Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
CARLOS E. V.,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General;
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security;
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
DAVID EASTERWOOD, Acting
Director, St. Paul Field Office,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
and ERIC TOLLEFSON, Sheriff,
Kandiyohi County,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-1618 (LMP/DJF)
ORDER
M. Boulette, Boulette Law, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner.
Anthony 	P. 	Barrows, 	United 	States 	Attorney’s 	Office, 	Minneapolis, 	MN, 	for
Respondents.
Petitioner Carlos E. V. is a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United
States in 2006. 	ECF No. 1 ¶ 14. 	Carlos E. V. was arrested by immigration officials in
Minnesota on January 30, 2026, and remains in the custody of United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). 	See id. ¶¶ 17, 25. 	He asserts that Respondents (the
“Government”) have detained him pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions of
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Id. ¶ 35. Carlos E. V. contends that he is not subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See id. He also contends that he is not subject to
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discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) because the Government has not issued
him a warrant. See id. ¶¶ 17, 35.
This Court has concluded that the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) do not apply to noncitizens similarly situated to Carlos E. V. 	See Roberto
M. F. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4456 (LMP/ECW), 2025 WL 3524455, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 9,
2025); Victor Hugo D. P. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4593 (LMP/DTS), 2025 WL 3688074, at *2–
3 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025). This Court has further held that to the extent such noncitizens
are 	detained 	pursuant 	to 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1226(a), 	the 	Government 	must 	present 	an
administrative 	warrant 	to 	justify 	their 	detention. 	See 	Joaquin 	Q. 	L. 	v. 	Bondi,
No. 26-cv-233, 2026 WL 161333, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Jan. 21, 2026); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) (stating that a noncitizen “may be arrested and detained” pending removal “[o]n
a 	warrant 	issued 	by 	the Attorney 	General”). 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	ordered 	the
Government to respond to the petition no later than March 2, 2026, and to offer any
material distinctions between this case and the cases that this Court has already decided.1
ECF No. 4.
The Government responded that this case is materially distinguishable from the
Court’s previous cases because, the Government asserts, Carlos E. V. is subject to the
mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). See generally ECF No. 5.
That provision states that the Government shall take into custody any noncitizen who “is
1 	The Government submitted a Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest dated January 30, 2026.
ECF No. 6-6.
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charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits
committing,” among other offenses, “any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury
to another person,” when the noncitizen “is released” from criminal custody. 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). A noncitizen taken into immigration custody pursuant to this provision
“must be detained without a bond hearing while their removal proceedings are pending.”
Ndiaye v. Jamison, No. 25-cv-6007, 2025 WL 3229307, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2025);
see Calderon v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-2136-LK-TLF, 2025 WL 3754042, at *4 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 29, 2025) (noting that “noncitizens who have committed one of certain listed
offenses” are “subject to mandatory detention”); Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d 265, 270
(D. Mass. 2025) (noting that “Section 1226(c) is the sole exception” to the otherwise
discretionary detention framework of Section 1226).
The Government asserts, and Carlos E. V. does not contest, that on January 29, 2026,
Carlos E. V. was arrested in South St. Paul, Minnesota, on suspicion of first-degree assault
based on reports that he stabbed someone. 	See generally ECF Nos. 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5.
Based on investigative reports the Government provided, officers recovered a pocketknife
with blood on it that matched the description Carlos E. V. gave. 	ECF No. 6-3 at 2. The
victim of the assault needed medical treatment at Region’s Hospital. ECF No. 5 at 2; ECF
No. 6-5 at 2.
Carlos E. V. was initially taken to the Dakota County Jail. ECF No. 6-2 at 2. The
very next day, on January 30, 2026, ICE agents took Carlos E. V. into custody from the
Dakota County Jail, ECF No. 6-1 at 2, and, at some point, transported him to the Kandiyohi
County Jail, ECF No. 1 ¶ 8. ECF No. 6-1 at 2. Carlos E. V. has remained in ICE custody
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while his removal proceedings are ongoing. See ECF No. 6-7; ECF No. 5 at 2. As a result,
says the Government, Carlos E. V. is “arrested for” a crime involving a “serious bodily
injury,” triggering the mandatory detention provisions of Section 1226(c). ECF No. 5 at 2.
Carlos E. V. concedes that he was “arrested for” a crime involving a “serious bodily
injury to another person.” See generally ECF No. 8; Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1. But
Carlos E. V. argues that even if Section 1226(c) justified his initial detention, it can no
longer serve as a basis for mandatory detention because a decision has been made “not to
charge him.” ECF No. 8 at 2. Indeed, the Government contacted county prosecutors (at
some point after Carlos E. V. filed this habeas petition), and they indicated the county “most
likely would not be pursuing charges, due to lack of cooperation by the injured party.” ECF
No. 5 at 3. Carlos E. V. asserts that, as a result, Section 1226(c) no longer applies because
“[i]f charges are never brought, if the case is dismissed, or if the non-citizen is acquitted,
the justification for detention ends.” 	ECF No. 8 at 2–3 (citing Helbrum v. Williams,
No. 4:25-cv-00349-SHL-SBJ, 2025 WL 2840273, at *5 (S.D. Iowa Sep. 30, 2025) (holding
that after charges are dismissed it is no longer accurate to say that a person “is charged
with” theft (present tense) and because the Petitioner’s theft charge was dismissed with
prejudice (past tense), he is not subject to mandatory detention).
But 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) requires the Government to detain a noncitizen who
“is arrested for” a qualifying offense, “without regard to whether the alien may be arrested
or imprisoned again for the same offense.” This suggests that the ultimate disposition of
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an arrest is irrelevant.2 But the Court need not even reach that issue. As other courts have
recognized, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) requires the detention of a noncitizen who “is”
(present tense) “arrested for” a qualifying offense. 	Helbrum, 2025 WL 2840273, at *5.
That status is determined at the time that a noncitizen is “take[n] into custody” by federal
immigration officials. 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1); see Selvin Adonay E. M. v. Noem,
No. 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL 3157839, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025)
(determining whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary or mandatory detention based
on his status “at the time of his arrest”).
Here, Carlos E. V. was arrested in South St. Paul and taken to the Dakota County
Jail on January 29, 2026, and on the following day taken from the Dakota County Jail and
into ICE custody. 	ECF No. 6-1 at 2; ECF No. 6-2 at 2. 	Therefore, Carlos E. V. moved
directly from criminal custody to immigration custody, so “Petitioner was remanded to
federal immigration custody, and not simply released by state authorities.” 	Calderon v.
Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00352-BAT, 2026 WL 507683, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2026).
Accordingly, at the moment that Carlos E. V. was taken into immigration custody, he “is”
2 	Indeed, that is how the Ranking Member of the statute’s committee of jurisdiction
understood the statute. 	See 171 Cong. Rec. H280 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2025) (statement of
Rep. Jamie Raskin) (noting that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) subjects to “mandatory
detention not just undocumented people who have been convicted of theft, shoplifting, and
other criminal offenses . . . but people who have been simply charged with such offenses
or arrested for such offenses, even if the charges are dropped or even if they are never filed
in the first place”). 	Congress’s “awareness of and ‘failure to heed’ the objection of the
bill’s opponents” lends support to the Government’s interpretation of the statute. Wiley v.
Fleet Farm LLC, 799 F. Supp. 3d 860, 889–90 (D. Minn. 2025) (quoting Booth v. Churner,
206 F.3d 289, 299 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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(present tense) “arrested for” an offense that subjects him to mandatory detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii).3
In sum, to determine whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) applies to Carlos E. V.,
the Court looks to his present status at the moment when he is “take[n] into [ICE] custody.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). At that point in time, Carlos E. V. had the status of a noncitizen who
“is arrested for” a crime resulting in serious bodily injury. 	See Rueda Torres v. Francis,
25 Civ. 8408 (DEH), 2025 WL 3168759, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2025) (recognizing that
mandatory detention may be appropriate under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) “immediately
following an arrest”). As a result, the Government has put forth a valid basis for subjecting
Carlos E. V. to the mandatory detention provisions of Section 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). The Court
must therefore deny his petition.4
3 	Carlos E. V. also overreads the statement provided by the Government as to the
status of the criminal proceedings. 	The Government informs the Court that a county
prosecutor stated that the county “most likely would not be pursuing charges, due to lack
of cooperation by the injured party.” 	ECF No. 5 at 3. 	That does not suggest, as Carlos
E. V. implies, that he “will not” be charged. ECF No. 8 at 3–4. At best, it implies that the
county has made an initial determination—one required within 36 hours after arrest in
Minnesota—that it will not file charges at this time. Minn. R. Crim. P. 4.02, subd. 5(1).
4 	This is not a case where Carlos E. V. is challenging whether he is inadmissible under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) or whether he is the person referenced in the South St. Paul Police
reports who is arrested for first-degree assault, which is a crime that results in death or
serious bodily injury to another person. 	This is also not a case like Helbrum, 2025 WL
2840273, at *5, where the Petitioner’s theft charge was dismissed with prejudice. 	No
charges have been brought against Carlos E. V., and it is uncertain if they ever will be.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings in this matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Carlos E. V.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF
No. 1) is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 18, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
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