Guevara v. Tostrud et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Peter Michael Guevara,
Plaintiff,
v.
Eric C. Tostrud, United States District
Judge, in his individual capacity; David T.
Schultz, United States Magistrate Judge,
in his individual capacity; Paul Engh,
Federal Public Defender, in his individual
capacity; Laura Provinzino, Assistant
United States Attorney, in her official
capacity; Michelle Margoles, government
actor and cooperating witness, in her
individual capacity; and Does 1-50,
inclusive
Defendants.
Case No. 25-CV-1273 (KMM/SGE)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Peter Michael Guevara was recently convicted in this District on charges
of receipt and possession of child pornography. See United States v. Guevara, No. 21-CR-
0241 (ECT/DTS) (D. Minn.). In this action, Guevara sues the judge and magistrate judge
assigned to that case, as well as the prosecutor, his defense counsel, another attorney, and
fifty John Doe defendants, alleging that each of those individuals conspired to deprive him
of his constitutional rights during the criminal proceedings. Guevara would like
compensatory damages “in excess of $10,000,000,” plus punitive damages and other
unspecified relief. (Dkt. 1 at 8.)
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Because Guevara is a prisoner, his complaint is subject to preservice review under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (“The court shall review, before docketing,
if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity.”).
On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or
dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Guevara’s complaint is plainly, obviously barred by the doctrine set forth in Heck v.
Humphrey:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that
the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence;
if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already
been invalidated.
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512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (footnote omitted). Although Heck itself states only that
claims under § 1983 that necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s detention are
foreclosed until the prisoner’s conviction or sentence is otherwise invalidated, other cases
have since made clear that the Heck bar must be applied to any claim that necessarily
implies the invalidity of a facially valid criminal judgment. Sheldon v. Hundley, 83
F.3d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Under Heck . . . we disregard the form of relief sought and
instead look to the essence of the plaintiff’s claims.”).
The essence of Guevara’s claims is that he believes the criminal proceedings against
him that culminated in a jury’s finding of guilt were conducted unlawfully. Indeed,
Guevara contends that the judge, magistrate judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, and many
others (including as many as 50 unidentifiable John Doe litigants) were each involved in a
conspiracy to “suppress [his] defense.” (Dkt. 1 at 6.) If this were true, then the validity of
Guevara’s conviction would plainly be called into doubt. But there are appropriate
procedural channels for calling a conviction into doubt—direct appeal, and should that
prove unsuccessful, a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A non-habeas civil lawsuit is not
one of those appropriate procedural channels, as Heck makes clear.
This action should therefore be dismissed without prejudice. See Gautreaux v.
Sanders, 395 F. App’x 311, 312 (8th Cir. 2010) (modifying dismissal pursuant to Heck to
be without prejudice). Guevara remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee for this
matter, which must be paid in installments over time from his prison trust account as funds
become available to him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Financial officials at the prison
where Guevara now resides should be informed of that ongoing requirement.
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RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. This matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
2. The application to proceed in forma pauperis of plaintiff Peter Michael
Guevara (Dkt. 2) be DENIED.
3. Guevara be directed to pay the unpaid balance ($350.00) of the statutory
filing fee for this action in the manner prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2),
and the Clerk of Court be directed to provide notice of this requirement to
the authorities at the institution where Guevara is confined.
Dated: February 17, 2026 s/Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set
forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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