
Petitioner’s other habeas claims are not reached.
This Order does not bar future custody action taken in compliance with the
governing law.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings in this case,
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Petitioner Mohammed A.A.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.
No. 1) is GRANTED.
2. 	Release. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody.
He must be released in Minnesota only subject to his 2024 Order for Release on
Recognizance. At the time of Petitioner’s release, Respondents shall return to Petitioner
all personal property in Respondents’ custody or control, including but not limited to,
passports, identity papers or licenses, immigration records, prescribed medications, and
treatment-related equipment. Release may not be delayed for any reason related to the
retrieval, processing, or return of such property. Any delay or failure to effectuate release
in accordance with this paragraph constitutes noncompliance with this Order.
If Petitioner is currently held outside Minnesota, Respondents shall immediately
initiate Petitioner’s return to Minnesota for the sole purpose of effectuating release.
Respondents shall not delay initiation of return based on administrative convenience,
transportation availability, or detention-capacity considerations.
Upon Petitioner’s arrival in Minnesota, Respondents shall effectuate release
forthwith. If, at the time release would otherwise occur, weather conditions would expose
Petitioner to extreme cold or other reasonably dangerous conditions, Respondents may
delay physical release only for the brief period necessary to effectuate release in a safe
manner. Respondents shall employ the earliest reasonably available safe means of release
and may not delay release where a safe option is available. Any such delay must be
strictly limited and must not be used to justify continued custody, supervision, or
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discretionary release authority.
3. 	Notice. Respondents shall file an update on the status of Petitioner’s release
by 7:05 p.m. on March 15, 2026. In the update, Respondents must confirm the time, date,
and location of the release or anticipated return and release. The update must also confirm
that Respondents have not imposed conditions on Petitioner’s release. If Petitioner has
been removed from Minnesota, Respondents must file a confirmation of the time, date,
and location of release, and the absence of release conditions, promptly upon Petitioner’s
arrival in Minnesota.
4. 	Respondents may not administratively recharacterize the release granted by
this Order as grounds to impose conditions or re-impose existing conditions in
conjunction with release (including release on recognizance or similar instruments),
without prior notice to and authorization from the Court, or absent a new and
independently lawful custody decision properly executed under the law. For the
avoidance of doubt, Respondents’ compliance with this Order requires Petitioner’s
immediate release in Minnesota without any newly issued instrument that either imposes
new conditions of supervision or restraint or restates previously imposed conditions. Any
such conditions imposed at the time of Petitioner’s release shall be considered null and
void as inconsistent with this paragraph.
5. 	Petitioner’s other claims are not reached.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: March 13, 2026 	s/ Jerry W. Blackwell
Time: 7:05 p.m. 	JERRY W. BLACKWELL
United States District Judge
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