Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Jorge H.C.F.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the
United States; Kristi Noem, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and David Easterwood,
Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-1111 (DWF/SGE)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jorge H.C.F.’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus (the “Petition”). (Doc. No. 1.) Respondents filed a response seeking
dismissal or transfer and, alternatively, asserting authority to detain Petitioner under
8 U.S.C. § 1225. (Doc. No. 4.) Petitioner then filed a motion for contempt. (Doc.
No. 5.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Petition, orders Respondents
to release Petitioner immediately, denies the motion to dismiss or transfer, and denies as
moot the motion for contempt.
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela and a resident of Fridley, Minnesota. (Doc.
No. 1 ¶ 11.) He entered the United States on November 5, 2023. (Id.) He has a six-year-
old daughter and a pregnant wife. (Id. ¶ 2.)
Shortly after entering the United States, Petitioner was encountered by United
States Border Patrol agents and detained. (Id.; Doc. No. 4 at 2; Doc. No. 4-1.) He was
issued a Notice to Appear and released on recognizance under an Order of Release on
Recognizance (“OREC”). (Doc. No. 4 at 2.) Notably, OREC forms are used for release
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. See Order of Release on Recognizance, U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention/checkin/I_220A_OREC.pdf (last visited
Feb. 10, 2026). Upon release, Petitioner entered the Intensive Supervision Appearance
Program (“ISAP”). (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 11.) ISAP requires bi-weekly check-ins and location
tracking via an ankle monitor, among other requirements. (Id.) Petitioner has complied
with all conditions of the ISAP, except for one missed phone call. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 11.)
Petitioner also has a pending application for asylum. (Id.; Doc. No. 4 at 2.)
On February 4, 2026, Petitioner was detained at one of his regular ISAP check-in
meetings. (Doc. No. 4 at 2; Doc. No. 1 ¶ 11.) He was first taken to an U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detention center at Fort Snelling in Minnesota. (Doc.
No. 1 ¶ 18.) That same day, he was transferred to an ICE detention facility in El Paso,
Texas. (Doc. No. 4 at 3.) On February 5, 2026, Petitioner’s counsel attempted to locate
Petitioner, but the ICE locator did not yield any results. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 18.) On
February 7, 2026, Petitioner was booked into an ICE processing center in Pearsall, Texas.
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(Doc. No. 4 at 3.) As of February 10, 2026, Petitioner has been moved back to
Minnesota and remains in ICE custody at Sherburne County Jail. 1 Online Detainee
Locator System, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search (last
visited Feb. 10, 2026).
Petitioner filed the Petition on February 5, 2026. (Doc. No. 1 at 17.) Petitioner
claims that his detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. (Id. ¶¶ 42-60.)
Petitioner asks the Court to order his immediate release, or alternatively, order
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven
days. (Id. at 16.) Respondents filed a response seeking dismissal or transfer and,
alternatively, asserting authority to detain Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.2 (Doc.
No. 4.)
1 	On February 6, 2026, the Court enjoined Respondents from moving Petitioner
from this District and ordered Respondents to immediately return Petitioner to Minnesota
if he had already been moved. (Doc. No. 3.) Respondents violated that Order by failing
to return Petitioner to Minnesota and instead moving Petitioner to a different location in
Texas. In response to that violation, Petitioner filed a motion for contempt. (Doc. No. 5.)
However, Respondents have since remedied that violation by returning Petitioner to
Minnesota. The Court therefore denies the motion for contempt as moot.
2 	Respondents filed this response shortly after the deadline. (See Doc. No. 4 at 1.)
The Court excuses the fifty-one-minute delay due to Counsel’s family emergency.
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Dismiss or Transfer
As a threshold matter, Respondents challenge the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the
Petition. (Doc. No. 4 at 3-4.) They ask the Court to either dismiss the Petition or transfer
the matter to the Northern District of Texas. (Id.) The motion to dismiss or transfer is
denied.
Generally, jurisdiction over a habeas petition lies only in the district of
confinement. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). However, “[w]hen . . . a
prisoner is held in an undisclosed location by an unknown custodian, it is impossible to
apply the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules.” Id. at 450 n.18. At the
time of filing, Petitioner’s counsel attempted to locate Petitioner using ICE’s online
detainee locator system, but the locator did not yield any results. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 18.) The
exception therefore applies because Petitioner’s location was unknown. Further, now
that Respondents have returned Petitioner to Minnesota, this District is the district of
confinement. For both of these reasons, the Court has jurisdiction over the Petition.
II. 	Merits of the Petition
A district court may provide habeas relief to a person who is being detained in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). That
authority includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896,
900-01 (D. Minn. 2020). The burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a
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preponderance of the evidence. See Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149,
1154 (D. Minn. 2025).
Respondents assert that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225,
arguing that he is an “applicant for admission” because he was encountered and detained
shortly after unlawfully entering the United States. (Doc. No. 4 at 4-6.) Section 1225
applies to “applicants for admission”—noncitizens who are either “present in the United
States who ha[ve] not been admitted or who arrive[] in the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1). Section 1226 applies where § 1225 is inapplicable and provides
immigration judges with the discretion to grant release on bond to noncitizens subject to
removal proceedings. See id. § 1226(a). As this Court has explained in previous cases,
under the plain language of the statute, a person apprehended after already being present
in the United States is properly detained under § 1226. See, e.g., Jose L.M.S. v. Bondi,
No. 26-cv-474, 2026 WL 185066, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2026); Victor S.M. v. Noem,
No. 26-cv-400, 2026 WL 161445, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 21, 2026). Here, Petitioner is not
an arriving noncitizen because he has been in the United States for over two years. See
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). Petitioner is subject to the
discretionary bond provisions of § 1226(a), not the mandatory bond provisions of
§ 1225(b)(2).
Respondents seem to suggest that Petitioner is subject to § 1225 because he was
previously detained near the border shortly after his arrival. However, Respondents do
not explain how that encounter is relevant here. Petitioner was released from detention
after that initial encounter and his February 2026 detention is an entirely separate event.
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Further, Respondents fail to address the impact of his prior release under § 1226.
Respondents do not show that Petitioner’s OREC was revoked or that there was any
change in circumstances that would warrant its revocation. Sections 1225 and 1226 are
meant to address different populations, they are not interchangeable. See Adriana
M.Y.M. v. Easterwood, No. 26-cv-213, 2026 WL 184721, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 24, 2026)
(citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 285-90).
Lastly, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s pending asylum application warrants
categorization as an applicant for admission because he is seeking admission through
asylum. (Doc. No. 4 at 6.) The Court has already considered and rejected this argument.
Omar E.F.G. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-451, 2026 WL 184571, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2026).
The fact that a petitioner is an applicant for asylum does not change the Court’s § 1225
analysis.
Having found that Petitioner is being detained unlawfully, the question becomes
the correct remedy. A detainee being held pursuant to § 1226(a) must have been served
an arrest warrant prior to detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also Ahmed M. v. Bondi,
No. 25-cv-4711, 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (collecting cases). There
is no evidence that Respondents had a warrant to arrest Petitioner. And after being given
the opportunity to explain the true cause of Petitioner’s detention and provide documents
of such (see Doc. No. 3), Respondents did not do so, (see Doc. No. 4). The Court
therefore concludes that Petitioner was arrested without a warrant. The remedy for a
warrantless arrest is immediate release. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)
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(“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention. The typical remedy for
such detention is, of course, release.” (citation omitted)).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1. 	Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. [1]) is
GRANTED.
2. 	The Court DECLARES that Petitioner’s current detention is unlawful
under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
3. 	Respondents’ motion to dismiss or transfer (Doc. No. [4]) is DENIED.
4. 	Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody
immediately, subject only to the conditions of his prior Order of Release on
Recognizance.
5. 	Within three (3) days of the date of this Order, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update confirming Petitioner’s release.
6. 	Respondents are directed to release Petitioner:
a. 	In Minnesota;
b. 	With all personal documents and belongings, such as his driver’s
license, passport, other immigration documents, and cell phone;
c. 	Without any new conditions on release, including but not limited to
requiring Petitioner to sign a new “Order of Release on Recognizance” or
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requiring Petitioner to enroll and complete an “Alternatives to Detention”
program;
d. 	Without any tracking devices; and
e. 	With all clothing and outerwear he was wearing at the time of
detention, or other proper winter attire.
7. 	Respondents shall provide reasonable advance notice to counsel to arrange
for a safe release of Petitioner.
8. 	Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under this same
statutory theory, absent materially changed circumstances.
9. 	Petitioner’s motion for contempt (Doc. No. [5]) is DENIED AS MOOT.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 10, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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