Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Nelson G.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Daren K.
Margolin, Director for Executive Office for
Immigration Review; Executive Office for
Immigration Review; Kristi Noem,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Department of Homeland Security;
Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
David Easterwood, Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and Joel Brott, Sheriff of
Sherburne County Jail,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-851 (ECT/DJF)
OPINION AND ORDER
Luke 	Grundman 	and 	Michelle 	Monserrat 	Gonzalez, 	Mid-Minnesota 	Legal 	Aid,
Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner Nelson G.
Ana H. Voss and Trevor Brown, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for
Respondents Pamela Bondi, Daren K. Margolin, Executive Office for Immigration
Review, Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security, Todd M. Lyons, and David
Easterwood.
Petitioner Nelson G. is an Ecuadorian citizen who entered the United States without
inspection on or about July 28, 2023. Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 9, 38–39. Nelson “entered the
United States and encountered Customs and Border Patrol,” and he “was detained for
approximately two weeks and released on his own recognizance ‘in accordance with
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Section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.’” 	Id. ¶ 40; see ECF Nos. 2-1, 2-2.
The Department of Homeland Security “placed [Nelson] in removal proceedings pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.” Pet. ¶ 10. On February 23, 2024, Nelson “filed an application for
asylum.” 	Id. ¶ 41. 	“On August 21, 2024, Respondents issued [Nelson] a work
authorization card, which is valid until August 20, 2029.” 	Id. 	On December 5, 2025,
Nelson “was detained by immigration authorities . . . without an administrative arrest
warrant.” Id. ¶ 9; see id. ¶ 46 (“Respondents provided no warrant for his arrest.”). Nelson
is “presently held in ICE custody in Sherburne County Jail in Elk River, Minnesota.” Id.
¶ 48; see also id. ¶¶ 22, 24. 	Nelson “has no criminal convictions of the sort that would
subject him to mandatory custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).” Id. ¶ 44. Respondents1 do
not dispute the Petition’s facts. See ECF No. 5 at 2, 7.
Nelson challenges his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. ¶ 18. 	He claims he
has been wrongly classified as a § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is mandatory)
rather than a § 1226(a) detainee (whose detention is discretionary and who is entitled to a
bond hearing). 	Pet. ¶¶ 50–75; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961–62
(D. Minn. 2025) (explaining legal framework). According to Nelson, that misclassification
and denial of a bond hearing violate his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment
and the Immigration and Nationality Act and its implementing regulations. See Pet. ¶¶ 91–
117. Nelson seeks a declaration that his detention absent a bond hearing violates the Due
1 	When used in this Order, “Respondents” refers to the federal officials named as
Respondents. 	Respondent Joel Brott, the Sherburne County Sheriff, has not appeared in
these proceedings. See Dkt.
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Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; issuance of a writ of habeas corpus requiring his
release unless Respondents provide a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); issuance of
an order restraining Respondents from moving him out of this District during the pendency
of his Petition; attorneys’ fees and costs; and “all further relief this Court deems just and
proper.” Pet. at 30–31.
Acknowledging that the Petition “raise[s] legal and factual issue similar to those in
prior habeas petitions that this Court has decided,” Respondents argue that Nelson’s
Petition fails on the merits for the same reasons set forth in the appeal of Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-cv-3741 (JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal docketed,
No. 25-3248 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025). See ECF No. 5 at 7. This raises an issue of statutory
interpretation2 that courts in this District have repeatedly considered and rejected, and it
will be rejected here as well.
Nelson has shown he has been misclassified under § 1225(b)(2) rather than
§ 1226(a). 	As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants “seeking
admission,” and the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c));
see Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn. 2025); Belsai D.S. v.
Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6–7 (D.
2 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Nelson’s Petition, consistent with previous rulings on this issue, I find that the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not apply to “the narrow
question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226
or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” 	Fernando F.P.D. v. Brott, No. 25-cv-4455
(ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) (citing cases).
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Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF),
2025 WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-
3248 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025
WL 3146312, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem, 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS),
2025 WL 3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-
4264 (PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2025). As of this writing,
only one federal court of appeals has ruled on the question, and it reached the same
conclusion. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, (7th Cir.
2025). Nelson has lived in the United States for more than two years. See Pet. ¶ 39. His
detention falls under § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2).3
The final issue is the appropriate remedy. 	Section 1226 provides that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to
justify 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Chogllo 	Chafla 	v.
Scott, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-cv-00437, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (D. Me. Sep. 21,
2025), appeal filed (Nov. 7, 2025). 	“[I]t follows that absent a warrant a noncitizen may
not be arrested and detained under section 1226(a).” 	Id. (emphasis in original); accord
Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-00479, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me.
3 	Respondents do not argue that Nelson is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), or that any other statutory scheme other than that raised in the Petition
would apply to Nelson’s detention. See ECF No. 5; see also Pet. ¶ 37 (“Petitioner entered
the United S[t]ates without inspection and is not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.”).
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Sep. 30, 2025); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354, 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); see also Florida v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D.
Fla. 2023) (stating § 1226 “is not even triggered unless an arrest warrant is issued” and that
“[i]f [an] alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then the subsequent provisions giving
the Attorney General discretion to detain or release ‘the arrested alien’ are likewise not
triggered”), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir. July 11, 2023). Here, Nelson
alleges that he was arrested without a warrant. Pet. ¶¶ 2, 9, 46. Respondents were ordered
to include in their answer “[w]hether the absence of a warrant preceding [Nelson’s] arrest
necessitates [Nelson’s] immediate release.” 	See ECF No. 4 at 2. 	Respondents have not
produced a warrant, nor have they advanced any specific argument that Nelson’s release is
an unwarranted remedy. 	See ECF No. 5 at 7 (acknowledging that “many judges in this
District conclude the absence of a warrant preceding a petitioner’s arrest necessitates
immediate release”).
“[R]elease is an available and appropriate remedy” for “detention that lacks a lawful
predicate.” 	Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Vedat C. v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS) (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 9 (citing Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)). 	“Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a
valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through
further proceedings.” 	Id.; see Chogllo Chafla, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2688541, at
*11 (“Since the Government did not comply with the plain language of section 1226(a),
[petitioners’] immediate release is justified.”); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (same);
Chiliquinga Yumbillo, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (reaching same conclusion); see also
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Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693 (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.
The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” (citation modified)).4
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner Nelson G.’s Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, but
not later than 48 hours after entry of this Order.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 2, 2026, at 9:40 a.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
4 	The resolution of this statutory-interpretation question in Nelson’s favor makes it
unnecessary to address the Petition’s remaining grounds, including Nelson’s assertion that
he is entitled to release as a “bond class member certified in Maldonado Bautista v.
Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM (C.D. Cal.).” See Pet. ¶¶ 4, 13.
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