Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Jaime D.B., 	Case No. 26-cv-891 (MJD/DTS)
Petitioner,
v. 	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
David Easterwood, et al.,
Respondents.
Introduction
After being detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Petitioner
Jaime D.B. petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Jaime D.B.
alleges that his detention notwithstanding an unrevoked grant of deferred action violates
his procedural and substantive Fifth Amendment due-process rights. He also claims that
his warrantless arrest was unlawful. For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends
granting the petition.
Background
Petitioner Jaime D.B. is an El Salvadorian citizen who has resided in the United
States since 2015. Pet. ¶¶ 4, 33–34, Dkt. No. 1. In 2016, his wife was the victim of a
felonious assault. Id. ¶ 35. The Burnsville City Attorney signed a certification attesting to
the fact that Jaime D.B.’s wife and her family helped in the investigation. Id. ¶ 36. In
November 2018, the family applied for a U Visa, an application which remains pending to
CASE 0:26-cv-00891-MJD-DTS Doc. 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 1 of 7

2
this day. Id.1 In November 2023, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
granted deferred action for Jaime D.B. and his family. Id. ¶ 37. Jaime D.B. then applied
for and received employment authorization, which remains valid through November 15,
2027. Id. ¶ 39. Jaime D.B. was taken into custody outside his home on January 30, 2026.
Id. ¶ 40. Nothing in the record indicates that USCIS has revoked Jaime D.B.’s grant of
deferred action.
Jaime D.B. challenges his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. ¶ 17. In Count I,
Jaime D.B. claims that his detention notwithstanding the grant of deferred action violates
the due process protections of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 42–52. In Count II, Jaime D.B.
argues that his detention violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Id. ¶¶ 53–60.
In Count III, Jaime D.B. contends that his detention and warrantless arrest violate the
Fourth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). Id. ¶¶ 61–69.
Analysis
I. 	Legal Standard
“A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to any person who demonstrates
he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Aditya W. H.
v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). The
right to file a writ of habeas corpus “extends to those persons challenging the lawfulness
of immigration-related detention.” Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01
(D. Minn. 2020). “The burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a
1 A thorough summary of the U-visa legal framework can be found in Domingo M.M. v.
Shea. Order Dismissing Habeas Petition, Domingo M.M. v. Shea, No. 25-cv-2830
(D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2025), Dkt. No. 24 at 2–5. That framework is incorporated by reference.
CASE 0:26-cv-00891-MJD-DTS Doc. 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 2 of 7

3
preponderance of the evidence.” Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3051, 2025 WL
2466670, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W. H., 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
II. 	Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction refers to the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a
case. Thigulla v. Jaddou, 94 F.4th 770, 773 (8th Cir. 2024) “[J]urisdiction is a threshold
question” that must be answered before the Court reaches the merits. Ginters v. Frazier,
614 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2010). Although the Government did not raise a jurisdictional
challenge in its response to Jaime D.B.’s habeas petition, this Court must raise the issue
sua sponte. Thigulla, 94 F.4th at 773.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause
or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against
any alien under this chapter.” In Domingo M.M. v. Shea, a court in this District concluded
that § 1252(g) deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear a similar habeas petition because
“[n]o matter how [petitioner] frames it, his challenge is to the Secretary of Homeland
Security’s exercise of her discretion to execute his removal order, which this Court lacks
jurisdiction to review.” Order Dismissing Habeas Petition, Domingo M.M. v. Shea, No. 25-
cv-2830 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2025), Dkt. No. 24 at 21. This case is different because there
is no evidence in the record that Jaime D.B. is subject to a removal order.2 Jaime D.B.
2 The Court directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on this issue. Jaime D.B.
responded that “he has not been served with a warrant for his arrest or a removal order
confirming that he is being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).” Dkt. No. 9 at 2.
Moreover, “the initiation of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) and the
allegations made in the NTA indicate that he is in fact not being detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6).” Id. at 3. The Government failed to respond. See generally Docket.
CASE 0:26-cv-00891-MJD-DTS Doc. 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 3 of 7

4
cannot be challenging the Government’s decision to execute a removal order if there is
no removal order. See Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968–69 (D. Minn.
2025).
III. 	Merits
Therefore, the Court proceeds to the merits. The fighting issue here is whether the
Government can detain and deport Jaime D.B. notwithstanding an unrevoked grant of
deferred action. The Court agrees with “an ever-growing number of district courts across
the country . . . that an unrevoked grant of deferred action prevents removal.” Victor G. v.
Lyons, No. 26-cv-119, 2026 WL 127733, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026) (quoting Nevarez
Jurado v. Freden, No. 25-cv-943, 2025 WL 3687264, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2025));
see also Marcos L. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-676, 2026 WL 327953 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2026),
R. & R. adopted by 2026 WL 331418 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2026). As the court explained in
Victor G.,
While it is true that a petitioner “may be removed from the
waiting 	list, 	and 	the 	deferred 	action 	or 	parole 	may 	be
terminated 	at 	the 	discretion 	of 	USCIS.” 8 	C.F.R. 	§
214.14(d)(3), Respondents here have not provided any legal
authority to support that Victor’s arrest in an immigration
sweep was an act of their discretion on Victor’s U-visa
application or deferred action, nor have they provided any
facts supporting that any circumstances have changed since
less than two months ago when he was granted deferred
action. Respondents provide no facts indicating that Victor’s
employment authorization was revoked, that his deferred
action was terminated, or that a determination was made that
the employment authorization or deferred action were “no
longer warranted or were granted in error.” See ECF No. 1-1
at 8 (notifying Victor that USCIS “reserve[d] the right to revoke
[his] employment authorization and terminate the grant of
deferred action at any time if it determines they are no longer
warranted or were granted in error.”). . . . There are simply no
factual 	allegations 	to 	support 	that 	Respondents 	revoked
CASE 0:26-cv-00891-MJD-DTS Doc. 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 4 of 7

5
Victor’s 	deferred 	action, 	and 	as 	such, 	no 	basis 	for 	his
detention.
Victor G. v. Lyons, 2026 WL 127733, at *2. Here, as in Victor G. and Marcos L., the
Government has provided no facts indicating that Jaime D.B.’s grant of deferred action
was terminated. See generally Dkt. No. 6. Although no doubt the Government has broad
discretion to revoke a grant of deferred action—after all, deferred action is nothing more
than an act of prosecutorial discretion—it nonetheless must actually revoke said grant
before detaining and removing a noncitizen.3 Victor G. v. Lyons, 2026 WL 127733, at *2;
Marcos L., 2026 WL 327953, at *3.
The Government also failed to respond to Jaime D.B.’s claim that his warrantless
arrest was unlawful, see generally Dkt. No. 6, a claim that is far from frivolous, See, e.g.,
A.B.D. 	v. 	Wamsley, 	No. 	6:25-cv-02014, 	2026 	WL 	178306, 	at 	*11–13
(D. Or. Jan. 22, 2026) (granting a habeas petition because the Government unlawfully
arrested a noncitizen without a warrant). Cf. Escobar Molina v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 25-cv-3417, 2025 WL 3465518, at *13 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2025) (“Generally,
officers making civil immigration arrests must have an administrative warrant.”). By failing
to respond, the Government waived any challenge to this claim. See Juan M. v. Bondi,
No. 26-cv-266, 2026 WL 129059, at *1–2 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026). Jaime D.B.’s unlawful,
warrantless arrest thus provides an alternative basis to grant his habeas petition.
3 There is reason to believe that the Government’s discretion to revoke a grant of deferred
action, although broad, is not entirely unfettered. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents
of the Univ. of California, 591 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2020) (rejecting the argument that Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals was unreviewable because it was committed to the
Government’s absolute discretion).
CASE 0:26-cv-00891-MJD-DTS Doc. 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 5 of 7

6
What remains is deciding the appropriate remedy. Victor G. and Marcos L. both
found release to be the appropriate remedy, reasoning that the USCIS had already
determined that the petitioner did not pose a public safety risk by virtue of its Bona Fide
Determination and grant of deferred action. Victor G., 2026 WL 127733, at *3; Marcos L.,
2026 WL 327953, at *3. The Court agrees and recommends that the Government be
ordered to release Jaime D.B.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS THAT:
1. 	Petitioner Jaime D.B.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. No. 1) be
GRANTED;
2. 	The Government be ordered to immediately released from detention into
Minnesota, and that the Government be ordered to return any documents, property, or
effects seized during his arrest;
3. 	The Government be ordered to provide a status report to the Court within
three days; and
4. 	Jaime D.B. be permitted to move separately within 30 days of final judgment
in this action to recover attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
Dated: February 25, 2026 	s/ David T. Schultz_____________
DAVID T. SCHULTZ
United States Magistrate Judge
CASE 0:26-cv-00891-MJD-DTS Doc. 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 6 of 7

7
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court. It is not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under the circumstances of this case and Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), the parties may file and
serve specific written objections to this magistrate judge’s proposed findings and
recommendations within 3 days of the filing of the Report and Recommendation. A party
may respond to those objections within 3 days after being served a copy of the objections
without regard to weekends or holidays. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and
responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
CASE 0:26-cv-00891-MJD-DTS Doc. 12 Filed 02/25/26 Page 7 of 7