Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Marina E.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Daren K. Margolin, Director
for Executive Office for Immigration
Review; Executive Office for Immigration
Review; and David Easterwood, Director,
Fort Snelling Field Office Immigration and
Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-377 (ECT/SGE)
OPINION AND ORDER
________________________________________________________________________
Maria Miller, Martin Law, Bloomington, MN, for Petitioner Marina E.
Ana H. Voss,1 United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Pamela
Bondi, Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security, Todd M. Lyons, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Daren K. Margolin, Executive Office for Immigration Review, and
David Easterwood.
Petitioner Marina E. is an Ecuadoran citizen who has resided in the United States
since July 2007, when she entered the country without inspection. Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 14,
1 	J. Cruz Rodriguez filed a response on behalf of the United State’s Attorney’s Office.
See ECF No. 4. Mr. Rodriguez has not filed a notice of appearance in this action. See Dkt.
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31–32. 	Marina “did not have contact with immigration authorities upon entering the
United States.” 	Id. ¶ 33. 	“Respondents took [Marina] into custody on or about January
15, 2026.” Id. ¶ 34. Marina “is currently in custody at the Henry Whipple Federal Building
in Fort Snelling, MN.” 	Id. ¶ 14. 	According to the Petition, “Respondents maintain that
[Marina] is not eligible to seek a bond redetermination rehearing [sic] consistent with [8
U.S.C.] § 1226” and that she instead “is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2).”2 Id. ¶¶ 35–36.
Here, Marina challenges her detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. ¶ 7. She claims
she has been wrongly classified as a § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is mandatory)
rather than a § 1226 detainee (whose detention is discretionary and who is entitled to a
bond hearing). 	Id. ¶¶ 35–65; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961–62
(D. Minn. 	2025) 	(explaining 	legal 	framework). 	According 	to 	Marina, 	that
misclassification and denial of a bond hearing violate her right to due process under the
Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a),
and § 1226’s implementing regulations. Pet. ¶¶ 77–96. She seeks a declaration that she is
not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2); a declaration that her detention absent
a bond hearing is unlawful under the Fifth Amendment; issuance of an order that
Respondents provide a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); a determination that
Respondents’ administrative decision violates the Administrative Procedure Act; an order
2 	Neither party provided the Court with Marina’s Notice to Appear or the other
paperwork we’ve usually received in these cases. In this case, it doesn’t matter. In their
very brief response to Marina’s habeas petition, Respondents did not contest any of the
facts alleged in the Petition. See ECF No. 4.
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directing the Fort Snelling Immigration Court not to follow the Board of Immigration
Appeal’s decision in In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025); reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs; and an order enjoining her transfer out of the District of
Minnesota during the pendency of this case. Pet. ¶¶ 73–76; id. at 29–30.
In a one-paragraph response, Respondents state that Marina’s petition “raises legal
and factual issues similar to those in prior habeas petitions this Court has decided,” and
argues that the petition fails on the merits for the same reasons set forth in the appeal of
Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741 (JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025),
appeal docketed, No. 25-3248 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025). ECF No. 4. This raises an issue
of statutory interpretation3 that courts in this District have repeatedly considered and
rejected, and it will be rejected here as well.
Marina has shown she has been misclassified under § 1225(b)(2) rather than § 1226.
As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants “seeking admission,” and
the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c)); see
Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn. 2025); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi,
--- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6–7 (D. Minn.
Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025
3 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Marina’s petition by way of their response in Avila, consistent with previous
rulings on this issue, I find that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9),
and (g) do not apply to “the narrow question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” Fernando
F.P.D. v. Brott, No. 25-cv-4455 (ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17,
2025) (citing cases).
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WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741 (JRT/SGE),
2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-3248 (8th Cir.
Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312,
at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem, 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL
3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4264
(PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2025). As of this writing, only
one federal court of appeals has ruled on the question, and it reached the same conclusion.
See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, (7th Cir. 2025).
Marina has lived in the United States for more than eighteen years. 	Her detention falls
under § 1226 and not § 1225(b)(2).
For these reasons, Marina is subject to discretionary detention and entitled to a bond
hearing.4
4 	In her reply, Marina argues for the first time that she is entitled to release “[b]ecause
Respondents have failed to produce a warrant or any other exhibit that sets forth the proper
basis for [Marina’s] detention,” and as a result, “the statutory requirements authorizing
detention are not satisfied.” ECF No. 5 at 1. 	The Petition does not allege that Marina was
not provided with a warrant, see Pet., and thus her argument raised for the first time in
reply 	will 	not 	be 	considered. 	Considering 	the 	Petition’s 	resolution 	on 	statutory-
interpretation grounds, Marina’s remaining arguments will not be addressed.
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ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner Marina E.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	The Court DECLARES that Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and is instead subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to the
discretionary provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
2. 	Respondents are ENJOINED from denying Petitioner a bond hearing on the
basis that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) applies to Petitioner, and Respondents shall provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A).
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 19, 2026 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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