Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Melvi Alexander Mata Guevara,
Petitioner,
vs.
David Easterwood, Field Office Director of
Enforcement 	and 	Removal 	Operations, 	St.
Paul Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 0:26-cv-00789-DMT-LIB
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
INTRODUCTION
[¶ 1] 	THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
a Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking immediate release of Petitioner filed on January 28,
2026. Doc. No. 3. The Court ordered additional briefing and the Petitioner responded on January
30, 2026. Doc. Nos. 7–8. Respondents did not file a response. Petitioner asserts that because the
executive branch has enforced removal proceedings such as his under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the
current administration’s enforcement of removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) is
unlawful and violates his due process rights.
[¶ 2] 	Petitioner is a 36-year-old citizen of El Salvador. He entered the United States without
inspection at the border in June 2009. He was issued a Notice to Appear before an immigration
judge on August 4, 2020. Doc. No. 1-1. Petitioner received a judgment in April 24, 2024, ordering
him to be removed to El Salvador. Doc. No. 1-2. Petitioner filed an appeal on May 22, 2024. Doc.
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No. 1-3. This appeal is pending at the Board of Immigration Appeals. He currently resides in
Rosemont, Minnesota and is the father of three children. He has no criminal convictions subjecting
him to mandatory detention under § 1226. On January 28, 2026, he was arrested by federal agents
and is currently detained in Fort Snelling, MN in ICE custody.
[¶ 3] 	As discussed in more detail below, the Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction are DENIED.
DISCUSSION
[¶ 4] 	The purpose of temporary restraining orders is to preserve the status quo pending a hearing.
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438–39 (1974); Carroll v. Princess Anne,
393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968). Rule 65(b) governs injunctions and restraining orders and directs the
Court to look at the specific facts shown by sworn testimony to determine whether immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant. In addition, the Court is required to
balance the factors set forth in Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir.
1981): (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) threat of irreparable harm, (3) balance of harms
between the Petitioner and other parties, and (4) the public interest. See also Heartland Acad.
Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 335 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2003).
I. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
[¶ 5] 	The likelihood of success on the merits is “the most important” factor when determining
whether to issue injunctive relief. Craig v. Simon, 980 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Adams, 151 F.3d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiffs must show a “fair
chance” of succeeding when the case is fully heard. Eggers v. Evnen, 48 F.4th 561, 565 (8th Cir.
2022).
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[¶ 6] 	Petitioner argues he is likely to succeed on the merits of his habeas petition because his
detention does not reasonably relate to the purpose of his detainment, which also prohibited as
punitive. The Court disagrees with Petitioner.
[¶ 7] 	The Court looks to the plain language of the statute to determine whether Petitioner’s
detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) is appropriate. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
340 (1997). The first question is whether Petitioner fits into the presumption of being an “applicant
for admission” under § 1225(a)(1), which provides, “An alien present in the United States who
has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall be deemed for purposes of
this chapter an applicant for admission.” (emphasis added). In this context, “admission”
specifically means lawful entry, not just presence in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).
Accordingly, “[a]n alien can have physically entered the country many years before and still be an
applicant for lawful entry, seeking legal “admission.” Mejia Olalde v. Noem, Case No. 1:25-cv-
001680JMD, 2025 WL 3131942, at *3 (E.D. Miss. 2025). Petitioner meets these criteria. It is
undisputed that he is present in the United States. It is also undisputed that at this time that he has
not been lawfully admitted into the United States. No authorization was given for him to stay in
the country during the pendency of his appeal. See Doc. Nos. 8-1–8-4. And it is undisputed that
he is seeking admission by appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Therefore, he is an
applicant for admission for purposes of § 1225(b)(2).
[¶ 8] 	This does not end the analysis. Aliens who are applicants for admission “shall be detained”
when the “examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly
and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The statute does not limit an
examining officer to those working at the actual border of the United States. Limiting § 1225’s
application to the border alone, as Petitioner asks, would frustrate the purpose of § 1225(b)(2)
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because it expressly applies to those already present in the United States who have not been
admitted. The Court cannot ignore the plain language of the statute.
[¶ 9] 	Additionally, the structure of § 1225 illustrates that “Congress knows how to limit the
scope of the text geographically and temporally when it wants to.” Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL
3131942, at *3. For example, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) applies to an alien “who is arriving in the United
States.” In contrast, § 1225(b)(2) has no similar language limiting applicability only to aliens who
are in the process of “arriving.” Likewise, § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) applies to an alien who cannot show
he has been physically in the United States “continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior.”
Again, § 1225(b)(2) does not include a time limit. If Congress wished to impose similar geographic
and temporal restrictions on the category of aliens that fall under § 1225(b)(2), it could have done
so. The Court will not impose these restrictions where Congress has failed to do so.
[¶ 10] As for the application of § 1226, the Court is not persuaded that it applies to the Petitioner’s
circumstances. Under § 1226(a), “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.” That section further provides the Attorney General discretion to hold the alien, release on
bond, or conditionally parole them. Id. at § 1226(a)(1)–(2). This is a broader rule than § 1225 and
seemingly would cover the Petitioner. However, the crux of Petitioner’s argument lies in where
Petitioner was arrested. He claims his arrest in the interior of the country automatically places him
in the bounds of § 1226. But, as noted, nothing in § 1225 prohibits immigration authorities from
detaining aliens who are already present in the United States without having previously been
admitted in the interior of the country.
[¶ 11] The Court is aware the vast majority of courts who have ruled on this issue have come out
the other way. See e.g., Coronado, 2025 WL 3628229, at *7 (noting more than 700 decisions
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addressing this issue with some courts characterizing the “overwhelming majority” of decisions
holding § 1226 applies). “But even if so, the overwhelming majority of district courts sometimes
get the law very wrong.” Mejia Olalde, 2025 WL 3131942, at *1 (citing Trump v. CASA, Inc.,
606 U.S. 831, 840 (2025) (universal injunctions are beyond a district court’s equitable authority
despite widespread use in the lower courts)). Indeed, this Court is not alone in its interpretation of
this issue and believes the other line of cases to be more persuasive. See id.; Coronado, 2025 WL
3628229; Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 802 F.Supp.3d 1132 (D. Neb. 2025). The Court is also aware
that the federal government has operated under the Petitioner’s reasoning for decades. However,
someone does not suddenly become right simply because they have held onto a wrong belief for a
very long time.
[¶ 12] Further analysis on the likelihood of success on the merits at this preliminary stage is
unnecessary because the plain language of § 1225(b)(2) clearly covers Petitioner’s arrest and
detention. This factor, therefore, weighs against issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a
Preliminary Injunction.
II. 	Threat of Irreparable Injury
[¶ 13] The next factor is whether Petitioner has a threat of irreparable injury. Depriving an alien’s
liberty has been considered an irreparable harm. See Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs,
697 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 2012). Where an individual is detained without due process, courts
tend to presume irreparable harm. See Torres-Jurado v. Biden, Case No. 19 Civ. 3595 (AT), 2023
WL 7130898, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2023).
[¶ 14] Petitioner contends he suffers an irreparable injury because he has been detained without
due process. Certainly, the Court agrees loss of liberty may be an irreparable harm. The Court also
agrees that absent due process, there is truly an irreparable injury. The problem with this case, as
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the Court has concluded, Petitioner is not likely to succeed on his claim he is being held on an
incorrect application of § 1225(b)(2). As noted, § 1225(b)(2) squarely governs his immediate
detention. Therefore, he is not being detained absent due process because he is being detained
pursuant to lawful statute promulgated by Congress. The Supreme Court addressed a similar
situation in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), and concluded that mandatory detention pending
removal proceedings does not violate due process. The Demore detainee argued, since deportation
proceedings are indefinite, the indefinite detention violates the Due Process Clause. Id. However,
the Court rejected that premise, holding that “detention under § 1226(c) has a definitive end-
point—the end of the removal proceedings—and thus a noncitizen is not subject to indefinite
detention.” Coronado, 2025 WL 3628229, at *12 (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 529). Thus,
Petitioner’s due process claim “must fail [and] [d]etention during removal proceedings is a
constitutionally permissible part of the process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 531. Thus, the threat of
irreparable injury weighs against issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Preliminary
Injunction.
III. 	Balance of Harms and Public Interest
[¶ 15] “Once the court has determined that there is a threat of irreparable harm to the moving
party, it must balance this harm with any injury an injunction would inflict on other interested
parties.” Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 826 F.3d 1030, 1039
(8th Cir. 2016). “For the court to grant an injunction, the moving party must establish that the entry
of the relief would serve public interest.” North Dakota v. E.P.A., 127 F.Supp.3d 1047, 1059
(D.N.D. 2015). When someone’s constitutional rights are being violated, the public interest is
served in enjoining such constitutional violations. See Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly
Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 2012).
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[¶ 16] The balance of harms and public interest weigh against issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order. The Petitioner is harmed by being incarcerated during the pendency of his
removal proceedings. But, as described above, immigration authorities correctly applied §
1225(b)(2) in detaining him and holding Petitioner without bond. It cannot be said he is being
detained unlawfully or that his constitutional rights are being violated. The harm to the executive
branch is greater if the Court were to hamstring its ability to effectuate the will of Congress and
increase the chances of deportable aliens fleeing prior to or during removal proceedings. See
Demore, 538 U.S. at 512 (holding that “detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing
deportable aliens from fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the
chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully removed”). Likewise, the executive
has a strong interest being able to enforce the laws of the United States absent micro-managing by
the judicial branch. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (noting that the
executive’s “most important constitutional duty” is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” (quoting U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3)) As such, these factors weigh against issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order or a Preliminary Injunction.
CONCLUSION
[¶ 17] It is a sorrowful conclusion to require an otherwise law-abiding man be detained and kept
from his family. But the law requires his detention without bond under the circumstances presented
in this case. The executive branch must be permitted sufficient flexibility to ensure our nation’s
borders are secure and to have enough authority to conduct thorough inspections and removals.
The Court’s role in all of this is simply to determine what the law is within the bounds of our
constitutional structure.
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[¶ 18] Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction are DENIED. He shall remain in custody
during the pendency of this litigation. As previously ordered, the Respondents shall keep the
Petitioner detained within the District of Minnesota until further order from this Court.
[¶ 19] IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED February 3, 2026.
Daniel M. Traynor, District Judge
United States District Court
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