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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Juan C.R.R.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION WITH
MODIFICATION AND
GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS IN PART
Civil File No. 26-01282 (MJD/DJF)
Laura Matson, Brian D. Clark, Nash Bundy Edgerton Hall, Lockridge Grindal
Nauen PLLP, Counsel for Petitioner.
David W. Fuller, David R. Hackworthy, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Counsel for Respondents.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court upon the Report and
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster dated
February 23, 2026. [Doc. 15.] Respondents filed objections to the Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”), and Petitioner responded to such objections. [Doc.
16; Doc. 17.] Pursuant to statute, the Court conducted a de novo review upon the
record. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b). Based upon that review, the
Court adopts with modification the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate
Judge Dulce J. Foster.
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I. 	Objections
A. Mandatory Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
Respondents object to the R&R’s determination that Petitioner is not
subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). As the R&R points
out, Respondents did not, by any means, fully and adequately brief the argument
that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) in
their initial response to the petition. [Doc. 15 at 4.] Yet, in their objection to the
R&R, Respondents attempt to restate that Petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) by arguing that “this case is different” from
the many cases filed interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). [Doc. 16 at 1.] The
assertion that this case is somehow “different” seems to rely on the fact that
Petitioner was paroled after entering the United States and the fact that he is
currently seeking asylum. [See Doc. 16 at 1–2.]
However, this Court, along with countless others in the District of
Minnesota, have already rejected these same arguments time and time again. See
e.g., Denis C.G. v. Pamela Bondi, et al., Civ. No. 26-cv-01202 (MJD/LIB)
(February 13, 2026 Order) (“such argument that [Petitioner’s] brief detention and
subsequent release on his own recognizance is somehow materially distinct
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based on this fact alone fails to persuade this Court.”); Mahamed C.A. v. Noem,
No. 25-CV-4551 (MJD/JFD), 2025 WL 3771299, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2025), R&R
adopted sub nom. Awaale v. Noem, No. 25-04551(MJD/JFD), 2025 WL 3754012
(D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2025) (rejecting the argument that asylum seekers are “seeking
admission” for purposes of mandatory detention under § 1225); see also Paula G.
v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-410 (JMB/DLM), 2026 WL 146003, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 20,
2026); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312, at *3
(D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025) (collecting cases). Considering this same argument has
been considered and rejected, this objection is overruled.
B. Procedural Due Process Violation
Magistrate Judge Foster determined after comprehensive analysis that
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under the 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), the Laken
Riley Act (“the Act”). [Doc. 15 at 5–8] The Act mandates detention of a noncitizen
who 1) is deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7), and 2)
who “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed,
or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any
burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer
offense, or any crime that results in death or serious injury to another person.”
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[See 8 U.S.C. 1226(c)(1)(E) (emphasis added).] Magistrate Judge Foster
considered both requirements and ultimately determined that Petitioner’s
immigration status, as well as the charges pending against him, subject him to
mandatory detention under both requirements of the Act. [See Doc. 15 at 5–8.]
While Magistrate Judge Foster determined that Petitioner’s criminal
charges subject him to mandatory detention under the Act, she ultimately
recommends the Court grant Petitioner a bond hearing because his continued
detention without such hearing violates his procedural due process rights. [Doc.
15 at 9–15.]
Respondents offer several objections to such determination. First,
Respondents object to Magistrate Judge Foster’s characterization of Petitioner as
“lawfully present in the United States.” [Doc. 16 at 2.] Second, Respondents
argue that “each of the cases cited by the [R&R] is distinguishable” from the
Petitioner’s circumstances. [Doc. 16 at 2–3.] Third, Respondents assert that the
R&R misstates Petitioner’s detention as “indefinite.” [Doc. 16 at 3.]
1. 	Petitioner’s Lawful Presence in the United States
As stated, Respondents object to the R&R’s recommendation that
Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing violates his
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constitutional right to procedural due process, in part, because Magistrate Judge
Foster erroneously determined that Petitioner is “lawfully present in the United
States.” [Doc. 15 at 9; Doc. 16 at 2.] Respondents argue that he is not lawfully
present because he is “paroled to seek asylum,” a status he has not yet achieved.
[Doc. 16 at 2.]
Respondents’ objection on this basis can be easily rejected. Petitioner here
was paroled specifically to seek asylum, a fact the Respondents admit. [See id.]
Being paroled constitutes “lawful presence” because it is effectively permission
to remain in the United States subject to certain conditions. See United States v.
Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 2019) (“parolees’ physical presence within the
United States cannot be said to be unlawful or illegal because it is authorized by
the Attorney General, and parole has long been understood to constitute lawful
status.”). Further, Petitioner was granted a work permit that does not expire
until July 2026. [Doc. 1 at 3.]
Simply put, Respondents cannot concede that Petitioner was paroled into
the United States and authorized to work through July 2026 while
simultaneously insisting that he is not lawfully present; their attempt to
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recharacterize his authorized parole as unlawful presence is unavailing and does
not undermine the R&R’s due process analysis. This objection is overruled.
2. 	The R&R’s Reliance on “Distinguishable” Cases
Respondents also take issue with the R&R’s citation to other courts that
have similarly found the Laken Riley Act (“the Act”) violates the Due Process
Clause to the extent it mandates detention based on criminal accusations as
opposed to criminal convictions. [Doc. 16 at 2–3.] The Respondents state that
“each of the cases cited by the [R&R] is distinguishable from the case here.” [Id.
at 2.]
Respondents’ objection to the R&R’s citation of other courts’ discussions of
similar due process concerns with the Act is unpersuasive. As an initial matter,
the Act is a newly enacted statute and the constitutional question presented here
appears to be one of first impression in the District of Minnesota. In that context,
it is entirely appropriate for Magistrate Judge Foster to consider how other courts
have analyzed similar due process challenges.
Respondents’ assertion that the cited cases are “distinguishable” does not
undermine the analysis. Magistrate Judge Foster’s R&R cited these decisions not
as binding precedents that are dispositive to the matter here, but as persuasive
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examples illustrating that constitutional concerns over denying bond hearings to
noncitizens who are merely charged with, but have not been convicted of, crimes
have likewise been raised elsewhere. Magistrate Judge Foster’s R&R contains an
extensive, well researched, and well-reasoned independent examination into the
governing Mathews v. Eldridge procedural due process analysis. [See Doc. 15 at
9–15 (applying the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) due process
balancing test to the facts of this case).] The discussion of other courts’ decisions
cited after this analysis was completed served only to demonstrate that the
reasoning adopted in the R&R was consistent with emerging judicial
consideration of comparable situations. [Doc. 15 at 15.] Respondents’
disagreement with the persuasive weight afforded to analogous case law without
proffering any other authority – binding or persuasive – hardly constitutes a
valid basis to reject Magistrate Judge Foster’s comprehensive analysis, review of
case law, and ultimate recommendation. [See Doc. 15 at 9–17.]
This Court shares Magistrate Judge Foster’s concern for DHS’s use of
unchecked, extensive detention authority based solely on a noncitizen’s
unproven criminal charges. Such practice is deeply troubling against the
backdrop of Operation Metro Surge, where ICE agents swept across the Twin
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Cities and beyond, levying similar charges against noncitizens and later
dismissing them. See, e.g., Longworth, N., North Minneapolis ICE shooting: DOJ
dismisses charges against Venezuelan men, Fox9 (Feb. 12, 2026),
https://www.fox9.com/news/north-minneapolis-ice-shooting-doj-dismisses-
charges-venezuelan-men-feb-12-2026. ICE’s immigration enforcement actions
have raised serious concerns about the reliability of criminal charges lodged
against noncitizens. Such actions compel the Court to closely scrutinize, and
reject where appropriate, potential detention practices that rest on “dubious
allegations.” [See Doc. 15 at 13.]
Given these concerns and the risks of unjustified deprivation of liberty, the
Court ultimately agrees with Magistrate Judge Foster and concludes that
mandatory detention violates Petitioner’s Procedural Due Process rights under
the Fifth Amendment. This objection is overruled.
3. 	Petitioner’s Detention is not “Indefinite”
Respondents also claim that the R&R misstates Petitioner’s detention as
“indefinite,” when in reality, “his detention will . . . end after final adjudication
of his [asylum] application.” [Doc. 16 at 3.]
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This objection frankly confuses the Court because it appears to conflate the
argument that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under the Act with
the argument that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention based on his
pending asylum application. To the extent that Respondents are arguing the
latter, this Court has addressed, and rejected, that argument above. To the extent
that Respondent is arguing the former, the Court remains unpersuaded.
Specifically, the Act permits mandatory detention based on the fact that
Petitioner has been charged with a crime. Therefore, as Magistrate Judge Foster
points out, such statute “would permit Respondents to keep him detained
indefinitely, even if he is acquitted of that crime or the government voluntarily
dismisses the charges.” [Doc. 15 at 14 (emphasis in original).] Accordingly,
Magistrate Judge Foster found that the Act violates the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the extent it mandates detention based solely on unproven
criminal charges. (Id. at 15 (gathering cases).) Therefore, the use of the term
“indefinite” and Magistrate Judge Foster’s reliance on its meaning is more than
appropriate under these circumstances. This objection is overruled.
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II. 	Remedy
Magistrate Judge Foster ultimately recommends Petitioner receive a bond
hearing because the “appropriate cure for [a deprivation of due process] is to
provide [Petitioner] with the process he is owed.” [Doc. 15 at 15.] This is where
the Court departs from Magistrate Judge Foster’s recommendation.
The few other cases interpreting the Act have ultimately determined that a
bond hearing was the appropriate remedy for the violation of due process. See
Doe v. Moniz, 800 F. Supp. 3d 203, 217 (D. Mass. 2025); Veletanga v. Noemi, No.
25-cv-9211 (NSR), 2025 WL 3751865, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2025); S.E. v. Noem,
No. 26-cv-00356 (DAD/SCR), 2026 WL 206085, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026); E.C.
v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01789 (RFB/BNW), 2025 WL 2916264, at *13 (D. Nev. Oct. 14,
2025). However, that remedy is not necessary here because Petitioner has
already had a bond hearing based on his criminal charges. At that hearing,
Magistrate Judge Foster determined that Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a
danger to the community. [Doc. 15 at 12.] Instead, Magistrate Judge Foster
ordered Petitioner released subject to certain conditions. See United States v.
Juan Carlos R.R., No. 25-cr-00497 (PAM/ECW) (D. Minn.) (Doc. 15).
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While Magistrate Judge Foster reiterated the decision to release Petitioner
in the R&R, Respondents have provided no indication that Petitioner’s
circumstances have materially changed since her conclusion. There is no
evidence that Petitioner, if released during the pendency of his criminal
proceeding, would suddenly present a flight risk or some great danger to the
community.
Instead, the Court finds that Petitioner has already received the very
process that other courts have deemed sufficient to remedy a procedural due
process violation. All the Court must do now is enforce the previously made
bond determination.
III. 	ORDER
Accordingly, based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED:
1. 	The Court ADOPTS with modification the Report and
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Foster dated
February 23, 2026 [Doc. 15].
2. 	The Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is
GRANTED as follows:
a. 	Respondents are ordered to arrange for the immediate release of
Petitioner into Minnesota at a safe time and in a safe place that is
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communicated at least two (2) hours in advance of Petitioner’s
counsel;
b. Respondents are ordered to immediately return all Petitioner’s
personal items that were taken from him when he was detained
in substantially the same condition as when the items were taken
during his arrest, such as his driver’s license, immigration
papers, passport, cell phone, and keys; and
c. 	Respondents are enjoined from imposing any conditions on
Petitioner’s release other than the conditions contained within his
preexisting Order Setting Conditions of Release pursuant to
United States v. Juan Carlos R.R., No. 25-cr-00497 (PAM/ECW)
(D. Minn.) (Doc. 15); and
d. Respondents are enjoined from re-detaining Petitioner under the
same statutory theory that has been rejected in this Order.
3. 	Respondents are ordered to confirm Petitioner’s release from
custody as well as the Respondents’ compliance with the rest of the
Court’s Order within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of this
Order;
4. 	Any motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access
to Justice Act must be filed within 21 days of entry of judgment in
this matter, along with a well-reasoned memorandum of authorities
explaining why an award of fees and costs is warranted.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 17, 2026 	s/Michael J. Davis
Michael J. Davis
United States District Court
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