Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Paula G.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as
Attorney General; Kristi Noem, in her
official capacity as Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Todd
Lyons, in his official capacity as Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and David Easterwood, in his
official capacity as Acting Director, St. Paul
Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
File No. 26-CV-410 (JMB/DLM)
ORDER
Graham Blair Ojala-Barbour, Ojala-Barbour Law Firm, MN, for Paula G.
Trevor Brown and Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for
Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd Lyons, and David Easterwood.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Paula G.’s1 Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus 	(“Petition”) 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 2241. 	(Doc. 	No. 	1 	[hereinafter, 	“Pet.”].)
Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and David Easterwood
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in immigration cases.
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(together, “Respondents”) are named in the Petition. For the reasons explained below, the
Court grants the Petition and orders Paula G.’s immediate release.
FINDINGS OF FACT2
1. 	Paula G. is a citizen of Colombia who entered the United States without
inspection on December 13, 2022. (Pet. ¶¶ 1, 15.)
2. 	After she entered the United States, Paula G. was arrested by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and was, shortly thereafter, released and granted parole under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), also referred to as Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212.
(Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 29.) Her parole was valid until February 21, 2023. (Id. ¶ 3.)
3. 	Paula G. is seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the Convention Against Torture and filed the relevant application on January 28, 2025. (Id.
¶¶ 1–2, 5.)
4. 	Paula G. has never been arrested for or charged with a criminal offense and
has no pending charges or criminal convictions. (Id. ¶ 31.)
5. 	She has appeared at all appointments required by ICE to date. (Id. ¶ 5.)
6. 	Respondents re-detained Paula G. on or about January 17, 2026. (Id. ¶ 15.)
7. 	On January 17, 2026, Paula G. filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet.) At the time the Petition was filed, she was detained
2 Because Respondents did not contest any of the factual allegations in the Petition, these
allegations are deemed admitted. 	See, e.g., Bland v. California Dep’t of Corr., 20 F.3d
1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994) (“When the State’s return fails to dispute the factual allegations
contained in the petition and traverse, it essentially admits those allegations.”), overruled
on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000).
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in Fort Snelling, Minnesota. 	(Id. ¶ 15.) 	She seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a
bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Id. at 20.)
DISCUSSION
Respondents generally oppose Paula G.’s Petition, explaining that the Petition
“raises legal and factual issues similar to those in prior habeas petitions this Court has
decided” and that Respondents have appealed one such petition (see Avila v. Bondi, No.
25-3248 (8th Cir.)). (Doc. No. 4.) Respondents then incorporate by reference all of the
arguments raised in the Avila appeal and request denial of the petition. (Id.) In this way,
Respondents reiterate their argument that the detention of petitioners similarly situated to
Paula G. is mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 	As this Court has previously
concluded, however, Respondents’ interpretation lacks merit. Furthermore, Respondents
do not address the fact that they previously released Paula G. on parole. 	Because
Respondents continue to rely on an incorrect interpretation of sections 1225 and 1226, and
because the portion of the Petition challenging Paula G.’s re-detention after parole is not
directly opposed, the Court grants the Petition and orders immediate release.3
3 Because Paula G. filed her Petition while she was detained in Minnesota, even if she were
physically transferred to another state after the initiation of this proceeding, such a transfer
would not deprive this Court of jurisdiction over her habeas petition. Weeks v. Wyrick, 638
F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1981). 	This is particularly true because any transfer after the
Court’s January 17, 2026 order enjoining Respondents from transferring her out of the
District of Minnesota would violate the Court’s order. 	(See Doc. No. 3.) 	The record,
however, does not reflect any transfer, and Respondents do not challenge this Court’s
jurisdiction. 	If Respondents have in fact transferred Paula G. outside of the state of
Minnesota despite this Court’s order, and if Paula G. seeks additional relief concerning
release or return transportation, Paula G. is invited to file any appropriate requests.
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A. 	Constitutional Guarantee of Habeas Review
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted
to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to
every individual detained within the United States” (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2));
Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025). For most of the nation’s
history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it
does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” 	Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525
(quotation omitted). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “extends to . . . immigration-related detention.” Deng
Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citation omitted). 	The
petitioner bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal by a preponderance of
evidence. 	Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670, at *5
(D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H., 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
B. 	Interpretation of Section 1225
Courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ interpretation that section
1225(b)(2) requires the mandatory detention of all noncitizens living in the country who
are “inadmissible” because they entered the United States without inspection. 	See, e.g.,
Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 & n.22
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that this interpretation had been rejected in 350 cases
“decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across
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the United States” and collecting cases in an Appendix A); Jose Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No.
25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025)
(collecting cases); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL
2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). 	This Court also finds
Respondents’ interpretation unpersuasive.
When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word of a statute should have
meaning.” 	United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883)). 	Noncitizens who have been residing in the United States but who entered
without inspection have not, historically, been considered to still be “arriving” under
section 1225(b). 	This is because the statute itself states that, in order to apply, several
conditions must be met; specifically, an immigration officer must determine that the
noncitizen “is an applicant for admission . . . seeking admission . . . [and] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Determining the plain
meaning of the statute requires consideration of the tense of the verb “is” and the present
participle “seeking.” 	Here, section 1225(b)(2) applies to persons who presently are
applicants for admission and who presently are seeking admission at the time of their
detention. 	To be seeking admission means to be seeking entry, which “by its own force
implies a coming from outside.” United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401
(1929). 	In this case, Paula G. has been residing in the United States since 2022 and is,
therefore, not currently “seeking admission” into the United States.
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In addition, Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other
immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens
who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the
country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section
1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject
to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens
lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain
crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section
1225 were correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these
additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have
not 	been 	admitted 	would 	have 	already 	been 	ineligible 	for 	bond 	under 	section
1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also agrees with those courts that have found that Respondents’
interpretation of section 1225(b) is “at odds with both the relevant legislative history and
longstanding agency practice.” Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *7; see, e.g., Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025) (discussing the longstanding practice
of treating noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had entered without
inspection, as being subject to section 1226(a)).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Paula G.’s detention is governed by
section 1226(a), and she is not subject to section 1225(b)’s mandatory detention.
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C. 	Independent Grounds for Release
Paula G. also argues that re-detaining her under these circumstances, after having
already granted her parole, violates the law. (See Pet. ¶¶ 51–56, 60–63 (alleging violations
of the Administrative Procedure Act and due process clause of the Fifth Amendment).)
Respondents do not respond to this argument, so the Court considers this request
unopposed and grants it on that basis.4
As a separate and independent basis for ordering Paula G.’s immediate release, the
Court is persuaded by the analysis of the court in Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No.
2:25-CV-6065 (NJC), 2025 WL 3314420 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025) regarding the merits
of the Petition. Like the petitioner in Rodriguez-Acurio, Paula G. was previously released
on temporary parole; there is no evidence of any violations of conditions of release, and
she has appeared at ICE appointments as required over the years; and she remains in the
United States with a pending asylum and withholding-of-removal application after the
expiration of the temporary parole. 	See id. at *9–24. Accordingly, the Court orders that
Paula G. be released.5
4 Respondents have waived any argument contesting this alternative basis for the Petition.
See Rodriguez-Quiroz v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 809, 822 n.6 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting that the
government waived an argument by failing to raise it in an immigration appeal); see also
Estephanny P. v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-198 (ECT/JFD), Doc. No. 10, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 15,
2026) (citing Doe v. Mayorkas, No. 22-cv-752 (ECT/DTS), 2022 WL 4450272, at *2 (D.
Minn. Sep. 23, 2022) (concluding that failure to respond is an express waiver of those
arguments or claims)).
5 In light of its decision, the Court declines to address the remaining allegations and claims
in the Petition. The Court also does not address the request for an award of fees and costs
under the Equal Access to Justice Act; Paula G. may move separately for such relief within
30 days of final judgment in this action. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED, as follows:
1. 	Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody immediately
in Minnesota, and in any event no later than 4:00 p.m. CST on January 20,
2026.
2. 	On or before 11:00 a.m. CT on January 21, 2026, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update affirming that Petitioner was released from
custody in accordance with this Order.
3. 	To the extent Petitioner seeks relief beyond an order requiring release or an
order requiring a bond hearing, the Petition is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 20, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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